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This thesis focuses upon ‘Do-it-Yourself’ (DiY) music practices in Glasgow, a Scottish 
city with an established reputation for sustaining a prolific grassroots music scene. With 
special reference to three local music actors – a band, a music collective and a live 
music promoter – it explores ethnographically the pluralistic nature of music-making 
and its relation to ethics. Rather than perceiving activities under the DiY rubric as 
peripheral and haphazard, I argue that they  play an intrinsic role in ethical self-
formation and that they  are striking in their capacity to order the lives of urban 
individuals. Therefore, I attend to music practice as an ethical practice by  underscoring 
the interrelationship  between music and the city as a distinctive form of ethical urban 
life.
In drawing upon the emergent anthropology of ethics and echoing the work of authors 
such as Michel Foucault and Henri Lefebvre, I conceive of music-making as a process 
of intersubjective ethical cultivation, as a way of exercising freedom, and the means by 
which my informants perpetually sought to exert their right to inhabit the locality. In 
treating the local as a series of repetitive but ever evolving and intersecting pathways as 
opposed to a given and fixed geographical entity, I attempt to render the city an inherent 
ethical modality of social life and, conversely, to scrutinize music practice as a process 
that localizes subjects. 
Thus, my  ethnographic examination of the ways in which urban space impinges upon 
music practice and, in turn, is musically constructed and experienced, offers a lens into 
the ethical resonance of music as a processual nexus for the making of ethical selves 
and cities. My informants’ desire to inhabit the locality on their own terms was 
predicated upon the active appropriation and enactment of spaces and norms, rather than 
oscillating between passivity or subordination and resistance. This highlights the needs 
to problematize the pervasive notion of ‘agency’ that underpins social-scientific 
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accounts of human freedom and to question the rigidity  of the dichotomy between 
structure and agency. 
An emphasis on ethical judgement and the pedagogical role of music activity in 
conferring a DiY êthos and in making oneself a certain kind of person also requires the 
consideration of the embodied dispositions pertinent to and cultivated through 
variegated music practices, and how the acquisition of relevant musical skills 
simultaneously  engenders particular ethical potentialities. This construes ethics as 
Aristotelian poiêsis and an ineluctably skilled practice and further alludes to the 
intimate relationship between music and the body. 
In resorting to the body’s capacity to affect and be affected by music and other bodies, 
my analysis aims to account for the conditioning of sensuous articulations and corporeal 
registers by sonic vocabularies, and the process of interpenetration between the musical 
and the visceral that elicits specific ethical propensities. This interface between sound 
and the affective body, I argue, provides a uniquely ‘musical’ way of thinking about 
ethics as a relational phenomenon, and also helps to restore a notion of politics on the 
basis of intersubjective ethical transformation rather than conventional political efficacy 
in the public realm.
vi
Contents




Ethnographic Context and Conceptual Background
.........................................................................................Chapter 1: Glasgow 37
.................................................................................................1.1 City of Extremes 37
.........................................................................................1.2 Historical Background 40
........................................................1.2.1 Origins, Settlement and Expansion 40
.............................................................................1.2.2 Economy and Politics 42
.......................................................1.3 Industrial Decline and Urban Regeneration 45
...................................................................................1.3.1 Cancer of Empire 45
.................................1.3.2 Urban Regeneration and Economic Reorientation 46
...............................................................1.3.3 European City of Culture 1990 49
.............................................................................................1.4 Cultural Production 53
.......................................................................................1.5 Towards a Local Êthos 64
...........................................................Chapter 2: Music, Ethics and the City 67
...............................................................2.1 Music in Culture and Music as Culture 67
......................................................................................2.2 Ethnographies of Music 73
...................................................2.3 Music-Making in Liverpool and Milton Keynes 85
...............................................................................2.4 From Subcultures to Milieux 92
vii
..................................................................................2.5 Music Practice as Ethics 104
......................................................................2.6 Making Music, Selves and Cities 115
Part II
Becoming Ethical Subjects
..................................................................Chapter 3: Winning Sperm Party 121
...........................................................3.1 Urban Rhythms and Musical Pathways 121
........................3.2 Winning Sperm Party in Action: 10+ Electric Guitar Orchestra 128
..............................................................................3.3 The Value of Making Music 132
...........................................................3.4 The Importance of Names and Naming 135
........................................................................................3.5 The Virtue of Sharing 141
......................................................................3.6 Music-Making as Urban Practice 150
.................................................................................3.7 The Raw and the Cooked 160
.........................................................................................Chapter 4: Divorce 167
..............................................4.1 Affect and the Sensuous Embodiment of Ethics 167
...............................................................................................4.2 Initiating Divorce 174
............................................4.3 Music Practices and the Functioning of the Band 180
.........................................................................................4.3.1 Performance 180
...............................................................4.3.2 Rehearsals and Composition 182
.........................................................4.3.3 Recording and Releasing Songs 184
..............................................................................4.4 ‘Satanic Toga’ House Party 187
...............................................................................4.5 Extreme to a Certain Point 192
.............................................................................4.6 The Vocalist’s Three Bodies 199
.....................................................................................4.7 The Ethics of Etiquette 208
............................................................................................4.8 Noise Interference 214
viii
....................................................................................Chapter 5: Cry Parrot 219
...................................................................................5.1 I Just Want to Be Ethical 219
........................................................................................5.2 From Rags to Riches 224
.....................................................................................5.3 Junior Nuts and Seeds 229
.................................................................................5.4 From DiY to Independent 237
..............................................................................................5.5 A Scene of Crisis 245
...........................................................................5.6 The Stigma and the Dilemma 248
.............................................................................................5.7 A Flurry of Activity 255
..................................................................................5.8 A Sense of Togetherness 257
........................................................................................................5.9 Generosity 260
......................................................................................5.10 The Ethics of Identity 263
Part III
Towards a DiY Êthos
..............................................................................Chapter 6: Do-it-Yourself 269
........................................................................................6.1 The Ethical Bricoleur 269
............................................................................6.2 To ‘DiY’ for: Doing for What? 276
...............................................................................6.3 The Floating Nature of DiY 284
.................................................................................................6.4 Locating Ethics 287
..............................................................................................6.5 DiY as Weaving? 293
......................................................................................6.6 The Ethics of Freedom 297






............................................................Figure 2.1: ‘Family tree’ of Scottish musicians 103
.....................................................Figure 3.1: Outer sleeve of the Ultimate Thrush 7’’ 146
.....................................................................Figure 3.2: Winning Sperm Party posters 147
...........Figure 4.1: Divorce/Ultimate Thrush split cassette tape cloth cover and insert 185
........................................................Figure 4.2: Ruth at the ‘Satanic toga’ house party 190
....................................................Figure 4.3: Alistair at the ‘Satanic toga’ house party 191
..............................................................................Figure 4.4: Divorce 10’’ vinyl label 193
..................................Figure 4.5: Anna’s pedals on stage at Sneaky Pete’s, Edinburgh 197
.......................................................................................Figure 5.1: Cry Parrot posters 241




This thesis would not have been completed without the generous support, guidance and 
advice I have received from my supervisors, Dr Richard Baxstrom and Dr Nicholas 
Prior. I consider myself fortunate to have worked under their aegis and I wholeheartedly 
thank them for their wisdom, enthusiasm and friendship. I would also like to thank my 
two examiners, Dr James Laidlaw and Professor Alexander Robertson, for taking the 
time to read this thesis and for providing me with thorough and invaluable comments. 
My warmest regards go to Dr Jeanne Cannizzo, who supervised the initial stages of this 
thesis, as well as the M.Sc. dissertation that laid the foundations of my Ph.D. research.
I have greatly benefited from the welcoming atmosphere and intellectually stimulating 
environment of the Department of Social Anthropology of the University  of Edinburgh. 
Members of academic staff as well as friends and colleagues have helped me in diverse 
and often indirect ways during the long process of preparing, researching and writing 
this thesis. I thank them all for their intellectual nourishment, penetrating feedback, 
genuine kindness and ongoing support. 
I am particularly  indebted to Professor Janet Carsten, Dr Magnus Course, and Professor 
Alexander Robertson for facilitating the Department’s writing-up seminar during my 
post-fieldwork period, and to Dr Jacob Copeman, Dr Joost Fontein, Dr Ian Harper, Dr 
Tobias Kelly, Dr Rebecca Marsland, Professor Jonathan Spencer and Dr Neil Thin for 
trusting me with various roles in the Department over the years. I have only  the deepest 
respect and gratitude for Dr Dimitri Tsintjilonis for initiating my conversion to 
Anthropology and for his inspirational teaching, but mainly for making my transition 
from Archaeology to Anthropology  feel like as a natural step  forward. His conviction 
that Anthropology is about the questions one confronts rather than the answers one 
receives is a lesson that I have taken to heart.
xiii
During the period of my postgraduate studies I have had the opportunity to interact and 
collaborate with numerous colleagues and friends. A huge thanks to all my fellow 
travelers on the Ph.D. trail, and specifically  to Lucy Lowe and Siobhan Magee, whose 
friendship  and affection surrounded me from the beginning and have left me astonished 
ever since. I also thank them for reading the final draft of the thesis in order to eliminate 
any ‘Greeklish’ elements that might have sneaked into the document. A special thank 
you goes to my  colleague and friend Tristan Partridge for sharing his invaluable and 
insightful understanding of the nexus between anthropology, DiY, music and Glasgow, 
and also to my ‘brothers’ Hussain Al-Hariri and Anastasios Panagiotopoulos. Anastasios 
has overseen the process from the start  and his mentoring and friendship  have been 
priceless. Last but not least, I would like to warmly thank my colleagues in the 
Unfamiliar journal for their professionalism and for believing that anything is possible, 
as well as two of the School secretaries, Sue Renton and May Rutherford, for their 
crucial administrative support and welcoming attitude, which was translated into our 
excellent collaboration throughout.
My understanding of popular music as a field of academic study has been considerably 
strengthened through participation in the weekly seminar at the Department of Music of 
the University of Edinburgh under the auspices of Professor Simon Frith, whose work 
has been an unfailing source of inspiration. My membership in the International 
Association for the Study of Popular Music (IASPM) and the Scottish Pop  Academic 
Network (SPAN) has also been extremely  helpful and I am grateful to Professor Martin 
Cloonan and Professor George McKay  for giving me opportunities to present and 
discuss parts of my work.
Bob Anderson provided me with the NME feature that started everything and 
Lysimachos Zografos put me in touch with Divorce. Both of them have been 
instrumental for the launching of my research. Of course, I could not have conducted 
my fieldwork and produce this thesis without the protagonists it includes and the other 
Glaswegians who granted me access to their lives and put up  with my constant presence 
xiv
and endless questioning. They  are too many to mention all of them here but I am 
particularly indebted to Rob Alexander, Andy Browntown, Ricky Egan, Fielding Hope, 
RM Hubbert, Steev Livingstone, Vickie McDonald, Laurie Pitt, Lachlann Rattray, 
Hilary  Van Scoy, VSO, Chris ‘Waldo’ Wallace, Chris White, Duncan Young and Sinead 
Young, as well as all others who graciously agreed to be interviewed for the purposes of 
this research. Thank you all for your warm hospitality and kindness, and for the music. I 
have learned a great deal from you. 
My friends Georgia Axiotou, Stella Bolaki, Giorgos Bouras, Sotiria Grek, Manolis 
Kalogiannakis, Panos Kompatsiaris, Michalis Kontogiannis, Nikos Kourampas, Tony 
McKibbin, Vangelis Makrigiannakis, Robin Campbell Oliver, Ola Rek, Angela Maria 
Ojeda Ruiz, Penny  Travlou, Vasilis Vasaitis and Apostolis Vasilopoulos have been 
immensely  helpful and supportive and I cherish their companionship, creativity, 
intellectual fervour, and musical inclinations. Kenny Smith treated me as his own son 
for five consecutive years and ensured that  our garden always looked neat. Finally, I 
have the utmost affection and appreciation for Nikos Farmakis, Giannoula Korma, 
Christos Paraskevas, Mitsos Syrinakis and Costas Varnavas for their natural charisma in 
making me feel ‘at home’. I cannot thank you enough. Elpida Pavlidou has given me a 
compass, both literally and figuratively, which I hold most dear. 
I cannot capture in words the infinite love, care and support I have received from my 
companion in life and beloved partner, Maria Stathopoulou. The patience and 
perseverance she exhibited during the writing phase have been impressive. Her presence 
every day reminds me what is important in life. 
Without  the unconditional love of my  family and specifically my parents, Velissarios 
Chrysagis and Asimina Spilioti, this thesis could never have happened. I feel a profound 
sense of gratitude for everything they have done for me over the years. I could not have 
asked for more and my debt to them will never be repaid.
xv
xvi
Or shall we argue that music conduces to excellence, on the ground that it can form 
our minds and habituate us to true pleasures as our bodies are made by gymnastic 
to be of a certain character? 
[ἢ µᾶλλον οἰητέον πρὸς ἀρετήν τι τείνειν τὴν µουσικήν, ὡς δυναµένην, καθάπερ ἡ 
γυµναστικὴ τὸ σῶµα ποιόν τι παρασκευάζει, καὶ τὴν µουσικὴν τὸ ἦθος ποιόν τι 
ποιεῖν, ἐθίζουσαν δύνασθαι χαίρειν ὀρθῶς]
Aristotle, Politics (1984: 169)
Nothing essential happens in the absence of noise.




I cannot recall the first time I visited Glasgow. It  must have been sometime in late 2005 
when I arrived in Scotland to take up a postgraduate degree in anthropology. What I do 
remember very clearly  is that I knew Glasgow beforehand: I knew it from its music. The 
advent of what has been glossed as ‘post-rock’, a largely  instrumental guitar-based 
music genre, had accompanied my undergraduate years and several bands at the 
forefront of the genre were Glasgow-based. I remember sitting back and listening to the 
music of these bands, with lyrics that were scarce but back then I could not fully grasp 
their meaning anyway and, in a somewhat essentialist and romanticizing spirit, thinking 
that such slow-paced, melancholic but simultaneously  angry music – sometimes called 
the ‘quiet/loud dynamic’ – could only come from a ‘rainy’, ‘gloomy’ place, somewhere 
‘up North’. I remember wondering, why Glasgow? Why, of all the places ‘up  North’, 
was it Glasgow’s music that had struck a chord with me? I still wonder why today.
This thesis, therefore, is partially the outcome of a personal musical journey and about 
my musical relationship with the city. Though I was unaware at the time that just  two 
years later I would leave Greece for Scotland and archaeology for anthropology, I can 
now see that my memories and choices followed a particular logic (at least of sorts). 
Over the past eight years my musical ‘distance-learning’ has been intensified by 
constant concert (‘gig’) attendance in Glasgow. And then, of course, there is my 
fieldwork. 
As my gig attendance and music-listening, which included several non-local bands and 
musicians, diversified considerably and as my familiarity  with Glasgow deepened, more 
questions emerged. Why would touring bands visit Glasgow and not nearby? Why, out 
of the whole of the UK, would certain bands play in, say, London and Glasgow only? 
How does a provincial (by which I mean not a capital) British city  sustain such a 
wealth of musical activity? Why do affluent local bands continue to reside in Glasgow 
rather than relocate to the musical ‘mecca’ of London? Although the anthropology 
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department at  Edinburgh graciously approved my research proposal in 2008, I was fully 
aware that music, especially British music, was not  a central ethnographic concern 
within the discipline. Since the general lack of anthropological interest in the subject 
made it  unlikely  that  anyone would answer these questions for me, I have decided to do 
this for myself.
I might be accused of a certain egocentrism. However, I did not embark on this long and 
laborious process out of some personal whim. Rather, my main motivation was to 
answer anthropologically significant questions and attempt to address the identified gap 
in the ethnographic literature. To the best of my knowledge, there is no ethnographic 
study of popular music that focuses exclusively on Glasgow or Scotland more widely. 
When I arrived in Glasgow determined to enlist one or two local bands in my project, 
the first problem I stumbled upon was not how to find bands. I had already established 
various connections with musicians and other relevant actors before formally entering 
the field, but it soon became obvious that I had to make a swift decision regarding the 
musical form I wanted study, which potential research participants would represent. Due 
to the pluralism and complexity of music practices in the city this was not an easy task. 
Nevertheless, a random event led to the shift of my focus from music genres to modes 
of conduct, and from categories and classifications to practices and processes. A PhD 
student at Glasgow University provided me with a copy of a feature that had recently 
appeared in the national music magazine New Musical Express (NME). The one-page 
feature contained information about Glasgow’s ‘nae wave’ scene and included excerpts 
from an interview with a band called Divorce. Along with other bands such as Ultimate 
Thrush, Big Ned and Golden Grrrls, Divorce ‘were flying the nae wave flag north of the 
border for fans of face-melting onslaughts of savage noisescapes [sic]’ (Dosanjh 2009: 
21). The NME journalist had attempted to draw a link between the musical traits and 
aesthetic conventions of nae wave with those of late 1970s New York’s no wave, which 
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had spurred an array  of influential bands, such as Suicide and the recently split-up Sonic 
Youth.1
Despite the feature’s attempt to label and pigeonhole the nae wave ‘sound’, the avant-
garde sensibilities of no wave, which as a music/art crossover was informed less by a 
specific sound and more by an ‘approach’, were indeed present in ‘nae wave’. ‘I have 
no idea what nae wave is’, says Ruth, the vocalist from Divorce, ‘but it could be a 
genre’, she adds. Lucy, the guitarist, who, along with Anna, the second guitarist, 
Alistair, the drummer, and Sophie, the bassist, complete the band’s line-up, states that: 
‘I think we all want to play loud and erratically. Have fun and make ears bleed’ (cited in 
Dosanjh 2009: 21). NME described nae wave as a ‘community’ comprising ‘not so 
much like-sounding but like-minded individuals who’ve stuck two proverbials up at  the 
twee niceness of their musical surroundings’ (ibid.).2  As Alistair put  it: ‘There are so 
many bands here that just seem to want to play nice music’ and ‘we wanna do 
something completely  different’; but ‘I think the aesthetic behind it is just more sorta 
people with a similar attitude than a signature sound’ and, therefore, ‘a band from 
London can be nae wave even though they’re not fannies like people from Scotland’, 
concludes Scotland-born and bred Alistair with self-deprecating humour (cited in ibid.).
In light of this, additional questions began to emerge. What was ‘nae wave’? Was it 
about music, ‘fun’, or an ‘attitude’? What did ‘like-minded’ mean in this context? Did it 
signal a particular ‘ideology’, an ‘aesthetic’ as Alistair put it, or something else? And 
why did Ruth have ‘no idea’ what nae wave was? Moreover, why did NME and the 
band themselves described the Divorce sound by  conjuring up images of bodily 
disintegration rather than emotion or cognition? How could I make sense of the 
‘aggressive’ but largely  ironic nature of their statements? Finally, how had a shared 
3
1 For an overview of no wave see Masters (2007), Moore & Coley (2008) and Reynolds (2005: 50-72). In 
reality, nae wave was a linguistic joke based on a local idiom. In The Complete Patter Munro explains 
that ‘-nae or -ny’ literally means ‘not’  and it ‘is a negative suffix common enough in Scots, as in cannae, 
willny, etc. It is used on its own by local children to contradict the last thing said to them’ (2006: 113).
2 ‘Twee’ refers to indie-pop, a sentimental and melodic guitar based music genre (Chapter 1).
‘attitude’ engendered a musical ‘community’, and how and why did they  set themselves 
apart musically, but also dispositionally, from their ‘surroundings’? 
A few days later I was discussing my fieldwork predicament with one of my Edinburgh 
friends, namely how to locate appropriate bands and other relevant musicians to take 
part in my research. It turned out that he was acquainted with the Divorce drummer 
through their mutual involvement in the Edinburgh club scene. Soon, I would have my 
first meeting with Alistair, who was living in Edinburgh (before relocating to Glasgow 
halfway  through my fieldwork). Alistair subsequently offered to introduce me to other 
‘like-minded’ actors, such as the promoter Cry Parrot and the music collective Winning 
Sperm Party. The latter of whom had also been mentioned in the NME feature as 
‘releasing all that is glorious and new in Scotland’ (Dosanjh 2009: 21). All three actors 
feature extensively in what follows and form the ethnographic focus of this thesis.
❊❊❊❊❊❊
During my fieldwork I encountered an impressive array of music practices within a 
close-knit network of individuals that was infused with creativity, aspiration and 
determination. Within a period of eighteen months I witnessed various bands forming, 
evolving and breaking up. I learned that multiple band membership and overlapping 
personnel were the norm. Several of my informants were employed in the local music 
and art industries in various posts and for variable intervals and the crossover between 
music and art pervaded a good deal of the practices I observed. Music events took place 
in a variety  of appropriated urban spaces. In tracing my informants’ musical trajectories 
I attended gigs in flats, pub basements, art galleries and recording studios, among 
others, both inside and outside of Glasgow. A host of individuals participated in the 
realization of these events and sustained music-making tout court, contributing as 
performers, audiences or intermediaries, or as an amalgamation of all three. As such, 
music emerged as an intrinsically  social practice and process (Cohen 1991; Finnegan 
1989).
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Particularly striking about this network of individuals was the actuality that their 
practices were present, but ‘hidden’ (Finnegan 1989). After three years of constant gig 
attendance and a long-standing personal interest in the city’s musical output, I was 
oblivious to the prolific activities of my would-be informants and the extended and 
interwoven networks underpinning them. Much of this musical activity was public, 
even gigs in private flats. Nevertheless, one had either to seek out these events that did 
not feature prominently in local press or online music websites, or to take part in the 
word-of-mouth and digital social media publicity that served to attract crowds. 
That these practices were a ‘public secret’ (Taussig 1999) was exemplified by the fact 
that my informants themselves were unaware of many of the other activities, happenings 
and events occurring in parallel with theirs, which mutually reinforced and 
characterized the pluralism of urban music. This was unsurprising for a city that had an 
established reputation for grassroots cultural production that formed the bedrock of its 
music and art scenes (Lowndes 2010), and which had a long local history  of ‘making 
do’ (de Certeau 1984) and a culture of survival (Damer 1990). This cultural activity was 
fraught with competition and pride, but also with mutual support, humour, love, care 
and encouragement. 
The urban fabric of Glasgow provided the background as well as the generative context 
of these events. Thus, the city affected in explicit, practical ways this flurry of activity 
by either facilitating or hindering specific practices due to the lack of appropriate spaces 
for exhibitions and performances. More generally, the unequal distribution of local 
resources had historically engendered widespread and violent forms of social inequality. 
This had fostered a reality of exclusion for large segments of the population, but had 
equally spurred a wealth of self-sustained activities from individuals whose ambitions 
sought to transcend financial and social constraints. A sense of this common urban 
history also shaped music practice in tacit and implicit ways, giving rise to a local êthos. 
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In turn, this endowed and constituted the parameters of music-making as a distinctively 
urban practice. The city  had become part  and parcel of particular forms of music 
practice, not so much as a geographic entity or as the stuff of local fantasy and 
imagination, but as an integral dimension of both everyday musical conduct and social 
life in general. Urban symbolisms and local mythology  for past successes of bands were 
enacted in everyday practice rather than musical products per se. This calls for a 
reconsideration of ‘the local’ as a generative modality of social life and not as its 
contextual ground, and begs the question of how local practices produce local subjects 
(Appadurai 1995). In its simpler form, therefore, the central argument of this thesis 
dwells in the reciprocal process of people making music and music making people.
In attending to musical processes as processes of localization, I aim to address the 
intrinsic role of the city  in music practice, but also to account for the role of music in 
affording particular forms of identification and belonging within an increasingly 
alienating urban environment. For many  of my informants who had arrived in Glasgow 
from elsewhere in Scotland, England, as well as abroad, music represented a meaningful 
path and the means to transform, create and ultimately  integrate within the locality. 
According to Bennett the term ‘local’ is applied in two ways in the study of popular 
music (2000: 52). Sometimes the term ‘locality’ is used to denote a musically 
homogeneous national context, while others employ the term in order to analyze more 
limited areas of music practice, such as urban and rural settings. For Bennett, both 
applications are problematic, because they presuppose a ‘fixed’ spatial and cultural 
territory, and such territories do not exist. Thus, any locality is a contested place.
In conceptualizing the variegated forms of music activity  as one set  out of a series of 
plural urban routes or ‘pathways’ (Finnegan 1989), I seek to illuminate the salience of 
music practice, its repetitiveness and its distinctive importance in everyday  life. The 
pluralistic nature of urban pathways also reflects the heterogeneity of ‘the local’ and of 
the local êthos, which had variably  influenced equally  real perspectives and narratives 
about the city. The diverse and sometimes competing nature of musical pathways had 
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also sparked the emergence of conflicting views and practices, that is, of different 
‘minds’ and ‘attitudes’. This thesis deals with one set of attitudes and ideas of ‘like-
minded’ individuals. Rather than focusing upon a music genre or a specific ‘sound’ it 
grapples with the modes of conduct and practical judgements, as well as the discursive 
attitudes and explicit practices relevant to the enactment of music, but also about its 
enactment. Therefore, I focus upon a network of individuals that operated under the 
rubric of what I will identify not as ‘nae wave’, but as ‘Do-it-Yourself’ (DiY) – 
following my informants’ rejection of the former term and loose identification with the 
latter.
Let me pause here to stress that this thesis is not about ‘punk’. In fact, as I have stated, 
my ethnographic account does not refer to any particular music genre. The musical 
diversity within the DiY cohort positively precludes such a focus. The use of ‘Do-it-
Yourself’ in popular discourse and in a vast array  of unrelated contexts to convey 
different practices has not only  obscured the meaning of the term, but has further 
distanced it from its privileged association with punk or music as such. My informants’ 
practices shared similarities with the punk êthos and they were aware of its legacy. 
Without  the emergence of punk in the late 1970s, and thus of a DiY êthos in music, with 
the message that ‘anyone could do it’, the face of music would be totally different today. 
However, neither the musico-aesthetic and stylistic debates about punk, nor the 
stereotypical clichés and moral panics, nor the contested claims about continuity and 
‘authenticity’ find a direct parallel to the music, views and practices of my informants.3
The crucial similarity between DiY as it is employed here and punk is nicely identified 
by the late D. Boon from the band The Minutemen, who famously stated that ‘punk is 
whatever we made it to be’.4  This explains why Ruth – and in fact all my informants – 
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3 For a thorough overview of the academic and popular literature on punk, see Gordon (2005: 13-45).
4 There is no available reference or official source for this quote. D. Boon co-authored a song with the 
same title for The Way Things Work, the debut album by American improvisation band Unknown 
Instructors. The Minutemen were a punk rock band from San Pedro, California, active between 
1980-1985 (see Azerrad 2001: 61-94).
was unsure of the definition of nae wave (or DiY). The ill-defined nature of DiY was 
not predicated upon a disinterest in its meaning but upon the understanding that it 
consisted of fluid and ever evolving practices. These practices did not hark back to a 
DiY archetypical ideal but were pragmatic responses to shifting financial, social and 
practical circumstances. As a result, DiY was firmly rooted in practical necessity but 
also in the desire to make music in an ethical manner. A DiY êthos or ‘ethic’ was seen 
as something to be formed and renewed indefinitely rather than a package of rules to be 
applied. Hence ‘a’ (and not ‘the’) DiY êthos, which is how I refer to it throughout. In 
order to highlight the ethical qualities of DiY practice, I conceive of êthos as ‘a way of 
being and of behavior’ (Foucault 1997: 286). 
This êthos-in-flux was in conflict with what was considered ‘unethical’ practice on the 
part of other local music actors, who employed a ‘business-like’ approach by privileging 
financial gains without paying attention to the harmful effects of their conduct. This 
unethical conduct was comprised of live music promoters not paying bands that 
performed at their events, requesting musicians to sell tickets on their behalf in order to 
become eligible for payment,5  and a lack of interest  in the music or concern for the 
well-being of bands in the line-up. In short, the cultivation of a DiY êthos was opposed 
to the exploitation of musicians and was geared towards a positive attitude and a self-
sufficient approach. In doing so, my informants sought to realize an ethical mode of 
music-making and, by extension, to bring about an ethical self. Thus, DiY practitioners 
set themselves apart from other local actors neither musically  nor aesthetically, but 
through the cultivation of different ethical dispositions. 
My ethnographic account, therefore, clearly diverges from debates about music, 
aesthetic boundaries, or punk, and instead delves into ethical debates and specifically 
how these informed the everyday  reflection and practice of individuals who strived to 
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5  Also known as ‘pay-to-play’. Young and unknown bands were sometimes being exploited by certain 
promoters.  Bands would be asked to sell an allocated number of tickets, otherwise they would not receive 
payment for their performance (see Chapter 6). The pay-to-play model is not limited to this practice and 
may also involve the band directly paying a fee to the promoter (see Webster 2011: 83-85).
become ethical subjects. In the remainder of the thesis, following the writings of Michel 
Foucault on ethics and what he termed ‘techniques’ or ‘technologies of the 
self’ [techniques/technologies de soi] (1982, 1985, 1986, 1997, 2005), I shall argue that 
practices such as playing an instrument, reflecting on the ways in which a music event 
should be set-up and promoted, preparing oneself for performance, producing posters, 
paying bands and taking care of one’s vocal chords, were all powerful ethical 
techniques. These were sought in order to equip  my informants with particular 
sensibilities and capacities consistent with a DiY êthos, and to confer the ethical selves 
that these individuals wished to realize. I shall further argue, following Foucault, that 
such conscious ethical practices can only  be perceived as practices of freedom. My 
general aim then is to ethnographically  study music in terms of the ethical and, 
conversely, ethics in terms of the musical by treating music practice as an ethical 
practice.
Saying that music represents a site that is particularly  conducive to the study of ethics 
and freedom may raise some eyebrows. Surely ‘amateur’ music is simply ‘leisure’? And 
clearly  ethics and freedom have nothing to do with ‘fun’ but belong instead to the realm 
of the ‘serious’, a place for religion, science, politics and society? For example, as 
James Laidlaw contends in an influential article that  has largely set the tone for the 
resurgence of an anthropological interest  in the subject of ethics, it is ‘in formalized 
religious techniques of the self’ that: 
[T]he ambition of shaping the self is explicit, and is informed by sophisticated 
theoretical reflection, as it is not, perhaps, when people join a voluntary association 
of some kind, or change the way they dress, or take to buying recycled washing 
powder. They are doubtless much more powerful techniques of the self than these 
more do-it-yourself activities (Laidlaw 2002: 326-327, emphasis added). 
However, in a turn of phrase crucial for my argument, Laidlaw explains: ‘But these, too, 
may be instances of the exercise of ethical freedom’ (2002: 327, emphasis added). 
Laidlaw does not use the term ‘Do-it-Yourself’ in relation to music, but his conviction 
that practices of self-deliberation and formation in everyday, mundane contexts reflect 
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instances of ethical freedom – the freedom to become the person one wishes to be – is 
the starting point for my argument. It is this idea which, along with a focus on ethics as 
Aristotelian practice and as intrinsically ordinary (Lambek 2000, 2010a, 2010b, 2010c), 
squarely places my ethnography within the anthropological study of ethics. 
This is where, I believe, the distinctive contribution of this thesis lies, in the sense that 
there is no ethnographic account that explicitly considers the relationship between 
popular music and ethics. Furthermore, this contribution is distinctively ‘musical’ 
because it seeks to examine not only  how music ‘fits’ within an anthropology  of ethics 
but how, if at all, we can come up with ‘musical’ ways to think about ethics. It should be 
clear that, by ‘anthropology of ethics’, I do not wish to invoke professional standards of 
ethical conduct, that is, the ‘ethics of anthropology’.6 Nor do I conceive of ethics within 
a legalistic jargon of bio-ethics or human rights. Rather, I approach the ethical as a site 
of self-formation and as an everyday  process where ordinary  people strive in different 
ways to carve out an ethical life.
I should confess that it had never occurred to me when embarking on fieldwork that  I 
would end up exploring the nexus between music and ethics. Yet I suspect I am not 
alone in taking for granted that music is a form of human activity that  brings plenitude 
and which has self-evident benefits for musicians and listeners alike to such an extent 
that they normally go without saying. In other words, music is so attached to our 
experience of everyday  life and so close to our definition of ‘the good’ that we tend to 
forget or disregard its intrinsically ethical dimension and that, when playing or listening 
to music for its own sake, the goods are internal to these practices (MacIntyre 1981). 
The classical notion of music per se as having the capacity  to ‘refine morals’ – a notion 
that goes back to Plato and Aristotle – needs qualification (e.g. Riethmüller 2008). As I 
shall demonstrate, music practices can facilitate ethical self-fashioning in various ways, 
but the idea that music is inherently ‘ethical’ should be approached with caution.
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6 See, for example, Caplan (2003), Carrithers (2005),  Evens (2008), Fluehr-Lobban (1991), Meskell & 
Pels (2005) and Strathern (2000).
But my fieldwork taught me more than this. It showed me, for example, how music 
practices can be ‘unethical’. Although I began my research without ethics in my 
ethnographic purview, the frequent talk of ethics that I encountered in the field brought 
these matters into dizzying focus. I had not initially sought to study  ‘local morality’, nor 
is what follows an ‘after the fact analysis’ (Zigon 2008: 8). Rather, ethics emerged as a 
central theme during my fieldwork. For the most part, the ways in which the terms 
‘ethics’ and ‘morality’ entered conversations were not informed by consistent and 
agreed-upon definitions and meanings – no more or less consistently than we use the 
terms in everyday discourse. 
Moreover, these words did not always appear in all conversations about ethical or 
unethical practices, despite these conversations being about these things. Hence, I have 
not confined my ethnographic description within instances, acts and utterances that  my 
informants explicitly  framed in terms of ‘ethics’ or ‘morality’ (see Rogers 2009: 24-25). 
This would dramatically  diminish the potential to elucidate the ethical polyvalence and 
ambivalence of music practice. It would further inhibit me from tracing the complex 
interrelationships and intersubjective encounters, that is, the pedagogical aspects that 
pervaded ethical discourse and practice in the efforts of individuals to occupy, negotiate 
and expand specific ethical subject positions (Faubion 2011).
My ethnographic account revolves around both the ethical reasoning and the cultivation 
of dispositions conducive to a DiY êthos. Furthermore, because of the multi-sensory 
ways in which individuals relate to music, music practices should first and foremost be 
conceived of as bodily practices: touching and playing an instrument, looking at the 
performers on stage, smelling freshly pressed vinyl, listening to sounds, dancing to the 
rhythm or feeling the vibrations on one’s body are all instances in which haptic, 
olfactory, visual, aural and kinesthetic elements merge in what is a profoundly visceral 
experience. This sensory interplay (Classen 1993, 1997) found its expression in 
Divorce’s music, and this is perhaps the reason why its members described the band’s 
music exclusively in bodily terms. 
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However, this sensory kaleidoscope is the hallmark of all musical experience as is the 
fact that making music is a ‘technical’ operation – exactly  as technologies of the self are 
(Faubion 2001a: 93). In dissolving – via Aristotle – the Socratic distinction between the 
‘technical’ and the ‘ethical’, Foucault’s technologies of self-formation highlight the 
manner in which repetitive bodily practices are intrinsic to ethical projects. 
Nevertheless, for Foucault, bodily technologies are not the only type of exercises 
pertinent to ethical cultivation and, although he focuses mainly upon techniques from 
the classical period, he argues that  different forms of technologies of the self can be 
found in all societies (1997: 87, 277).
Undoubtedly, the Aristotelian meta-virtue of ‘practical wisdom’ or phronêsis should be 
distinguished from the derivatives of techne (Lambek 2000), but the practical resonance 
of virtues at least  allows us to consider music and ethics as forms of skilled practice 
(Ingold 2000; Widlok 2004). Both require the acquisition of the skills necessary for the 
project at hand, albeit ones that do not pre-exist as a package of rules but emerge 
through the interaction between practitioners, (ethical) materials and the environment in 
which they are situated. Consequently, insofar as music becomes a skilled ethical 
operation, it invites an intersubjective approach to ethics rather than a focus on the 
‘subject’, and much less the ‘individual’ (Faubion 2011). 
In drawing an analogy between Ingold’s anthropology of skill and DiY music-making, I 
suggest that the nature of DiY as an ethical practice is better perceived as a form of 
‘weaving’. Specifically, the lack of a DiY ‘design’ means that the form of the practice 
(and by extension the ethical self) gradually emerges in a process that is generative and 
not merely revelatory, and it comes into being within a complex field of forces in an 
environment. For Ingold, weaving ‘continues for as long as life goes on – punctuated 
but not terminated by the appearance of the pieces that it successively brings into 
being’ (2000: 348).
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The urban and ethical environment I encountered in Glasgow did not set my  informants 
apart from other actors engaging in ‘unethical’ music practices, in a way that would 
warrant me to draw a sharp distinction. Rather, the latter were a sine qua non of DiY 
practice, in the sense that they were essential elements of the complex web of relations 
that had given rise to DiY (if anything, as ethical examples to be avoided). Besides, my 
informants did not speak about the ‘evils’ of commerce, nor did they, for the most part, 
perceive creativity and commerce as mutually exclusive (Cohen 1991). Instead, while a 
DiY êthos necessitated the development of different ethical sensibilities and approaches, 
its associated practices would seek to emulate, appropriate and put to use some of the 
effective strategies of non-DiY actors. In other words, a DiY êthos was not predicated 
upon what is usually  called ‘resistance’, and the ensuing material and urban ‘tactics’ (de 
Certeau 1984) should not be seen as ‘the weapons of the weak’ (Scott 1985). Rather, 
they  were my informants’ means to inhabit those established practices and norms in the 
process of becoming ethical subjects (Mahmood 2005). Thus, Glasgow emerged as a 
site where institutionalized ‘strategies’ and ever evolving ‘tactics’ coexisted and 
interpenetrated (de Certeau 1984).
This demands caution with regards to the established dualism between ‘agency’ and 
‘structure’, and calls for a reexamination of agency as distributed rather than subjective 
(Laidlaw 2010b), or as the outcome of amoral ‘causality’ (Latour 2005, cf. 2010). It 
further demonstrates how the politics of ‘DiY culture’ (McKay 1996, 1998), caught up 
in a language of ‘resistance’, have disregarded both the fact that DiY is not dependent 
upon a pre-existent cultural consensus and that ‘politics’, in the conventional sense of 
the term, need not be the hallmark of DiY. By contrast, the ‘political’ power of DiY is 
rooted in its transformative ethical potential. As Mahmood (2005) has shown, this 
should not trick us into declaring the apolitical character of ethical practices, but it 
should shift our attention to their political efficacy through the ethical transformations 
they engender. 
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The upshot of this argument is that despite the long genealogy and prevalence of agency 
in social theory (Keane 2003), and contrary to what a vertical dichotomy between 
agency and structure presumes, ‘more agency’ does not equal ‘more freedom’ (Laidlaw 
2010b). Hence the need to distinguish ethical freedom from ‘liberation’, and ground the 
former not, I emphasize, in subjective, but intersubjective ethical acts that make men 
and women free and which allow subjects to excel and shape the conditions of their own 
existence (Arendt 1998 [1958]; Faubion 2011; Foucault 1982, 1997; Hirschkind 2006; 
Laidlaw 2002; Mahmood 2005). This is DiY ‘politics’.
Ethical practice, then, involves neither passivity, nor subjection, but rather the active 
manner in which individuals are compelled to form ethical selves within intersubjective 
environments. As I have argued, music practice as a situated practice enveloped the city 
and unfolded onto the urban fabric, which emerged as an ethical modality. Therefore, 
the spatial practices inextricably related to the culmination of a DiY êthos sought to 
inhabit established norms, but also the city itself, both literally and figuratively. 
Thus, music-making represented the main way in which my informants sought to 
exercise their right to the city  (Lefebvre 1996, 2003; see also Amin & Thrift 2002; 
Harvey 2008; Mitchell 2003). Crucially, this right was an ethical right and not merely a 
demand for the fair use of urban resources. It was my informants’ right to realize an 
ethical life in the city  (Baxstrom 2008) and to change themselves through effecting 
changes in the urban fabric (Harvey  2008).7 The city thus emerged ‘as a space of moral 
action’ (Hirschkind 2006: 22) and music practice as a form of urban orientation and 
ethical becoming. Cultivating a DiY êthos involved a process whereby music and the 
city were mutually constituted. Therefore, the reciprocal relationship  between music 
and the city as a distinctive form of ethical urban life is one of the central tenets of my 
argument. 
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7 See Attoh (2011) for an overview of the diverse conceptions of ‘rights’  by scholars that have employed 
Lefebvre’s idea of the right to the city.
However, what  follows is not an ethnography  in the city  or of the city  (Low 1996) but of 
quotidian activities that constitute the fabric of everyday life and of music practices that 
sustain, reproduce and reform it. As such, this thesis does not seek to examine these 
practices from a perspective that would necessarily be relevant to ‘urban anthropology’. 
I see musical ‘pathways’ (Finnegan 1989) as an agglomeration of partially improvised 
(Hallam & Ingold 2007) everyday ethical practices and a distinctively  ‘local’ – but not 
localized – form of collective ethical action (Lambek 2011). Therefore, I conceive of 
urban pathways as intersecting and spatially embedded routes running through the city, 
but first and foremost as ethical life trajectories constituted by specific acts of 
habitation.
 
With special reference to the music collective Winning Sperm Party – the first of the 
three music actors that comprise my  ethnographic focus – I will demonstrate how, from 
a pluralism of urban routes in a multi-temporal city, musical pathways were of high 
importance to my  informants’ everyday lives and ordered their urban existence around 
repetitive music practices. The regularity and periodicity of these practices blended 
urban space and time and obtained their own distinctive rhythms (Lefebvre 2004), 
which were the outcome of spatial and temporal appropriations. The numerous bands 
associated with the music collective, the collective’s promotional tactics in the 
organization of music events and its function as a record label meant that Winning 
Sperm Party constituted a DiY actor par excellence. The conjunction of music and the 
urban environment pervaded their practice. This was particularly  evident in their 
appropriation of urban spaces for performances and in the mundane routines associated 
with promotional activities that involved the re-enactment of well-trodden pathways. 
The musical construction of place (Stokes 1994) was effected through sustained 
practices of sharing resources within an extended network of individuals (Widlok 2004). 
This sharing was not perceived as a series of transactions but as having the capacity to 
bring about and sustain music-making per se. As such, sharing was intrinsically  good 
(MacIntyre 1981) – an ‘actuality’ in Aristotle’s sense [energeia] (Arendt 1998 [1958]) – 
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and part of an ethical repertoire geared towards immanence, that is, ‘life as lived for 
itself’ (Lambek 2010a: 3). Sharing as virtuous action sought to extend the circle of 
individuals who could enjoy the resources at hand rather than establish a transactional 
network. This is not to say that it had no practical function. However, the virtue of 
sharing allows me to stress, as the collective did, that  means should not necessarily  be 
distinguished from ends. For Aristotle, ‘human life lived at its best’ involves ‘the 
exercise of the virtues’ as ‘a necessary and central part of such a life, not merely  a 
preparatory exercise to secure such a life’ (MacIntyre 1981: 149). 
Not only does the virtue of sharing undercut notions of crude utilitarianism but also 
challenges established notions of professionalism based on conceptions of ‘work’ and 
‘livelihood’. On this plane, sharing renders problematic the professional/amateur 
dichotomy, the definition of which depends upon the presence or absence of financial 
rewards. The ethics of care upon which sharing is firmly  rooted signals the 
reconceptualization of ‘amateurs’ and ‘professionals’ on the basis of situated ethical 
action and commitment (Lambek 2010b), and undermines a rigid distinction between 
those who ‘do it for love’ and those who engage in it ‘for money’ (Baily  1988; Cottrell 
2004; Finnegan 1989; Merriam 1964). 
Such an ‘attitude’, to recall Alistair’s words, was part of the ethical dispositions that 
blurred and, in fact, reversed this conventional distinction: being professional meant you 
cared about the bands you hosted and the music they  played, that you paid all the bands 
in the line-up  and that you were genuinely  dedicated and committed to the event. 
Moreover, your investment of personal time and effort aimed to cater for the bands’ 
requirements, which were agreed upon verbally. This meant that trust was the only form 
of contract8 and that you attended to the needs of band members beyond the functional 
requirements of the gig by being there and by being friendly, accommodating and truly 
engaged with the event. 
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8  For a critical examination of the notion of ‘trust’, see Jiménez (2011). For Jiménez, trust is not 
‘diaphanous’ but ‘works by creating its own preconditions of existence, which must in turn be certified as 
trustworthy’ (ibid.: 193).
Conversely, an amateur was someone that enforced a high level of organization, 
reflecting a strict timeline, and who was not genuinely  interested in the music of the 
bands he or she hosted. After the agreed requirements – usually outlined in a contract – 
were met, an amateur would be absent for the duration of the event. Finally, he or she 
might not pay the support bands. Thus, amateurs would ultimately ‘exploit’ young 
bands to benefit themselves financially.
Several bands from the DiY cohort had fallen victim to the pay-to-play policies of 
professional promoters. Divorce, who to my knowledge had never performed under 
such a contract, had rejected this policy outright. My ethnographic focus on the band 
primarily  seeks to illuminate the musical aspects of a DiY êthos through the 
examination of the bodily technologies, affects and sensualities that contribute to ethical 
self-formation. I do not perceive Divorce as the typical DiY band from Glasgow, and I 
recognize that lack of space makes it impossible to consider in detail (or even mention)
the practices of many other affiliated bands that  would serve my purposes equally  well. 
However, Divorce did seem to exemplify the cultivation of attitudes and dispositions 
conducive to the realization of a DiY êthos. As one of the main representatives of ‘nae 
wave’ they enjoyed a certain degree of musical capital and recognition, both locally and 
beyond the city limits. 
This, as well as the collective’s practice of sharing digital music files through their 
website are two instances that alerted me to the need to rethink ‘the local’ and the 
overlapping, but not complete, identification of my informants and their practices with 
Glasgow. Divorce also made me realize that gender relations would not find a place on 
my research agenda. As evident in the four to one ratio in the band, for example, women 
had an active role in the DiY network. This does not mean that gender did not play a 
role. However, the undeniable gender bias that has historically permeated music 
practices (e.g. Leonard 2007; Reddington 2007; Whiteley 1997) was not translated into 
the subordination of women among my informants. This was based not only upon my 
personal observations, but on the words of my female informants. 
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What renders Divorce particularly appropriate for my argument is what  I can only term 
as the intensity of their music and its ‘affecting presence’ (Armstrong 1971). This is not 
an aesthetic judgement or a judgement of taste, but a designation of the bodily affects 
and the ethical predilections that  their music afforded. Thus, Divorce and their music 
represent an ethnographic examination of the bodily regimes and affects (Blacking 
1979; Connolly 2002; Massumi 2002; Mazzarella 2009), the sensuous articulations 
(Classen 1993, 1997; Howes 2003; Seremetakis 1994), and the corporeal technologies 
(Hirschkind 2006; Mahmood 2005), which undergirded and synergistically fashioned 
and honed ethics. Rather than embarking on a phenomenological approach, I ground my 
analysis of this ethics of ‘embodied musicality’ on concrete practices and the everyday 
work  taken up by my informants, and upon the ways in which their acts elicited 
particular sensibilities and aptitudes. 
Therefore, I treat affect as a tendency and a potential that is realized in action and as a 
tool with which to consider the visceral modes of ethical self-formation. Without 
ascribing to a biological determinism, I argue that by attending to the sensory and 
affective registers in which music interacts with the body we will be better positioned to 
address questions of intentionality  and subjectivity  with regards to ethical cultivation. 
Furthermore, I do not treat the body merely as a material entity upon which the external 
environment impinges, but as a dynamic and sensorially  rich interface that actively 
partakes in the production of sensuous sociality (Chau 2008). Thus, I perceive affects as 
conditions that enable the formation of ethical subjects and within which these subjects-
in-becoming circulate and interact (Richard & Rudnyckyj 2009), rather than reified 
entities traveling between autonomous bodies. 
In paying ethnographic attention to the kinetics and the bodily  conformity that music-
making necessitates, I argue that specific forms of ‘docility’ and etiquette, partly incited 
by music’s affective impingements, were common among audience members. Bodily 
deportment encouraged the internalization of a contextualized and ethically  appropriate 
behaviour. Audiences actively took part in performances, even when silent reception 
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characterized their conduct. To treat audiences as an integral component of musical 
performances might initially  seem strange. However, different performances 
necessitated and invoked different audience behaviours, without which the former could 
not be deemed successful. Thus, with audiences being an absolutely essential part of 
successful performances, audience members could be seen as ‘“musicians” of a 
kind’ (Finnegan 1989: 15; see also Blacking 1971; Small 1998).
However, cultivating a DiY êthos as a conscious practice of freedom could not be 
confined to corporeal technologies of the self, and Foucault’s writings on ethics go 
beyond the technical execution of practices of self-fashioning. Moreover, Faubion 
(2011) argues that Foucault’s approach is in need of modification in order to enable us 
to explicitly account for the variegated judgements that mediate between the subject’s 
relation to the ‘rule’ and a training regime. Judgement also informs the actual choices 
that subjects make in ethically shaping themselves into certain kinds of persons. As I 
mentioned above, DiY lacked a ‘canon’ and there was no ‘rule’ to which individuals 
could relate. How, then, did my informants seek to realize an êthos that could not be 
‘authenticated’? Was it only a matter of personal opinion and choice?
I think not. The fact that  a DiY ideal was missing did not preclude my  informants from 
cultivating an êthos on the basis of available examples (Faubion 2011; Humphrey 
1997). This elucidated the pedagogies of self-making as an integral aspect of music-
making and further demonstrated the nature of DiY as a practice that dissolved the 
distinctions between ‘design’ and execution, practitioners and followers, producers and 
consumers. It also highlighted the emergent nature of this practice and the ethical 
debates that lay at the heart of a fluid but not precarious mode of cultural production, 
which had to be continuously molded and reformed. 
The DiY local music promoter Cry Parrot ethnographically exemplifies these points. 
Largely a solo operation, Cry Parrot was a unique case among my informants due to the 
fact that Stuart, who was the main person behind it, and his practice were generally 
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considered to be on the verge between having an ‘accepted’ DiY êthos and a quasi-
commercial outlook. Stuart’s trajectory over the course of my fieldwork provided me 
the opportunity  to observe the subtle and not-so-subtle changes in his practice and in his 
alleged conversion from a ‘DiY promoter’ to an ‘independent promoter’. 
Stuart’s decisions with regards the functioning and êthos of Cry Parrot were thought out 
in painstaking detail and this process often took the form of a ‘moral torment’ (Robbins 
2004). Stuart was clearly concerned and perplexed about the ethical nature of different 
promotional practices. Not knowing which ethical path to follow was not the real 
dilemma, though. What Stuart’s ‘critics’, who included some of my informants, seemed 
to have missed was that Stuart was not seeking to become the occupant of a non-DiY 
subject position. 
Rather, he was searching for ways to expand and adjust the DiY position’s scope in 
order to make it both ethically and financially sustainable in the long term. Stuart’s 
apparent shift reflected a pragmatic response and his desire to confront the challenges of 
what he perceived as a stigmatized and thus ineffective domain, without compromising 
his musical and aesthetic choices (Hesmondhalgh 1999). Cry Parrot exemplified the 
polyphony as well as the divergence among my informants about what constituted DiY 
and also pointed to the intrinsic temporality  of music practice – its futurity as well as its 
immanence. Finally, it indicated the ways in which judgements and reflexive and self-
reflexive technologies of the self, such as thinking and discursive processes, could 
become the means towards ethical self-formation.
By grappling with these issues, in this thesis I hope to ethnographically demonstrate that 
anthropologists could augment the methodological, analytical and ethnographic 
apparatus of the discipline, should they  decide to take seriously the music that most  (if 
not all) encounter in the field. At the very least, I intend to show that by dissolving 
music into everyday practice, and specifically social and ethical practice, it  becomes the 
very stuff of anthropology, and anthropology emerges as musically ‘relevant’. Although 
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this thesis treats music and ethics as inextricably linked, I argue for an anthropology of 
music ethics. This overcomes the pervasive bias of music as ‘special’ and as a separate 
and abstracted domain of human activity, but retains the primacy of the musicality that 
orchestrates the everyday lives of many  anthropological subjects. In providing an 
êthography of music practices (rather than an ethnography of music or a musical 
ethnography), I wish to underscore the ubiquity of music in all its ordinariness and 
mundane glory, how its presence makes people’s lives more meaningful, and why it 
might compel them to become ethical subjects.9
❊❊❊❊❊❊
The data collection techniques and strategies that anthropologists employ during 
fieldwork vary greatly. The defining characteristics of the ethnographer are ‘shameless 
eclecticism’ and ‘methodological opportunism’ (Suttles cited in Jackson 1985: 169). 
This thesis is based upon 18 months of fieldwork conducted between January  2010 and 
June 2011. It  consisted of a combination of intensive participant observation, 
unstructured/semi-structured interviews, online research and the use of visual and 
written documentary sources. For the whole period I was residing in Edinburgh, and 
commuted to Glasgow by  train or bus. Observations and interviews would normally 
take place in the evening and I would spend the day at home writing-up my fieldnotes, 
analyzing and reflecting on my findings, browsing the videos and pictures I had taken 
the night before, as well as obtaining further information online. 
This ‘non-full-time involvement’ (Finnegan 1989: 344) was dictated by  the focus of my 
study, which occurred on a part-time basis. The majority  of my informants – and 
certainly all the members of Winning Sperm Party, Divorce and Cry Parrot – were 
making music in between their other commitments (the reverse may be truer), such as 
work or studies. In other words, there was no need for me to be there during the day 
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9  The term êthography should not be conflated with the folkloric realism of late nineteenth and early 
twentieth-century Greek literature, known as ithografia or ethographia [ἠθογραφία] (see e.g. Beaton 
1982).
(Geertz 1988; Watson 1999) since the great bulk of the activities relating to my research 
questions took place in the evening. Nevertheless, I did find myself in the city several 
days for the purposes of interviews, daytime talks and events and to visit places of 
interest. Furthermore, it is useful to bear in mind that I knew Glasgow long before I 
decided to embark on fieldwork there, something which greatly facilitated my 
‘entrance’ to the field. In many ways, it was experienced as if a part of my  personal life 
had become my object of study. 
Moreover, it was not only I who lived outside Glasgow during the period of my 
fieldwork but certain key informants too: Alistair lived in Edinburgh – where I 
interviewed him for the first time – and Stuart commuted to Glasgow from Motherwell. 
Hence the anthropological imperative of ‘being there’ had become ‘being there...and 
there...and there!’ (Hannerz 2003; Marcus 1995) and also raised questions about 
‘being...where?’ (Coleman & Collins 2006). After all, I conducted additional interviews 
in Edinburgh, Glasgow and Rosebank, I followed Divorce on their second 2010 UK 
tour, I met some of my informants at a festival in the South-West of England and 
constantly monitored their virtual spaces. This raised questions about anthropological 
fieldwork per se and also alerted me to the problematic notion of ‘the local’. Being ‘in’ 
Glasgow, then, was complex and entailed a link to other places, which necessitated the 
reconsideration of ‘the local’ and, by extension, of my ‘field site’.
This situation was intensified by  the urban nature of my  research. The plural urban 
landscape comprises diverse, even contradictory urban routes and thus affords multiple 
interpretations and representations. Consequently, urban ethnography presents 
challenges that small-scale research in rural places does not (and vice versa), because 
the subtlety of ethnographic description might be outweighed by issues of 
representativeness due to the partiality of the undertaking (Jackson 1985: 170; Jacobs 
1993: 828). This ‘partial truth’, as Clifford and Marcus put it in their introduction to 
Writing Culture (1986), is further reflected by the unavoidable unevenness in the 
distribution of my ethnographic focus in my effort to account for at least some of this 
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diversity. The dispersed creativity I encountered while in the field rendered my 
ethnographic focus a challenging affair. At different points in the process my attention 
was focused on different individuals, actors and themes. However, as Hannerz noted 
some time ago, ‘[t]he construction of whole lives may seem to be biography  rather than 
ethnography’ (1980: 255). 
Issues of generalization and typicality further emerge by my conscious choice to focus 
upon specific music actors for reasons outlined above. This allows for a deeper 
examination of the conventions and constraints involved in music-making in the city, 
but raises the question of how typical these actors are within the particular context  and 
whether it is possible to do meaningful generalizations (Cohen 1993: 125, 2007: 233). 
Therefore, I will refrain from making sweeping generalizations about the city as a 
whole. Instead, I have opted for a more pluralistic, kaleidoscopic representation of the 
locality and its inhabitants, as well as of the diverse practices of my informants.
Being able to detach myself from the field on a daily  basis provided the necessary space 
and time to produce the building blocks of my  ethnography through the uninterrupted 
writing of fieldnotes. It  further ensured that I would avoid the trap  of becoming too 
much of an ‘insider’. Despite the fact that ‘going native’ is more of an idea within 
anthropology rather than a common practice (Hannerz 2006: 34; Sluka & Robben 2007: 
14), and although the insider/outsider distinction should be rather perceived as a 
complex continuum (Narayan 1993), certain characteristics of my identity  both 
inhibited and facilitated my fieldwork. For example, originating from abroad and having 
a non-British accent seemed to be an advantage. This mattered not because I avoided 
classification in terms of ‘class’ (Fonarow 2006: 16) but  because I presented myself and 
behaved as I was: a sympathetic foreigner who showed an acute interest in learning 
what people were doing and listening to what they  had to say about their practice. 
Indeed, I was advised that foreign researchers in fieldwork contexts similar to mine 
seemed to be obtaining a wealth of data (Sara Cohen, personal communication). 
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On the other hand, a single male in a music venue might not be readily approachable to 
strangers, especially female participants who represented a large segment of the DiY 
cohort. Nevertheless, issues of accessibility rarely emerged, due to the fact that a 
snowball effect took hold soon after I first met with Alistair. This meant that the close-
knit DiY network and especially my key informants became aware of my identity as a 
researcher from early on, which eased my transition and shifted my status from an 
outsider to an ‘insider’. Last but not least, the definition of ‘the field’ has been contested 
and in my case it  cannot be perceived as a bounded locus or as being neatly  separated 
from my everyday life over the last  eight years (Amit 2000; Fox 1991). Therefore, I 
have not distinguished between the informal data collection before and during the 
preparation stage, the more intensive ‘formal’ process of ethnographic immersion and 
the writing process. Entering and leaving the field and turning from an outsider to an 
insider and back to an outsider were overlapping processes and the outcomes of a slow 
transition rather than specific, momentary events.
My previous knowledge notwithstanding, maintaining a balanced naivety that  would 
motivate my informants to speak more and in detail (Bernard 2006: 366-368), certainly 
helped. However, a sympathetic approach was not peculiar to the researcher. The first 
time I met  with Winning Sperm Party Colin declared that, because I was a social 
anthropologist, he knew that I had to ‘get the feel for it’ and that this was the reason 
why I had to attend numerous DiY music events. Likewise, Eileen from Synergy 
Concerts, a local independent promoter, stated that she preferred to have interviews 
with anthropologists rather than journalists because anthropological questions were 
‘more interesting’. 
This reversed received anthropological wisdom whereby  subjects tend to suspect 
participant observers of being ‘spies’ of some sort (Hammersley & Atkinson 1983: 77; 
O’Reilly 2005: 85). It further engendered a dialogical and collaborative approach 
(Clifford & Marcus 1986; Marcus 2008a), with informants actively helping out with my 
research by introducing me or contacting potential interviewees on my  behalf, by 
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inviting me to specific events that they thought were related to my fieldwork, by making 
suggestions on relevant readings and by offering friendly  advice on what to include in 
the thesis. Most of the individuals I interacted with beyond a simple introduction also 
expressed their intention to read the final draft (and I assume to comment on it). As 
Marcus puts it: 
In other words, once the “reflexive” subject is now the only kind of subject  the 
anthropologist encounters, and where the reflexivity of the subject exists in, or 
overlaps with, the same intellectual universe that  informs the researcher 
(necessarily making the subject  his epistemic partner, so to speak, in the conduct of 
research), then “collaboration” replaces the trope of “apprenticeship” (or its 
alternatives) as defining the “scene” of fieldwork encounter (2008b: 7)
Anthropologist and research subjects are conceived as collaborators in a multi-sited 
field (Marcus 1995, 2008a, 2008b), partaking in a ‘shared anthropology’ [anthropologie 
partagée] (Rouch 2003). Multi-sited does not only refer to a juxtaposition of different 
places within or outside of the city limits where music practices take place. It is also 
points towards the different conceptualizations of music and the locality, and the 
conflicting interpretations that inhabit the everyday lives and imagination of research 
participants. ‘Reflexivity’ was intrinsically related to my own conduct and I was 
particularly careful about the ways in which I presented myself in the field by paying 
attention to similarities and differences, equalities but also inequalities (Cohen 1993: 
134).
I did not rely on an elaborate preparation before ‘entering’ the field, in the sense of 
locating appropriate music actors to enlist in my  project. This was largely because, from 
the outside, I was unsure of what ‘appropriate’ meant. Nevertheless, I did not face 
practical difficulties in obtaining the necessary ethnographic material. Similar to my 
case, Cohen had spent a considerable amount of time searching for bands after she had 
arrived in Liverpool ‘full of strategies on how to seek out bands and establish contacts 
in the music world’ (1991: 1). My material was mainly  collected through participant 
observation but the term requires clarification. 
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A participant observer oscillates between the two poles of participation and observation, 
while most anthropologists would situate themselves somewhat ambiguously in the 
middle of the spectrum (Bernard 2006: 347). Wolcott contends that anthropologists 
should participate as little as they have to in order to obtain their data (1999: 48-49). 
This is what I attempted to do. Clearly, becoming a ‘fly  on the wall’ is hardly  possible 
and I did ‘participate’ in several instances – briefly helping out on the door at music 
events, carrying music equipment and other paraphernalia, and other basic tasks. 
However, I never took part in musical performances by playing an instrument, despite 
having the opportunity. My participation was also inevitably restricted due to the urban 
nature of the research. It was simply impossible to take part in all of the activities of 
overlapping and extended networks of individuals engaging in myriad practices (see 
Finnegan 1989: 342).
Because the DiY network was mobilized and gathered around music events, it is within 
these contexts that my ethnographic attention was placed. Gigs and the practical 
processes culminating in and following music events were perhaps the most valuable 
sources of first-hand information on a wide range of musical and extra-musical 
activities. Other practices, such as the communications pertinent to the organization of 
music events or the production of records were not readily  observable. For example, 
Stuart from Cry Parrot organized everything by email, while Winning Sperm Party had 
outsourced the pressing of vinyls and CDs to individuals or companies at home and 
abroad. Music events were also contexts germane to social interaction and it was in 
these places that I was first introduced to most of my informants. 
The common perception, according to which doing fieldwork in music means that one 
has ‘too much fun’, is simply false. As Bigenho (2008: 31) and Herzfeld (2001: 312) 
have succinctly pointed out, such an association tends to question the legitimacy of an 
anthropological engagement with media forms and is seen as diminishing the 
anthropologist’s potential to contribute anything of use theoretically. Besides, 
ethnomusicologist Luis-Manuel Garcia (2012) argues in his detailed ‘fieldwork guide’ 
26
on nightlife research that ‘nocturnal’ ethnographers often have to confront distinctive 
challenges, which ‘daylight’ ethnographers might not face. These include issues relating 
to building ‘rapport’ with individuals that seek to have ‘fun’ and ‘let go’, etiquette, 
adverse conditions (lack of light, heat, noise), the costly nature of such fieldwork 
(tickets, door charges) and the profound interference with the researcher’s circadian 
rhythms, among others. Despite all this, I would certainly  hesitate to gloss my field as a 
‘field of screams’ (Pollard 2009).
Although my competence as an observer and my ‘explicit awareness’ (Bernard 2006: 
364-366) were gradually sharpened as my fieldwork unfolded, my memory  was only 
one data collection depository during the sessions of participant observation. I also had 
to rely on what is referred to as ‘scratch notes’, a mnemonic word or phrase that will 
later be transformed into fuller notes (Sanjek 1990: 95-99). Depending on the 
circumstances, I would use my return trip to Edinburgh to outline the structure of these 
fuller fieldnotes, to be written the following morning. The use of fieldnotes forms the 
main material for my post-fieldwork analysis (Emerson et al 1995; Sanjek 1990). 
However, it is rarely  the case that a comprehensive ethnographic account of music 
performances could be based exclusively  on fieldnotes, except if the ethnographer has 
the opportunity  to repeatedly witness the same performance. In popular music though, 
performances tend to differ every time due to their less rigid ‘ritualistic’ character. 
Therefore, I made an extensive use of visual recording techniques. Photography  and 
video enabled me to capture aspects of the action and a level of detail that my memory 
could not. Proponents of visual research methods (e.g. Banks 2001; Pink 2001; Pink et 
al 2004) have stressed their practical importance but  also their inherent ability for 
detailed cultural representation. 
My use of visual media is geared towards enriching the detail of my descriptions, rather 
than images constituting objects of research in themselves. Taking scratch notes, 
pictures and videos was dictated by the event at hand and my personal judgement with 
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regards to the level of the breach of etiquette that such an action would impose. Visual 
documentation was complemented by regularly collecting posters, flyers, fanzines and 
other local publications, pins, t-shirts, vinyl records, CDs, cassette tapes, tickets (where 
applicable) and other relevant materials. Finally, I did not record the music of bands and 
musicians that participated in the research, for the simple reason that it was publicly 
available from various sources.
Apart from the invaluable informal discussions that I engaged in before, during and 
after music events, I have had the opportunity to follow up specific points and converse 
extensively  with my informants in the context of ‘interviews’. I have placed the word in 
quotation marks to convey the fact that, although these discussions were pre-scheduled, 
audio-recorded and fully transcribed later on, I neither prepared specific questions, nor 
did I seek to consciously direct  the discussion. Ruth Finnegan notes that she conducted 
only a few ‘deliberate interviews’ during her fieldwork among amateur musicians in 
Milton Keynes. Although Finnegan distinguishes these from ‘the many informal 
conversations’ she had, she is still reluctant to label them as ‘interviews’ (1989: 344).
Most of the important information obtained through interviews was the result of follow-
up questions, which cannot be prepared beforehand (Rubin & Rubin 1995: 151). 
Probing was employed in order to extract additional information and I made use of an 
open-ended form of questions out of the various types available (see Kvale 1996). 
These conversations took place in a relaxed and open way, with no specific topics to be 
covered or predetermined questions to be posed. This was deliberate for two reasons: 
first, my goal was to gain a solid background knowledge of the context within which 
music practices happened, therefore every detail was important – at least initially. 
Second, during the first few months in the field I attempted to discover the right 
questions to ask in a socially  and culturally informed manner in order to avoid distortion 
(Cohen 1984: 225; Spradley 1979: 83-84). 
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Thus, by employing a strategy of ‘deep hanging out’ (Rosaldo cited in Wolcott 1999: 
14), I opted to let the relevant themes emerge in due course (Adler & Adler 1994: 382). 
Some of my key informants were interviewed twice in this manner. Some individuals 
were interviewed but their useful insights do not appear in this thesis, though they 
contributed to and deepened my understanding and knowledge of the field. I did not 
manage to interview a handful of individuals, as they did not respond to my emails. For 
the most part, they turned out to be peripheral to my project and they rarely  or never 
attended DiY music events. Most of the interviews were agreed upon in person, but 
some were arranged over email or text messages.
I have sought to address ethical concerns about anonymity and confidentiality  by 
changing the names of all the individuals that appear in this thesis. However, I have not 
changed stage names, institutional names or venue names. The imaginative stage and 
institutional names themselves are analyzed later on. My informants were happy  for me 
to use these names and ‘spread the word’ about DiY. Informed consent was sought and 
obtained at all times and, where possible, audio-recorded. However, I did not seek my 
informants’ consent to use information that was publicly available, such as posters, 
flyers and details that were accessible online. 
Obtaining informed consent was confined to individuals with whom I had more than a 
brief encounter but in all cases I ensured that people became aware of my identity as a 
researcher, without of course intimidating them by  immediately  declaring my  status. 
Online information was not only  useful as background knowledge but also necessary, in 
the sense that social media were the primary  means of promotion of music events, 
several of which were announced very close to the day of the event or even on the day. 
As such, I felt  obliged to join social media, and specifically  Twitter, in order to be kept 
updated about the diverse and multiple events that were taking place. Sometimes I 
would attend more than one event on a single evening.
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My informants’ views on ethical music practices did not  coincide with the definitions 
that other local music actors embraced and put forward. Although a wealth of material 
was obtained through attending music events organized by  other promoters, and where a 
host of different bands performed, I did not seek to examine the views of individuals 
who were unrelated to the DiY network. This limits the scope for comparison but it 
allows me to deeply engage with a loosely coherent set of ideas and practices. Space 
constraints here, as well as the sheer diversity  of ethical and musical opinions and 
practices in the city, make it impossible to pay credit to the pluralism of competing 
representations and arguments present in the locality. 
Crucially, there are also temporal constraints in the study of ethics, as Faubion notes 
(2011: 142). Ethical becoming is the outcome of a long process, which leaves its traces 
on subjects. These are manifested through a particular mode of being and acting in the 
world, but anthropologists will most likely not be able to trace ethical trajectories in 
their entirety. Thus, ethics is as much a process of the present and future, as it is of 
history. What makes life worth living and the shaping of ethical selves and ideas are the 
outcome of historical circumstances and events rather than simply  ‘pastness’, while to 
which extent all this is affected by different stages in one’s life-course is difficult to 
discern (Mathews 1996: 739-740). 
Similarly, Finnegan notes that musical pathways are ‘something essentially  self-chosen 
not primarily for monetary reasons but in some sense for their own sake’, but  she also 
highlights the need to attend to the various ‘patterns of constraints and opportunities 
that – sometimes partly  outside the actors’ own awareness – help to draw individuals 
towards or away from particular paths, or shape the way  they tread them’ (1989: 
316-317). I remain sensitive to these methodological and analytical limitations and I can 
only partially address this by  employing the past tense throughout. This is also 
consonant with the shifting attitudes and practices that characterized music-making 
during the time of my fieldwork. I perceive this thesis as a snapshot in time and of my 
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informants’ lives, but I do hope that some of the issues I raise will have a more lasting 
resonance.
Formal ‘methods’ aside, I should stress the fact  that my fieldwork was a profoundly 
sensual experience. In what follows, I attend to my informants’ views, bodily acts, 
musical activities and ethical practices. However, I cannot disregard that my knowledge 
about the experience of music and about how music informed certain dispositions 
among my informants was partly gained through music. It was passed down as 
embodied knowledge by  virtue of my attendance of DiY music events. Questions of 
ethical etiquette, affect, as well as the broader relationship between music and ethics, 
were put in perspective by paying attention to my own bodily and emotional responses 
during my exposure to sounds. Although I do not explicitly address the tacit  knowledge 
obtained through my own body, my account has greatly  benefited from the conscious 
reflection following these experiences. 
Therefore, I can only agree with Csordas (1993) and his injunction to attend with and to 
the body, and to how somatic modes of attention can enrich our ethnographic analyses. 
The bodily  engagements and felt dimensions of fieldwork deserve at least an implicit 
recognition, especially when the subject matter directly relates to the sensorium, as it 
does in the cases of sound and dance (see e.g. Feld 1996; Potter 2008; Samuels et al 
2010; Skinner 2005; Sklar 2000). As Colin from Winning Sperm Party put  it, as an 
anthropologist I had to ‘get the feel for it’. And Lefebvre’s Rhythmanalysis utilizes the 
body as a tool and begins from the premise that: ‘Rhythm appears as regulated time, 
governed by rational laws, but in contact with what is least rational in human being: the 
lived, the carnal, the body’ (2004: 9).
Agar’s (1996 [1980]) cogent metaphor of the ethnographic process as a ‘funnel’ that 
narrows down as the ethnographer gradually  reaches ‘saturation’ neatly matches my 
experience. Ellen (1984) aptly subtitled her edited volume on ethnographic research 
methods as ‘a guide to general conduct’. Although the book covers every formal aspect 
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of ethnographic fieldwork, it  suggests practices, techniques and strategies that 
fieldworkers may or may  not choose to follow. I have outlined my fieldwork experience 
and described how ‘methods’ have contributed towards reaching my  goal. However, 
ethnography is fluid and emerges dialogically  and on the spot. It is a matter of thorough 
preparation as much as improvisation, because it is adventurous and quite unpredictable. 
Thus, it is almost impossible to describe ethnographic methods in painstaking detail. In 
many ways these are the characteristics that make ethnography most attractive. A 
successful ethnographer is one who enjoys doing it. As Rubin and Rubin advise us, we 
have to ‘try to think of fieldwork as one long conversation with someone we are 
fascinated with’ (cited in O’Reilly  2005: 127). And I have certainly  enjoyed taking part 
in the conversation.
❊❊❊❊❊❊
For the purpose of clarity I have separated the material into three parts. Part I sets the 
scene for my ethnographic analysis and the conceptual space that informs it. Chapter 1 
provides a historical overview of Glasgow and local cultural production with special 
reference to musical antecedents that have engendered particular approaches to 
grassroots music-making in the city. In Chapter 2 I draw an outline of my conceptual 
apparatus by considering various ethnographic works on music and by comparing 
different analytical frameworks for the study of music collectivities. I also discuss the 
anthropological literature on ethics and establish a link between the ‘ethical’ and the 
‘urban’. 
Part II presents my findings organized around the ethnographic examination of three 
DiY music actors. Chapter 3 considers Winning Sperm Party and describes the 
collective’s practices and affiliations by grounding the analysis in questions about the 
relationship  between urban musical pathways, practices of sharing and virtuous action 
in the musical transformation of urban spaces. In Chapter 4, through a discussion of 
Divorce I proceed to examine the centrality  of the body to music practice and the 
32
affective and sensory  impingements of sound. By exploring the functioning of the band 
and the multi-sensory  constellations that their music forged I argue that the nexus 
between music and the body offers a distinctive lens into the visceral qualities of ethical 
self-formation. In Chapter 5, I turn to Cry Parrot in order to address non-musical 
processes of ethical self-formation. In shifting my  focus from musical to extra-musical 
activities and from the collective cultivation of ethical dispositions to the ethical 
becoming of one individual, my aim is to underscore the salience – as well as the 
inadequacies – of Foucault’s ethical apparatus. 
Part III consists of Chapter 6 and the Conclusion. In the former, I grapple with a 
seemingly simple question, namely: ‘what is DiY?’. It will become apparent that the 
complexity of the phenomenon and the multiple and obscured definitions of the term do 
not allow for definitive answers. This terminological confusion, when projected onto the 
ethical realm, raises some interesting questions about the temporality  and 
intersubjective nature of ethics, the emergent character of music practice and the 
production of urban space through music, as well as posing a challenge to established 
notions of ‘agency’ and Western ‘individualism’. The Conclusion reiterates and builds 
upon some of these ideas, and I end my  ethnography by pondering on whether music 









1.1 City of Extremes
In her call for an ethnographic approach to the study of popular music, Sara Cohen 
notes that:
Ideally, that  approach should focus upon social relationships, emphasizing music as 
social practice and process. It should also be comparative and holistic; historical 
and dialogical; reflexive and policy-oriented. It should emphasize, among other 
things, the dynamic complexities of situations within which abstract  concepts and 
models are embedded, and which they often simplify or obscure. The social, 
cultural and historical specificity of events, activities, relationships and discourses 
should also be highlighted (1993: 23). 
This chapter aims to address several of these characteristics and attempts to embed the 
subsequent ethnographic description within its social, cultural and historical 
specificity.10  In setting the scene for the empirical examination of music practices, I 
seek to make explicit the historical antecedents and socio-cultural particularities that 
have influenced and culminated in specific forms of music-making in the city. 
In tracing these continuities and disjunctions, I hope to show that Glasgow’s social, 
economic and political history  has engendered a pluralism of local experiences and 
subsequent interpretations of the city. In turn, these lived realities and conflicting 
representations have been historically embedded within a constant stream of creative 
practices characterized by varying approaches, but also a shared êthos. This leads me to 
perceive the city  as being inextricably linked to music practice, not so much as a 
symbolic or material context, but as an inherent and often unconscious modality of local 
music-making. If, as I argue, music-making can be perceived as an ethical practice, then 
the characteristics of the locality that afford, facilitate or inhibit  music-making are 
integral to my consideration of ethics.
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10  For a general historical overview of Glasgow, see Berry and Whyte (1987), Daiches (1982),  Damer 
(1990), Gibb (1983), Pacione (1995), Maver (2000) and Reed (1993a). For an overview of historical 
developments until 1830, see Devine and Jackson (1995); for the period between 1830-1912, see Fraser 
and Maver (1996); and between 1875-1980, see Checkland (1981).
Glasgow is the largest city in Scotland, with an estimated population of 598,830 within 
the city  limits,11  and it is located on the West coast of the country. Glasgow currently 
relies primarily upon the service sector, but its post-industrial urban landscape still 
discloses aspects of the city’s past. There is a common perception that, compared to 
Edinburgh, Glasgow’s music industry is thriving. The city  has been characterized as ‘an 
underground music incubator’ and in popular discourse its music scene has been 
compared to Liverpool in the 1960s and Seattle in the 1990s (Porter 2004). As journalist 
Barry Nicholson puts it:
While it may not be pretty, it’s nonetheless become the country’s de-facto cultural 
capital, a vibrant  mini-metropolis of artists and musicians who live cheaply and 
party freely. Like pre-Giuliani New York City, it’s a place with its own unique 
culture and character, where almost anything goes (2009: 141). 
Within academic quarters, however, these accounts are considered somewhat hyperbolic 
(Forsyth & Cloonan 2008). Nevertheless, UNESCO recently designated Glasgow as 
City  of Music (2008), with its music scenes generating £75 million a year for the local 
economy. In 2009, and for the first time outside London, the prestigious MOBO (Music 
Of Black Origin) awards were held in Glasgow. This city  of so many mottos, 
nominations, titles and awards – such as City of Architecture (1999), European Capital 
of Sport (2003), host of the Commonwealth Games (2014) and Glasgow with Style 
(2004), to name but a few (see below for more) – exhibits a poignant history of rapid 
economic development and subsequent dramatic decline. Until recently, Glasgow had 
an established reputation as a city  of ‘razor-gang street violence and urban 
decay’ (Bianchini 1993: 17), while its characterization among sociologists as a ‘totem 
for every kind of modern urban horror’ (Berry & Whyte 1987: 1) used to aptly  describe 
a degrading image of the city and the tough living conditions of its dwellers. 
During the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries Glasgow stood as a mercantile and 
industrial centre of global calibre. This certainly did not anticipate the downward 
economic spiral and violent industrial decline that would mark its trajectory into the 
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11 According to the 2011 Census.
twentieth century, when urban malaise came to be closely  associated with the city. In 
order to dispel its negative image, over the past few decades local authorities have 
embarked on a project involving aggressive city marketing and PR campaigns in their 
effort to convince the world at large – but also Glaswegians themselves – that Glasgow 
has now become an attractive tourist destination and a cultural metropolis that boasts an 
enviable retail sector. 
This re-invention of Glasgow through image-making might not  be revealing of the 
whole truth about the city’s character. Nevertheless, municipal authorities have 
managed to develop its service-based economy and regenerate large parts of the city 
considerably. As such, Glasgow is in a constant state of flux and has emerged as a city 
of extremes, with its urban landscape dominated by  regenerated areas alongside 
monolithic concrete housing estates. The social effects of such discrepancies are 
reflected by  its urban fabric, which attests to the uneasy coexistence of severely 
deprived parts of the population and affluent city elites. These dissonances have been 
the outcomes of a series of overlapping historical, political and economic processes 
rather than isolated or recent policies and events. Therefore, the examination of the 
circumstances that have culminated in Glasgow’s contemporary state should take into 
account the historical, political and economic factors that have forged its distinctive 
identity. 
In what follows, I will outline several events and processes that have variably defined 
and contributed to the city’s current condition. In doing so, my aim is to tease out 
specific characteristics that will help  me discern a particular local approach to music-
making. The city’s rich and complex history precludes the elaboration of definitive 
statements regarding its identity, which has been and remains plural. However, there are 
tangible examples, as well as forms of local knowledge, that underscore this identity. 
This justifies a historical overview for the purpose of capturing the elements that will 




1.2.1 Origins, Settlement and Expansion
Precise historical data is lacking with regards to the city’s origin as a settlement. 
Archaeological findings place it firmly within the period of the Roman Empire but signs 
of temporary occupation exist since prehistoric times (Gibb 1983: 4). According to 
Maver (2000: 6), the city’s authenticated history does not begin prior to the twelfth 
century. Glasgow’s ecclesiastical connections elevated its prestige in the region (Durkan 
1998; Macquarrie 1997), while it  was only in 1611 that it  achieved official recognition 
as a royal burgh, with a population of 7,000. 
Over the course of the seventeenth century  its population doubled, undoubtedly due to 
Glasgow’s commercial expansion, which involved the consolidation of the city’s trading 
connections with England and Ireland, as well as continental territories (Smout 1960, 
1968). Nevertheless, it was the eighteenth century that marked Glasgow’s rise to 
prominence, bolstered by the transatlantic tobacco and West India sugar trade (Devine 
1978, 1990a). By the end of the century Glasgow’s population had increased to 66,000, 
one of the most accelerated urban growth rates in the country (Maver 2000: 28).
In the nineteenth century  Glasgow entered a phase of unprecedented development and 
expansion. The established commercial relations with colonial territories were 
complemented by a boom in the local textile industry  (Fraser 1976; Murray  1978), the 
extraction of coal and iron from areas in close proximity to the city (Slaven 1975), the 
development of railways (Kellett 1964, 1979; Nicholson & O’Neill 1987), and the 
emergence of financial institutions (Checkland 1975). The city’s industrialization played 
a crucial role in this process and the deepening of the Clyde allowed larger ships to gain 
direct access to Glasgow (Riddell 1979).
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Even more than in the previous centuries, the River Clyde, the most distinctive 
topographic feature of Glasgow, was bound to seal the city’s fate. In the decades 
preceding the end of World War I the shipbuilding industry  became inextricably linked 
with the city  and its surrounding areas, particularly Govan and Partick, which served as 
the bases for several shipbuilding firms (Carvel 1950; Hume & Moss 1975, 1979; Moss 
& Hume 1977). Glasgow’s territorial expansion in early twentieth century, which 
incorporated the aforementioned areas, resulted in the city boasting a population of over 
a million (Withers 1996: 142). From this, only  a small percentage was due to 
immigration from the continent but, as a result of the potato famine in Ireland, Irish 
presence in the city was already established since the previous century (Devine 1990b; 
Mitchell 1998). 
The population influx over the course of the city’s history had a tremendous impact on 
the urban fabric (Pacione 1995; Reed 1993a). The property development of the late 
eighteenth century reflected an attempt by  the mercantile elites to move out of the 
increasingly  disintegrating inner city (Walker 1993). This culminated in the subsequent 
suburbanization of Glasgow by  the middle classes (Atherton 1991; Simpson 1977) and, 
ultimately, to slum clearances and the relocation of large segments of the workforce 
during the nineteenth (Edwards 1993) and twentieth centuries (Markus 1993; see also 
Glendinning 1997). 
The pressures caused by overcrowding have historically  resulted in anarchic 
construction and, in most cases, piecemeal attempts by local authorities to deal with the 
phenomenon with demolition and redevelopment rather than consolidation (see below). 
As Reed points out, Glasgow is a place of architectural ‘disjunctions rather than 
conjunctions’ (1993b: 2), despite the fact that two centuries ago the city  was envied for 
its urban outlook (Maver 2000: 25-26). The contradictions of Glasgow’s contemporary 
built  environment and its fragmented urban landscape stand as (literally) concrete 
manifestations and reminders of the acute economic and social inequalities that have 
accompanied the city’s rise to prominence.
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1.2.2 Economy and Politics
Although Glasgow’s economic output has risen in the first decade of the millennium, 
during the time of my fieldwork the city was experiencing a steady increase in 
unemployment. Large parts of the population were living in deprivation, though 
relevant figures had fallen.12  Nowadays Glasgow relies mainly  on the service sector, 
with its industrial base making only a minor contribution to the local economy. 
However, the heavy  industrialization of the city  was precisely what has historically 
influenced Glasgow’s economic fortunes. 
When tobacco monopolies broke due to the American Revolution (Devine 1973), the 
city’s commercial expansion and diversification, as well as investments in land and 
industry  ensured continuous economic growth. For example, the local textile 
production, particularly linen, greatly  benefited the local economy. The economic 
success of textile-making notwithstanding, by  the 1830s both handloom weaving and 
cotton factories were in decline, not least due to the intensification of competition in the 
industry, with English companies eventually  overtaking Scottish ones. Increasingly, 
textiles became less important for the city’s economic growth, but a large part of its 
population was still employed in the industry throughout the century (Robertson 1970). 
According to Berry  and Whyte (1987: 2), the turning point in Glasgow’s history was the 
discovery  of large supplies of coal and ironstone in nearby locations towards the end of 
the eighteenth century. The abundant iron and coal supplies were crucial for the rapid 
development of Clyde shipbuilding over the period 1860-1918. Other related industries 
also contributed to the city’s economic development, such as steel (Payne 1979), which 
eventually displaced iron, supplies of which were drying up by the 1890s. The figures 
associated with shipbuilding in Glasgow during this period are astonishing: Clyde 
42
12 According to the Scottish Index of Multiple Deprivation (2012), unemployment rates have risen from 
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share in the 5 percent of the most deprived areas for the same period has fallen from 48,6 percent to 45,5 
percent.
shipyards produced 70 percent of the total iron tonnage in Britain during the 1850s and 
1860s, and in 1913 nearly one fifth of the tonnage produced globally. Overall, the city’s 
shipbuilding output  between 1870-1914 consisted of one third of the total British output 
(Booth & Boyle 1993: 24; Maver 2000: 116). Shipbuilding for military purposes also 
constituted a sustained source of wealth and employment, and ensured that even during 
wartime the shipyards remained active (Scott & Cunnison 1924). Thus, it is after the 
end of World War I that the city’s dramatic industrial decline took place. Before then, 
Glasgow’s prominent position as a globally important industrial centre had conferred 
the designation of ‘Second City of the Empire’ (Oakley 1946). 
Significantly, the shipbuilding industry left its mark on Glasgow and ‘created an 
enduring identity that blended masculine skill, cosmopolitanism and entrepreneurial 
flair’ (Maver 2000: 113). Clyde shipbuilding and the River itself became potent 
metaphors for Glasgow’s commercial expansionism, civic pride and competitive 
achievement. Such an image was not singular though, and this was evident  in other city 
titles, such as ‘Venice of the North’, which highlighted its mercantile profile, or in the 
promotion of the city  by local authorities as a self-sufficient city-state that cared for its 
citizens (ibid.: 124-125). But neither the economic momentum nor the prestigious labels 
of the city  could mask the appalling living conditions for a large segment of the 
population. 
The residential polarization and the deterioration of the city’s urban fabric was 
encapsulated by the tenement (Wordsall 1979), which from the mid-nineteenth century 
dominated Glasgow’s urban landscape. According to Reed, it was the construction of 
tenements that engendered the city’s characteristic architectural outlook, underpinned 
by singular homogeneity (1993c: 104). Ironically, tenement building formed part  of an 
inner city  improvement plan that aimed to meet insatiable housing demand and 
counteract the rapid decline of the old town and the proliferation of slums. Usually a 
four-storey poor quality  building, the tenement provided inexpensive housing for a fast 
growing urban population. The tenement became the definitive characteristic of the 
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city’s image but the issues of congestion and overcrowding, which improvement plans 
in the latter half of the nineteenth century sought to rectify, reemerged in the new 
tenements that subsequently declined into slums. A second slum clearance was thus in 
order after the Second World War. 
As a symbol of social deprivation brought about by industrial decline, the tenement was 
at the centre of demolition and urban restructuring plans. Nevertheless, as Booth and 
Boyle remark (1993: 25), much like the Clyde shipyards, which had become 
inextricably linked with the city’s fate, the tenement became the object of urban 
mythology, as well as a symbol of community  and sharing among the city’s working-
class inhabitants. The fond memories of the tenement (Faley 1990) obscure the hardship 
of its residents that was so characteristic of the period, but they also attest to a rich 
legacy of local ideas about urban living that derive from the city’s history.
The shipbuilding industry and the attendant developments in the city gave rise to 
particular images of Glasgow, but they also decisively influenced the politics of the 
period, which resulted in the emergence of Glasgow’s reputation for political radicalism 
and left-wing activism. Of course, social and political upheavals were not uncommon 
throughout the history of the area. The city  has been the site of several socio-political 
struggles, among which the notorious rent strikes (Melling 1983), reflecting the 
inequalities embedded in the unequal distribution of wealth. Glasgow exhibits a 
political identity  which has been intimately connected with its economy and inter-class 
tensions (see Cage 1987; Duncan & McIvor 1992; Fraser 1988; Gordon 1991). 
Although the appeal of socialism in the city was initially  weak, Glasgow subsequently 
became strongly identified with ‘municipal socialism’ during the late 1880s (Fraser 
1990, 1993). The Labour Party’s rise to power came during the pivotal year of 1922 and 
remained so for the best part of the twentieth century. Post-electoral reforms and the 
expansion of the city’s boundaries, which now included working-class areas previously 
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outside its jurisdiction, contributed to the success of the phenomenon known as ‘Red 
Clydeside’ (MacLean 1983). 
The notion of Red Clydeside had its roots in various precedents (Kenefick & McIvor 
1996; Knox 1989), such as the anti-war movement, the rent strikes, the Singer strike of 
1911, as well as the engineering workers’ strike in 1919, which culminated in violence 
and echoed the revolutionary  sentiments of the period (Boyle & Hughes 1994: 455; 
Maver 2000: 229-230). The industrial militancy and political radicalism of this period 
represent an important  part of the labour movement’s history  and left  an enduring mark 
on public consciousness and local politics by securing Glasgow’s image as a workers’ 
city. The insurgency of the working classes belongs to a tradition of political protest and 
activism that  came to be closely  associated with Glasgow. This had a continuous 
presence throughout the century, particularly  as Glasgow entered a period of severe 
economic decline after 1918.
1.3 Industrial Decline and Urban Regeneration 
1.3.1 Cancer of Empire
For all the anti-war sentiments within the labour movement, the city’s industries 
managed to sustain production during the war due to the increased output of warships 
and munitions. After the end of the conflict, however, Glasgow began to feel the 
consequences of recession, which hit  its industrial base hard. The war had restructured 
the global economic map, and competition from Japan and the United States 
dramatically diminished Glasgow’s shipbuilding output (McGoldrick 1982). Exports 
plunged, the coal and steel industries were affected severely  and unemployment levels 
rose sharply, reaching 30 percent in 1930 (Booth & Boyle 1993: 25). 
It is not surprising, then, that  within a few years Glasgow had gone from ‘Second City 
of the Empire’ to ‘Cancer of Empire’ (Bolitho 1924). Interwar economic fluctuations 
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exposed Glasgow’s over-reliance on specific industries and the situation was further 
affected by  the lack of industrial expansion and diversification. Protectionism and 
monopolization had emerged in order to offset the crisis, but eventually backfired and 
the industry continued its downward spiral. According to Booth and Boyle (1993: 26), 
union militancy and defensiveness had become associated with the city’s industry, while 
employers had an equal share of responsibility  due to their outdated management 
practices.  
The global recession of the 1930s inflicted another blow on Glasgow’s weakened 
shipyards, and by 1933 production reached its nadir (Maver 2000: 207). Although 
interventions by the state and local authorities sought to reverse this uncertain climate, 
Glasgow entered the Second World War devoid of its previous image and glory. Again, 
military production temporarily  revived the economy and the aftermath of the war 
found the city in a more affluent state than during the pre-war recession. However, local 
industries were in terminal decline as the long-term issues of an aging infrastructure and 
dated production methods had not been tackled effectively. Consequently, the following 
decades saw further contraction of the industry  and in the 1971-1983 period Glasgow 
lost 45 percent of its manufacturing workforce (Booth & Boyle 1993: 26).
1.3.2 Urban Regeneration and Economic Reorientation
In the meantime, the deterioration of the urban environment had become a symbol of 
industrial decline. Social problems as the by-products of economic recession were 
increasingly  visible and large parts of the city were descending into slums. Anti-social 
behaviour and the long-standing problem of housing were pressing issues, while 
specific areas of the city, such as the notorious Gorbals in the south, became 
synonymous with urban degradation in the United Kingdom (Maver 2000: 252-255). 
The second half of the century  found Glasgow derelict and the transition in the 1920s 
and 1930s from the old to the modern Glasgow and, later on, from the industrial to the 
post-industrial city was the product of several decades of reconstruction and 
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redevelopment (Reed 1993b: 4). The severe economic problems of the period and their 
impact upon the city’s decaying architecture certainly did not anticipate Glasgow’s 
subsequent reputation as a model for urban regeneration (see Boyle 1990; Keating 
1988; Keating & Boyle 1986; Lever & Moor 1996). 
Interwar urban planning strategies (McKean 1987), as well as the more comprehensive 
reconstruction policies from the 1950s onwards, were initiated in order to deal with the 
acute housing problem. A combined strategy was implemented which included slum 
demolition, rebuilding and the construction of high-density, multi-storey buildings, 
which represented the great majority  of the completed buildings during this period 
(Horsey  1990: 49; see also Glendinning & Muthesius 1994). The relocation of families 
from the old tenements to newly-built  residencies was complemented by an ‘overspill’ 
policy that resulted in several thousand city dwellers leaving Glasgow for neighbouring 
towns. These combined policies proved fruitful and within thirty years the city’s 
population fell from 1.1 million in 1951 to 765,000 in 1981 (Maver 2000: 264). 
However, due to the adverse economic circumstances that continued to impinge upon 
the city, reconstruction policies did not  always live up to the expectations of the 
migrating populations. Relocation meant  that communities were fragmented, while the 
remoteness of several high-rise flats and the failure to equip them with adequate 
amenity  resources sharpened the image of a city divided between disadvantaged 
working-class areas and middle-class suburbs. Booth and Boyle contend that the 
reconstruction plans put forward in the 1950s and 1960s were ‘quantitative rather than 
qualitative, physical rather than social, utilitarian rather than enriching’ (1993: 28). The 
problems created by the alienating qualities of these new housing forms led to a shift in 
strategy towards inner city regeneration from the 1970s, while the conservation 
movement gradually revealed the city’s rich architectural heritage, until then obscured 
by layers of industrial grime (Martin 1993). 
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The rediscovery of inner city areas and their conservation led to the revitalization of 
disused buildings and warehouses (Donnison & Middleton 1987). The resulting 
‘Merchant City’ echoed Glasgow’s re-invention as a commercial and leisure centre. The 
fact that the Glasgow District Council owned much of the area played a decisive role in 
its control of development, while the housing association movement and the Scottish 
Development Agency were crucial for the shift of attention towards the regeneration of 
the city centre and the materialization of relevant projects. However, the effects of 
deindustrialization were not tackled by  these processes of development and 
gentrification (Macinnes 1995), something which further enhanced the division of the 
city in two extremes. Moreover, additional criticisms emerged with regards to 
Glasgow’s urban regeneration and the way in which ‘“Red Clydeside” had apparently 
yielded to Thatcherite market economics, in a city  with an entrenched Labour power 
base’ (Maver 2000: 282).13 
The civic celebration of ‘Glasgow 800’ (Cochrane 1975), launched to commemorate the 
granting of the burgh charter in 1175, was both a nod to historical continuity and part of 
a forward-looking attitude (Maver 2000: 216). By the early  1960s, as well as during the 
interwar period, a service-based economy was on the rise. The growth of the service 
sector continued throughout the decades that followed, although unemployment figures 
show considerable job losses during the 1980s (Booth & Boyle 1993: 27). Notably, 
employment in the arts exceeded employment in the shipyards during the same period 
(Myerscough 1988). The pursuit of a new economic base focused upon business 
services, while tourism, which accompanied Glasgow’s makeover, contributed to the 
gradual reversal of the city’s image. 
Undoubtedly, the hugely successful ‘Glasgow’s Miles Better’ campaign (Struthers 
1986) played an important role. The marketing of the city  began in 1983 with the launch 
of the campaign, which sought to demonstrate to the world that Glasgow was becoming 
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(2006), Gray (2008, 2009) and Nesbitt (2008).
‘an innovative city’ with a ‘can-do’ attitude (MacDonald 2002: 51). The apparent 
optimism in the slogan endeavoured to enhance civic pride for past  achievements and 
helped to dispel Glasgow’s negative image. There was something profoundly  ironic in 
the ‘Glasgow’s Miles Better’ campaign, considering the long-term economic decline 
and urban malaise that characterized the city for the best part of the twentieth century. 
Nevertheless, it was precisely this new image, sharply contrasting with Glasgow’s past, 
that local authorities sought to promote in order to highlight  the city’s renaissance 
(Maver 2000: 281). 
The perennial problem of unemployment was still present and the negative connotations 
associated with Glasgow were not  easily suppressed in the public consciousness. For all 
this, ‘Glasgow’s Miles Better’ was not solely civic hype. Crucially, it  involved a sense 
of pride for the city’s cultural and artistic heritage and reflected the blossoming of 
cultural activity in the city (Booth & Boyle 1993: 31). Glasgow’s regeneration 
initiatives, and specifically the ‘Glasgow’s Miles Better’ campaign, highlight the 
multiple identities of the city and the conflicting representations encountered by 
outsiders (Charsley 1986). These expose the widely  disparate everyday experiences of 
different parts of the population and create a kaleidoscopic sense of community in the 
city. These images are equally real and range from ‘working-class Glasgow’ to 
‘culturally vibrant metropolis’. 
1.3.3 European City of Culture 1990
The launch of the ‘Glasgow’s Miles Better’ campaign was predicated upon the view that 
the negative image of the city  inhibited inward investment and therefore presented 
obstacles to the process of regeneration. Thus, the marketing of the city through a 
reconstruction of its image aimed to have an immediate and short-term effect that would 
yield much needed long-term economic benefits (Paddison 1993: 346-347). If 
‘Glasgow’s Miles Better’ represented the first step towards recasting the city’s image, 
then the title of ‘European Cultural Capital’ was the culmination of this process and an 
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exposition of Glasgow’s cultural achievements (Booth & Boyle 1993: 32; Boyle & 
Hughes 1991: 220). Glasgow’s designation revealed the powerful ways in which city 
marketing based upon culture and the arts was perceived to have an effect upon 
economic regeneration.14  While previous title-holders such as Athens, Florence, 
Amsterdam, Berlin and Paris had established reputations for their cultural heritages, in 
Glasgow the title was employed to confer a similar status. It was a tool for regeneration 
(García 2005: 843). The strong economic rationale behind this image-making was 
aimed at attracting tourism as well as making the city a more appealing place for living 
and working (Mooney 2004: 329). 
During the 1980s, the opening of various galleries, exhibition spaces, cultural and arts 
institutions, the launch in 1982 of Mayfest, a month long arts festival, and the hosting of 
the International Garden Festival in 1988, facilitated Glasgow’s strategy. The city’s 
successful bid resulted in a year-long celebration of ‘culture’ in 1990, during which 
3,500 events were presented (Myerscough 1991). In comparing the income generated 
with an estimated expenditure of £53.5m, the municipal authorities’ aim to attract 
cultural tourism initially seemed to be successful (Booth & Boyle 1993: 36). In addition 
to the immediate economic benefits, the city now had a good reputation among visitors 
and inhabitants alike (Mooney 2004: 329). 
Although a large proportion of tourists held positive views about Glasgow, the 1990 
event did little to influence public opinion beyond that  or increase the fairly low number 
of those positively inclined to relocate to Glasgow (Paddison 1993: 347). Furthermore, 
there is little evidence indicating that  1990 directly contributed to the local economy, 
much less in the long-term. In fact, its economic benefits have been questioned and it 
has become apparent that the rhetoric of economic development adopted by local 
authorities was translated into low-paid, short-term jobs (García 2005: 861; see also 
Gómez 1998). In citing relevant figures, Mooney argues that renewal strategies have 
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Parkinson (1993), Smith (1996) and Zukin (1982, 1995). For popular music’s role in processes of urban 
change and local economic development, see Cohen (2007). 
actually contributed to the worsening of deprivation and poverty in the city by securing 
low-wage jobs for large segments of the population, thus limiting their prospects (2004: 
333-337). Whereas the effects of the 1990 event appeared not to have made a positive 
impact on the city’s economy, the cultural discourse associated with it presents its most 
sustained legacy (García 2005). But celebrating culture necessitates a definition of what 
‘culture’ is.15 
In the case of Glasgow 1990, local authorities adopted an all-encompassing definition 
ranging from lifestyle and sport to food, science and the arts (Booth & Boyle 1993: 
35-36). It is precisely a utilitarian adoption of culture that fueled reactions against the 
event, notably from Workers City, a group of left-wing activists consisting of local 
artists, celebrities and other public figures (Booth & Boyle 1993; Boyle & Hughes 
1991, 1994; Mooney 2004). The access of the group to local, national and international 
media secured considerable exposure for Workers City’s criticisms, which were 
compiled in two essay collections (McLay  1988, 1990). Their critical opposition can be 
summarized as follows:
[A] concern to stress that the event  has more to do with the interests of capital and 
politics than culture; that  in a bid to re-present Glasgow in a positive light the 
reality of working class life and the richness of its cultural heritage are being 
systematically ignored and thrashed; that  the event  itself will bring no economic 
comfort  for the average Glaswegian; and that  the event is confirmation of the 
willingness of the labour GDC [Glasgow District  Council] to form partnerships 
with the capitalist  system, which is to be regarded as an illegitimate sell out  (Boyle 
& Hughes 1991: 224).
Workers City  cannot be said to have voiced the concerns of the wider Glasgow 
population but the group did stand as the most outspoken critic of the event (ibid. 1994: 
465). At the heart of the debate was the historically fragmented image of the city, torn 
between a deprived working-class population and urban elites. The politicized nature of 
the opposition characterized the conflict over the representation of local identity and its 
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Edinburgh and Glasgow are renowned for promoting ‘culture’, albeit very different types. For a parallel 
portrait of both cities, see Crawford (2013).
‘realness’. Workers City argued that official discourses surrounding the event by and 
large excluded the working classes. Their own conviction was predicated upon the need 
to re-work the past and employ a concept of culture that would be readily translatable to 
Glaswegians, by enabling them to work through their everyday problems. As Paddison 
notes, ‘recasting a post-industrial image for a city  such as Glasgow needs to come to 
terms with its previous existence as an industrial city’ (1993: 348). Damer, a local 
academic associated with the group, contends that  ‘Glasgow’s problem is that it  is a 
workers’ city whose rulers resolutely pretend that it is something else’ (1990: 210). 
Whatever the veracity  and limitations of the claims made by  Workers City might be 
(Booth & Boyle 1993: 39; Mooney 2004: 333), we have seen that the fractured sense of 
the city’s identity has been part  and parcel with its history, and still continues to 
resonate with the reality of contemporary urban living. Thus, the different 
representations of the city’s identity had the political effect of favouring different parts 
of the population (Boyle & Hughes 1991: 227). 
If Glasgow 1990 represents a failure to come to terms with and resolve the city’s social 
problems, it is important to note that the debate was framed in relation to contrasting 
representations and not material concerns. It  was the adoption of a specific definition of 
culture and the meaning of local identity that provoked a political response, rather than 
a conflict  regarding the economic matters pertaining to the event. The symbolic 
reorientation of the city by its leaders cannot be underestimated, as it betrayed a shift in 
what the new Glasgow stood for, namely a city ready to collaborate with capital by 
displacing and marginalizing long-standing cultural traditions (Boyle & Hughes 1994: 
468).16 
This also highlighted the inadequacy of a cultural policy exclusively based upon 
economic criteria and called attention to the risk of conflating economic benefits with 
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Glasgow’s economic development since the 1970s, see Kantor (2000).
cultural ideas. On the one hand, the cultural legacy  of the 1990 event cannot be 
measured with economic figures, and on the other hand, the adoption of a business 
approach to cultural matters may displace ‘culture’ from its supposedly central position 
in culture-led regeneration. The event’s aftermath stresses the need to embed ‘culture’ 
within the dynamics of the different communities comprising the city  and not in 
fabricated images or urban spectacles (Booth & Boyle 1993: 43, 46; García 2005: 
862-863). In other words, if, instead of catering for the enrichment of the city’s artistic 
and cultural life, the aim is purely economic development, then ‘culture’ can easily  be 
replaced by  anything marketable that could yield income. And in the case of Glasgow, 
even this has proven to be a short-term strategy. As García demonstrates (2005: 
860-861), the vibrancy of Glasgow’s creative cultures long preceded the 1990 events, 
and in the years following the city’s designation as European Cultural Capital this 
vibrancy was sustained primarily due to the strong informal artistic networks operating 
in the city.
1.4 Cultural Production
It is within these historical, socioeconomic and political circumstances that cultural 
production was nurtured in the city in the latter half of the twentieth century. Various 
forms of entertainment and artistic production had preceded these more recent 
developments. Nevertheless, it is mainly since the 1970s that Glasgow’s artists and 
musicians, as well as the city’s architectural heritage, gained international recognition. 
During the same period, the informal networks supporting this ongoing activity 
expanded and consolidated their presence in the cultural and social life of the city. 
Although Glasgow is considered to be ‘the industrial, working-class city  par 
excellence’ (Damer 1990: 209), it was the increasing confidence of the industrial and 
commercial middle classes that was reflected in the introduction of new forms of 
recreation (Maver 2000: 100-109). Glasgow had turned to Haussmann’s Paris for the 
mid-nineteenth century regeneration programmes (Edwards 1993: 88-89), and now 
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looked once again to European metropolitan centres, particularly London, for such 
cultural impulses. As early as 1782, the first Theatre Royal opened in Glasgow, 
following tensions that had arisen from the need to establish appropriate forms of 
entertainment for the rapidly increasing population. 
After the turn of the century, the construction of several other theatres and playhouses 
followed, while the monumental Anderson’s City  Theatre, with a capacity  of 5,000, was 
built  in 1845. It was not only theatre that captured the interest of Glaswegians, however. 
Musical activities were also quite popular during this period. Encouraged by the rise of 
evangelicalism and the temperance movement (King 1979), people attended or took part 
in choral music concerts, due to their perceived elevating qualities. These ensembles 
could not meet increasing demand, and the need to stage larger performances led to the 
construction of the Glasgow City Hall and the Queen’s Rooms in 1841 and 1857 
respectively. 
In their interesting historical anthology of first hand observations about everyday life in 
Glasgow, Berry and Whyte write about the passion of Glaswegians for concerts and 
recitals that resulted in regularly packing the City Hall, and which established 
Glasgow’s reputation as a music loving city (1987: 79-81). The establishment of 
McLellan Galleries, the first municipal gallery in Britain, took place in 1856, and in 
1898 the People’s Palace Museum was opened in Glasgow Green. The ‘Second City’s’ 
Art Gallery in Kelvingrove Park opened its doors to the audience for the International 
Exhibition in 1901, around the time when the Glasgow School of Art  was established in 
the city, housed in a building designed by  former student Charles Rennie Mackintosh 
(Kaplan 1996). In the meantime, the ‘Glasgow Boys’, a collective of local painters, had 
already acquired fame both at home and abroad since the 1880s (Billcliffe 1985). 
The first chain of cinemas, named ‘Picturedromes’, was already operating in the city  by 
1911. During wartime, cinemas and music halls had gained wider popularity over other 
forms of entertainment (Maver 2000: 195; see also Peter 1996). More than sixteen 
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theatres were built before the First World War and over a hundred cinemas were in 
business by the 1930s. However, it was dancing and the culture of the ballrooms that 
made a distinctive contribution to the city’s vibrancy before and during the mid-century 
(Casciani 1994). By the 1920s, Glasgow had eleven ballrooms and seventy smaller 
dance halls, more than anywhere else in Britain. The Barrowlands ballroom, which 
opened in 1934 in the East End of the city, burned down in 1958 and was re-erected in 
1960, is currently used for live music concerts, but stands as a reminder of that era. 
Although ballroom dancing was highly popular, it was not  the only form of dancing 
available in the city during this period (see Frith et al 2013), while the subsequent 
proliferation of new musical trends resulted in ballroom dancing fading out by  the 
1970s.17 
Towards the end of the century, the rediscovery of Mackintosh’s architectural heritage 
strengthened the conservation movement and became a prime tourist attraction, thus 
bringing into focus the city’s architectural legacy, including the work of Alexander 
‘Greek’ Thomson (McFadzean 1979; Stamp & McKinstry 1994), among others. Civic 
leaders and local elites continued to boast  the city’s international profile and Glasgow at 
the turn of the millennium enjoyed an established reputation as a cultural centre. The art 
gallery that houses the internationally  renowned Burrell Collection was opened in 1983 
(Marks 1983), the Centre of Contemporary  Arts which succeeded the Third Eye centre 
was established in 1992 and the Gallery of Modern Art (GoMa) in 1996. 
A host of local writers emerged during the 1980s and 1990s (Burgess 1998), with James 
Kelman winning the Booker Prize for fiction in 1994. Today, Glasgow is home to the 
Scottish Opera, the Scottish Ballet, the Royal Scottish National Orchestra, the BBC 
Scottish Symphony  Orchestra, the National Youth Orchestra, the Citizen’s Theatre and 
the Royal Conservatoire of Scotland. Combined with an array  of other performing arts 
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organizations and institutions, as well as a substantial number of live performance 
venues, theatres, galleries and exhibition spaces, the strong presence of music and arts 
in the city is indisputable. 
Though the city’s cultural heritage largely  maps onto the social, economic and spatial 
divisions that characterized its urban history, the undocumented activities of individuals 
and groups from varying backgrounds engaging in local cultural production cannot be 
neatly separated from established or high-profile institutions. The grassroots artist and 
musician-led projects, spaces and events have formed the bedrock of the city’s art and 
music scenes and have fueled a continuous activity that cemented Glasgow’s reputation 
as a culturally vibrant place. However, and this is a conviction that runs through this 
thesis, it is the plural relationship, interpenetration, continuity  and overlap between 
grassroots practices and the more established art and music worlds that  foster Glasgow’s 
distinctive cultural outlook. This relationship has not always been positive, but it is 
precisely issues of exclusion that have sparked cultural countercurrents, as I shall 
demonstrate.
Lowndes (2010) provides a social history  of such grassroots practices in an effort  to 
redress the balance between the critical attention given to established local artists and 
the lack of commentary on the emergence and work of several prolific artists and 
musicians that have operated in the city  over the past few decades.18 As already  pointed 
out, such a distinction is quite ambiguous, as a number of local artists and musicians 
have made the transition from obscurity to fame precisely through their engagement in, 
and dedication to, the local grassroots networks. The general transition of the Glasgow 
arts scene from ‘emergent’ in the 1980s to ‘established’ in the 2000s, is reflected in the 
recent success of several local artists and musicians (ibid.: 10). For example, Glasgow-
born, Glasgow-educated or Glasgow-based artists have won or have been nominated for 
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the Turner Prize,19  while a constant stream of nationally or internationally successful 
bands have emerged since the mid-1990s.20 
Lowndes’s account traces the history and work of local poets, playwrights and literary 
figures, such as Edwin Morgan, Alexander Trocchi and John McGrath, as well as a 
series of artists, many of whom were associated with the Glasgow School of Art (GSA). 
Lowndes also describes the proliferation of music venues, artist-led spaces, studios and 
galleries, such as Transmission; the advent and local appropriations of different music 
genres, for example northern soul, punk and post-punk, as well as dance music and 
some of its exponents, such as Optimo;21 and finally, the emergence of Variant and other 
grassroots publications. 
This is not an exhaustive list and it would be impossible to chart the different 
circumstances and the important role of a large number of individuals and groups that 
gave rise to this wealth of cultural activity. However, it is possible to discern some 
general characteristics that have left a sustained legacy and engendered an êthos of 
grassroots art and music practice. Thus, it  is not a coincidence that the second edition of 
Lowndes’s out-of-print book, which became available half-way through my fieldwork, 
included a new chapter (under a section titled ‘New Directions’) that briefly  mentioned 
all three music actors included in this thesis (Lowndes 2010: 406-407).
Without  a doubt, the success of specific artists and musicians in the locality  has 
functioned as a catalyst for the recruitment of individuals in music and the arts. 
Moreover, I was struck by the continuous presence of highly-regarded local artists and 
musicians at  the small-scale gigs I attended. Even more striking was not only  their 
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19  Winners of the Turner Prize from Glasgow include Douglas Gordon (1996), Simon Starling (2005), 
Richard Wright (2009), Susan Phillipsz (2010) and Martin Boyce (2011). 
20  The Yummy Fur,  Belle and Sebastian, The Delgados, Mogwai and Arab Strap, among others. More 
recently Camera Obscura, Travis, Glasvegas and Franz Ferdinand, two members of which had joined 
The Yummy Fur before disbanding in 1999.
21  Optimo club nights represented something of a cultural institution in Glasgow, while one of their 
members had been instrumental in the development of the Edinburgh club scene during the 1990s.
presence and interaction with other musicians and audience members, but their 
contributions to these events. For example, it was not difficult to come across somebody 
giving a hand at the door or DJing at these events.22  I was indeed surprised and 
intrigued by the fact that successful and relatively  affluent cultural producers would 
nevertheless continue to reside in Glasgow and not relocate to cities such as London. 
These contributions extended beyond hands-on support. Notably, facilitating and 
supporting the cultivation of local talent pervaded the attitude of many of the more 
established figures. The band Mogwai, for example, had built their own studio locally 
and had launched their own label (Rock Action). The label had signed Remember 
Remember and Errors, among others. One of their members’ ex-wife, Eileen, who ran 
Synergy Concerts, regularly  hosted bands from the DiY cohort. Then, Optimo released 
Divorce’s first single (Chapter 4), while Gerard (see below and Chapters 3 & 6), who 
along with his band El Hombre Trajeado was an important actor in the mid-1990s 
pinnacle of the local independent music scene, retained strong ties with the local DiY 
network. This efflorescence, concurrent with the advent of ‘post-rock’, revolved mainly 
around the success of Chemikal [sic] Underground record label, which is owned by  The 
Delgados and has released music from Bis, Mogwai and Arab Strap, among others. 
Gerard, who was a close friend of members of Franz Ferdinand – perhaps the best 
known band to emerge from Glasgow in the last decade – had explained to me that 
during their early  years their singer was a core and dedicated member of the DiY 
network. Franz Ferdinand famously played their initial gigs in the ‘Chateau’, a 
dilapidated warehouse in the Gorbals that was transformed into an unlicensed, self-run 
gallery and music venue. After being raided by the police, the Chateau was moved to a 
disused Victorian courtroom and jailhouse in the East End. The Chateau later became an 
artists’ collective but its initial use also provided inspiration for the launch of similar 
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22 I met Richard Wright at one event,  I have seen David Shrigley – a local artist nominated for the 2013 
Turner Prize – attending and DJing at Cry Parrot events (Chapter 5), while members of Mogwai, Arab 
Strap and other bands have had a regular presence in small-scale events.
projects, such as the more business-oriented Studio Warehouse Glasgow (SWG3), a 
music and art studios complex (Lowndes 2010: 379-380; see also Chapter 5).
These multi-layered and diversified activities are indicative of the cross-pollination 
between music and the arts locally. Many  of my informants were artists themselves 
(Chapter 4), appreciated the contribution of the arts to the city and to the development 
of a DiY êthos (Chapter 3), or sought to implant an artistic dimension to music events 
(Chapter 5). Such a crossover is painstakingly  documented by Lowndes, who identifies, 
following LeWitt  (1969), an ‘idea chain’ as one of the main characteristics of the ways 
in which grassroots music and art have operated in the city (2010: 419). As products of 
creative labour, many of these events lacked a commodity  value, and their actual value 
existed in their capacity to inspire others to take up similar projects. While grassroots 
practices did not fit  a specific model or blueprint, their legacy of a DiY êthos and their 
influence on subsequent generations of artists and musicians have been profound. With 
regards to music specifically, there have been various examples of local bands, music 
collectives and record labels whose character resembled, was echoed in, or at least  had 
implicitly  influenced the nature of my  informants’ practices. These precursors stretch 
back to the 1970s.23
Although atypical, one such example was the short-lived but well-known Postcard 
Records founded by Alan Horne in 1979 (Reynolds 2005: 343-360). Despite its 
moderate independent success, Postcard was nevertheless a grassroots operation and the 
outlet for local and Edinburgh bands.24  Its melodic musical inclinations and the 
associated bands’ playful and innocent outlook went on to influence a generation of 
musicians in the city  and beyond. The informal organization of the label and its musical 
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23 Some notable bands from Glasgow or nearby towns in that period include The Sensational Alex Harvey 
Band, Deacon Blue,  Del Amitri,  Simple Minds, Teenage Fanclub, Jesus and Mary Chain,  The Vaselines 
and Primal Scream.
24  For example, Orange Juice, Josef K and Aztec Camera, were all signed to Postcard. Along with the 
NME C86 cassette-tape compilation, they played a decisive role in the emergence of indie-pop.  The C86 
compilation featured several Scottish bands, among whom The Pastels, whose guitarist and vocalist 
currently co-runs the independent record shop Monorail.
reaction to the period’s dominant sounds provided a set of characteristics evident in 
subsequent local record labels.25
The emergence of the Glasgow Music Collective (GMC) in 1991 marked another 
important moment in Glasgow’s ‘Do-it-Yourself’ music history. GMC organized regular 
gigs for local and touring bands and their aim was to retain control of their own 
entertainment, by operating outside of what they perceived as the ‘corrupt’ music 
industry (Lowndes 2010: 160). They saw their modus operandi as having a political 
aspect, and according to Gerard – one of the collective’s founding members – GMC 
would run parallel to several local bands, such as Dawson and Dog Faced Hermans. 
The collective regularly utilized 13th Note for shows.26 They disbanded in a sad manner 
in 2002 (ibid.: 346). 
Alongside GMC and these bands, which also included The Mackenzies, Whirling Pig 
Dervish, Badgewearer and Archbishop Kebab, a local band called Stretchheads were 
active in the city  between 1987 and 1992 (Robb 2009: 285-292). Their name was 
repeatedly mentioned by my informants as one of the bands that had made an impact on 
them. Its short  lifespan included the release of two albums and various singles. The 
band initially promoted their own shows and according to their singer: ‘We definitely 
didn’t have ideas of being on a major. Doing independent music and playing with bands 
that we liked or inspired us was all we wanted’ (ibid.: 291). Members of Stretchheads, 
as well as the aforementioned bands, are now involved in other musical projects and 
have fostered links with younger local musicians. 
The demise of GMC and the absence of similar endeavours were felt  locally  and 
ultimately  gave rise to Nuts and Seeds (NaS), a DiY music collective, partially 
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25 In reaction to rock machismo and punk’s angst, sensitivity became subversive, according to Reynolds 
(2005: 344). Ironically, it was precisely this mellow sound aesthetic that Divorce sought to oppose 
(Introduction).
26 Between 1992-1998 the venue was situated on Glassford Street, before relocating to King Street. For 
the history of the 13th Note, see Lowndes (2010).
consisting of several GSA graduates (Lowndes 2010: 400-403). NaS started in 2002 and 
continued from where GMC had left off. However, they too ceased activities shortly 
after I began my fieldwork because some of its core members had decided to move 
away from Glasgow. Nonetheless, the seed had already been planted, and Winning 
Sperm Party, Cry Parrot and others followed in their steps. As it will become apparent 
(Chapters 3 & 5), my informants’ practices were largely influenced by  the collective’s 
êthos, which was exemplified in a published ‘about us’ statement:
The door prices are kept  affordable and the bands are paid well in order to support 
a sustainable and ethical network for live music. Costs are kept  low and bands are 
fed, paid and given a decent  place to sleep. All the money made on the door goes to 
covering costs and paying the bands and consequently there are no guest lists. 
Every effort  is made to keep music inclusive, cheap, anti-elitist and fun. Nuts and 
Seeds frown upon the following: Attempts to enter gigs without paying the door fee 
(rarely in excess of 4 pounds) because you work for music press/a record label/
music publishing organization etc. Deluded aspirations to major label stardom 
leaving the magnanimous and good willed trampled in your wake. Taking down 
our posters. Nuts and Seeds will not take down your posters.27
To the aforementioned examples, we should add the constant influx of sounds and 
touring bands, which, at times, may have been more important in shaping the music and 
approach of local cultural producers. Similarly, despite the fact that this thesis does not 
deal with Glasgow’s various ethnic minorities (see Edward 2008 [1993]) and their 
musical heritage, it cannot be overlooked that the city’s history of heavy 
industrialization had created from early  on a sense of ‘cosmopolitanism’ that  was rare in 
most British provincial cities. It has been argued that:
[T]he pace, scale and impact of industrialization forged urban heterogeneity that 
was to become manifest  in an artistic community that  combined the best of 
European, English, lowland Scots and Gaelic culture. Moreover, the commercial 
development  of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries brought further cultural 
variety to the city, from Eastern Europe, from Italy, from the United States; and 
most recently from the Indian sub-continent (Booth & Boyle 1993: 23).28
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27 Retrieved from http://www.myspace.com/nutsseeds [Accessed 27 May 2012].
28  For only one example, Glasgow boasted a considerable country music fan base revolving mainly 
around the Grand Ole Opry music venue.
Although the presence of individuals from different ethnic backgrounds in the DiY 
cohort was not strong, a non-British element was occasionally  apparent. This was 
particularly due to the large number of incoming students, some of whom studied at  the 
GSA (Chapter 4). 
All these musically, culturally  and operationally diverse examples testify  to the fact that 
my informants had at their disposal an array of established paths to follow, emulate or 
avoid. However, this is only  part of the story, and perceiving the intensity of cultural 
activities as being triggered by individual cases or successes risks distorting a much 
more complex and multi-layered reality. Similarly, the increasing number of venues, 
galleries and other music and art-related spaces has provided many opportunities for the 
flourishing of different activities, but they  have also been the direct outcome of those 
activities, without which the viability of many small venues and galleries would be in 
doubt. 
The extent to which grassroots music and art in Glasgow was sustained and nurtured by 
the sheer determination of groups and individuals can be demonstrated by the long-
standing ‘tradition’ of local cultural producers forging links with other individuals and 
institutions outside the locality. In turn, this reflects the relative lack of appropriate 
infrastructure in Glasgow, as opposed to other cities such as London, something that 
would serve as the backbone of a healthy and evolving music industry (Williamson et al 
2003). 
This has done as much to inhibit  as to promote music and art-making in the city, both of 
which have been subsequently molded by a substantial degree of creative initiative and 
self-reliance. As Lowndes’s account demonstrates (2010), the grassroots nature of much 
local cultural activity has been equally  determined by the lack of an established market 
and media exposure. This has ensured a certain degree of (by no means complete) 
insularity and independence from funders and taste-makers alike. The expectation of 
making a living from one’s art or music was not ingrained within a mindset  geared 
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towards anti-commercialism and instead oriented towards a collaborative approach in 
producing music and art. Such an approach has been encouraged by the city’s relatively 
small size, as well as its provincial character, which facilitates collective activity and the 
focused and uninterrupted creative work of individuals. 
Although Glasgow’s grassroots music scene regularly  features in non-specialist 
journalistic accounts (e.g. Porter 2004; Nicholson 2009), its protagonists have managed 
to stay  under the radar of mainstream publicity  for the most part. Indeed, the majority  of 
these activities remain undocumented due to their ephemeral character. However, the 
lack of momentum in the media – whose largely retrospective accounts fail to capture 
contemporary  developments in-the-making – does not translate into these events and 
activities being of lesser importance to the groups of people that witness them or make 
them happen. It is exactly  these close-knit groups and particularly their mutual desire to 
make things happen that supports and runs through their creative endeavours.
Several bands and artists have achieved considerable fame and commercial success, and 
have sparked the interest of younger generations by contributing to local cultural 
mythology. This thesis does not focus upon such examples, because it  is the vast 
number of undocumented creative practices that in reality sustain and support cultural 
production in the city  in conjunction with established local actors and institutions. The 
question of whether a small segment of local actors, whose practices and views are 
discussed in subsequent chapters, will ‘make it’ (Cohen 1991), does not form part of my 
ethnographic examination. 
After all, this appeared to be irrelevant to the musicians and other actors’ motivations 
for engaging in music practices in the first place. Neither this nor the lack of appropriate 
infrastructure preclude the possibility  (or the desire for that matter) of success. As 
Lowndes puts it: ‘The outlook of these individuals has been informed less by an 
absence of financial constraints, than by a refusal to let those constraints limit their 
ambitions’ (2010: 419-420). However, these ambitions for numerous local musicians 
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and artists have been shaped by a history of creative practice in the city that, at  times, 
seemed to have taken place for its own sake, with long-term, material-oriented 
objectives being of secondary importance.
1.5 Towards a Local Êthos
In this chapter I have attempted to outline the historical, economic and political 
processes that have shaped Glasgow. The heterogeneity of the place and the 
forcefulness of urban change render generalizations impossible (Berry & Whyte 1987: 
4). The unpredictable quality of the city is reflected in its urban fabric and an ever 
changing outlook, which essentially  renders the history of Glasgow a history of change. 
From early on, Glasgow combined the best and the worst characteristics of urban living 
and served as a telling example of the uneasy and conflicting realities of industrial 
capitalism. As such, Glasgow has been a ‘dual city’ for a long time and, therefore, the 
co-existence of a regenerated ‘cultural’ city centre alongside peripheral housing estates 
inhabited by  disadvantaged populations is the culmination of a process deeply 
embedded in local history (Danson & Mooney 1998; Mooney & Danson 1997). If this 
distinction fails to grasp and account for the complexities of lived experience and how 
the two worlds interpenetrate in everyday  life, it  is certain that these two extremes exist 
in the city, both concretely and figuratively (as shown in the example of Workers City). 
This nexus between ‘culture’ and privation, development and exclusion, wealth and 
unemployment, hard living conditions and pride, is what gives Glasgow its distinctive 
character and informs the city’s attitude to the world. For all the uncomfortable realities 
and the seemingly juxtaposed differences between the privileged and the less well-off 
Glaswegians in different parts of the city, let us not forget that Glasgow does not  exist in 
a vacuum. Glasgow means different things to different people, and there are series of 
demarcations amongst the city dwellers beyond income indicators, ranging from 
religious (Gallagher 1987) to class differences (see above). Where other characteristics, 
such as accent, come into play, it has been noted that there is a tendency, as a defensive 
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mechanism towards outsiders, to submerge local identity within a broader image of 
Scottishness, and it is more likely to contrast that image with an English identity, rather 
than engage in inter-local comparisons (Charsley 1986: 179, 181). 
In the 1997 referendum, 84 percent of Glaswegians voted in favour of a Scottish 
parliament, the second highest vote in the country (Maver 2000: 248-249). Yet, although 
Scotland is no longer a ‘stateless’ nation (McCrone 1992), the extent to which 
devolution has facilitated or can contribute towards the development of a music industry 
sensitive to local concerns remains to be seen (Symon & Cloonan 2002). Whatever such 
music policy  might be (see Cloonan 2007; Williamson et al 2003), local ‘culture’ should 
feature prominently in it. Clearly, the question of whether an economically successful 
Scottish band actually is or should be ‘Scottish’, in the sense that  it appeals to a regional 
or national identity, is ambiguous (Frith 1996a; Symon 1997; Williamson et al 2003). 
For Glasgow, bringing musical culture to the foreground would primarily  involve not 
intervention, but support for the vibrant informal networks of musicians already  based 
in the city. 
I hope to have shown that individual success and the backbone of local music and 
creativity have been historically  rooted in the cooperation of individuals making music 
not necessarily for profit, and that this êthos embodied cultural conceptions as well as 
pragmatic responses to everyday circumstances. The existence of prestigious 
institutions or historical antecedents, and the relative lack of accessible musical 
infrastructures foreclose music-making because they do not practically  impinge upon or 
cater for the everyday, creative needs of many. But as we have seen, they  also facilitate 
creativity because they anticipate without determining or channeling these practices. 
This is reinforced through communication and occasional collaboration between both 
sides (but not the ends) of the spectrum. Williamson, Cloonan and Frith close their 
report on the status and the future of the Scottish music industry  with the following 
words:
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[W]e have been concerned here primarily with the problems of developing the 
Music industry in Scotland – hence the emphasis on business practice. But  if, as we 
suggest, a healthy music economy is dependent on a healthy music culture, then 
policy should be concerned not just with business growth, and changing the way 
things are done, but also with people’s ability to make a living from music without 
being ambitious to change their lives. As a cultural industry music is unique – and 
uniquely important  – because so much of its commercial success depends on 
people making and listening to music for its own sake, without economic concerns 
at all (2003: 127-128).
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Chapter 2: Music, Ethics and the City
2.1 Music in Culture and Music as Culture
The transient and intangible nature of sound presents particular challenges to the 
ethnographic description of music. This is reflected in and further intensified by the 
apparent lack of analytical tools that would sufficiently  account for this cultural form. 
Western musicology has been at the forefront of the academic discourse, but the 
analysis of musical works – of music as text – is predicated upon ethnocentric 
definitions and assumptions. Crucially, it fails to address how music is practiced and 
experienced within social settings and everyday life. In other words, it conceals the 
social relationships and practices that music constitutes and which constitute it. This 
thesis, therefore, begins from the premise that music is prima facie a social practice and 
process, which engages actors beyond what we would designate as ‘musicians’. As 
Christopher Small has argued, the participants in ‘musicking’ are anyone engaged in 
any capacity in a musical performance (1998: 9).
Further difficulties arise from the Western definition of music ‘as any communicational 
practice which organizes sound in terms of pitch, duration, timbre and loudness’ (Stokes 
1996: 383). Music cannot be disentangled from its multiple functions, which are always 
culturally sensitive (McLeod 1974: 107). Moreover, it would be inappropriate – indeed 
ethnocentric – to attempt a definition of music that disregards indigenous categories. 
Certain forms of speech, such as the Maori haka, are considered music, while in Middle 
Eastern contexts, the chanting of passages from the Qur’an is never classified as 
‘singing’ but as recitation, because ‘music’ and ‘song’ connote immorality  (Stokes 1996: 
384; cf. Hirschkind 2006: 35). Furthermore, various indigenous conceptions of music 
do not necessarily  correspond with the Western assumption that music and dance are 
interrelated but essentially separate entities (Kaeppler 1978: 33). Therefore, a definition 
of music should not depend upon its formal properties, but on how people perceive and 
make use of it (Finnegan 1989: 7).
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It is striking to observe that, even within anthropology, the study of popular music (now 
an emerging discipline in its own right) has been both peripheral and irregular. 
Undoubtedly, treating music as an abstraction and an idealised form rather than an 
embedded and widespread cultural practice has inhibited the flourishing of 
anthropological research on the topic (McLeod 1974: 107). Although music reflects 
important ethnographic and theoretical questions concerning power, agency, identity 
and personhood, to name but a few, an anthropological approach has been quite modest 
(Mahon 2000: 467-468). While the ethnographic initiation of music into anthropology 
has been slow to emerge, the neighbouring discipline of ethnomusicology introduced 
anthropology into music.
It was not until ethnomusicologist  Alan Merriam published his influential book, The 
Anthropology of Music (1964), that the academic study of music turned to the 
examination of music as social practice and process. Merriam suggested that an 
anthropological apparatus could illuminate cultural aspects and meanings hitherto 
underplayed or obscured by the established practices of abstracting musical works from 
their social settings and human behaviour, and by treating music as a ‘product’. He 
defined ethnomusicology as the study of music in culture and devised a multi-layered 
approach through a simple threefold model, involving ‘conceptualization about music, 
behavior in relation to music, and music sound itself’ (ibid.: 32). Merriam’s 
groundbreaking contribution paved the way for scholars without musical backgrounds 
and successfully outlined the ways in which music could fit  into the project of 
anthropology. 
A more dynamic approach is demonstrated by Anthony  Seeger’s Why Suyá Sing (1987), 
an ethnographic account of the Suyá Indians in Mato Grosso, Brazil, and specifically  of 
their performance of the Mouse Ceremony. The ceremony lasts fourteen days, during 
which notions of space and time, as well as human relationships are enacted and 
rearticulated through singing. This marks a shift from Merriam’s formulation of music 
in culture to the study of music as culture. Rather than music being perceived as part of 
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the culture in question, a musical anthropology, as Seeger suggests, ‘studies social life 
as a performance’ and conceives music as a fundamental process, which not only 
reflects pre-existing contexts, structures and values, but also generates and affects 
society and culture (1987: xiii-xiv).
But how are we to make sense of and employ the idea that society and culture happen 
‘in music’, in late-capitalist environments where ‘[m]usic often seems to do little more 
than fill a silence left by something else’ (Stokes 1994: 2)? And yet, as Stokes argues, 
and as DeNora (2000) has shown, it would be hard to imagine our everyday lives 
without the presence of music. Not only does music provide the background or the 
soundtrack to our busy  lives, but it is an intrinsic dimension of the way we live and 
conduct ourselves in different contexts. For Stokes (1994), this becomes particularly 
evident in music’s capacity to inform, transform, evoke, construct, contest and negotiate 
a sense of place and thus to locate subjects in space. As such, music, space and place 
should be seen as interconnected (Connell & Gibson 2003). Therefore, my  initial 
premise should be complemented by the conviction that music – in both urban and rural 
environments – is also a spatial practice.
Music also ‘moves’ us. By this, I do not only mean that music has an emotional effect 
but, as any listener or performer knows, that music engages and envelops our bodies in 
ways unmatched by any other entity. Whether playing, listening or dancing to music, 
sound organizes bodies and orchestrates movement. Music demands attention: the body 
cannot escape it because sound vibrates and penetrates it – music affects bodies. Thus, 
music also emerges as an intrinsically bodily practice.
This seems, to me, a way to study the musical qualities of music practices, that is, how 
sound ‘in itself’ has the ability to elicit specific bodily states and articulate sensory and 
affective registers that  condition and inform our corporeal engagements with the social 
world. This also addresses the long-standing (and still present) bias in ethnomusicology, 
whereby a competent ethnographer is expected to have musical skills, if not a 
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participating musician within the culture he or she studies. It further challenges the 
anthropological assumption that studying music per se results in ‘many compelling 
anthropological and theoretical questions’ being ‘swept to the sidelines’ (Bigenho 2008: 
28). 
For sure, musical analysis is not the anthropologist’s craft and I agree with Bigenho that 
the privileging of music, which is consonant with music’s perceived ‘special’ nature, is 
a drawback. Ultimately, anthropologists are not  ethnomusicologists. To expect an 
anthropologist to extract meaning from musical notation would be a category error. 
Therefore, although musicological analysis would be relevant, it is beyond the scope of 
this thesis, as well as my own scope of knowledge. Nevertheless, this does not preclude 
us from approaching the social in terms of the ‘musical’. Indeed, sound can be a 
meaningful object of anthropological analysis in and of itself (e.g. Feld 1996; Samuels 
et al 2010).
While it may address music as culture, anthropology cannot lose sight of the 
overlapping levels of meaning that frame music-making. Some of the best 
anthropological treatments of Western popular music testify to this (Cohen 1991; 
Finnegan 1989). Therefore, in what follows, my arguments borrow insights from across 
the range of disciplines within which the consideration of music as a form of practice 
has been prevalent. Even within anthropology, music features prominently in the 
writings of ethnographers grappling with such diverse topics as ritual, technology, 
affect, or the city. In each case, music emerges as an important site for the articulation 
of meaning, social reproduction and agency. In their analyses, anthropologists have 
engaged the practico-material circumstances that  facilitate music-making, as well as the 
social and cultural values that mobilize actors and make music possible. 
But what my fieldwork in Glasgow taught me goes further than this. My  informants’ 
involvement in music was not confined to what  one would call ‘leisure’. Rather than 
being set apart from more ‘serious’ engagements, DiY music activity  was a fundamental 
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part of their lives and it was conceived of as an ethical practice. This focus on being 
‘ethical’ did not nullify the primary reason for making music, namely ‘fun’ and 
pleasure.  Instead, this primary motivation and an ethical perspective were interlinked. 
Upon my arrival in Glasgow (after a short trip  on the train), I did not anticipate that the 
chain of events described in the Introduction would turn my attention to the association 
of music with ethics. 
Even during my increasing familiarity with the DiY êthos I did not readily make the 
connection between music and virtuous action. Only after repeated observations and 
verbal exchanges did music practices start to gradually unfold as ethical practices. I 
began to see clearly  that music-making embodied an ethical dimension and a form of 
self-cultivation that was an intrinsic modality  of my informants’ social lives. Ever since 
punk, DiY’s claim to an ‘alternative’ music culture and mode of being stood for a 
different ethics, which was ostensibly in conflict with the established norms (of the 
music industry and society at large). 
But this was exactly  the reason for my initial ethnographic shortsightedness, namely 
that the conflation between a music ‘culture’ and its ethics made it  difficult to pinpoint 
what was ethical about it. This argument is not something new. In fact, it is precisely the 
same observation that has recently sparked an ‘ethical turn’ in anthropology. As James 
Laidlaw has succinctly pointed out (2002), one of the effects of the Durkheimian legacy 
was to paralyze and preclude any  anthropological attempts to study ethics. For 
Durkheim, society was morality (1953 [1906], 1957 [1937]). It follows that, either 
anthropologists have been studying ethics all along, or that there was no way  of 
distinguishing the ethical from the social in order to address the former 
ethnographically. The truth lies somewhere in between, but it is only  recently that 
anthropology decidedly  turned its attention to ethics as a distinctive field of inquiry. 
This has spurred an array of anthropological accounts in diverse contexts and on 
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variable themes. However, ethnographic data explicitly on music and ethics is lacking, 
both within and outside of anthropology.29 
❊❊❊❊❊❊
The remainder of this chapter begins with the examination of various ethnographic 
approaches to music, paying particular attention to works that have influenced my 
approach. A number of relevant works are reserved for consideration in subsequent 
chapters. I continue with an overview of the main conceptual frameworks currently 
available in social-scientific literature for the study and representation of music 
collectivities. I will suggest  that, despite their analytical virtues, they  fail to grasp the 
nuances of everyday music practice and to account for the notion of ‘the local’ as an 
ethical dimension of social life. Finnegan’s (1989) concept of ‘pathways’ seems to 
capture aspects missed in other approaches, by  cutting through the structure/agency 
dualism and by allowing me to embed processes of ethical transformation and becoming 
within a spatial framework. 
The discussion then proceeds to examine the anthropological literature on ethics. 
Specifically, I will provide a detailed outline of contemporary approaches to what is 
essentially  an emerging field, by clarifying my use of the terms and by  highlighting the 
importance of the ideas of ethical cultivation, freedom and virtuous practice for my 
ethnographic description. Finally, I will conclude this chapter by  arguing that music 
practice constituted my  informants’ means to assert their presence on the musical and 
urban terrain of Glasgow. The effort to realize an ethical self through music practice 
was predicated upon an intense interaction with the urban environment and culminated 
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29 To the best of my knowledge, the only exception is an unpublished PhD dissertation on punk in Leeds 
and Bradford (Gordon 2005). Gordon narrows his approach to ‘DiY punk ethics’, and he is preoccupied 
with issues of purity and authenticity and not with questions of ethical cultivation. Gordon is not clear 
about his definition of ‘ethics’. From his account and the description of conflicts between different punk 
ethics we could discern that he identifies it with the ‘values’, ‘habits’  and ‘conduct’  of participants in the 
punk ‘scenes’ he studied.
in the ‘musical’ production and transformation of urban spaces. This helps us to start 
conceptualizing music-making in the city as a distinctively urban practice.
2.2 Ethnographies of Music
The relationship  between anthropology and music, although limited in comparison with 
other subfields such as kinship or religion, has produced a vibrant body of work. This 
attests to the multifarious meanings of music cross-culturally  and underscores the 
discipline’s distinctive potential to contribute to our understanding of music as a social 
and cultural actuality. This by no means exhaustive review cites works that demonstrate 
thematic overlap and grapple with multiple issues, something which unavoidably 
renders my classification somewhat arbitrary.30 
I include certain ethnographic examples from ethnomusicology, sociology, cultural 
studies and popular music studies for the plain reason that the academic study of music 
has been quite plentiful in these disciplines. These studies’ valuable insights have and 
could in the future benefit anthropological approaches to music. This corpus of 
culturally diverse ethnographies exemplifies the complexity of the nexus between music 
and social life and demonstrates an understanding of music as a site for the creative 
appropriation, negotiation and articulation of meaning. This contrasts with a definition 
of music as a mass-mediated cultural form lacking artistic quality and targeting passive 
consumers, as opposed to the ideal of an ‘authentic’, ‘high’ art (Horkheimer & Adorno 
1972 [1944]).
The performance paradigm and its expressive symbolisms has taught us that music 
performances reveal overlapping levels of meaning that have to be examined in situ 
(Turner 1969, 1977, 1983, 1988). Strikingly, because music performances involve the 
active participation of audiences, the artificial performer/audience divide has been 
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30  For a comprehensive overview of relevant anthropological approaches, see Feld and Fox (1994), 
Kaeppler (1978), Mahon (2000), McLeod (1974), Samuels et al (2010) and Stokes (2004).
challenged. For example, Finnegan demonstrates how in the classical music world, the 
formal, silent posture and the lack of bodily  movement on the part of audience members 
does not constitute a passive behaviour, but rather a necessary component of successful 
performances (1989: 152). In other ethnographic contexts this idea is made explicit. The 
intense interaction between blues performers and audiences has been documented by 
Keil (1966), while music spectatorship  per se has been recently  scrutinized within the 
context of ‘indie’ music in Britain (Fonarow 2006). 
Keil demonstrates the crucial role of audiences and how their communication with 
performers symbolically expressed ideas important for the black community. Fonarow’s 
ethnography considers gig participation as a conversion narrative and an embodied 
metaphor for the ritual transformation of ‘physically and emotionally exuberant youth to 
Protestant adulthood’ (2006: 182). Thus, apart from the apparent disintegration of the 
boundary between performers and audiences, the interaction that takes place in music 
events embodies and disseminates certain ideas, values and meanings. This was also 
evident in my own research, where audience comportment and interaction with the 
bands was articulated upon mutually shared affects and etiquette (Chapter 4).31 Besides, 
the dissolution of this boundary  was readily observable in the sense that, quite 
frequently, various audience members were performing on the night, while the spatial 
boundary separating stage and audience area was virtually non-existent.
The articulation and expression of meaning in music events and the affirmation of group 
values highlight music’s association with ritual. Although my argument diverges from 
Fonarow’s connection between popular music and ritual, there have been notable 
studies about the conjunction of musical forms and bodily movements as parts of 
shamanistic and spiritual practices (e.g. Laderman 1991; Moyle 2007; Rouget 1985). 
The association of drumming with transition between different ritual states, as well as 
the intrinsic role of music and dance in ritual, have been stressed by Needham (1967) 
74
31  This echoes the musical-aesthetic notion of ṭarab (Racy 2003).  In the context of Arab musical 
traditions, ṭarab encapsulates a musically induced ‘ecstacy’ and the intersubjective nature of musical 
performances, engendered through the mutual contribution of performers and audiences.
and Bloch (1989) respectively. Finally, the choreographic and rhythmical aspects of 
ritual are the main themes of Gell’s essay on Umeda dance (1985). Despite the 
importance of the aforementioned works, Kaeppler recently noted that anthropological 
research on the relationship between bodily movement and ritual structure has been 
quite limited (2010: 263).  
McLeod argues that the behavioural constraints that music imposes and its subsequent 
association with comportment in ritual – which itself requires a high degree of 
redundancy – present a double paradox (1974: 110-111). First, music is largely used in 
recreational contexts that presuppose a lesser degree of austerity and rigidity. Second, 
recreational music often conveys social critique and focuses upon conflict and 
uncertainty rather than the affirmation of social order. In the face of uncertainty, 
McLeod continues, music serves to mediate between individuals and their dealings 
within adverse circumstances by attempting to bring the latter into an intelligible form. 
Thus, it  would be more correct to perceive music as a mechanism for dealing with 
uncertainty, rather than the means to support  and reproduce established norms. The 
performance conventions of DiY music events cannot be seen as forms of redundant, 
ritualistic behaviour. This is not due to their ‘messy’ or ‘shambolic’ character (Chapter 
3), but because they followed irregular patterns, the fluidity  of which reflected ethical 
concerns. 
As I will argue in Chapter 4, music is first and foremost an affective experience that 
engages the body in its totality. An influential contribution at the nexus between music, 
body and dance is John Blacking’s work (e.g. 1977, 1979), which examines the 
corporeal qualities that underpin musical ability and performance within an analytical 
framework of the body. Blacking’s writings have been instrumental in the emergence of 
the anthropology of dance (see Grau 1993).32  Music’s capacity to invoke emotions and 
bodily  sensations is well-known: music ‘moves’ us. Finnegan (2003) notes that musical 
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32  Notable contributions include Cowan (1990), Hanna (1983, 1987 [1979]), Kringelbach & Skinner 
(2012), Sklar (2001) and Spencer (1985).
‘experience’ has not been clearly  defined, and suggests that the term should cut across a 
mind-body dualism to encompass emotional, bodily, affective and expressive registers 
and how these come into play in variegated contexts. Although I favour the term 
‘affect’ over ‘emotion’ for reasons discussed in Chapter 4, the interface between music, 
sound and speech-based forms, such as singing or poetry performance, provides a lens 
into the emotional qualities of sound. 
Sound symbolism and expression has been Feld’s subject-matter in his ethnography 
among the Kaluli (1982), a people who perceive the sound of singing as the cry of birds, 
with textual forms representing ‘bird sound words’. The crucial role of birds rests on the 
belief that  they embody the spirits of dead people. In a manner reminiscent of Seeger’s 
account of the Suyá, Feld demonstrates how sounds and songs enact cosmological 
beliefs and correspond with an array  of cultural ideas and values, such as kinship bonds, 
social behaviour and religious thought. According to Feld, singing and weeping as the 
mutual sharing of feelings of grief are expressive of the theme of reciprocity – which is 
‘highly  visible’ in the Kaluli society (ibid.: 6). But more than this, through the 
performance of moving songs the Kaluli organize and express their entire emotional 
world. This is hardly surprising considering that, as a group dwelling in a dense rain 
forest, the Kaluli ‘use sound to advantage over other sensory  systems’ (ibid.: 10; see 
also Gell 1995). Apart from highly articulate cosmological systems, sonically 
transmitted emotions also convey underlying political concerns. For example, Abu-
Lughod (1986) demonstrates how the expression of emotions in Bedouin poetry is 
intertwined with issues of social power and control. 
Along similar lines, Caton’s (1990) ethnography of Yemeni tribal poetics exhibits the 
idiom’s cultural and political significance. Caton examines poetry as a cultural practice 
and as a means to strengthen tribal ideology. Tribal poetry flows directly from the 
group’s values and it is considered an integral part  of tribal identity. The interrelation 
between tribalism and poetry exemplifies how political issues can be embedded in 
cultural forms and identity  formation. Boissevain’s (1965) research in religious cults, 
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music and political rivalry in Malta is also a case in point, and it  further alludes to the 
entanglements between music and politics. Hirschkind’s ethnography in Cairo (2006) 
elucidates the relationship between the act of listening to sermons and religious ethics. 
Hirschkind argues that the careful listening of sermons signifies a practice of ethical 
self-cultivation, against the prevalent view of their association with radical or 
fundamentalist Islam. 
The general premise that ‘music’ practice – in the broadest sense – encapsulates a form 
of self-making is central to my argument. In Chapter 4, I will demonstrate how music-
making constitutes a deeply affective experience, while the ‘political’ resonance of DiY 
practice will be discussed in Chapter 6. The meaning of affect that I employ  here 
deviates from Qureshi’s (2000) exploration of the affective, that is, emotional qualities 
of sarangi instrument playing and the embodiment of cultural memory (see also 
Kapchan 2006).33  Qureshi foregrounds issues of embodiment and affect in instrument 
playing, but her analysis focuses upon the rich instrumental symbolisms associated with 
sarangis. However, I examine musical affect in its corporeality. For this, I turn from the 
relationship  between the body and musical instruments to the body as an instrument 
(Chapter 4). 
Music has also been a field, within which scholars have studied ethnicity (e.g. Cooley 
2005; Kallimopoulou 2009; Regev 2004; Stokes 1994; Waterman 1990), as well as 
nationalism (e.g. Askew 2002; Ramnarine 2003; Szemere 2001). Stokes argues that 
‘music is socially  meaningful not entirely but largely because it provides means by 
which people recognize identities and places, and the boundaries which separate 
them’ (1994: 5). Following my empirical observations, in this thesis I do not explicitly 
deal with Scottishness or what it ‘means’ to be Glaswegian, beyond the consideration of 
a local êthos in music practice (Chapter 1). However, in DiY music-making, spatial, 
77
33  Dent (2009) scrutinizes the ways in which memories are enacted in Brazilian rural music forms by 
tracing the parallel trajectories of the music’s increasing popularity and the country’s transition from a 
rural to a modern economy. Similar ideas about music and social and cultural change have also been 
analyzed elsewhere (e.g. Baranovitch 2003; Cushman 1995; Moore 2006).
musical and, above all, ethical boundaries were pertinent to my informants’ music 
practices and their connections to other local and non-local actors. 
Cultural memory was enacted, not at  a macro level or as a sense of nostalgia grounded 
in a musical tradition, but rather in the role that  the ill-defined legacy of DiY (Chapter 
6) played in decision-making and the overall conduct of individuals. DiY’s contested 
definition meant that my informants would regularly confront ethical dilemmas 
(Chapter 5). Therefore, change was not only a characteristic of the transforming urban 
and social circumstances within which music actors had to operate; it was integral to the 
very nature of DiY, something that was reflected in the short life-cycles of many  bands, 
their shifting membership, as well as the precarious financial circumstances that 
sustained musical activities. The open-ended nature of a DiY êthos was also predicated 
upon direct cooperation between a large number of individuals. Perhaps it  was because 
of this that, to the best of my knowledge, gender relations seldom arose as an issue (see 
below). 
Gender has been a recurrent theme in ethnographies of music (e.g. Cohen 1991; 
Fonarow 2006; Koskoff 1987; Leblanc 1999; Walser 1993), as have ‘youth’ (e.g. 
Bennett 1999a; Fornäs et al 1995), ‘deviance’ (e.g. Becker 1963; Redhead 1993) and 
‘style’ (e.g. Fox 1987; Hodkinson 2002).34  Shank (1994), following a Lacanian 
perspective, has provided a nuanced account of identity  formation through music 
practice. A participating musician, Shank studied the rock‘n’roll music scene in Austin, 
Texas. Through a historical overview of local music traditions, he demonstrates how the 
creative appropriation of these forms by  Austin’s university students had resulted in the 
emergence of music-making as the fundamental means for the articulation of identity. 
This subsequently  influenced the codes and practices of various local music genres and 
thus the proliferation of the musical production of subjectivity. Austin was transformed 
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34  A host of relevant but non-ethnographic studies on the relationship between music, youth and style 
were conducted in the 1970s from the Birmingham Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies (BCCC). 
See the brief discussion of ‘subcultures’ below.
into the ideal site for the exploration of new identities, a process which, according to 
Shank, the commodification of music currently seems to withhold. 
Despite the ephemeral, intermittent and fluctuating nature of much musical activity in 
Glasgow, I would nevertheless hesitate to embrace Shank’s conviction that individuals 
involved in music-making were ‘united by an intensity of commitment driven by 
anxiety’ (1994: 131). Nor do I hold that my informants were ‘deviant’ and thus driven to 
form a homogeneous group of ‘outsiders’ (Becker 1963), somehow inhabiting a space 
outside society. After all, Becker shows that ‘deviance’ is a label (see Chapter 5), 
because a rule-breaking behaviour first requires to invoke a response from those who 
will then identify it as deviant. Such a label is ambiguous in that  it fails to account for 
what ‘outsiders’ themselves define as deviance (ibid.: 8-18). 
The jazz musicians in Becker’s ethnography employed the term ‘square’ in order to 
convey  their idea of what constituted an ‘outsider’ and a mindset which was opposed to 
what was valued by  them. Becker’s insights are useful for my argument because DiY 
practice necessarily relies upon difference: difference with established music practices 
and with ‘unethical’ ways of making music. Despite the existence of an êthos of 
inclusivity  and open-mindedness (Chapter 5), the DiY cohort drew sharp boundaries 
between themselves and actors operating outside a similar ethical framework. As such, 
difference was perceived as important insofar as it ultimately conferred, not so much a 
musical, but an ethical identity (Chapter 6).
The sense of inclusivity was immediately observable in women’s central role in musical 
and extra-musical activities. Male musicians still outnumbered female ones (Leblanc 
1999), but this should be perceived as a reflection of broader social and cultural norms 
and expectations, rather than a characteristic peculiar to a DiY êthos. Divorce consisted 
of four females and one male (Chapter 4). I attended gigs by  all-female bands, female 
musicians organized and promoted gigs and club nights, and they  designed and 
produced posters and album covers. I interviewed several women active in music-
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making and, despite my persistent  questions, their critique was never related to the ideas 
and behaviour of individuals from the DiY network. 
Male domination and, conversely, female subordination seemed to be non-issues for 
research participants (cf. Walser 1993: xvi), but there was a shared belief and 
acknowledgement that the music industry promoted masculine ideals by marginalizing 
women (Cohen 1997). The fact that my  female informants were actively engaged in 
DiY music-making and were treated as equals by male participants does not mean that 
gender was irrelevant. After all, as I will show later on, there were instances where 
being a female performer could make a difference in how audiences perceived 
performances or how male technical personnel behaved, while female audience 
members could confront practical issues stemming from the conduct  of other audience 
members. However, these instances were rare and, for the most part, my female 
informants had to deal with such behaviour outside the DiY cohort. Therefore, I remain 
sensitive to gender issues but, following my informants’ views and my  own 
ethnographic observations, I focus on both men and women involved in DiY music 
practice and how this supportive environment privileged rather than dismissed 
participation, female or otherwise.
The pluralism of music genres and the egalitarianism and inclusiveness professed by 
research participants also translated into the lack of distinctive ‘styles’. Clothing did not 
play  a role in signifying a particular status or generating a sense of belonging. This 
contrasts with a good deal of research in musical ‘subcultures’, such as Hodkinson’s 
recent study of goth (2002), a particularly  spectacular form. My informants showed no 
interest in clothes as identifiers of a musical or ‘subcultural identity’ (Kruse 1993). They 
did, however, pay  attention to the visual elements and the overall sensual qualities 
revolving around music-making, such as gig posters and record sleeves, and 
occasionally dressed up for specific performances (Chapter 4). DiY also resisted the 
categorization of ‘youth culture’. Indeed, certain participants were already in their 
thirties or forties.
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I have alluded to my informants’ indifference to the ‘Glaswegianess’ of their music-
making, which partially rendered the notion of ‘the local’ problematic (Chapter 6). As I 
argued in the previous chapter, the specificity of the city  enters and affects creativity in 
explicit  but also unconscious ways. Urban contexts represent a fertile ground for 
musical interactions and various scholars have accounted for music’s ubiquity and its 
importance in urban living (Finnegan 1989), urban migration and its effects on 
traditional music (Turino 1993), and the plural worlds of street musicians (Tanenbaum 
1995). Cohen (1994, 1995, 2007) brings various threads together in order to show how 
a city’s identity can become inextricably linked with particular types of music or 
‘sounds’. Discourses around issues of authenticity  in relation to place have romanticized 
Liverpool in particular, and the resulting fetishization of the local has facilitated the 
promotion of the city through music and the promotion of music through the city 
(Connell & Gibson 2003: 277). Although my ethnographic examination of DiY music 
practices does not reveal such a strong, ‘sensuous’ identification between music and the 
city, Sheila Whiteley is right when she states that:
As well as providing the socio-cultural backdrop for distinctive musical practices 
and innovations, urban and rural spaces also provide the rich experiential settings 
in which music is consumed. In each case, music becomes a key resource for 
different  cultural groups in terms of the ways in which they make sense and 
negotiate the everyday (2004: 2).
I have reserved most of my arguments about music and the urban for discussion in the 
following chapter (see also below). Nevertheless, it is important to state here that music 
represented for my  informants important means by which they navigated the urban 
landscape and produced meaning in their everyday  lives. Music practice empowered 
and enabled them to exercise what Henri Lefebvre has called ‘the right  to the city’, the 
right to inhabit particular spaces (1996, 2003). The creative appropriation and use of 
urban spaces became the process through which music-making emerged as a skilled, 
urban practice (Chapter 6). 
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The range of the spaces employed for music performances was remarkable: pubs, bars 
and clubs; dilapidated or abandoned buildings; flats, houses and basements; music 
studios, record stores and art galleries; kebab shops and community  centres. These did 
not exclude open, public spaces (Chapter 3). However, although street performing or 
‘busking’ was a popular practice in Glasgow, the specific events I will refer to did not so 
much convey a commitment to a specific form of outdoor music performance. Rather, 
they  were related to a conscious and explicit motivation to challenge the legitimization 
of indoor gigs as the only proper contexts for live music dissemination. Thus, these 
events had an ethical and ‘political’ dimension in addition to practical benefits (see also 
Tanenbaum 1995: 19). 
Another theme that pervades my analysis is the failure of the concept of ‘amateurism’ to 
grasp the ethical underpinnings of DiY practice in relation to its ‘professional’ 
counterparts (Chapter 3). The formation and function of amateur musical groups or 
bands has been chronicled in ethnographies by Behr (2010), Bennett  (1980), Gay (1991) 
and White (1983). Cohen (1991) further examined the tension between musical 
creativity and commercial concerns, while Finnegan (1989) focused on the prolific but 
‘hidden’ activity of an array of musicians in Milton Keynes. Anthropologists have not 
confined their analyses to the undocumented practices and quotidian lives of everyday 
musicians. The conventions and constraints of professional music worlds have become 
the ethnographic foci of Baily  (1988) and Cottrell (2003). In addition, Atkinson (2006) 
and Born’s (1995) studies of the Welsh National Opera in Cardiff and IRCAM  in Paris 
respectively have documented the day-to-day  activities of high profile cultural 
institutions. 
The distinction between amateurs and professionals is a problematic one. As will 
become apparent, the two terms represent abstractions or objectified categories that do 
not correspond with musicians’ own meanings and conceptions about their practice. We 
can neither retain an absolute distinction between amateurs and professionals, nor are 
we warranted to conceptualize commerce as creativity’s ‘other’ (Chapters 5 & 6). The 
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problem arises from the connotations of status and livelihood associated with 
professionalism. Yet in an essentially non-profit operation such as DiY music-making, 
this definition becomes irrelevant. The second reason is a cultural one. In particular, so-
called ‘amateur’ music is usually  – but mistakenly  – examined within a ‘leisure’ 
framework. It is telling that my informants almost never spoke of ‘professionals’ or 
‘amateurs’. When they were prompted to contextualize their ideas in these terms, they 
provided definitions on the basis of dedication and commitment (or the lack thereof), 
thus reversing popular opinion on the subject. 
The disintegration of this dualism opens the way to consider whether additional 
distinctions can be reformulated. For example, in her translocal study of dance and rave 
culture Thorton (1995) draws on Bourdieu’s work (see below) and coins the term 
‘subcultural capital’ in order to explain issues surrounding opposition to the 
‘mainstream’. This opposition, however, which is largely mediated and constructed 
through media representations, does not directly map onto the distinction between 
creativity and commerce. Therefore, the overlap that  is normally encountered with 
regards to the latter dichotomy might support a less singular approach to the former. 
This reveals the risks of applying distinctions as hard and fast realities upon lived 
experience, the nuances of which evade the rigidity of social-scientific frameworks. 
The global/local distinction and the appropriation of music forms is a third theme, 
addressed by  various scholars in studies about Indonesia (Baulch 2008; Luvaas 2009, 
2012, 2013) and Japan (Matsue 2009), among other sites. I am not concerned here with 
issues or debates about globalization (e.g. Appadurai 1996; Kearney 1995), or with how 
my informants were ‘internationalizing their music’ or ‘localizing international 
music’ (Luvaas 2012: 137). By contrast, I am interested in how ‘the local’ has been 
obscured and has become an elusive notion and a catchword that  nevertheless fails to 
‘catch’ the essence behind the word (Lambek 2011). As I will further elaborate in 
Chapter 6, locality (and DiY as such) should be recast as a form of ethical life and not 
as a piece in the global puzzle. Instead of perceiving localities as constituting a 
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homogeneous global grid, I agree with Lambek that, in transcending geographical 
boundaries, the singularity  and heterogeneity  of the local dwells in ethical acts; 
specifically, in how subjects constitute themselves and the locality through music 
practices. 
The interpenetration of the local and the global becomes apparent in the nexus between 
virtual technology, sociality  and music, which has caught the interest of several scholars 
(e.g. Condry  2004; Giesler & Pohlmann 2003; Kibby 2000; Lysloff 2003), and which 
pervaded a great deal of my informants’ practices (Part  II). Digital media were 
employed for practical as well as ethical purposes (Chapter 3). The impact of 
technology has been further scrutinized in relation to radio (Bessire & Fisher 2012; 
O’Connor 2006) and the music industries of the periphery (Wallis & Malm 1984). 
Manuel (1992) explores the effects of cassette technology in India, by situating the 
phenomenon within a larger socio-economic context. Issues of autonomy, freedom, and 
national integrity are reflected in ‘cassette culture’, along with a critique of the mass 
media. Although the mobilization of specific technologies carried ethical meanings 
(Chapter 3), my informants’ everyday use of technology also exemplified a process of 
‘making do’ (de Certeau 1984). Virtual technology played an important role in DiY 
practice (see also Luvaas 2012), mainly in the promotion of music events, in the 
dissemination of recorded music and in the effective communication between groups 
and individuals, both within as well as outside of Glasgow. 
The geographic and thematic diversity of the aforementioned ethnographic material 
testifies to the idea that music is a field conducive to the study of social life in its 
various manifestations. The following section explores in greater detail two 
ethnographic monographs, which address several of the issues that pertain to my 
analysis. These works have examined the everyday practices of musicians in two 
provincial English cities.
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2.3 Music-Making in Liverpool and Milton Keynes
Finnegan’s (1989) study of amateur musicians in Milton Keynes and Cohen’s (1991) 
account of post-punk bands in Liverpool belong to the 1980s shift towards an 
anthropology ‘at home’ (Cole 1977; Jackson 1987a; Messerschmidt 1981a).35  These 
studies consist of attempts to foreground and describe events and practices that were 
widely  taken for granted in their social and cultural contexts, to the extent that they 
were rendered ‘invisible’ to insiders and outsiders alike. Apart from hinting at issues 
that encompass broader concerns within the discipline, these monographs also provide 
much needed ethnographic detail about hitherto underplayed cultural practices.
Finnegan’s monograph (1989) exhibits remarkable breadth by comparing and 
contrasting the music practices of such diverse genres as classical music, jazz and folk, 
as well as the worlds of musical theatre, country and western, rock and pop. Finnegan 
provides detailed data and insightful observations on music participation and the 
practical organization of music in the locality. Issues of material and financial support 
that were crucial for the sustainability  of music-making in Milton Keynes are also 
scrutinized. Local musicians took these practices for granted, to the extent that they 
themselves were often unaware of many other forms of music-making taking place 
simultaneously; hence Finnegan’s characterization of amateur music activity as 
‘hidden’, but not secret (ibid.: 4). Finnegan exposes a sheer amount of musical 
creativity and goes on to show the level of commitment and work invested in music-
making. 
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35  Raymond Firth and Max Gluckman are considered pioneers in the study of British society.  In the 
United States exponents of research ‘at home’ included Margaret Mead and Ruth Benedict (Peirano 1998: 
106). Although the legitimacy and/or the possibility of insider research has been debated,  the efforts of 
Anthony Cohen during the past few decades are considered crucial in the development of an 
anthropology of Britain (Rapport 2002: 4-5). According to Messerschmidt, the diverse terms in the 
literature that describe anthropology ‘at home’, such as ‘insider’  or ‘native’ research, ‘auto-ethnography’, 
‘indigenous’ anthropology and so on, reflected its phenomenal growth (1981b: 13). The emergence and 
proliferation of anthropology ‘at home’ is related to practical aspects of the profession (Cole 1977: 
355-358; Jackson 1987b: 8-9; Messerschmidt 1981b: 9-12). However, the conceptual backdrop of a 
critique of objectivity, representation and the relationship between self and other cannot be disregarded 
(Clifford & Marcus 1986; Marcus & Fischer 1986; Narayan 1993).
This challenges established distinctions between amateur and professional musicians, 
demonstrating that the two worlds are actually  interdependent. Finnegan is aware of the 
impossibility  of providing accurate numbers and covering all aspects of music-making, 
not least because of the precarious nature of much musical activity, the different 
definitions of ‘music’ and ‘music groups’, and the shifting identification of ‘the local’, 
both geographically  and musically. However, Finnegan highlights the common and 
profound effects of music-making on individuals, ranging from the ‘satisfaction of joint 
playing’ (1989: 65) and ‘a sense of camaraderie and enjoyment’ (ibid.: 51), to ‘a sense 
of beauty  and fundamental value, of intense and profoundly  felt artistic experience 
which could reach to the depths of one’s nature’ (ibid.: 41). For Finnegan, the positive 
feelings fostered by  music-making cannot be disentangled from its collective nature. 
The activity of making music together is a social practice, which ascribes meaning to 
people’s everyday lives. 
The diverse but intersecting musical ‘pathways’ that Finnegan’s musicians followed, 
changed or expanded, were essentially  personal and socially recognized familiar routes 
for navigating the complexity of everyday urban living (ibid.: 305-307, 323). According 
to Finnegan, the collective nature of music has broader resonance for our society  and is 
pertinent to central ideas and values in human life (ibid.: 329, 335). Echoing Blacking 
(1973), she argues that music is a ‘distinctively  human’ expressive form that cuts 
through the mind/body dichotomy  (1989: 340). As Finnegan puts it, music not only 
creates the necessary space for its enactment but ‘it also fills it’ (ibid.: 336).
Cohen’s study of Liverpool bands (1991) is more modest in scope but richer in 
ethnographic detail. Cohen followed, observed and described the concrete practices of 
two local ‘rock’ bands, as well as the values underpinning their music-making. Her 
account grapples with the themes of band formation and function, composition and 
performance, gender relations, as well as the tense relationship between bands and the 
music industry. Her ethnography serves as a chronicle of the bands’ struggle to ‘make 
it’. Such a struggle was rooted in and informed by an ongoing tension between 
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creativity and commerce, and was largely motivated by  the temporal frame of the 
economic and social downturn that  characterized Liverpool in the mid-1980s, as well as 
the spatial frame of a post-industrial city in decline. Cohen, like Finnegan, does not 
engage in musicological analysis. However, she does address the music and its aesthetic 
meanings, and demonstrates how ideas of purity and impurity informed the bands’ 
practices and gave rise to privileged notions of ‘masculinity, democracy, egalitarianism, 
honesty, naturalness, and cleanliness’ (1991: 4).
The interrelationships and collaborations between different bands and individuals 
involved in music-making is explored in painstaking detail. However, Cohen also 
skilfully exposes the cliquey nature of these associations, clustered around specific 
rehearsal and recording studios, as well as how issues of conflict  and rupture within 
bands were concealed by an idealized egalitarian êthos. Moreover, women were seen as 
a threat to the healthy functioning of the bands (ibid.: 201-222). In her critical analysis, 
Cohen reveals the delicate dynamics that kept band members together and the degree to 
which failure was felt by and impacted upon the bands that operated under financial and 
social pressures, which largely  affected their creativity. Oscillating between grand 
ambitions and phases of depression was not uncommon in the daily  lives of her 
informants. 
The social biography of these two bands can be seen as typical of many musicians at the 
time of Cohen’s fieldwork in Liverpool. Indeed, information on the history, institutions 
and role of Liverpool’s music scene in the proliferation of music-making is provided 
throughout her study. Cohen devotes a chapter to the analysis of the particular practical 
circumstances that facilitated, dictated or constrained band activities. The hardships, 
pressures and ambitions, common to so many  bands and musicians trying to ‘make it’, 
had fostered a sense of collective ‘destiny’ but also motivated them and served to 
establish a strong sense of competition. Bands strived for musical originality, 
vehemently resisted categorization and perceived their music as part of their identity 
87
(1991: 182-187). The music practices of these young Liverpudlians had their roots in a 
DiY approach that had encouraged them to form bands (ibid.: 172). 
Cohen focuses upon ‘rock culture’ and its ‘aesthetic of musical incompetence’ (ibid.: 
173), but also outlines certain ideas and values surrounding music in general. Thus, she 
points to the way in which music encompasses both the private and public spheres, for 
example through the public performance of deeply personal thoughts expressed in lyrics 
(ibid.: 177). Cohen further argues that the bands’ quest  for originality  had its roots in 
related historical trends within the arts during the 20th century  (ibid.: 182), as well as 
class dynamics (ibid.: 196-197). For Cohen, the visceral properties of music-making 
and its inherent emotional and pleasurable qualities conjure up an image of music as the 
ideal experiential medium for the production of meaning (ibid.: 190-191). Music’s 
ability  to embody, reflect  and sonically express meaning was evident in the bands’ 
compositions. Although not overtly  politicized, their music was still an implicit social 
critique and an aurally articulated tension between creativity and commerce, which was 
integral to they way in which these bands operated. At the same time, Cohen says, 
music has the distinctive capacity  to affect society  through the dissemination of these 
meanings. Music is ‘good to think’ (ibid.: 191).  
Finnegan and Cohen’s contributions are substantial. Their accounts are valuable 
ethnographic records of grassroots music practices in British urban environments. But 
their textured descriptions further constitute exemplary contemplations of the profound 
value of music in social life that is irreducible to any particular socio-cultural function 
or context. My own research shares various similarities with these works. For example, 
I have decided to focus upon individuals and groups operating at a grassroots level. My 
informants did not think of themselves as either amateur or professional musicians, 
promoters or record label owners (Chapter 3). Similarly, the level of commitment that I 
observed, as well as the work, energy and effort invested in music-making correspond 
with both Finnegan and Cohen’s findings. My research participants shared key 
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similarities with Cohen’s case studies by operating within a DiY framework, as well as 
within similar social and financial constraints. 
I also encountered identical claims of egalitarianism and democracy amongst the bands, 
collectives, promoters and various other individuals during my fieldwork, while the 
contingent nature of many bands gave rise to similar patterns of conflict and rupture 
(Chapter 4). The musical diversity  in Finnegan’s study is also reflected in the pluralism 
of different types of music within the DiY cohort in Glasgow. The interpenetration of 
music and the city  is also a recurring theme in this thesis (Chapters 3 & 6). Furthermore, 
the positive feelings of joy and pleasure generated by  the collective activity of making 
and performing music (Chapters 3 & 4) or organizing music events (Chapter 5) find a 
direct parallel in these works. The at  once collaborative, competitive and ‘cliquey’ 
atmosphere was also present, but the latter characteristic was mostly evident between 
larger associations rather than among the bands operating under the DiY rubric. Finally, 
producing music that was ‘original’, as well as the avoidance of musical pigeonholing, 
were common traits (Chapter 3 & Conclusion). 
There are also important differences and lacunae that this study seeks to address. To 
begin with, while both ethnographies have mainly scrutinized musicians and their 
practices, my research equally considers individuals and groups that make music 
possible (Small 1998), including audiences, promoters and record labels that play a 
crucial role in music production and dissemination. As opposed to the struggle of 
Liverpool bands to ‘make it’, none of the bands I interacted with in Glasgow 
demonstrated such a desire that could be framed in terms of ‘struggle’. For sure, the 
historical circumstances and technological means are different. However, this neither 
suppressed my informants’ desire to excel, nor did it point to a more accessible music 
industry – quite the opposite. They simply lacked a conception of the process of 
‘making it’ as a ‘struggle’ (or ‘sell-out’). In other words, my informants did privilege 
creativity and flexibility above and beyond any immediate financial benefits, but most 
of them cherished the possibility  of making a living in music (Chapters 5 & 6). Relevant 
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to this approach, however, was a realistic view of the status of the music industry, which 
placed future possibilities into perspective.
This leads me to a second, related point. Cohen considers rock bands and the aesthetic 
and ideological underpinnings of their practices, although the term ‘rock’ should be 
qualified and retrospectively it would be more precise to refer to post-punk bands 
(1991: 4-5). Cohen recognizes that the umbrella terms of ‘rock’, ‘independent’ or 
‘alternative’ produce a certain set of expectations and positions for such bands within 
the political economy of music. However, she seems to underplay  the fact that  her case 
studies are firmly rooted, not in an ‘ideological’, but in an ethical space, which, perhaps 
ironically, contributes more to the self-production and reproduction of such positions 
(reserved for unknown, local bands – for the most  part). It is exactly the same ethical 
stance that brings up  the tension between creativity  and commerce, and which 
transformed the Liverpool bands’ desire to make it into a ‘struggle’. 
The ethical similarity  I have observed above thus represents a paradox, namely  that my 
informants, who embraced a similar êthos, did not perceive this process as a struggle. I 
hold that, beyond historical or local specificities, this paradox is predicated upon the 
malleability of a DiY êthos (Chapter 6). This requires a shift from musical and 
ideological classifications towards the consideration of differentiated, ethically-charged 
practices. Part of the problem derives from the insufficiency of ‘ideology’ to capture the 
evolving and variegated nature of music practices. Thus, the spectre of musical ideology 
as a monolithic and pre-determinative factor would certainly inhibit any meaningful 
ethnographic explanation of lived realities. The paradox, then, rests upon DiY 
‘ideology’.
It would be interesting to know how musicians and bands from other local music 
‘cultures’ were ethically positioned and negotiated these positions in Liverpool during 
the mid-1980s. Along the same lines, Finnegan (1989), who focuses upon different 
musical ‘worlds’, refrains from a discussion of ethics and how it informed the decision-
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making, actions, and aesthetic considerations of different music actors. I believe that 
Cohen (1991) and Finnegan (1989) would be better placed to highlight  these nuanced 
differences had they recognized that many of the claims and practical decisions that 
musicians made were in fact ethical claims and decisions, and that their positions and 
actions were ethical positions and actions. In short, to recognize that, instead of 
ideology shaping music practice, music practice was informed by (and gave rise to) an 
êthos. I believe that, in order to redress the balance and further elucidate the relationship 
between musical and social action, a focus upon ethics is necessary. Therefore, instead 
of carving out an abstracted musical or ideological space, such as music genre (see also 
below), within which my informants would be situated, I have chosen to delineate a 
fluid ethical realm (DiY).
My third point also relates to the previous two and brings up a difference with regards 
to the use of ‘the local’. The spatialization of music production is evident in both works. 
Cohen’s (1991) fieldwork revolved mainly around a specific studio with which her two 
case studies were associated. Her account demonstrates a strong identification of music 
with the city, and the experience of music is presented as part and parcel with the 
locality. Music had its ‘citiness’ (Massey cited in Cohen 2007: 2). Cohen describes rock 
music in Liverpool. The fact that she talks about rock culture is also telling, because it 
reveals the situatedness of music action as well as its boundedness (although Cohen 
does discuss the bands’ various trips to London and Manchester in relation to their 
music activities). Elsewhere, she develops these ideas in greater depth (1994, 1995, 
2007).  
Similarly, I have remarked on Finnegan’s (1989) acknowledgement about the 
ambiguous nature of ‘the local’. Yet, although she devises the notion of urban pathways 
in order to convey the porous boundaries of places, Finnegan does not directly confront 
the meaning of locality, neither its significance in bringing about an ethical life. As I 
have already noted, locality should be perceived as an ethical modality  of action and not 
as a material or symbolic context – less as a bounded space and more as an open-ended 
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ethical potential and entity. I will seek to restore the analytical and empirical importance 
of Finnegan’s pathways for our understanding of ‘local’ and urban contexts, as well as 
urban life in general (Chapters 3 & 6). In order to do so, I will first have to examine the 
strengths and weaknesses of other available analytical frameworks. The lack of 
consensus as to which one best captures or represents popular music practices, to some 
extent seems to draw upon the very same issues surrounding ‘the local’. It  is these 
conceptual frameworks to which I now turn. 
2.4 From Subcultures to Milieux
Terms such as ‘subcultures’ (Hebdige 1979), ‘worlds’ (Becker 1982), ‘scenes’ (Straw 
1991), ‘fields’ (Bourdieu 1993), ‘tribes’ or ‘neo-tribes’ (Bennett  1999b), and 
‘milieux’ (Webb 2004) have all been employed in academic discourse. Scholars have 
devised or used these concepts in an effort to address the concrete music practices of 
individuals in real circumstances and actual settings, as well as the wider socio-
economic contexts within which music practitioners operate. It should be noted that not 
all of these frameworks were developed exclusively, or even mainly, for the study of 
popular music. There is no space here for their thorough examination, but  I will provide 
a general outline of their usefulness and/or inappropriateness for my argument. 
I will start by stating that their contribution to our understanding of the relationship 
between music and social life has been crucial. However, there are inadequacies in all of 
these approaches and I will therefore organize the discussion around their shortcomings. 
First, I will consider the concepts that fail to provide a dynamic framework for 
anthropological analysis. Second, I will examine the ones that demonstrate certain 
ambiguities in the ways in which they have been taken up in the relevant literature. 
Finally, I will focus upon the conceptual frameworks that focus upon subjectivity and 
agency by  disregarding how musicians’ practices are actually caught up within broader 
economic and social formations. For the sake of brevity, I will confine my discussion 
within Bennett’s criticisms of subcultures (1999b), Hesmondhalgh’s commentary on 
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subcultures, scenes and tribes (2005), his assessment (2006) and Born’s consideration 
(2010) of Bourdieu’s field, Finnegan’s critique of art worlds (1989), as well as my own 
remarks.36
The term ‘subculture’ is mainly associated with research in ‘youth cultures’ conducted 
in the 1970s by the Birmingham Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies (BCCC). 
Perhaps the most prominent exponent of subcultural theory is Dick Hebdige and his 
work on post-war white working-class subcultures in the UK. His study focuses on the 
emergence of punk, which Hebdige perceives as a ‘symbolic violation of the social 
order’, an element that constitutes the fundamental characteristic of any subculture 
(1979: 19). Despite the insightful analysis, the book totally lacks ethnographic data. 
This does not permit a grounded and nuanced understanding of the ways in which punk 
emerged and subsequently evolved. 
With the exception of Willis (1978), whose Profane Culture attempts to account for 
individuals’ agency and creativity in the accumulation of musical taste, subcultural 
theory  in its vaguely Marxist orientation has been preoccupied with structure and 
particularly class (Hesmondhalgh 2005: 25). The emergence of BCCC research was 
premised upon the reconsideration of ‘deviance’ as normal behaviour and embodied a 
shift from the study  of youth gangs – popular in the Chicago School quarters – to the 
examination of style-related youth cultures (Bennett 1999b: 600). 
Working-class youth’s resistance towards established social norms was advocated as the 
very essence of subcultures. However, this idea was based upon the assumption that, 
instead of consumerism providing youth with the means to transcend class boundaries 
and articulate different identities, it somehow generated a homogeneous (working-) 
class-based response. Thus, consumer goods were appropriated and used in order to 
resist post-war structural changes in Britain (ibid.: 602). Nevertheless, the postulate of 
resistance as an exclusive privilege of the working classes did not always correspond 
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36 See Finnegan for a critique of additional approaches from urban studies (1989: 304-307).
with reality. This is particularly  relevant to punk. Hebdige seems to disregard that punk 
was not an exclusively working-class phenomenon. A final issue, as Bennett notes, is 
that there has been a distinctive lack of female presence in the subcultural literature.
Despite BCCC’s attempts to normalize ‘deviance’, it failed to go beyond the idea of 
resistance and, as such, to abolish the distinction between subcultures and the 
‘mainstream’. This results in the exclusion of dominant or popular cultural forms and 
essentially  places ‘subcultures’ outside or in opposition to society  (Bennett 1999b: 604). 
Besides, their persistent association with a homogeneous class foreclosed a deeper 
understanding of the plural ideas and meanings that are associated with youth cultures. 
Even though the concept of subcultures has survived in the literature (e.g. Hodkinson 
2002), its preoccupation with ‘style’ still precludes the necessary articulation of an 
analytical argument that takes into account the whole range of overlapping meanings 
embedded within any ‘subcultural’ form. 
The partiality of focus and the overall lack of ethnographic data, as well as the 
connotations of rigidity, homogeneity  and stability, diminish the concept’s capacity to 
render intelligible the richness of essentially  fluid and diverse music practices. 
According to Hesmondhalgh, ‘the CCCS work on youth subcultures was never really 
about music, it was about youth collectivities that used music, among other means, to 
construct their identities’ (2005: 31). Yet I would add that the problem did not rest upon 
studying people who used music to form their identities, but that subcultures did not 
sufficiently foreground the musical dimensions of processes of self-making.
Becker’s art worlds (1982), which anticipated Small’s ‘musicking’ (1998), present 
different but related difficulties. Becker defines art worlds as follows: 
Art  worlds consist  of all the people whose activities are necessary to the production 
of the characteristic works which that world, and perhaps others as well, define as 
art. Members of art worlds coordinate the activities by which work is produced by 
referring to a body of conventional understandings embodied in common practice 
and in frequently used artifacts (1982: 34).
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Thus, an art  world is a social concept – cooperation being integral to its very existence. 
Despite the constraints imposed on artists, these shared conventions allow for a better 
coordination of the activities pertinent to artistic production and establish a common 
vocabulary between cultural producers and audiences that enables art works to exercise 
emotional effect. These conventions are rigorous but never absolute, as artists can 
choose whether they will follow them or not  (Becker 1982: 29-33). In fact, Becker’s 
concept is sensitive to change and innovation: ‘Art worlds...are born, grow, change, and 
die’ (ibid.: 350). 
Finnegan observes that art  words convey the systematic nature of much musical activity 
that tends to be perceived as an outgrowth of happenstance (1989: 180). However, she 
argues that specific characteristics of the term ‘world’ are problematic (ibid.: 188-189). 
Its concreteness and absolutism, its autonomy and lack of interaction with other worlds, 
the connotations of all-inclusiveness, largeness and, finally, the shifting identification of 
worlds with people and musical styles alike, ultimately render art worlds an insufficient 
framework.
The third and final concept with structural overtones is Bourdieu’s field of cultural 
production (1993). Although it did not include music and was exclusively focused upon 
art and literature, Bourdieu’s framework has been taken up by scholars writing on 
popular music (e.g. Moore 2007; O’Connor 2008; Prior 2008). Bourdieu’s opus is 
constructed through the interplay of three of his own core theoretical concepts, namely 
field, habitus and capital. He perceives the field of artistic production as being 
composed by  the subfields of small-scale or ‘restricted’ production and large-scale 
production. These are in turn included within the field of power that represents a 
combination of the economic and political fields, both of which form part of the broader 
field of class (Bourdieu 1993: 37-39). 
What distinguishes the two subfields is their respective degrees of autonomy from the 
overarching field of power. The more autonomy a subfield gains the more evidently it is 
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different from the other subfield. In terms of ‘capital’, the more autonomous the 
subfield is the more symbolic capital accrues and the less economic. By contrast, lack of 
autonomy reverses the relationship between symbolic and economic capital. The main 
differentiating factor between the two subfields is public access (Bourdieu 1993: 39). 
Thus, an artistic field that is market-driven is a subfield of large-scale production with 
little autonomy and symbolic capital but substantial economic capital. On the other 
hand, a specialist artistic or literary  field (Bourdieu uses Symbolist poetry as an 
example) possesses little economic capital but high levels of symbolic capital and 
autonomy. These two subfields are clearly discrete. When one examines Bourdieu’s 
schema, it becomes clear that he associates cultural production with the dominant class 
(Hesmondhalgh 2006: 214). 
Bourdieu’s framework pays a good deal of attention to class and his framework is 
broader than Becker’s. Although elements of the field resemble those of art worlds – 
self-contained, concrete and autonomous – Bourdieu also accounts for what happens 
within the field and, by implication, to it by describing position-takings in what he calls 
the ‘space of possibles’ (ibid.: 216; Bourdieu 1993: 30, 61-73). Position-taking is 
largely but not  exclusively determined by one’s habitus or dispositions that  shape these 
positions, but, rather, these dispositions can be fully realized only in relation to the 
positions chosen, taken, and retained by an individual (Bourdieu 1993: 71). It follows 
that habitus and positions are mutually constitutive (ibid.: 61). In other words ‘possible 
positions define the thinkable and the unthinkable, the doable and the impossible for 
agents in the field’ and at the same time ‘counter naïve notions of creative freedom and 
innovation’ (Hesmondhalgh 2006: 216).
As Born notes, the study  of cultural production as the intersection between habitus and 
broader structural currents is a major advancement, while Bourdieu’s insistence on the 
relational qualities of the field softens its rigidity (2010: 7). However, Born also points 
out that the concept of the field undermines the historical importance of aesthetic 
traditions. By  reducing cultural production to a set  of competing power relations, 
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Bourdieu fails to provide a theory  of how aesthetic traditions and art objects inform 
specific artistic and literary  forms. Furthermore, the field does not accommodate for 
processes of social and cultural transformation, which are evident in the historical 
trajectories of these traditions. This further weakens Bourdieu’s formulation of stability 
and change within the field, because ‘it  is only by  theorizing diachrony in cultural 
production that processes of stability and change can be grasped’ (Born 2010: 9).37 
Another point made by Born is that cultural institutions and individual actors are 
represented as occupying similar positions in Bourdieu’s framework, but most 
important for my discussion here is Born’s view on Bourdieu’s notion of subjectivity 
and agency. As a component of the habitus agency  is enacted and exercised through 
improvisation and, therefore, it is the only  characteristic within Bourdieu’s schema that 
could be held responsible for transformation and change. The concept of improvisation 
remains underdeveloped though, ‘a residual term’ that results in a highly deterministic 
concept of the field, from which subjectivity  is excluded (ibid.: 11).38 While Bourdieu’s 
field would be an ideal site for the consideration of the tension between creativity  and 
commerce, it would do little towards evaluating aesthetic factors, individual 
sensibilities, and ethical considerations pertinent to music practices. As I shall 
demonstrate, these sensibilities and considerations should not be conflated with 
‘agency’ (Chapter 6).
The concept of music scenes, as loose aggregations of style, genre and practice, but with 
spatial coordinates, offers a more dynamic analytical tool. We may trace the emergence 
of the concept in journalistic discourse during the 1940s, when the term was initially 
employed in order to describe the bohemian lifestyle of jazz musicians. ‘Scenes’ have 
been widely  used in the popular press to convey a variety of cultural practices, but they 
have also become the means to forge and represent collective identifications between 
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37  Born proposes a framework (not specifically for the study of music-based groupings) that she calls 
‘post-positivist empiricism’.
38 For a thorough assessment of Born’s criticisms, see Prior (2011).
individuals (Bennett & Petterson 2004: 2). In many instances, local authorities have 
contributed to the reification and romanticization of particular music scenes in order to 
attract tourism, with the hope of galvanizing their economies (see e.g. Cohen 2007). 
Instead of conceiving music practices as fixed in particular locations, music scenes can 
be seen as cultural spaces that transcend the boundaries of localities to incorporate 
trajectories that  link various centres of music production (Straw 1991: 373-374). While 
they  were initially seen as local, unique and ‘authentic’, music scenes are now perceived 
as fluid, global and mobile (Cohen 1999), and occupy local, translocal, as well as virtual 
spaces (Bennett & Peterson 2004). According to Straw, regional or local scenes cannot 
provide anymore the necessary dynamic for evolution in musical styles (e.g. Liverpool 
in the 1960s). Rather, it is the interaction between a multiplicity of localities through 
‘circuits’ of music production that gives rise to contemporary scenes (1991: 378). 
As Hesmondhalgh (2005) points out, the term came into academic vogue through 
Straw’s article and Shank’s ethnography on the rock‘n’roll scene in Austin, Texas 
(1994). But where Cohen (1999) traces a transition from local and fixed to global and 
mobile scenes, Hesmondhalgh identifies a contradiction in these two uses of the term 
and notes that Straw and Shank conceive of ‘scenes’ in totally  different ways (2005: 
28). Whereas Shank's approach is rooted within a particular place, Straw argues for the 
cosmopolitan nature of evolving scenes. Echoing Bourdieu’s field, Straw is preoccupied 
with the broader competing forces and the economic and cultural arena within which 
music production takes place. By  contrast, Shank’s concept bears ‘subcultural’ 
connotations by  virtue of his focus upon the rock‘n’roll scene’s subversive and 
transformative qualities.
Apart from Cohen (1999) and other recent attempts (e.g. Bennett 2004; O’Connor 
2002), Bennett and Peterson have provided a spatial classification of scenes (2004). 
They  favour the term scene over that of ‘subculture’ because of the latter’s association 
with deviance from the mainstream, which assumes an opposition towards one, 
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dominant culture, as well as due to the underlying assumption that subcultures tend to 
dictate people’s lives (Bennett  & Peterson 2004: 3). They  place their concept of scenes 
alongside Bourdieu’s field (see also Luvaas 2012) and Becker’s art worlds, and proceed 
to review various works that have addressed the concept. Although the spatial metaphor 
is a useful one – not least for our understanding of the qualitatively different spatialities 
involved in music-making – the ambiguity of the term, as described above, remains. 
The analytical usefulness of ‘scenes’ derives from their close association with space and 
place, with situated everyday practices, and with shared values and taste. These latter 
characteristics are perhaps evident in the identification of music scenes with specific 
music genres in academic and popular discourse alike. However, the two terms should 
not be conflated and several scholars have explored the notion of genre (alone or in 
conjunction with other concepts) by arguing that it could bridge the general and the 
particular through a consideration of musical styles (e.g. Hesmondhalgh 2005: 32; Holt 
2007: 6-7). Music scenes have been employed in the academic literature in various and 
often conflicting ways. This highlights the problems that arise when a vernacular term 
that is loaded with diverse meanings is introduced in scholarly discourse. Consequently, 
music scenes have evolved into a polysemic and expansive, but simultaneously 
descriptive, vague, and obscuring concept.
In retaining the structure/agency dualism for purpose of clarity, it would seem that the 
final concepts I will briefly consider attach themselves to the latter category. It is a 
common trope that late modernity has brought the realization that individual identities 
are not and should not be considered to be ‘given’ or ‘fixed’ but rather as constructed 
and fluid. Two concepts that address this concern within the context of music practice 
are Bennett’s tribe (1999b) and Webb’s milieu (2004). As discussed above, Bennett 
identifies several issues with the widely used term ‘subculture’, such as an emphasis 
upon mass-culture and working-class resistance, as well as upon the exclusion of 
women. 
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Reminiscent of the conceptual conundrums present in the concept of scenes, Bennett 
remarks that subcultural theory  lacks objectivity  because of the variable ways in which 
the concept has been employed and due to the rigidity of its assumed social and cultural 
distinctions (1999b: 605). He adopts a postmodern approach and by  building upon 
Maffesoli’s tribus (1996) Bennett suggests that the articulation of contemporary 
identities occurs within the realms of consumerism and lifestyle, both of which reflect 
the contingent, fluid nature of collectivities. For Bennett, lifestyle incorporates 
individual choices and ‘patterns of consumption’ as ‘personal expression’ (Bennett 
1999b: 607). 
But Bennett’s tribes, in their individualized freedom and in their capacity to choose their 
identities from the ‘cultural supermarket’ (Mathews 1996: 723), are a poignant 
glorification of consumerism (Hesmondhalgh 2005: 25). Besides, the use of the term 
‘tribe’ is misplaced as well as opposed to Bennett’s main point, conveying strong 
associations with rootedness and boundedness, while simultaneously ascribing a sense 
of primitivism onto recent occurrences (ibid. 24). His definition of agency as 
individualized consumption is also exclusive, because the ability to consume is 
dependent upon various different external factors (ibid.: 25). The almost solipsistic 
nature of Bennett’s tribalism disregards the forceful, intersubjective and structural levels 
of identity  formation. His attempt echoes real concerns about the inadequacy of a 
singular focus on structure but ‘tribes’ seem to sit uncomfortably with broader accounts.  
Webb goes some way towards bridging that gap. The milieu concept resembles 
Bourdieu’s habitus (1977, 1990) as Webb admits (2004: 31). However, according to 
Webb, milieu is ‘much more nuanced’ and ‘it develops a number of different  areas of 
understanding’ (ibid.) – though he does not make clear which ‘areas’ he means. Webb, 
who borrows the concept from Durrschmidt (2000), explains that milieu:
[W]ould more fully encapsulate the dynamic, fluid and changing nature of 
particular types of music making and associations with it and would reflect the 
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networks of interaction, production, and influence that music makers and actors in 
the particular music “scenes” are involved in (2004: 29-30). 
Also, it would illuminate:
[T]he notion of a network and when used as a framework for researching the way 
in which particular networks of people and music cultures interact, also situates 
those activities in the wider cultural complex that they are developing within (ibid.: 
30). 
Finally, milieu:
[C]an be thought  of as a concept that articulates a set  of overlapping levels of 
meaning, relevance, disposition, and understanding. It then tries to illuminate the 
complex development  of types of cultural activity within the stock of knowledge of 
an individual operating within a social grouping or number of groupings (ibid.).
Thus, Webb’s emphasis on texture and different levels of understanding provides a 
framework that  is useful to conceptualize ethnographically interesting questions that 
deal with individual and collective everyday musical activities. Webb’s elaborated 
version of the milieu situates it  within Bourdieu’s field. On a third level, both the music 
milieu and the field of cultural production are constantly interacting with other milieux 
in a metaphorical, dialectical relationship  (ibid.: 36-38). For instance, we may think 
other music milieux and their impact on the aesthetic perceptions of a specific milieu. 
Similarly, individuals’ family and workplace milieux can be seen as being interrelated 
with their respective musical milieux. 
However, Webb’s framework does not seem to suggest a qualitative difference to the 
habitus and its role within Bourdieu’s field. The difference here is one of degree, not 
kind. Webb’s intention is to at once adopt a more nuanced and grounded perspective of 
agency and describe the wider economic and cultural arena within which actors are 
situated. Nevertheless, Webb neither escapes the same sort of criticisms expressed 
towards the field, nor does he provide a theory  of agency that would form the middle-
ground between Bennett’s fragmented identities and Bourdieu’s structured and 
structuring dispositions.  
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At stake in the concepts examined in this section is a delicate balance between 
accounting for the intimate and the familiar while addressing the more formal and 
abstract dynamics that inform everyday  conduct. The ways in which everyday  life is 
framed by the intimidating forces of a globalized economy and transnational 
connections lie at the heart  of such considerations. It is at the places where these 
intersect that an anthropology of music should penetrate. These junctures are neither 
static nor ceaselessly  mobile. Similarly, individual subjects are neither ‘integrated’ nor 
‘fragmented’ (Strauss 1997). They  might exhibit what Rosaldo has termed ‘multiplex 
subjectivity’ (cited in Narayan 1993: 676), or, as I prefer to call it, ethical complexity
(Faubion 2011). Yet these identities are realized and enacted in particular settings and 
through specific practices. By imposing abstract models ‘anthropologists run the danger 
of caricaturing complex realities, neglecting key realms of experience, and missing 
lived ironies and singularities that  might complicate and enrich analytics’ (Biehl & 
Locke 2010: 319).
The frameworks considered above do not sufficiently address the quotidian nature of 
musical activity, that is, how and, crucially, why actors become involved in music 
practices. These concepts fail to convey the overlapping and cross-cutting ideas, 
practices, affects and symbolic meanings, but also the structural logics, patterns and 
norms that encompass music in-the-making.39  Only by  attending to the particular may 
we meaningfully consider its relationship with more intangible aspects at higher levels 
of abstraction. 
Therefore, in the remainder of the thesis I turn to Finnegan’s ‘pathways’ (1989) in order 
to address the aspects missed by other approaches. Similarly, I refer to the collective 
(but by no means homogeneous) identification of individuals with DiY practice as 
comprising a ‘network’ (occasionally  it appears as ‘cohort’, ‘group’ or ‘circuit’). I 
should emphasize that I do not use ‘network’ to designate or foreground the structural 
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39  The habitus is clearly Bourdieu’s attempt to go beyond the structure/agency dualism. However, the 
habitus ultimately refers back to the social determinism from which it emanates (de Certeau 1984: 56-60; 
Farnell 2000).
properties of DiY, even those that do not imply  determinism (see Crossley 2008). Nor 
do I treat networks as human/non-human assemblages (Latour 2005), though I consider 
this possibility  in relations to ethics (Chapter 6). Similarly, in focusing exclusively  upon 
human actors, I am not concerned here – in the way that Crossley is with doing in the 
early punk ‘movement’ – with drawing a chart or ‘family tree’ of actors and bands 
within the DiY network (e.g. Figure 2.1). 
Figure 2.1: ‘Family tree’ of Scottish musicians.40
Along with musicological analysis, social network analysis is relevant to this thesis, but 
falls outside its scope. The notion of a network resonates with my topic through its 
revelation of a sense of connectedness between different subjects, without obscuring 
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40  Retrieved from http://thepopcop.co.uk/2010/11/family-tree-of-scottish-musicians/ [Accessed 12 
November 2012].
individual contributions and differences, or confining these connections to a specific 
place, local or virtual (e.g. Chapter 3). In employing the term, I draw attention to the 
open-ended nature and multiplicity of relationships and affiliations between actors 
engaging in music practices. Thus, my use of networks is closer to a ‘rhizomatic’ 
approach (Deleuze & Guattari 1987). In contrast  with the term ‘scene’, I consider an 
advantage the fact that ‘networks’ have been and still are widely  used outside academic 
discourse. Put more crudely, I use the notion of networks as people in everyday life do, 
and as my informants did. Importantly, networks avoid the connotations of rootedness 
and consensus, embedded in terms such as ‘culture’ or ‘society’, but still retain the 
complexity and intersubjective character of musical and ethical action. The following 
section seeks to establish what such ethical action might entail.
2.5 Music Practice as Ethics
To say that there has been a recent resurgence of interest in ethics within anthropology 
would be an understatement. Anthropology has not been unique in its preoccupation 
with the ethical, forming part of a wider postwar turn to ethics in the humanities and 
social sciences (e.g. Garber et al 2000). The development of ethics as a distinctive field 
of inquiry  within the discipline currently stands on shifting ground and, therefore, any 
attempt to account for its scope or to outline its specificity  is like trying to hit a moving 
target. However, the recent bourgeoning interest had various precedents.41 
Nevertheless, these earlier, pioneering works did not manage to spur theoretical debate 
or set an intellectual agenda for the comparative study of ethics. Efforts outside the 
discipline to establish ethnographically  an ethical field of inquiry  have been similarly 
unproductive (Laidlaw 2010a: 369). This has rapidly  changed over the last decade, after 
the publication of certain landmark contributions (Faubion 2001a; Laidlaw 2002; 
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41  Early contributions include Burridge (1960, 1969), Edel & Edel (1959), Firth (1951, 1953),  Fürer-
Haimendorf (1967), Gluckman (1972), Read (1955),  Vogt & Albert (1966) and Westermarck (1932). For 
more recent works, see Fiske and Mason (1990), Fortes (1987), Howell (1997), Parish (1994), Parkin 
(1985), Overing (1985), Parry and Bloch (1989), Pocock (1986) and Wolfram (1982). Zigon (2008) 
provides an overview of an impressive variation of relevant ethnographic works.
Lambek 2000). The sheer volume and variety  of anthropological works and approaches 
currently available attests to that.42 
Despite all of this, one could argue that given the intricate accounts of social customs 
and norms that one encounters in countless monographs, anthropologists have been 
studying ethics all along. However, this has been precisely part of the problem that 
inhibited the delineation of a separate conceptual space for the analysis of the ethical 
dimension of human life, something that was variably  recognized early  on (Edel & 
Edel, 1959: 7; Parkin, 1985: 4-5; Pocock 1986: 8; Wolfram 1982: 268). Laidlaw (2002) 
and subsequent  others have identified Durkheim’s conflation of morality with society  as 
an important  reason for the paucity  in the literature and the long overdue development 
of an anthropology of ethics (see also Faubion 2011; Lambek 2010a; Robbins 2004, 
2007; Widlok 2004; Zigon 2007). 
As Laidlaw shows (2002: 312-315), for Durkheim society  is dependent upon moral 
dictates that individuals tend to follow and moral norms are incorporated by and stem 
from society, which is perceived as an assemblage of ‘moral facts’ (1953  [1906]). The 
idea that morality directly derives from society is evident according to Durkheim in that 
‘the greater the strength of the group structure, the more numerous are the moral rules 
appropriate to it’ (1957 [1937]: 7). But the various facets of moral discipline and 
obligation are not only  experienced as ‘duty’. Durkheim contends that, because people 
are products of society, moral norms are also appealing to individuals (1953 [1906]: 
36-7, 44-7). Sexual, professional, as well as state morals, all emanate from and reflect 
society (1957 [1937]). In essence, Durkheim’s formulation, which is explicitly  geared 
towards critiquing and replacing Kantian rationalism with an ‘empirical’ explanation, 
eliminates the element of freedom and choice that was central in Kant (1998 [1785]). 
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42 Faubion (2001a, 2001b, 2001c, 2011), Laidlaw (1995, 2002, 2010a, 2010b,  2010c) and Lambek (2000, 
2002, 2003, 2008, 2010a, 2010b, 2010c, 2011) have all been instrumental in the development of an 
anthropology of ethics. Other significant contributions include Fassin’s ‘moral anthropology’  (2008, 
2011, 2012; Fassin & Lézé 2013), Robbins’s ‘anthropology of morality’ (2004, 2007, 2009, 2012) and 
Zigon’s ‘anthropology of moralities’ (2007, 2008, 2009a, 2009b, 2010a). Further important works include 
Al-Mohammad and Peluso (2012), Heintz (2009), Lakoff and Collier (2004), Sykes (2009) and Widlok 
(2004).
However, Kant’s universal and disembodied reasoning subject and his stress on moral 
obligations or categorical imperatives mediated through rational choice conjure up an 
already narrow conception of ethical life. In battling Kant’s deontology, Durkheim’s 
proposition and his:
[V]ision of human life, which simply lacks ethical complexity, dilemma, reasoning, 
decision, and doubt, does not  constitute an advance. It  is not just  that this kind of 
sociology is a charter for authoritarian corporatism, though that is also true. The 
relevant point  is that  it  is impossible...to see how specifically ethical considerations 
might  be distinguishable from the other causal factors that make the bits of the 
system – the people – function as they do (Laidlaw 2002: 315). 
Therefore, considering the central position of morality in Durkheim’s view of society, 
one would expect that ethics would be a central concern within anthropology. However, 
in conflating the moral with the social realm, Durkheim’s ideas hindered any attempts 
towards an explicit study of ethical behaviour as a discrete empirical and analytical 
domain. By restricting morality within a sense of social obligation, Durkheim limited 
considerably the possibilities and complexities of ethical life. Several scholars have 
remarked that, although a full-fledged anthropology of ethics has not  yet existed, there 
are various early examples that were not seized by Durkheim’s reductive conception. 
The work of Mary Douglas is one such example (Faubion 2011: 11; Lambek 2010a: 
12). In a slightly  different vein, Widlok refers to Durkheim’s view that certain important 
social customs, such as inheritance, are actually immoral, although Durkheim postulated 
that ‘if all social customs are not moral, all moral behavior is customary behavior’ (cited 
in Widlok 2004: 55). Robbins refrains from conceiving Durkheim’s moral facts and 
ethical freedom as mutually  exclusive, instead highlighting their complementarity 
(2007: 300; see also Yan 2011).  
Moving away from Durkheim, the description of ‘local moralities’ (e.g. Beidelman 
1971; Campbell 1964; Evans-Pritchard 1937, 1956; Howell 1997; James 1988; 
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Lienhardt 1961),43  but especially the Boasian strand (e.g. Boas 1928; Benedict 1935, 
1967 [1946]; Herskovits 1948, 1972; Mead 1928), embedded the discussion of ethics 
within a relativistic framework that further stalled a concerted approach (see Fassin 
2008; Heintz 2009; Laidlaw 2002, 2010a; Lambek 2010a; Zigon 2008).44 
Understanding the ethical domain as a series of homogeneous cultural idiosyncrasies 
will not get us far; on the other hand, the universalism of abstract  ethical reasoning fails 
to address ethics from a grounded perspective. Therefore, the empirical examination of 
ethics cannot not presuppose that culture, society and ethics coincide. Instead, it 
perceives the latter as being constitutive of the former and that ethics exhibits 
considerable diversity  and complexity. In turn, this may  require the reconsideration of 
basic social-scientific conceptual tenets, such as structure, agency, society  and culture 
(Laidlaw 2010a, 2010b).   
The recognition that the ‘ethical turn’ in anthropology aims to transcend some basic and 
long-standing hindrances to its development needs to be further alert to the semantic 
variation (and confusion) that  has been inherited by  moral philosophy, where ethical 
inquiry  has a long history.45  I cannot survey here the full extent of this terminological 
morass, but a few examples suffice to demonstrate (rather than clarify) this problem. 
Laidlaw, following Nietzsche (1998 [1887]) and Williams (1985), defines moralities as 
‘ethical systems where self-denying values inform law-like obligations’ (2002: 317). 
Thus, the ethical encompasses morality, which forms only  one out of many possible sets 
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43  Various edited collections with a regional ethnographic focus but without a particularistic view of 
ethics have appeared recently. See, for example, Barker (2007), Pandian and Ali (2010), Stafford (2013)
and Zigon (2011a).
44 For more recent but similarly attuned contributions, see Cook (1999), Geertz (1984), Hatch (1983) and 
Shweder (1989). The persistence of relativism is exemplified in a paradox mentioned by Laidlaw (2002: 
327, 2010a: 372), according to which, in postulating ‘the primacy of the ethical’, Nancy Scheper-Hughes 
almost simultaneously critiqued (1995) and embraced (2000) relativism.
45  As Lambek (2010a), among others (Faubion 2001a; Laidlaw 2002; Widlok 2004),  has noted, the 
emergent ‘ethical turn’ in anthropology should be informed and will benefit from a constant dialogue with 
philosophy. An ethnographically-grounded (and thus more pragmatic) anthropological approach does not 
have to exclude or defend (as often philosophers do) specific and often conflicting philosophical 
substrata.  Ethics is an essentially intersubjective affair, but not a set of social obligations in the 
Durkheimian sense. Therefore, anthropology has a distinctive task to confront the subjective nature of 
ethics widely present in moral philosophy (Faubion 2011: 56-57).
of values and actions. Zigon places ethics in the moment that emerges after what he 
calls a ‘moral breakdown’, and he defines ‘morality as the unreflective mode of being-
in-the-world and ethics as a tactic performed in the moment of the breakdown of the 
ethical dilemma’ (2007: 138). 
By contrast, Faubion, whose arguments I examine in Chapter 5, does not perceive the 
two as mutually  exclusive. He resists the conceptualization of everyday life as 
unreflective, retains the totality of the ethical domain to which morality is internal and 
renames the latter as the ‘themitical’. In doing so, Faubion seeks to convey  the 
normativity of the moral order by avoiding the semantic confusion that arises from the 
myriad connotations associated with ‘morality’ (2011: 20, 24). Lambek’s suggestion is 
to treat ethics and morality  as interchangeable (2010a: 9), because maintaining an 
inconsistent distinction is confusing as well as inhibitive to the creative appropriation of 
ideas and insights from relevant scholarship. He adds, however, that ethics is preferable 
due to its prominence in moral philosophy and its association with practice and the 
‘good’, rather than propriety and the ‘right’. 
I endorse this second point fully  and, in part, this is how I have and will refer to ethics 
in the remainder of the thesis. Due to the ambiguity of the term ethical (indicating a 
‘field’ as well as a positive dimension of action), here, too, ‘the reader has to exercise 
some discernment’ (Lambek 2010a: 9). I further embrace Lambek’s designation of 
ethics as ‘ordinary’, in the sense that ‘the ordinary is intrinsically  ethical and ethics 
intrinsically ordinary (ibid.: 3). But I also retain the relationship  between ethics and 
morality  (or the ‘themitical’), in the spirit of Laidlaw (2002) and Faubion’s (2011) 
formulations. 
In a nutshell, I reserve the term ethical to indicate the variegated practices and 
judgements pertinent to music-making. I perceive music as a site for self-cultivation and 
formation, in which my informants strived for ‘excellence’ or ‘the good’: ‘[T]hat at 
which human beings characteristically aim’ (MacIntyre 1981: 148). Some of these 
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music practices are seen as moral or ‘themitical’ due to their normative nature but also 
because of the connotations of ‘right’ or ‘wrong’ that accompanied and characterized 
certain behaviours. My purpose is not to provide a solution at the level of definition and 
this would not make much sense ethnographically. Nevertheless, I hope that thus 
articulated my use of these terms provides a useful compass for the reader to navigate 
what follows.
In turning from moral obligation to ethics as Aristotelian practice (2009 [1980]), my 
treatment of music-making as virtuous conduct and self-cultivation derives respectively 
from the ideas of MacIntyre (1981) and Foucault (1982, 1985, 1986, 1997, 2005). 
Aristotle conceived ethics as an intrinsic property of action and not thought, and 
distinguished between three types of human activities: praxis (doing), poiêsis (making) 
and theoria (thought). What I take from Macintyre is a conception of practice in which 
means and ends [telos] are conjoined (Chapters 3 & 6) – what Aristotle would term 
energeia and what Arendt calls ‘actuality’ (1998 [1958]: 206). From Foucault’s writings 
on ethics I embrace the link between ethics and ‘freedom’ (Chapter 6),46  and that 
various practices or ‘techniques of the self’ represent forms of self-fashioning and the 
means by which actors gradually become ethical subjects (Chapters 4 & 5). In other 
words, and contrary to Aristotle’s conviction, I treat ethics as poiêsis and not merely  a 
form of ‘doing’ [praxis] (see Faubion 2001a, 2011). 
Foucault distinguished moral precepts from ethics, which he called ‘the kind of 
relationship  you ought to have with yourself’ [rapport à soi], which is expressed in how 
individuals constitute themselves as ethical subjects (1997: 263). Foucault’s techniques 
or technologies of the self allow us to ethnographically  attend to how freedom is 
exercised cross-culturally and to the bodily practices pertinent to ethical cultivation. 
Crucially, his idea of ethical freedom offers the opportunity  to challenge a particular and 
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46 The link between ethics and freedom echoes Kant’s influence on Foucault (Hacking 2002: 115-120; cf. 
Faubion 2011: 38-39, 50-51).
prevalent conception of agency in social theory  (Keane 2003; Laidlaw 2002, 2010b; see 
also Chapter 6).
Of course, I am not alone in tackling these arguments. MacIntyre’s idea of goods 
internal to practices has been addressed elsewhere (e.g. Widlok 2004;  see also Laidlaw 
2010a: 372-373; Lambek 2010a: 21-23). Foucault’s schema of ethical self-cultivation 
has made an impact upon an impressive array of ethnographic topics and has variably 
influenced several recent approaches (e.g. Asad 1993; Candea 2010; Daston & Galison 
2007; Faubion 2001a, 2001b, 2011; Fischer 2003; Howell 1997; Humphrey 1997; 
Laidlaw 2002; Pandian 2008a; Rabinow 1996). His ideas are also echoed or directly 
taken up in a range of notable ethnographic monographs that  grapple with ethical 
projects.47 
Despite the thematic pluralism, there is no work engaging directly  with music. This is 
strange, because several important figures writing on ethics have alluded to the ways in 
which music and sound could be related to ethics but also how music practices 
exemplify central ideas and paradoxes about ethical cultivation. Thus, Mahmood (2005: 
29) notes that ‘docility’ as an ethical stance can be best understood through the example 
of a painful training regime, which a pianist undergoes in order to excel in his or her 
practice (Chapter 4). Lambek (2010a: 21-22) contends that one practice where 
MacIntyre’s (1981) internal goods are readily observable is that of music and 
specifically when one plays for the inherent pleasure involved, rather than to achieve 
goals external to the practice (Chapter 6). Finally, Hirschkind (2006) skillfully 
demonstrates how auditory aesthetics, vocal harmonies and the affective qualities of 
sound are intrinsic characteristics of ethical cultivation in the context of sermon-
listening. 
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47 Themes range from religion (Cook 2010; Faubion 2001c; Hirschkind 2006; Laidlaw 1995; Lester 2005; 
Mahmood 2005), history (Lambek 2003), motherhood and reproduction (Paxson 2004), mental illness 
(Davis 2012), suffering (Throop 2010) and HIV (Zigon 2011b),  to cultural change (Robbins 2004), 
postcolonialism (Pandian 2009) and postsocialism (Zigon 2010b). 
To reiterate, my purpose here is not to offer an additional set of definitions or a novel 
approach. Rather, my  aim is to enrich the ethnographic repertoire of technologies of 
self-cultivation and to bring attention to music practice as an ethical practice. I also wish 
to examine the potential to ethnographically address concerns that are of particular 
interest to an anthropology of ethics.48
Both Foucault and MacIntyre ground their ideas on specific practices. If an 
anthropology of ethics ought to be rooted in ethnographically observable practices 
(Faubion 2011: 93-94), then why  not endorse Bourdieu’s theory  of practice (1977, 
1990)? Part of the reason lies in my discussion above with regards to the confinement of 
‘agency’ in Bourdieu’s ‘field’, which renders it  overly  deterministic. Another reason is 
that Bourdieu is not preoccupied with ethics but with strategic calculation, competition 
and domination. His actors strive exclusively  for goods external to their practices 
(Lambek 2010a: 21). As Lambek notes elsewhere, practical judgement (‘wisdom’ or 
‘temperance’ [phronêsis]) involves good judgement: ‘Ethics in Aristotle is not 
something you apply but how you act. And it is not a matter of what you do – its 
specific content – but a matter of acting well’ (2000: 316). 
Rather than the unconscious embodiment and reproduction of social structure, ethics – 
for Foucault at least – is the conscious practice of freedom (1997: 284). Ethical practice 
encapsulates primarily the possibility  of change (Faubion 2011: 45-46). In adapting 
habitus from Aristole, Bourdieu retains the durability  of dispositions, which, once 
acquired, become part of the habitus (Chapter 6). However, he eliminates the 
pedagogical aspect present in Aristotle’s conception and central to ethical cultivation 
(Chapter 5). In other words, Bourdieu’s impressive work lacks an account of the explicit 
ways in which the habitus is learned (Mahmood 2005: 138-139). The Aristotelian 
master virtue of phronêsis is a sense of balance in life or the ‘middle ground’ between 
opposing extremes. This indicates that the exercise of practical judgement and the 
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48 I prefer this designation over others, such as anthropology of morality/moralities, moral anthropology, 
and so on. The intrinsically ordinary nature of ethics as a modality of human action reflects the fact that 
the ethical need not necessarily be a separate, sub-disciplinary ‘field’.
dispositional nature of ethical praxis necessarily involve a pragmatic synthesis of 
unconscious habit and self-interest (Lambek 2000: 316, 2010a: 22-23). In other words, 
ethics requires us to rethink the distinction between structure and agency, in which 
‘practice theory’ is embedded (Chapter 6).  
What for Bourdieu comes as an already formed unconscious habit, for Aristotle is 
formed and acquired through habitual practice: ‘[M]oral virtue comes about as a result 
of habit, whence also its name (êthikê) is one that is formed by a slight variation from 
the word ethos [ἔθος] (habit)’ (Aristotle 2009 [1980]: 23). Hence my use of êthos and 
not ethos in order to convey the dispositions acquired through habituated but ethically-
charged practices. Again, this does not offer a clarification (see Faubion 2011: 38).49 
However, it is consonant with how DiY ‘ethos’ and ‘ethic’ were used by  my informants 
and are used in popular discourse (‘good’ rather than merely ‘habit’). Êthos further 
avoids the connotations of a codified, professional ‘ethic’ (Chapter 3). My use of the 
term is consonant with Foucault’s ethical schema stemming from his treatise of ancient 
Greek ethics:
[E]thical in the sense in which the Greeks understood it: êthos was a way of being 
and of behavior. It was a mode of being for the subject, along with a certain way of 
acting, a way visible to others. A person’s êthos was evident  in his clothing, 
appearance, gait, in the calm with which he responded to every event, and so on. 
For the Greeks, this was the concrete form of freedom; this was the way they 
problematized their freedom. A man possessed of a splendid êthos, who could be 
admired and put forward as an example, was someone who practiced freedom in a 
certain way. I don’t think that a shift  is needed for freedom to be conceived as 
êthos; it  is immediately problematized as êthos. But  extensive work by the self on 
the self is required for this practice of freedom to take shape in an êthos that  is 
good, beautiful, honorable, estimable, memorable, and exemplary...Êthos also 
implies a relationship with others (1997: 286-287).
A DiY êthos encompasses the intersubjective nature of music-making as ethical 
cultivation, while emphasizing the role of ethical exemplars and pedagogy (Faubion 
2001a, 2011; Foucault 1997: 298-299). It also points to the internal virtuous 
dispositions, capacities and sensibilities acquired through external practices and 
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49 Êthos is synonym to the Latin mos, from which ‘morality’ derives. 
comportment (Mahmood 2005). It avoids the association of ethical action with ‘right’ or 
‘wrong’, retains the meaning of an êthos that is ‘good’ and highlights that its essence is 
the object of constant scrutinization, formation and reformation.
Foucault does not claim that we have to substitute ancient ethics for our current 
condition (1997: 261). However, a historical overview of ideas about ethics can help us 
expose contradictions in contemporary ethics, as well as its intimate relation with the 
ancient êthos. This, as Bernard Williams has shown (1993), is not that different from 
our ‘own’ and especially  the conception of responsibility (see also Chapter 6). What has 
changed is the way in which subjects historically have fashioned themselves: from ‘an 
aesthetics of existence’ – revolving around the ‘care of the self’ [souci de soi] that 
engenders a splendid êthos – to a ‘hermeneutics of the subject’ (Foucault 1985, 1986, 
1997, 2005). The latter is associated with the obligation ‘to know oneself’ [se 
connaître], and with inward self-examination and asceticism (as exemplified in the 
tradition of Christian morality). This shift is reflected upon the evolving variation of the 
technologies of the self that people have historically employed in becoming ethical 
subjects (Foucault 1997: 223-251).
The association of ethics with the freedom of the subject to become the person he or she 
wishes to be should not be seen as a capacity  for radical self-determination. 
Technologies of the self are predicated upon both reflexive and pedagogical registers 
(Faubion 2011), and for Foucault there is always a certain obligation to ‘truth’ in taking 
up techniques of self-formation (Laidlaw 2002: 324). As I will further elaborate in the 
chapters that follow, freedom (Chapter 6), technologies of the self (Chapters 4 & 5), and 
virtuous practice tout court (Chapter 3), belong to the domain of the intersubjective. 
Foucault’s ethical schema, with certain adjustments (Faubion 2011), is consonant with 
the observation that an ethnographic perspective on ethics should be pertinent to both 
collective considerations as well as individual concerns (Lakoff & Collier 2004: 429). 
This also recasts freedom as a condition of the ordinary and not the extraordinary, of 
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continuous ethical thought and practice and not only of periods of conflict between 
different value complexes (Robbins 2004, 2007, 2012). 
This ongoing practice of freedom also questions Zigon’s distinction between the ethical 
moment and the unthinking manner in which subjects, as he claims, live most of the 
time (2007, 2008). Not only does his formulation bring us back to Bourdieu’s habitus 
(see Laidlaw 2009, 2010a), but it further denies the possibility of ethical practice being 
informed by  and taking place in relation to moral or ‘themitical’ regimes (Faubion 
2011). As I argued above (see also Chapter 6), we cannot retain such rigid distinctions if 
we wish to ethnographically  describe the dynamics of ethical action. Ethics dwells in 
the interpenetration and continuous movement between ‘conscious’ work on the self and 
‘unconscious’ habitual practices, and between affective sedimentations and mindful 
responses (Chapter 4). 
In light of this, I do not endorse Zigon’s viewpoint that anthropological approaches to 
ethics fall broadly under two categories influenced by relevant philosophical strands: 
‘[T]he moral reasoning and choice approach’ and a virtue ethics based upon a ‘Neo-
Aristotelian and Foucauldian approach’ (2007: 133). According to Zigon, the second 
approach considers the cultivation of dispositional ethical capacities and not the 
possibility of actors becoming ethical subjects by following norms (cf. Mahmood 
2005). The aforementioned relation between conscious ethical practice, pedagogy and 
unconscious habit renders this statement problematic. Such a view assumes that Neo-
Aristotelian or Foucauldian ethics are only self-taught, which is false (Faubion 2011: 
86). 
For similar reasons, I keep at arm’s length the otherwise productive debates between 
phenomenological approaches and theoretical contributions sensitive to the structural 
constraints in which ethical subjects find themselves (Robbins 2009; Zigon 2009a, 
2009b). Nor do I hold that, as opposed to a first-person phenomenological or 
existentialist understanding of the self as ‘given’, the post-structuralist view of the self 
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as something to be created, cultivated and fashioned promotes an anti-humanist or 
posthumanist understanding of ethics (Mattingly 2012). I do argue, with Laidlaw 
(2010b), that ‘agency’ should be seen as distributed and relational, without embracing 
an anti-humanist ethics that fails to account for ethical responsibility (Chapter 6). I also 
believe that Foucault’s ethical formulation should be adjusted along the lines of 
Faubion’s schema (2011) in order to accommodate the consideration of ethical 
judgements, without dissolving the ethical into personal opinion – what MacIntyre has 
called ‘emotivism’ (1981: 11-12). 
The Aristotelian virtue ethics could be exemplified by the virtuous ‘balance’ of 
phronêsis attained through careful practical judgement. According to Lambek, 
judgement entails specific criteria, some of which are solid and unchanging, other of 
which are contingent, while others depend on their reproduction through ritual means, 
thus allowing space for their transformation (2010b: 43-44). It follows that judgement is 
not as ‘free’ as reason was for Kant, while, as Lambek himself contends, the very 
capacity to make judgements presupposes at least some degree of freedom (2010a: 20). 
Therefore, instead of perceiving judgement and its ability  to mediate between moral 
obligation and ethical freedom as the sine qua non of ethical action, I treat freedom, 
after Foucault, as an absolutely necessary  – but by  no means sufficient – condition for 
the exercise of judgement and ethics in general (Chapter 6).
2.6 Making Music, Selves and Cities
In this chapter I attempted to paint in broad strokes and lay the groundwork for the 
conceptual apparatus that I will employ  in Part II & III. I began by identifying a general 
lack of anthropological interest in music-making as a field of ethnographic 
investigation, a dearth partly  due to disciplinary boundaries and the erroneous 
conviction that anthropology has not much to offer to (nor to gain from) the cross-
cultural study of music. I proceeded to review the relevant literature by paying attention 
to works that have informed my approach. In doing so, I foregrounded the quantitatively 
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limited but invaluable and far-reaching contributions of anthropologists working in this 
field, and how insights derived from ethnographic approaches in related disciplines can 
overall strengthen an anthropological approach to music. The lack of a concerted and 
sustained approach has been further hindered by a glaring gap in the ethnographic 
literature between music and ethics – both within and outside of anthropology.   
From the examination of particular ethnographic examples I attempted to tease out the 
conceptual elements that will enable me to reveal the particularities of music-making, as 
well as its broader resonance for the locality and the lives of my informants. I suggested 
that the notion of ‘the local’ as a bounded geographical entity fails to address the ways 
in which music is practiced across time and space. Instead, I argued that the idea of 
urban musical routes or ‘pathways’ seems to provide a useful metaphor for an 
ethnographic study that seeks to demonstrate the fluidity  of music practices that take 
place today in urban environments. How to define or ‘catch’ the local appears as a 
central problem in various conceptualizations of music collectivities and their 
representations. Some of these frameworks have the capacity  to elucidate broader 
domains that affect music-making, but  to do so has been to the detriment of lived 
experience and its ethical dimension that should be continuously realized in action. 
In shifting from the consideration of the ways in which networks of music practitioners 
produce meaning to how actors become ethical subjects, I encountered the reverse 
problem, namely  that the burgeoning anthropological interest in ethics has excluded 
music from its ethnographic horizons. With the exception of Hirschkind’s ethnography 
of sermon-listening in Cairo (which as I have noted in the introduction cannot be 
defined as ‘music’), and despite the recurring links between music practice and virtuous 
action in the literature, an ethnographic approach is still yet to be realized. 
My consideration of relevant works in the emerging anthropology of ethics highlighted 
that ethnography in ethics should be based upon the examination of concrete practices, 
rather than abstract reasoning or moral values and obligations. The focus should be on 
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how actors become ethical subjects through training themselves in relation to and in 
spite of normative or moral ‘rules’. The Aristotelian tradition of ethics as practice is 
instructive for an anthropology of ethics, as is Macintyre’s focus on specific virtuous 
practices. Foucault has provided an explicit way for anthropologists to study ethical 
practices through his concept of technologies of the self. In grounding my subsequent 
ethnographic analysis in music practices as processes of self-cultivation, I seek to partly 
address the identified gap  in the literature. By blending the study of music and ethics, I 
also hope to enrich the anthropological record of technologies of subject-formation.
In doing so, I intend to go beyond the suggestion that music is simply an additional way 
of ethnographically  studying ethics. My aim is to attend to how music can uniquely 
contribute to our understanding of how ethical subjects come to be formed. This process 
of poiêsis necessarily  involves the relation between music and the subject in its totality, 
and the subjects’ relation to their bodies, others and their surroundings. A ‘musical’ 
approach to ethics demands attention to the sensory regimes and affective registers 
through which music interacts with human bodies and induces ethical sensibilities 
(Chapter 4). It further requires the examination of how subjects-in-the-making gradually 
become localized through repetitive practices and the embodiment of the ethical 
modality  of ‘the local’ (Chapter 6). Locality itself should be continuously  enacted, 
formed and reformed through practice. 
As Lefebvre reminds us in The Production of Space (1991), we should attend not to the 
‘giveness’ of space but  to the processes through which it is produced, lived and 
transformed. As Lefebvre also reminds us, exercising the right to the city (1996, 2003)
involves the use of urban spaces. This is achieved through social practice [praxis]: the 
production, reproduction and appropriation of spaces, artefacts, as well as social 
relations (ibid. 2002: 232-244). As Lefebvre further argues, only  when repetitive action 
[praxis] becomes ‘inventive’, that is, a creation [poiêsis], can the city  be reinvented and 
recreated as an oeuvre (1996: 87). Lefebvre thus provides us a way to examine not only 
how subjects cultivate themselves in space or with space, but  also how the cultivation of 
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space through music practice emerges as a distinctive urban ethical practice (Chapter 3). 
His ideas help to bring into focus the ways in which people make and remake cities 
through making themselves, and vice versa. 
In light of this, the right to the city should be perceived as an ethical right: not a quasi-
legal right, nor one ‘invested in the stable certainties of identity, but rather in the 
potential of individuals to realize an ethical self from a host of presubjective 
possibilities’ (Baxstrom 2008: 6). Lefebvre notes that the bewildering passivity  of 
‘users’ – of urban dwellers who are affected by the current state of cities – is due to the 
long history of delegating interests to representatives, decision-makers and skilled 
experts (2003: 187-188). What happens when skills do not come as a package of rules 
or form a privilege of experts, but are embedded within ongoing urban practices that 
cannot be reified or qualified by a specific ‘design’? What forms of ‘politics’ are 
encapsulated in such immanent practice (Chapter 6)? With these questions in mind I 







Chapter 3: Winning Sperm Party
3.1 Urban Rhythms and Musical Pathways
I had been in touch with Colin several times since Alistair from Divorce (Chapter 4) and 
Stuart from Cry Parrot (Chapter 5) had each suggested that Winning Sperm Party 
(hereafter WSP) were highly  relevant to my research. Colin was slow to reply to my 
emails. When he did reply a few weeks later he invited me to one of their events at the 
CCA,50 but I had already  planned to attend another gig at the 13th Note that evening,51 
at which Barry would perform solo as Tangles. Nevertheless, I decided to drop in early 
and meet them, even if it was to be brief. 
When I arrived at the Centre the allocated room was locked. A young man came to 
unlock the door. I had spotted him several times at previous DiY events. When I asked 
him about Colin, he replied, while we were entering the room: ‘Oh yes, Colin told me 
about you. There’s four of us’. This was Peter who introduced me to another young 
man, Corey, who was standing behind a table with the bands’ merchandise, and we all 
walked towards a small kitchen at the side of the stage. There, Colin was standing in 
front of a large pan containing a boiling yellowish soup. He was cooking for the bands 
in tonight’s line-up. Iain, the fourth member, was missing. After a brief introduction 
regarding my – at the time – rather ambitious fieldwork plans we arranged a meeting for 
the following week.  
This chapter traces the collective’s trajectory  from its beginnings in Stirling to the end 
of my fieldwork. WSP started off as an online blog and subsequently evolved into a 
record label and a live music promoter. The driving force behind the consolidation of 
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50 The Centre of Contemporary Arts is situated on Sauchiehall Street.
51  Bar, restaurant and music venue on King Street opposite Mono (Chapter 5) and very close to 
Transmission (Chapter 1). Mono was owned by Simon and it housed Monorail,  a popular independent 
record shop (Chapter 1). Simon owned several music venues across the city, including Stereo on Renfield 
Lane and The Flying Duck on Renfield Street.
their practice was their multiple band membership, which had resulted in an array of 
affiliations with other local musicians. Before moving to Glasgow, music-making had 
emerged out of necessity  in the absence of other forms of interesting recreational 
activities.52  But the collective’s practice was not just a ‘hobby’. Following Finnegan, 
who treats all of her informants equally  as ‘musicians’ (1989: 18), I argue that 
discourses of amateurism and professionalism are insufficient for grasping the nature of 
WSP practice. In rejecting the current terminology, I highlight the ethical qualities of 
commitment and acknowledgement (Lambek 2010b), by arguing that these offer an 
alternative framework for understanding the intrinsic ethical characteristics that pervade 
‘professional’ conduct.
The fact that materialism was subservient to an ethics of care and attention indicates a 
different form of professionalism defined by  a degree of dedication and effort that the 
concept of ‘work’ or, following Arendt, ‘labour’ (1998 [1958]; see Lambek 2010a: 
15-16) failed to grasp. In this context, being ‘disorganized’ took on a different meaning 
and it would be a mistake to perceive it as a lack of interest or efficiency. Rather, 
‘disorganization’ should be seen ‘as organising within a logic that prioritises collective 
need over greed’ (Schaumberg 2013: 389). Instead of attempting to compare degrees of 
ethical integrity, we should perceive professionalism as committed and intersubjective 
ethical action. This involves acknowledgement of our wrongdoings, as well as the right 
to recognition (Taylor 1992). If recognition is a ‘right’, then it can also be expressed as 
an ethical demand. For this I take inspiration from the work of Henri Lefebvre in order 
to show how members of the collective sought to assert their right to the city (1996, 
2003). 
I understand this to be an ethical right that allowed them to inhabit  the locality, in the 
sense of ‘the plasticity of space, its modeling and the appropriation by groups and 
individuals of the conditions of their existence’, with the aim of actively taking part in 
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52 This is a common theme in ethnographies of popular music. Fonarow argues that the idea of ‘boredom’ 
tends to reinforce a stereotype of affluent young musicians and to implicitly moralize the gratifying and 
pleasurable aspects of music, as opposed to the dominant work ethic (2006: 180). 
urban life (Lefebvre 1996: 76, 79). The practices through which WSP expressed this 
demand  involved the musical rendering of urban spaces through performance (Stokes 
1994). ‘Music’, write Connell and Gibson, ‘may  not always shape the spaces we 
inhabit, but in the media-saturated environments of contemporary  cities and towns it  has 
become a ubiquitous, and often deliberate, presence’ (2003: 194). It  is music-making as 
a form of ethical deliberation and a means to shape urban spaces that this chapter seeks 
to explore. 
The development of popular music has always paralleled the processes of increasing 
urbanization and industrialization. By illustration, certain genres have been termed as 
‘sounds of the city’ or ‘urban rhythms’ (Cohen 2007: 2). My  interest here is not in 
foregrounding the ways in which music was appropriated and harnessed by the locality 
as an urban resource or tourist attraction (Chapter 1). Nor, conversely, am I concerned 
with how the city was depicted and imagined in music. Rather, I aim to highlight the 
ways in which sounds as urban rhythms are constituted by everyday spatial practices. 
Such an approach conceives of the city not as a reified notion, but as a modality of 
everyday practice and a site of intensified social, cultural and economic inter-
connections. 
The pluralism of urban routes or ‘pathways’ (Finnegan 1989; see also Chapter 6) 
provides an experientially grounded perspective that traces and captures the repetitive 
nature of urban practices. In order to illustrate the predominance of musical pathways in 
the everyday lives of the collective’s members, I will show how these ordered a 
considerable part of their urban existence. This was achieved through the repetitive 
enactment of specific music practices that included, among others, organizing live 
music events, practicing and performing music, producing and distributing promotional 
material, as well as releasing records. Therefore, instead of music reflecting urban 
rhythms, I argue that these practices had their own rhythms, the beats of which 
patterned both Glasgow’s urban environment and the social lives of my informants. The 
123
regularity  of music-making as a cyclical-temporal and spatial practice necessitates that 
we treat urban music as a spatio-temporal phenomenon. 
To address this recurrent conjunction between urban space and time I turn once again to 
Lefebvre and his work on Rhythmanalysis (2004). For Lefebvre, ‘all rhythms imply the 
relation of a time to a space, a localised time, or, if one prefers, a temporalised 
space’ (ibid.: 89). Lefebvre distinguishes between cyclical and linear rhythms. The 
alternation of day and night is an example of the former, while linear rhythms derive 
from the almost mechanical repetition of movements [gestes], and they are generally 
associated with human work. In reality, the cyclical and the linear are indissociable: ‘An 
example: so many  days of work’ (ibid.: 90). Therefore, rhythms are relational and they 
can only  be measured against one another. They are measures passing through 
frequencies – there is no rhythm without measure [mesure], that is, without repetition 
(ibid.: 6). While all rhythms imply  repetition, there can be no identical, absolute 
repetition. Rhythms imply  difference. As such, only non-mechanical movements can 
have rhythms (ibid.: 78).
For Lefebvre, the reciprocal relation between human activity, time and space gives rise 
to rhythms, and I intend to demonstrate how the collective’s rhythms as time-space 
continua required the active appropriation of urban territories but also the appropriation 
of time. Crucially, the rhythmicity  of music practices afforded WSP the opportunity  to 
inscribe their own rhythms into the urban landscape. Lefebvrian rhythms do not assume 
an automatism or impose an identical repetition, but instead imply the impossibility of 
‘perfect’ simulation in day-to-day practice. As such, they encapsulate the dynamism of 
urban life, which, for all its mundane repetitiveness, is impregnated with the potential of 
diversity and innovation.
The collective’s rhythmic response to the lack of material resources was predicated 
upon practices of sharing, an idea that reverberates throughout the chapter. Mutual help 
and the sharing of resources were ethical practices that emerged out of necessity. 
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Sharing was not a means to an end, but an integral dimension of urban music practice 
particularly conducive to the collective’s circumstances. Rather than being a meta-
practice, sharing was inextricably linked to the collective’s nature and identity. My 
informants perceived sharing as a good practice in and of itself, beyond the specificities 
of what was being shared. Because the existence of WSP rested upon such a communal 
doing and collective sharing, to borrow or lend a guitar, or to record music and then 
make it available for free was, as Widlok (2004) has phrased it, a ‘sharing “in”’, that is, 
an extension of the group’s boundaries to include individuals who took part in this 
process. 
It would be erroneous to conceive of this form of sharing as an idiosyncratic process of 
gift exchange (Mauss 1990 [1925]) or as one-way, ‘unbalanced’ reciprocity (Sahlins 
1988). As Widlok explains (2004: 60-62), it is impossible to determine the eventual 
outcome of the transfers involved, because a seemingly one-way transfer (sharing) 
might become a two-way transfer in the long term. Not only is it impossible to account 
for the intermittent but ongoing transfer of goods between people, but the time 
constraints embedded in fieldwork dramatically restrict our capacity to observe even a 
small part of this give-and-take. Most importantly, it is the very definition of sharing as 
a form of giving (and taking) that is problematic due to its consequentialist 
connotations. Sharing ‘in’, by contrast, absorbs this consequentialist logic and inverts it 
within a practice that is defined by its very nature. This does not  mean that sharing 
implies the idea of a ‘free’ or ‘pure’ gift that is free from obligations and does not forge 
connections between individuals (see Laidlaw 2000). 
It is the composition of the group  that is altered through sharing, rather than the 
ownership of goods through exchange. Not only does sharing create an extended social 
group but it fosters communion and affects participants by  endowing them with 
particular identities. This brings us back to the politics of recognition, not from below 
(Appadurai 2004), but from within. By inhabiting its own temporality, sharing as a 
virtuous practice need not be assessed retrospectively but  it  is determined by sheer 
125
participation. Considering the ubiquity of sharing in urban music practices, its potential 
to produce a sustainable framework for music-making, as well as its capacity  to bestow 
identities and alter the terms of recognition, we could say that sharing is the practice of 
all urban music practices.
However, let us not overstate this. Without diminishing its integral ethical role, I have 
already alluded to sharing as only one of various ‘tactics’ or ‘ways of operating’, which: 
[C]onstitute the innumerable practices by means of which users re-appropriate the 
space organized by techniques of sociocultural production. [They also include] the 
clandestine forms taken by the dispersed, tactical, and makeshift  creativity of 
groups or individuals already caught in the nets of “discipline”...A tactic insinuates 
itself into the other’s place, fragmentarily, without  taking it  over in its entirety, 
without  being able to keep it  at  a distance. It has at  its disposal no base where it can 
capitalize on its advantages, prepare its expansions, and secure independence with 
respect to circumstances...because it does not have a place, a tactic depends on time 
– it  is always on the watch for opportunities that must  be seized “on the wing”. 
Whatever it  wins, it does not  keep. It  must constantly manipulate events in order to 
turn them into “opportunities” (de Certeau 1984: xiv-xv, xix). 
The concept of tactics is useful in many respects to my argument. First, it  neatly reflects 
the conditions confronted by the collective in an urban environment. Second, it 
highlights the collective’s tendency to appropriate and transform spaces across the city 
in order to stage performances. Third, it shows that exercising the right to the city 
implies more than ephemeral spatial contestation and appropriation and ultimately 
promotes an ethical claim with regards to urban freedom and self-sufficiency. It  also 
illuminates, to identify  a fourth area of utility, the significance of sharing in providing a 
‘base’ and a springboard for the acquisition of more permanent means to facilitate 
music-making. A fifth point is that it sheds light on the mutuality  or ‘alliance’ (Lefebvre 
2004: 60) of urban space and time. Finally, it hints at  the creativity and recurrence of 
tactics not as transient replication, but as a persistent and conscious practice, adjusted 
each time to fit the circumstances. 
These tactics consisted of concrete practices but  also symbolic gestures. For example, 
being ‘disorganized’ was an organizational tactic which helped to distinguish WSP from 
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highly  organized promoters, while the process of naming bands was an action of self-
determination par excellence. Bodenhorn and vom Bruck contend that names and 
naming work at the intersection of identity, society  and politics: ‘That identities can be 
stolen, traded, suspended, and even erased through the name reveals the profound 
political power located in the capacity to name’, but this also ‘illustrates the property-
like potential in names to transact social value [and] the powerful connection between 
name and self-identity’ (2006: 2). 
de Certeau himself pays attention to street and place names and how these take on 
diverse meanings by passersby  (1984: 104). I propose a different  view that sees names 
as having an inherent capacity to transmit meanings and to ‘protect’ or ‘mask’ their 
carriers. That is not to say that names cannot be endowed with multiple meanings. As I 
will demonstrate, the irony and ambiguity  of many stage and institutional names were 
the main characteristics that ensured the obscurity and protection of the named. The 
deliberate polysemy  of names equipped with an ironic twist meant that music managed 
to evade classification and pigeonholing by outsiders. Therefore, irony  could also be a 
substitute for silence (Fernandez & Huber 2001: 5). 
❊❊❊❊❊❊
The following section focuses upon the organization and execution of a WSP gig. This 
will be followed by a section that considers the emergence of WSP, their initial band 
involvement and participation, as well as their views on the value of making music. A 
striking feature of many of these bands was their whimsical, quirky and sometimes 
extravagant names. Therefore, the third section is devoted to the examination of names 
and their semantics. A subsequent  detailed ethnographic description of the collective’s 
music-related activities is offered in order to address the importance of sharing as an 
ethical act. The fifth and final section grapples with the contested spatiality  of WSP 
practice and the musical articulation of urban space through the examination of the 
negotiations and maneuvering involved in acquiring appropriate spaces for 
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performance. It also explores the broader significance of musical pathways in the 
collective’s life in the city, while the conclusion brings together these threads through a 
discussion of ethical professionalism.
3.2 Winning Sperm Party in Action: 10+ Electric Guitar Orchestra
I was waiting outside the room while the orchestra was sound-checking. I could barely 
hear Mary 53 speaking throughout our conversation, which was disrupted several times 
by the loud sound waves that poured into the hallways of the community centre. The 
previous night, Take A Worm For A Walk Week  launched their third record at the Centre 
of Contemporary Arts (CCA). They had gained a strong reputation locally  due to their 
musicianship, which was owed partly  to their classical training. According to Peter, they 
and Lapsus Linguae were two of the ‘best bands around’. At the CCA I met Peter and 
Iain who invited me to the Maryhill event. The line-up consisted of several acts but the 
main attraction was an electric guitar orchestra comprising ten or more guitarists. Iain 
asked me with a certain urgency  whether I could play the guitar (I could not). So far, 
they  had managed to confirm only six guitarists. We then talked about Peter J. Taylor, 
the orchestra’s Glenn Branca-inspired conductor from Milton Keynes.54
Iain recounted a story about a similar event that had occurred a few years back. 
Specifically, how everybody in the orchestra had gotten really drunk and did not play 
well. He hoped that this time it would be a success though, but Peter cut him off saying 
that the following evening’s event had a BYOB55 policy, and so it  would be ‘even worse 
this time’ – we laughed. Needless to say, the orchestra did not have the opportunity  to 
rehearse for the performance properly. 
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53 Peter’s girlfriend.
54 Glenn Branca is an American avant-garde composer and no wave pioneer (see Masters 2007). Branca is 
also known for composing symphonies for electric guitar ensembles. He first conducted his symphony 
No. 13 for 100 electric guitars (‘Hallucination City’) in New York in 2001 (see Hughes 2007).
55 BYOB stands for ‘Bring Your Own Booze/Bottle/Bucket/Beer’.
The Maryhill community centre did not normally  host music events of this kind. It was 
expensive to rent and was owned by the Glasgow City  Council. WSP had paid £80 and 
a ‘huge deposit’, according to Colin. With a formal capacity of forty people, Iain 
believed that it actually fitted at  least a hundred, and he had already informed ‘the old 
woman’ with whom he had made the arrangements that they needed more space. 
Booking a venue always involved similar limitations and negotiations, due largely to the 
existence of national and local policies. ‘Right now’, Iain continued, ‘the old woman is 
loving me and Colin, but we’ll see how that goes’, hinting at her potential reaction to 
the sonic attack unleashed by a dozen or so electric guitar amplifiers. The gig was 
scheduled to finish by midnight because the centre was not  appropriately soundproofed 
and was situated in a residential area. Iain also gave me a poster, which he and ex-
Divorcee Lucy had designed (Chapter 4).
After the sound-check had finished the doors opened. It  was almost 9pm – an hour after 
the gig’s scheduled start. As I entered the room I saw Sarah who was collecting the door 
charge (£5). Smack Wizards were also scheduled to perform tonight, as well as Eternal 
Fags (see below). Various stuff was scattered on the table including a box containing 
12’’ vinyl records in elaborately-drawn white sleeves. I asked Sarah about the records 
and after pausing for a moment she said that she did not know to whom they belonged 
(it turned out that they were Peter J. Taylor’s). She drew a beautiful rose-like flower on 
the inside of my wrist as an indication that I had paid the door fee. The narrow side of 
the room opposite the entrance was occupied by  several guitar amplifiers. I counted 
nine, which varied in size and brand. They formed a background for the rest of the 
equipment surrounding a drum kit in the middle, while guitars and effects pedals were 
placed everywhere. 
I stood next to one of the windows, and I saw Alistair, Jan and Anna from Divorce enter 
(Chapter 4). Alistair had arrived quite early because he was due to accompany the guitar 
orchestra on drums. He approached me while searching for his bag and said that he was 
already ‘pissed [drunk]’ and that he was ‘sweating like a pig’. He expressed concern 
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about whether he would be capable of playing the drums later on and pointed out that 
the room was very warm and humid. I had begun to feel the heat myself but I did not 
manage to reply because Eternal Fags were taking the stage.
Iain was standing on the right and Colin was drumming intensely but with a calm look 
on his face. Iain was striking chords on his guitar while shouting in the microphone, 
which was placed on a stand in front of him. Occasionally, his mouth would cover the 
microphone in order to produce a particular ‘fuzzy’ effect with his voice. Their music 
was loud and aggressive. A member of the Gummy Stumps (see below) in the audience 
was recording the sound with his portable equipment. The band played a few songs and 
then Iain addressed the audience with a self-deprecating tone: ‘Would you like one more 
[song]?’. People laughed and somebody shouted: ‘Play two!’. Alistair joined the verbal 
exchange with his characteristic sharp humour and shouted: ‘No, just one!’. The band 
played another song and finished their set.
After the Smack Wizards and Blue Sabbath Black Fiji performances,56  with the latter 
featuring a one-off contribution from Iain and Colin, the eleven guitarists started testing 
their guitars.57  Colin told me that they had eventually  managed to recruit eleven 
instrumentalists to participate in the orchestra. Most of the guitarists were standing in 
front of the amplifiers, but Peter, along with James from the The Cosmic Dead,58  was 
standing behind them. The sight of so many people and amps on stage in such a 
confined space was overwhelming. Peter, the conductor, walked in the middle of the 
room and stood with his back to the audience. He handed out sheet music to the 
orchestra and started by saying: ‘Hello Glasgow! It is great to be here tonight. I fucking 
love Glasgow!’. Considering the small-scale character of the event, his words were 
filled with irony. 
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56 Blue Sabbath Black Fiji were a guitar noise duo consisting of two French expats living in Glasgow.
57 Including, amongst others, Peter, Corey, Iain, and Lucy.
58 A local psychedelic rock quartet.
However, the music was immense. They  played two long pieces and Alistair blended 
well with the orchestra. My ostensibly good-quality  earplugs barely  did anything to 
filter the wall of noise stemming from the guitar amps; rather, the physicality  of 
frequencies engulfed my body and the sound absorbed me into its fibers. By contrast, all 
players’ eyes were fixed on the conductor. He was also playing the guitar in between his 
expressive gestures towards his orchestra. Because voices were drowned by the 
volume’s intensity, he also provided instructions by  moving his lips. In short, the 
orchestra’s sober and disciplined approach to performance contrasted sharply with the 
open-ended, cathartic effect of the sonic assault underpinning their musical production. 
When the first song finished, an awkward silence hung in the air. The audience 
appeared to be totally immersed in the echoes of layered noise that had left them numb 
and unable to clap or cheer. Alistair, who was sweating excessively, grabbed two bottles 
of beer, finished the half empty  one and opened the other with his teeth. He drank some 
and then took out a bottle of Buckfast  and had a large sip. He placed it  on the floor and 
continued looking Peter in the eyes awaiting his instructions.59 
The second piece was shorter, partially because halfway through the performance the 
janitor, a middle-aged man who was the only  person present in the premises responsible 
for the building stormed into the room. He went straight over to Iain and started 
shouting at him. Iain placed his guitar down and left the room along with the man, but 
the orchestra continued their musical assault. As they were leaving the receptionist said 
something to the conductor, who responded with a calm look while playing his guitar. 
After a minute or so, Iain came back and informed Peter J. Taylor that the show must 
end. He gestured as if he was saying: ‘It’s over’. Peter then signaled to the rest of the 
orchestra to play another ‘two’ [verses, apparently]. The music went on for another 
minute or so. The set finished with a sustained applause from the forty  people in the 
audience. Peter J. Taylor turned to us and stated that  he would like to thank all the 
people who played in the orchestra, as well as everybody who had come to watch the 
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59  Buckfast is a brand of fortified-wine that is widely known and rather controversial in Scotland, 
especially in Lanarkshire. It has been associated with anti-social behaviour.
gig. I later found out from Iain that the reason for the termination of the gig was that the 
centre had received several complaints from residents in the area. 
3.3 The Value of Making Music
WSP members were in their early twenties. None of them was originally from Glasgow, 
but, with the exception of Peter, they were all from the Trossachs Stirling area: Colin 
and Iain grew up  in Callander, while Peter and Corey were from Alloa and Aberfoyle 
respectively. They had moved to Glasgow to study, with Peter and Iain taking up sound 
engineering, Colin doing science and business, and Corey  enrolling in a graphic design 
course. Colin was currently  employed as a manager in a local poster distribution 
company and Iain had joined Colin’s team after quitting from his previous job at a 
supermarket. As a graduate, Corey initially  worked in a graphic design company but he 
subsequently  left in order to work in the kitchen of a bar-restaurant in the West End. His 
new job allowed him greater flexibility and ample time to make music. Likewise, Peter 
had become relatively disillusioned with his job as a sound engineer and he now 
occasionally helped his father in the field of market research. 
Colin and Iain knew each other from school, while the rest of the collective’s members 
first joined them not in Glasgow but in Stirling, where Iain and Colin organized music 
events during weekends. These gigs took place in spaces such as the School Hall, the 
bands’ own or other people’s garages, as well as other settings. According to Colin, 
putting on shows initially involved a different intention and served a different purpose 
to later on: 
We were doing it ourselves because it  was a natural thing to do. We hadn’t  thought 
about it  and we weren’t “anti-corporate” or anything. We probably wanted to be 
rockstars just  playing our own gigs. It  was like a school disco where you could get 
really drunk. 
In fact, as Peter explained to me, music itself did not seem particularly important either: 
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It  wasn’t about the music being good back then. It  was just something to do being 
underage and it was a pub you would be let in and where your mates could play. 
Despite their versatility as instrumentalists playing in different bands, WSP were not 
classically trained musicians but largely self-taught. The characteristics of autonomy 
and lack of pedagogy in the acquisition of musical skills within Western rock has been 
well documented (see Clawson 1999: 104).60  Colin had received some formal tuition. 
He had taken up piano lessons, but he was currently  a drummer. Colin expressed his 
lack of appreciation towards his ‘theoretical education’ as having the potential to help 
him improve his drumming skills. Trumpet was Corey’s first instrument at school, 
which he then dropped in favour of the electric guitar. This did not last long though, 
because he started playing the drums in Plaaydoh (see below) before realizing that he 
was not particularly good, which resulted in Colin taking over. Corey subsequently 
settled for the bass-guitar. Apart from Eternal Fags where he played the guitar, Iain 
drummed and played the bass-guitar in other bands. He had received relevant training at 
school for both instruments. For his main band though, Eternal Fags, he was playing 
the electric guitar, which was also Peter’s instrument. Peter had never received any 
formal music training whatsoever.
What made possible the simultaneous membership  in multiple bands was their 
intermittent nature. For example, Iain and Colin sometimes would not rehearse for a 
month if they had no upcoming gigs. However, the mere fact that the collective’s 
practical circumstances allowed them to participate in different bands does not explain 
why these bands existed in the first place. As Peter put it: 
It’s totally about the interaction with different  people, you have one interaction 
with a sound group and then a different  one with a group of people who play 
different  stuff. You have a lot  of different types of music you are interested in, but 
you know that other people are not necessarily interested in all of them. 
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60 I use ‘rock’ as an umbrella term in the broadest possible sense. Musical diversity and overlap, as well 
as my informants’ dismissive attitude towards generic categorizations inhibit me from employing narrow 
definitions. 
Indeed, the consensus was that social interaction and involvement in diverse music 
genres were the main reasons behind this prolific activity. For Iain, there was nothing 
compelling about playing an instrument alone at home and he needed to practice with 
other people in order to trigger his creativity. By  contrast, Corey highlighted the 
experience of live performance and individual creativity  as equally rewarding 
processes: 
Half the fun of playing music is playing with people, and that’s half of where the 
passion lies; but also spending the time on your own to create something and then 
take it  to people and see if that works...It’s a good feeling when you get  something 
that could “work” and then you take it  to practice and other people enjoy it...When 
all the ideas come together and create an end product, especially when you get to 
the point where you’re playing it  for the first time live and you pull it off...It gives 
me goosebumps. 
I was intrigued not only by the sheer amount of creative activity and the numerous 
bands associated with the collective, but also by an ongoing discussion about starting 
new bands and projects on top  of their existing ones and the various one-off (and 
sometimes impromptu) performances that took place in WSP events. This shuttered my 
preconceptions about the notion of a band as an entity  relatively stable through time, 
necessitating an exclusive focus and dedication on the part  of its members. The word 
‘band’ itself carries strong connotations of membership, solidarity and belonging 
(Cohen 1991: 36). 
Moving to the urban context of Glasgow provided WSP with opportunities for music 
cross-fertilization and exchange that resulted in an array of bands. Although much of 
WSP’s musical output was the outcome of part-time engagement (see also Finnegan 
1989: 304), I encountered a surprisingly  complex web of affiliated bands. Iain and Colin 
had been in a band since they  were teenagers and when they first came to Glasgow they 
were called Household. With the addition of Corey they changed their name to 
Plaaydoh but the band later disbanded. Corey went on to form the now also defunct 
Stomachs and later Smack Wizards in which Sarah, Colin’s girlfriend, played the drums. 
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Iain and Colin continued making music together as Eternal Fags. Colin had briefly 
joined Barry in Teenage Ricky, and also had a parallel project called Gummy Stumps 
along with Scott (who had recorded the orchestra’s performance), and Stephan, a well-
known local artist and GSA graduate. Iain was also performing with ex-Divorce 
member Lucy as Phat Trophies and, additionally, he played in Neighbourhood Gout 
along with Barry. Iain was planning to launch another music project with Peter’s 
brother. Peter’s main band was Gropetown but for quite a while he had also played with 
his brother in Almost Empty (a name they subsequently changed to Grozny), with whom 
they  had also performed once as D.+I.Y. Peter also ‘jammed’ with other friends of his in 
a band called Cop Porn. 
This brief band genealogy demonstrates the connections and interrelations that 
characterized band participation and membership. It also alludes to the plural value of 
music, which was translated into a variety of practices beyond composition and 
performance. In the next chapter, I will take a detailed look at issues of band 
membership and musical creativity. In this chapter, in contrast, I focus upon the variety 
of these arrangements. I now address a salient feature of this complex network: band 
names. I consider several of these stage names in an attempt to illustrate their 
significance in the production of meaning. As Finnegan puts it: ‘First, and most 
important, bands had names’ (1989: 263).
3.4 The Importance of Names and Naming
I was struck by the imaginative names adopted by many  of the bands affiliated with 
WSP. Laing offers an historical account of several band names, naming practices and 
meanings since the 1950s (1985: 41-52). Based upon his analysis, it would seem that 
some of the aforementioned stage names shared semantic similarities with band names 
from the punk era.61  For example, the apparent meaninglessness of Cop Porn, Eternal 
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61 Laing traces the shifting meanings of the word ‘punk’, from its association with deviant sexuality to its 
use as an affectionate (albeit derogatory) term akin to the British English ‘bugger’ (1985: 41-42). See also 
Fonarow for ‘indie’s’ connotations of ‘smallness, childhood, affection, and, at times, derision’ (2006: 45).
Fags, Gropetown and Smack Wizards evokes the punk band Sex Pistols. However, 
Laing shows that Sex Pistols had a name form that was unusual within punk and that 
mainly derived from 1960s ‘hippie’ bands. Also, argues Laing, their name was far from 
meaningless; apart from making sense at the level of grammar as an adjectival phrase or 
compound noun, it  did resonate at the level of meaning through sexual and phallic 
symbolism. But considering the intolerance exhibited by the DiY cohort towards 
homophobic, sexist and racist ideas and expressions, to argue that Eternal Fags, for 
example, was an implicit celebration of male sexuality would be ill-conceived. 
This is due to a crucial characteristic of several band names: irony. The direct inversion 
of established values, norms and ideas through the adoption of names that were obscene 
– but rarely  humorous or ironic – was a central tactic of the naming process of punk-
rock bands (Laing 1985: 47). By contrast, a lot of the band names associated with WSP 
worked only at the level of irony. Otherwise, their subversive qualities and meanings 
would be distorted. Household and Plaaydoh are examples of band names that 
implicitly  critiqued the ideas of safety  and comfort associated with home, family and 
childhood,62  while Phat Trophies can be perceived as a self-deprecating comment on 
professional or financial success. 
Another concrete way in which the subversion of social and cultural norms was 
expressed through band names was the grammatical ‘abuse’ of words. Malapropisms 
such as Plaaydoh and Phat Trophies,63  and spoonerisms such as Cop Porn exhibit 
deliberate grammatical ‘errors’. These express a dissonance between name and object, 
which in turn conveys a dissonance between the object and its associated meanings, 
and, ultimately between dominant social ideas and the reality  on the ground. Thus, 
phonetic dissonances or lexical disharmonies encapsulated a subtle form of social 
critique. Importantly, these erroneous and dissonant names did not articulate an idea of 
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62 Playdoh is a brand of modeling clay for children.
63 My favourite name in this category is Kylie Minoise, a noise solo act from Glasgow.
direct inversion of, nor opposition to, established social values, as many punk band 
names did. Rather, they pointed to their incongruity and hypocrisy. 
Nevertheless, certain band names had oppositional and negative meanings that 
embodied ideas such as a break (Divorce), destruction (Grozny),64  inferiority or low 
status (Almost Empty), and disease (Neighbourhood Gout). The semantic transparency 
of these and many punk names (Laing 1985: 46) can be contrasted with the polysemy 
and considerable ambiguity of the other names mentioned above. Take for example the 
words ‘fags’, ‘grope’, ‘smack’ or ‘household’. Could it be that Eternal Fags referred to 
endless cigarettes and that Household reflected the idea of housekeeping? Perhaps 
Gropetown was not meant to imply city-wide sexual promiscuity  but, rather, (social) 
uncertainty? Had a ‘smack wizard’ anything to do with heroin or was he or she 
somebody holding magical powers in order to physically hurt people? All these 
definitions seem plausible at the level of denotation.65 
It is evident, however, that the analysis of specific meanings of names should take into 
account their various connotations, as well as the context within which these names are 
produced, adopted and used. Laing argues that the meanings of band names are 
gradually reduced to their primary signifiers. They become signs for band members 
themselves. The naming process as a shock tactic has a relatively short life, while any 
subversive or rebellious qualities initially  associated with band names may subsequently 
become linked to the musicians’ behaviour and antics. That is why ‘as a name’, Laing 
notes, ‘Sex Pistols finally resonates no more or less than Beatles’ (1985: 52). 
What about the meaning of ‘Winning Sperm Party’? In an early  post on one of the social 
media employed by the collective, they wrote: 
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64  The capital of Chechnya in Southwest Russia, which was destroyed by the Russian army during 
1994-1995.
65 Teenage Ricky and D.+I.Y could be taken literally, in the sense that they derived from the real names of 
their members. However, the former name’s ironic connotations of adolescence/innocence and the latter’s 
association with DiY cannot be disregarded.
[P]robability of being a winning sperm.
The average human male ejaculates 17 litres of sperm in his lifetime. The average 
ejaculation contains, on average, 4 millilitres of sperm. Therefore, 17,000/4, the 
average male ejaculates 4,250  times in his lifetime. Each ejaculation contains an 
average of 320,000,000 sperm cells. Therefore the average male produces 
1,360,000,000,000 sperm cells in his lifetime. The average man has 2.5 children in 
his lifetime. Therefore, 1,360,000,000,000/2.5, there was only a 1 in 
544,000,000,000 chance of you being born. That doesn’t even take into account the 
chances of both your parents being born and meeting each other.66
The collective’s name, as well as the above calculation, does not so much convey 
phallocentric views, but rather a sense of ‘success’ or ‘breakthrough’ and a celebratory 
idea of music, captured in the collective’s name by the word ‘party’. The improbability 
of one’s having been born is a reason for celebration. For WSP the same applied to 
music, the pleasurable aspects of which made it a deeply rewarding experience and 
worthy of celebration. Its social dimension was again designated by the word ‘party’. As 
shown in the previous section, for WSP music was inherently social. The overtly sexual, 
anti-prestige but optimistic ideas conveyed by the name resonated with the names of 
early punk record labels (Laing 1985: 49).
Considering the rich meanings embedded in stage or institutional names, I was 
surprised that many  of the answers I received regarding the naming process, including 
WSP, Cry Parrot and Divorce (Chapters 4 & 5), focused upon its ‘randomness’. This 
was astonishing because names were not only important for their symbolic meaning, but 
according to Finnegan: 
The name was the focus of allegiance, an identification of both group and 
individual in conversing with outsiders and often a crisp epitomising of the group’s 
shared philosophy...The name was the key focus in any promotional literature or 
insignia...When a group was first formed it  had no real identity, but once it had a 
name took on a new quality. The very fact  that  the band had its own title gave its 
players a mark of unity and shared purpose for both themselves and outsiders. The 
life-cycle of bands was short and their organisation informal and precarious: but 
through the system of band names, each group marked out its well-recognized 
claim to its own unique identity and pride (1989: 263-265).
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66 Retrieved from http://www.myspace.com/winningspermparty/blog [Accessed 25 June 2012].
We may also apply Finnegan’s insights to institutional names. Names had a deeply 
symbolic value but they also served practical purposes. For both reasons, names could 
acquire property-like characteristics, and their ownership could be the object of 
considerable debate (Cohen 1991: 38), even legal disputes (see McPherson 2000). 
Consequently, band names and institutional names can be perceived as things and thus 
separable from the entities that they represent, as well as objects of transaction. 
As Finnegan shows, and contrary to Laing’s assertion, the integral value of names and 
their capacity to express but also define identities point to the inherent  power or agency 
of names and thus their irreducibility  to their primary signifiers (Bodenhorn & vom 
Bruck 2006: 3-5, 26-27). As a result, the naming process may also be one of 
objectification and recognition: bands (and other groups) had no real identity before the 
acquisition of a name. Therefore, what names are and do is clearly  linked to the process 
of bestowing a name and what this initial act aims to achieve (Bodenhorn & vom Bruck 
2006: 25).67 
What distinguishes naming individuals at birth from naming a music-related group is 
that the latter clearly involves agency on the part of the named.68  As Laing explains, 
whereas individuals and their names demonstrate a contingent relationship, bands and 
their names do not: ‘The name deliberately  chosen can then take on a motivated relation 
to the person or group to which it refers’ (1985: 42). Why is it  then that many of my 
informants stressed their random approach towards name-giving? Did they  consciously 
‘deny’ their agency or believe that  names were unimportant or just meaningless 
markers? Given the cross-cultural focus on a ‘good fit’ between names and persons 
(Bodenhorn & vom Bruck 2006: 27), one would expect that group-naming would be the 
outcome of a profoundly intentional and painstakingly examined act. 
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67 Naming can also be used to establish moral accountability (Bodenhorn & vom Bruck 2006: 1-2). For 
the moral significance of Yemeni naming practices, see vom Bruck (2006: 238-242). For the ways in 
which place-names are imbued with moral values among the Western Apache, see Basso (1996).
68  The distinction between name imposition and self-naming is not clear-cut. See Bodenhorn & vom 
Bruck (2006) and the other essays in that volume for different degrees of the tension between the ‘tyranny 
of the name’ and self-determination through naming. 
Indeed, I do not believe that the chosen names were random in the sense that any name 
‘would do’. Neither do I hold that my informants perceived these names as meaningless. 
Rather, I would argue that there were strong links between name and musical content 
and, therefore, that at least some of the reasons for choosing specific names were 
musical. In Peter’s words: 
People don’t really care what name is at  the top, it  maybe helps them recognize 
different  gigs but  at the same time people are going there to see the bands and are 
there to listen to your music. 
The primacy of content over label is a good enough reason for not paying due attention 
to ‘what name is at the top’. However, it seems to me that apart from echoing the ideas 
and meanings discussed above, the specific names were also strategically employed in 
order to reveal as well as to obscure or ‘mask’ the musical content, and thus ‘protect’ it. 
None of the names mentioned here reveal any musical associations. Moreover, several 
of these names, as well as Stuart’s view that Cry Parrot was a ‘ridiculous’ name (see 
Chapter 5), echo the widespread belief that sometimes ‘ugly’ or ‘silly’ personal names 
become masks that protect people (Bodenhorn & vom Bruck 2006: 8). 
But why protect  music and from whom should it be protected? The answer lies in many 
bands’ conviction that  their music was somehow unique and unclassifiable. Therefore, 
the use of ironic, non-musical names served as a means for bands to avoid internally 
pigeonholing their sound (and promoters and record labels their musical inclinations), 
discouraging externally-imposed classifications and judgements. Duncombe writes that 
‘irony is the opposite of authenticity’ but on the following page he exclaims that irony is 
a way to keep ‘the vultures’ off ‘culture’ (1997: 153-154). 
A name that resisted musical categorization demonstrated musical openness. It could 
thus become an effective strategy and an authenticating tool for bands, labels and 
promoters alike. At the same time, names loudly revealed this intention exactly through 
silencing musical connotations. The dual process of foreclosing and disclosing musical 
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information and intentions respectively through the adoption of specific names 
conveyed the message that  the musical content was, in a sense, ‘authentic’, but also 
open-ended, in flux or in the process of ‘becoming’ (Chapter 6). This conviction was 
encapsulated in names and was evident in the ostensibly  ‘random’ naming process, 
while also finding its social and ethical articulation and expression in the way in which 
the collective operated.
3.5 The Virtue of Sharing
Playing music in multiple bands was the main impetus for the formation of WSP in 
2007 and the reason for subsequent developments, such as the launch of a record label 
under the same name. But in its initial form, WSP was an online group blog that hosted 
gig and record reviews. The latter focused almost exclusively upon Scottish musicians 
and almost always upon young and unsigned bands, while gig reviews featured music 
acts that performed in venues across Glasgow. However, the reviewing process was 
anything but satisfying for WSP and it was consequently abandoned. Colin in particular, 
who was the main writer for the blog, could not see the point in producing a negative 
review instead of highlighting the positive aspects of music he found appealing. This 
emerged as an issue because the collective received dozens of records from musicians 
across Scotland, but a lot of the material was not to their taste. Their foray  into music 
journalism ended quite quickly. 
WSP activities were usually the outcome of collective action. Although they did not 
hold scheduled meetings to decide on future ventures, they would meet as friends at 
least weekly. Each member’s degree of participation in the collective depended on the 
activity in question. Corey, for example, did not help with the organization of events as 
much as others did. However, he would provide more hands-on support on the night. 
Not all ideas were put forward as a group: any member could release his band’s music 
on the label and even organize a WSP event based upon individual preference rather 
than collective decision. 
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When Plaaydoh recorded an EP,69  they decided to make it available as a free download 
through the WSP website.70  The idea of setting up a free-download record label sprung 
out of that first EP. The rationale was that promoting young musicians in Scotland by 
freely disseminating their music seemed a more fruitful and realistic aspiration than 
expecting Plaaydoh or other bands to generate profit (see Chapter 6). Contrary to the 
dominant economic model, Iain believed that  ‘getting the herds is more important than 
making sales’. 
WSP would strive to release one record per month with varying degrees of success. 
Except the ones from their own bands, the bulk of free-download releases were sourced 
from musicians with whom WSP were associated through friendship or mutual 
participation in the local DiY network. The collective would not intervene or manipulate 
the recorded material unless their support was specifically sought for. The speed and 
versatility of digital formats in music dissemination rendered downloads highly 
appropriate for this venture. It  follows that an additional advantage of free downloads 
was that they could keep the momentum going, as opposed to physical releases, the 
production and distribution of which were both time-consuming and costly.
Nevertheless, over the course of my fieldwork the collective became increasingly 
skeptical about the value of this practice. The free and disposable nature of digital files, 
the argument went, inhibited people from taking these releases seriously. This explains 
why the complete lack of ambition to make profit as a record company and the 
subsequent production of physical copies were not mutually  exclusive or contradictory. 
From early on WSP released their own music on CD-Rs and also encouraged other 
bands to produce CD-Rs themselves. These these were sold cheaply through the website 
or at  gigs. The collective were against using the standard jewel case and CD-Rs were 
normally housed in handcrafted sleeves with handmade artwork. 
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69  ‘Extended Play’ is recorded music,  in any format,  that includes more music than a single but not 
enough for an album.
70 http://winningspermparty.com/ [Accessed 5 May 2013].
All music on CD-Rs was also freely available in digital form, while any money made 
from sales was forwarded back to the bands. WSP believed that CD-Rs were a relatively 
economic and practical way of ‘spreading the word’ about music they  liked. More 
specifically, the production of CD-Rs stemmed from the assumption that bands should 
have something to sell at gigs, where audiences would expect to be able to buy a 
physical copy  of the music. Thus, CD-Rs were mostly a publicity technique geared 
towards attracting attention rather than financial gains. 
Although there was a revival of and fondness for the cassette tape medium within the 
broader network of individuals involved in DiY music practices, at the time of my 
fieldwork the only such release by  WSP was a tape by Iain’s band, Phat Trophies. The 
growing dissatisfaction with the public’s lack of response eventually led WSP to 
produce vinyl records. Vinyl releases were perceived as a serious pursuit due to the high 
production costs involved (covered by WSP) and the often elaborate artwork that 
accompanied the records. WSP had released only one 12’’ vinyl record by Grozny, while 
two additional releases – a split 12’’ by Gummy Stumps and Vom,71  and a 7’’ EP by 
Ultimate Thrush (see also Chapter 4) – were expected to become available just as I was 
finishing my fieldwork. The number of copies produced would be split between WSP 
and the bands, with each party being responsible for selling their own copies and 
subsequently  keeping the money. Understandably, WSP vinyl records would be sold at a 
higher price than CD-Rs and the collective were planning to use the cash they raised to 
fund future releases.
The variety of music formats in part reflected the collective’s practical circumstances: 
the preference for digital files, CD-Rs, and cassette tapes was largely  dictated by 
financial considerations and specifically the lack of sufficient resources.72  To gather the 
required amount for the production of vinyl records the collective decided to organize 
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71 Vom were an instrumental noise rock trio from Glasgow.
72  Early on, the collective had received a small grant from the Scottish Enterprise, a non-departmental 
public body, that they used to release CD-Rs.
fundraising events, such as an all-nighter at The Audio Lounge studios in Maryhill, 
where thirteen bands had agreed to perform.73  The choice of music formats also had 
strong ethical foundations. In discussing the production and circulation of cassette tapes 
within the underground hip hop scene in the Bay Area of San Fransisco, Harrison argues 
that: ‘Their antiquated technology gives a nod to nostalgic sentiments of local tradition, 
upholds the democratic priorities of DiY movements, and serves as a technological 
barrier to mainstream co-optation’ (2006: 298). 
WSP exhibited considerable ambiguity  in their relationship with technology. Caught up 
in a tension between the lack of financial means and the concern to make music widely 
accessible, the collective developed a contradictory stance in embracing technological 
innovations, while at  the same time holding on to less advanced forms of music 
dissemination. However, their distaste for jewel cases and their preference for CD-Rs 
with carefully  crafted artwork testified to their antipathy for mass-produced artefacts 
and their inclination towards more ‘authentic’ objects. 
This view was also reflected in the relatively limited production of objects, revealing 
two further ideas. First, that live music was favoured over pre-recorded music (see also 
Fonarow 2006: 49). The second had ethical significance: contrary to the normal practice 
of the music industry, bands were not forced to produce a large number of copies when 
what they really needed was a limited run. It was evident, then, that CD-Rs, cassette 
tapes and vinyl records embodied meanings that  transcended their functionality  as 
sound mediums. After all, digital files served the purpose of dissemination perfectly. It 
followed that these artefacts were employed as markers of authenticity and cultural 
distinction, while simultaneously providing the collective with the opportunity  to 
operate within an existing and established system of music circulation and distribution. 
That system, which generated audience expectations and blurred the boundaries 
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73 Finnegan notes the importance of ‘charity’ in local music-making (1989: 288-292). Not all DiY events 
attracted funds for the musicians or the organizers.  Certain events were free to attend, while others 
donated the proceeds to some cause unrelated to music. 
between music appreciation and material consumption, was not opposed to, but rather 
emulated, appropriated and adjusted in order to fit the needs of WSP.
The distributed nature of responsibility  for the release and dissemination of records 
demonstrates that the lack of clear boundaries and discrete roles in WSP extended 
beyond its core membership. For example, free downloads were recorded by the bands 
although sometimes Iain or Peter, who had set-up a small studio in his flat, would help 
the bands to record and mix their material (see also Chapter 4).74 A handful of releases, 
including the ones by  Eternal Fags and Smack Wizards, were recorded at the Green 
Door Studio in the West End, which had launched a government-supported youth 
scheme. Then, it was bands who normally designed the artwork, while the pressing of 
the vinyl records was reluctantly outsourced to two different companies. 
Quite frequently, the acquisition of relevant raw materials, as well as the production 
process, was collaborative. For the 7’’ vinyl artwork, Ultimate Thrush managed to order 
three hundred fifty  sheets of card through the Art School for £80 (Figure 3.1). CD 
pressings were done by Gerard (Chapter 1 & 6), who had his own CD duplicator and 
charged £25 for fifty  copies. Finally, Stephan had a friend who owned a small printing 
company and who was willing to offer a discount on the rather expensive screen-
printing of the Gummy Stumps/Vom 12’’ artwork. The organization and execution of 
music events (see below) was probably  the context within which this mutual 
involvement was played out most clearly. It was not uncommon for posters and flyers to 
be designed by individuals outside the collective, or collaboratively, as in the case of the 
Maryhill event (Figure 3.2). Again, WSP mobilized their friends and acquaintances for 
the printing of publicity  material, while they repeatedly emphasized the importance of 
their contacts in, or revolving around the GSA regarding the production of crafted 
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74 ‘Mixing’ is,  according to Izhaki,  ‘a process in which multitrack material – whether recorded, sampled 
or synthesized – is balanced,  treated and combined into a multichannel format,  most commonly two-
channel stereo.  But in addition to that – and more importantly – a mix is a sonic presentation of emotions, 
creative ideas and performance’ (2008: 4-5).
material. Online publicity was also a collective affair, with other DiY promoters 
advertising WSP events on their social media and vice versa. 
Figure 3.1: Outer sleeve of the Ultimate Thrush 7’’.75
Moreover, sharing musical equipment at gigs was the norm. For instance, bands would 
share one drum kit and sometimes the same amplifiers. At the Maryhill gig, Alistair had 
used Colin’s drum kit and he torn two drum skins, therefore they would subsequently 
negotiate a price for repair. Pieces of equipment were often provided by people outside 
the core WSP membership, such as Barry, who would lend his trademark blue guitar 
amplifier without him necessarily being scheduled to perform at the gig.
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75 Retrieved from http://www.oliverpitt.co.uk/ [Accessed 13 September 2012].
Figure 3.2: Winning Sperm Party posters.76
147
76 Retrieved from http://cargocollective.com/moonshakedesign/POSTERS & http://www.oliverpitt.co.uk/ 
respectively [Accessed 10 October 2012].
Similarly, WSP had purchased a petrol generator for outdoor events. This was not 
owned exclusively  by the collective but by  all seven people who had contributed, 
including a part-time filmmaker who occasionally used it to set up an outdoor cinema. 
Other individuals, such as Sarah, assisted with various other practical tasks such as 
collecting door charges. Mary, with whom I was chatting before the orchestra’s 
performance, was almost always in the audience but to my knowledge she did not 
directly  participate in the collective’s activities. However, I could not disregard the fact 
that intimate relations did play a role in forging new collaborations and projects. As 
Helen (see also Chapter 6), a GSA lecturer, nicely put it, one could draw a ‘romantic 
love map’ of Glasgow and that these associations had given rise to various partnerships, 
events and projects. 
Even audience members, who were neither friends nor partners of band members, 
contributed by moving furniture or decorating the venue. I noted in the previous chapter 
that audiences are absolutely essential for a musical performance to be deemed 
successful. The very fact that audiences were there and their money was used to fund 
the collective’s future projects rendered them participants in these events rather than 
passive consumers. And this without taking into account that several people in the 
audience were also performing on the night or at least played in bands that belonged to 
the same extended network. Supporters also came from outside of Glasgow, particularly 
when WSP organized shows in different cities, such as Edinburgh, or toured with their 
bands and had to rely on promoters based in other locations.
It would be tempting to perceive this practice of sharing and cooperation as a form of 
utilitarianism. However, by doing so we would unavoidably reduce the complexity  of 
the practice as well as deprive it from its ethical potential. Expectations of reciprocity 
do not rule out  the possibility that, in this context, the act of sharing could be virtuous 
sui generis (MacIntyre 1981). As Colin explained:
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I think it’s just the idea of sharing stuff, when you like some music and you want to 
share it  with people and be able to do it as cheaply as possible, or even free if 
possible. I mean, it’s good to be able to get people free downloads and that anyone, 
even if they don’t  have any money or anything, as long as they’ve got  an Internet 
connection, they can download it. And now there’s nothing, there’s no barrier 
really. It has to be as inclusive as possible.
Widlok makes precisely this point when he says that: 
Sharing in these instances need not involve a generous person who gives, nor a 
transfer at  all, but it entails allowing others access, and to do this for its own sake, 
i.e. for the sake of jointly enjoying these resources (2004: 63). 
He notes that sharing as a virtue does not divide individuals or groups into givers and 
receivers and does constitute a sharing ‘out’, but a sharing ‘in’, by opening up the circle 
of people who have access to these resources.77  Notably, the association of various 
individuals with the collective was relevant to practical matters such as the ones 
described above, but  also in the way WSP members reflected upon the reasons for the 
collective’s very  existence, nature and identity. For Colin, Iain, Peter, and Corey, the 
bands that had released music on the label and the individuals that regularly contributed 
to the organization of music events were part of the collective. This resonates with 
Widlok’s remark: ‘Sharing creates a shared base, triggering the emergence of social 
groups and shared identities’ (ibid.: 61). This, in turn, reflects Colin’s opinion that: 
DiY always ends up being a community sort of thing. Most of the time it’s like: 
“Can you do this, can you do that?”. It’s not like: “I’m going to do everything 
about it”. It’s not a perfect democracy, but  the more people on board with 
something, the more likely it’s going to be worthwhile doing.
In this context, sharing was a virtuous act realizing basic human goods that involved the 
joint use of resources and mutual enjoyment of music but also bestowed users with 
particular identities. That is not to say that the collective did not set specific goals that 
triggered collaborations and acts of sharing. But Colin’s views forcefully demonstrate 
that these goals were undermined by the primacy  of sharing as an ethical practice in and 
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77 Musical accessibility is not limited to the physical contact between music and listener but also involves 
participation and personal reception (Eisentraut 2013). 
of itself. As such, what animated basic goods was precisely the capacity of mutually 
using and enjoying these resources for the sake of it, rather than the ability  to share 
specific things. Thus, these goods were intrinsic to sharing and constituted by that very 
process. Sharing ‘is not done by default but it is constituted by turnout’ (Widlok 2004: 
63). Therefore, releasing and consuming music, as well as organizing events, were 
predicated upon sharing, which opened up the collective’s inner circle. The ‘passionate 
drive to share’ music that they liked (Frith 1997: 14) was central in this process. WSP 
managed to share their music with others but most importantly to share ‘in’, that is to 
extend the boundaries of the group, thus changing themselves in the process.
3.6 Music-Making as Urban Practice
When members of the collective first settled in Glasgow their experience of organizing 
and playing gigs back in Stirling did not allow them to deal effectively  with the 
specificities of their new setting. As newcomers they lacked the necessary  local 
knowledge and contacts to put on their own events. Initially, they had decided to follow 
the established path by booking slots through existing local promoters. However, Colin 
boldly stated that the experience was a negative one: 
When we were in our first band from the country and wanted to play gigs in 
Glasgow, we’d come through and being ripped off by...bastards! So then we 
realized that we’re not doing that again.78
Therefore, the formation and evolution of WSP reflected sentiments of discontent with 
the allegedly  ‘corrupted’ promotion companies. Partly, then, WSP sprung out of a 
reaction to what were considered to be unfair and unethical practices and represented a 
coping mechanism: as a collective body, WSP could assert their right to access urban 
resources and materialize on their own terms the desire to make and perform music in 
the city. A by-product of this process was that it  transformed and thus engendered a 
specific form of relation with local promoters and other music actors and institutions in 
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78 Colin was referring to the notorious ‘pay-to-play’ policy (Introduction & Chapter 6). 
the city. This might be classed as unsurprising given that during the process of urban 
migration different groups come into intense contact, defining subsequent relations. 
As Turino remarks, in such contexts music-making as a creative practice alludes to 
particular social and practical circumstances, conditions and constraints. It becomes a 
means for the group to negotiate its relationship  with its ‘others’ and places an emphasis 
‘on people, practices, and specific historical moments rather than on products and 
superorganic notions of “culture” and “music”’ (1993: 12). But the gradual rejection of 
promotional policies was in tension with the collective’s initial desire to integrate into 
the city’s musical landscape. For Colin:
WSP  has basically nothing to do with everyone else’s idea of music and we make 
up quite a large proportion of the local music scene. But  noone – who is in a 
position to acknowledge it – is acknowledging it for some reason.
This tension was articulated in spatial terms. The collective employed a variety of 
settings for music performances including music venues, abandoned buildings, flats, 
record stores and community centres, as well as open and public spaces. This is not  an 
exhaustive list and it excludes practice and recording spaces; it does suggest though the 
salience of urban spatiality in music-making and the latter’s potential as a process of 
spatial contestation. ‘Urban environments’, write Low and Lawrence-Zúñiga, ‘provide 
frequent opportunities for spatial contests because of their complex structures and 
differentiated social entities that collude and compete for control over material and 
symbolic resources’ (2003: 19). Within the realm of WSP practices, this material and 
symbolic struggle became acutely evident in the organization and carrying out of music 
events. Chapter 5 examines the organizational processes of DiY live music promotion in 
greater detail. Here, however, I will focus upon one of its main aspects, which is the 
ongoing issue of securing a place for performance. According to Peter:
For putting on a gig you just need to book the bands and a venue, get  a poster, 
transport the equipment and divide up the money. Other than that, I cannot  think of 
anything else technically.
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Despite this laconic description, the process was – usually  – long and complex. After 
the main band was booked and financial agreements were made verbally, members of 
the collective would proceed to book an appropriate venue. The aim was to locate and 
use different and diverse spaces across the city. This aspiration stemmed from the high 
value placed upon the uniqueness of music venues. As Colin explained: 
When you think about gigs you’ve been to and they’ve been really special, the ones 
that I can think of are the ones in spaces that  aren’t  normal, aren’t like “ordinary” 
venues. 
This is not to say that the majority of WSP events took place in ‘unusual’ places, but 
WSP did occasionally put this idea forward, for example, with the help  of the electricity 
generator purchased for outdoor summertime gigs. Novelty was desirable, but finding a 
space that was not ‘ordinary’ was a hard task. Even booking ‘generic’ venues presented 
challenges. First, many small venues or pub function rooms would be already booked 
for the specified date. Then, nearly  all venues charged a hire fee (usually around £50), 
which the collective would cover. Certain venues, such as the 13th Note had a slightly 
different policy. They provided the space for free as long as their bar sales would reach 
a specific amount. This increased during weekends and, while promoters did not have to 
pay any money  upfront, they were still responsible for covering the difference in case of 
a deficit in the venue’s bar sales. 
A third difficulty arose from the fact that over time several places closed down, which 
imposed a break in the continuity of WSP events at  specific places. For example, the 
collective used to organize events at the Ivy bar, which was totally free to hire. 
However, the business closed down and the place reopened as Mitchell’s (see Chapter 
5), which was in turn renamed to Gambetta, and is currently  an Indian food takeaway. 
Despite the fact that the new owners of Mitchell’s and Gambetta were not aware that  a 
string of gigs had taken place in the premises, they were still willing to provide the 
space for free. Nevertheless, since it became a food takeaway, music events had to be 
terminated. With more established music venues, such as Mono or the 13th Note, the 
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booking process was also less straightforward than expected. Apart from relevant fees 
and policies, in some instances there were additional issues and challenges that inhibited 
WSP from hosting events in these places. As Peter recounts:
I think it isn’t always as simple as just going and asking at a bar though...I mean, 
that can happen, but at  the same time it  depends on who is that  walks into the bar. 
Like, being younger, I remember walking into Mono and saying I’ve got these 
three bands that  I thought were all alright and not  like people who would be 
looking for loads of money or anything like that. But  the manager said: “We only 
put on stuff that I like and that’s what the gigs are here for”. That  really put  me off, 
and then there was other stuff as well, [for example] trying to book a gig in the 
13th Note, you would email folk in and there would just be no response at all.
Several of these problems could now be resolved through the various contacts that the 
collective had developed over time. For example, Alistair from Divorce had started 
working at the 13th Note and he was responsible for the monthly  gig schedule. This 
made the venue more accessible to WSP.79 The choice of a venue was often dictated by 
other considerations such as accessibility of the area or the existence of an installed 
sound-system. Thus, one of the generator-powered outdoor events was held next to a 
subway station, which made it more likely  for people to attend. The absence of a sound-
system could sometimes be balanced out by the lack of a hire fee, which was considered 
more important; in which case, however, WSP would have to carry their own sound 
equipment to the venue and back. The cost of hiring a venue was a determinant factor. 
Peter explained to me that:
None of us wants to put much money into paying out for a big venue and we don’t 
really want  to see touring bands not being able to pay for petrol to get to the next 
gig or to eat that day. If we put on gigs in places that  were more expensive then we 
wouldn’t be able to pay bands as much. It  seems that most of the gigs we’re putting 
on is about making sure that  everybody gets a bit of money for the trouble than us 
taking a cut.
The absence of a hire fee most of the time overshadowed the lack of equipment, but 
alcohol-related legislation inhibited minors from attending these events, which had 
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79  Peter refers to past experiences. Various of my informants stressed that 13th Note was a welcoming 
venue and I attended an array of DiY music events there during my research. Mono had also started 
hosting free gigs every Tuesday featuring a number of musicians and bands affiliated with the DiY 
network. This was Michael’s initiative from Errors, who worked in the premises.
emerged as an additional issue for WSP.80  The collective also expressed their concern 
regarding sound levels when events took place in unconventional spaces, such as the 
Maryhill community  centre. Despite the abrupt ending of that gig, ‘respecting the 
neighbours’ seemed to be a priority for WSP. Peter articulated this view as follows: 
The most important thing is just not to disturb neighbours and basically limit the 
amount of complaints that  we can get  about it. We want  to put on music but  we 
don’t want to be putting on music for us and annoying everyone else along the way.
Their overall approach to performance spaces fulfilled not only an aesthetic desire, but a 
practical necessity. These were not mutually exclusive, because music had the power to 
transform any space. In other words, a ‘venue’ was constituted and framed by  the 
performance and not vice versa; it was constructed musically (Stokes 1994). This is how 
Iain described WSP’s general approach:
We think that  if the bands are there, then it’s going to be good anyway because 
they’re good bands, so it  doesn’t really matter about the venue as much as people 
think. Maybe the sound might  not be as good but it’s more about the kind of energy 
of the band or the performance – the space doesn’t matter.
It is worth noting though, that certain venues were a priori rejected for reasons ranging 
from their perceived ‘bad vibe’ and aggressive security  staff, to the disinterested attitude 
of regular customers (some of whom would unavoidably end up in the audience out of 
curiosity). I believe that a ‘typology’ of music venues (e.g. Kronenburg 2012) fails to 
account for the constellation of practical considerations, aesthetic judgements, symbolic 
exclusions and fluid spatialities involved in the collective’s approach to performance 
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80  ‘All-ages’ gigs emerged in the Washington D.C. hardcore punk scene in the 1980s. Minors were not 
allowed in the premises where alcohol was sold and consumed and where hardcore punk gigs normally 
took place. However, another D.C. law inhibited music venues from denying entrance to minors. 
Consequently, their hands had to be marked with an ‘X’ in order to distinguish minors from individuals 
that could legally drink. Haenfler describes how this engendered an attitude of abstaining from alcohol 
not only as a legal obligation but as a right, and how the ‘X’ was transformed from a stigma to a marker 
of pride even for individuals who were allowed to purchase alcohol (2006: 7-8). This eventually gave rise 
to the ‘straight edge’  movement, which was opposed to punk’s nihilistic attitude. Its basic tenets were 
complete abstinence from substances such as alcohol, tobacco and recreational drugs, as well from sexual 
promiscuity. The movement gradually developed an orientation towards animal rights and environmental 
concerns, and veganism became a widespread practice.
spaces. The outdoor gigs that the collective initiated with the help of the newly acquired 
electricity generator seem to exemplify this approach. 
The sites were characterized by their inbetweenness, in the sense that they were not 
recognized, delineated spaces with static identities. ‘Places have space between them’ 
says Cresswell (2004: 8), and it was in these ill-defined spaces and inner city wastelands 
that the generator-powered gigs happened. The musical articulation and transformation 
of the ambiguous and heterogeneous nature of these ‘non-places’ (Augé 1995) or ‘any-
space-whatevers’ (Deleuze 1989: 5) marked their transition from disconnected spaces to 
a meaningful places, by foregrounding musical performance as the process through 
which spaces ‘become’. These fluid, ‘gelleable mobile’ spaces (Tironi 2010) were 
transformed into places as they were progressively experienced and endowed with 
value, thus acquiring definition and meaning (Tuan 1977: 136). 
The outdoor gigs, moreover, point to the contested process of spatial appropriation as 
opposed to the owner/customer logic characterizing the booking of normal venues. 
Ironically, outdoor gigs mainly reflected WSP’s attempt to overcome the practical issues 
described above. For Colin, the generator embodied ‘a sort of a dream of doing a gig 
wherever you want, whenever you want’. There were indeed certain practical 
advantages in this romantic aspiration. For example, the effort  involved in the 
organization of those gigs was minimal and the only  related costs had to do with the 
fuel needed for the generator. Furthermore, the long waiting time for bands performing 
in a conventional venue was eliminated. Besides, people arriving at the scene were 
expected to make only a minimal ‘donation’ to cover the cost of petrol. Finally, outdoor 
gigs were inclusive in both a symbolic and a concrete sense. There were instances in 
which passersby stopped to listen to the music, while there were no barriers whatsoever 
as to who could attend, such as minors.
The process was not totally free from issues or concerns. To begin with, the collective 
had to be particularly  careful with regards to the choice of an appropriate outdoor space. 
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Rain could very  easily  impose a cancellation, therefore some of the gigs took place 
underneath a bridge. Then, the chosen spaces had to be away from busy city  areas, but 
this had to be dealt  with by simultaneously  ensuring that spaces were easily accessible: 
for this reason, settings near underground stations were preferred. Last but not least, the 
collective had to ensure that the gig would not last long enough for the police to appear 
and terminate the event.81  The tactic employed was temporal, both in the sense of 
brevity, and in relation to the days and times of these events, for example Sunday 
afternoons. 
It seemed that  the ease with which the collective managed to put on these events 
mattered most, rather than a desire to upset or subvert. According to Cohen:
The production of place through music is always a political and contested process 
and music has been shown to be implicated in the politics of place, the struggle for 
identity and belonging, power and prestige (1995: 445).
However, I would be careful not to overstate the political intentions embedded in this 
practice (see Chapter 6). Again, the transient nature of these events matches Peter 
thought that it was ‘really nice to just be able to come to a gig, just to show up 
somewhere and see a couple of bands and then go off again and that’s it’. After all, in 
my experience and knowledge, WSP had never used tickets or guest lists for their 
gigs,82 something that enhanced the spontaneous and ephemeral character of all WSP 
events. This was due to the small-scale nature of the gigs that rendered ticketing 
unnecessary. However, Stuart from Cry Parrot disagreed, which was an indication of 
his shift away from a DiY outlook (Chapter 5). 
Yet this argument sidesteps a much more important issue by obscuring the practice’s 
persistence. As MacKay notes, we should pay attention to the permanent 
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81 This was sometimes a conscious strategy in flat gigs too. Alex from Ultimate Thrush (see also Chapter 
4) once recounted how the police had entered the flat while his band was performing. Because the flat 
was packed, by the time the police reached the stage the gig had finished.
82 This stands in stark contrast with dominant music industry practices. See Fonarow (2006: 128-137)
transformations that such practices could potentially effect rather than celebrate them as 
acts of momentary transgressions, or, at least, to acknowledge that their repeated 
occurrence exhibits some form of constancy (1996: 156). Despite the immanent nature 
of many of the collective’s practices, what consolidated their position on the local 
musical map  was the repetitive character of the musical routes that WSP members 
followed. 
These ‘pathways’ (Finnegan 1989) invoked the collective’s musical trajectories but also 
embodied actual and well-known urban tracks. For example, all four members would 
take part in the distribution of flyers and posters by cycling or walking around the city.83 
Posters and flyers mainly appeared in music venues, art spaces and university 
campuses. When Iain joined Colin as a poster distributor, this process would take place 
during their work hours and Iain had estimated that they managed to put up two to three 
times more the amount of posters than they used to do. ‘To walk is to lack a place’ (de 
Certeau 1984: 103), but ‘onward movement is itself a return’ (Ingold & Vergunst 2008: 
17). This continuing, repetitive ‘coming and going’ is embodied within urban pathways 
that engender a sense of place that is characterized by ‘routes rather than 
roots’ (Cresswell 2004: 53). It follows that localities are not bounded geographical 
entities but are experienced as ‘spatio-temporal events’ (Massey 2005: 130). 
The transience of these events though is balanced by the enduring and lasting presence 
of musical pathways. As Finnegan notes, they provide a sense of spatio-temporal 
structure in people’s lives through the repetitive enactment of music-related practices 
taking place across the city  (1989: 317). Musical routes were complemented by many 
others, relating to band practice and performance. But these routes were only one set of 
urban pathways among many. However, musical pathways were of high importance 
compared to others: Corey had quit his well-paid job as a graphic designer and Iain was 
trying to get by on as little money  as possible. Both of them, in common with Colin and 
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83  Apart from a promotional strategy, poster distribution was a symbolic practice of spatial contestation 
and appropriation (see also Chapter 5).
Peter, valued flexibility as a prerequisite for making music and perceived work as being 
of lesser importance – an enabling rather than restricting factor with regards to their 
musical aspirations. It was evident, then, that music-related activities defined and 
ordered a great deal of their everyday lives with their urban existence and social identity 
being structured largely around these musical routines.
It is not difficult to discern from the collective’s circumstances that the enactment of 
music involved not only  the appropriation of urban space, but of time. According to 
Lefebvre, ‘appropriated’ time:
[F]orgets time, during which time no longer counts (and is no longer counted). It 
arrives or emerges when an activity brings plenitude...This activity is in harmony 
with itself and with the world. It has several traits of self-creation or of a gift  rather 
than of an obligation or an imposition come from without. It is in time: it  is a time, 
but does not reflect on it (Lefebvre 2004: 76-77). 
We may thus draw a link with the practice of sharing and argue that appropriated time 
as a modality of music-making is a second aspect of its inherent ‘goodness’ (MacIntyre 
1981). For Lefebvre it  is precisely  the appropriation of space and time, which allows a 
group to imprint its own ‘rhythm’, effect changes and forge transformations onto urban 
reality  (1996: 105, 2004: 14). The spatio-temporal nature of pathways, articulated 
through the cyclical repetition of urban practices calls attention to the mutuality of 
urban space and time in everyday music practice. This reciprocal relation requires its 
rhythm: ‘Everywhere where there is interaction between a place, a time and an 
expenditure of energy, there is rhythm’ (Lefebvre 2004: 15). The rhythmical nature of 
music practice further points to a plural definition of the everyday not only as 
‘mundane’, but also as repetitive, something that occurs every  day  (Elden 2004: ix). In 
turn, the complexity and pluralism of music practices convey  the polyrhythmia of 
intertwined musical pathways and urban life more generally.
The collective’s rhythms were patterned in the use and appropriation of urban space and 
time. The use of temporalized spaces in the form of rhythmic practice underscored their 
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effort to inhabit  the locality (Lefebvre 1996, 2003). The repetitive actions or urban 
‘tactics’ (de Certeau 1984) of spatial appropriation and transformation through music 
foregrounded and enacted their right to the city. Nowhere was this desire to inhabit the 
city more apparent than in the collective’s eagerness to occupy their own dedicated 
space. Iain told me that this space would be like a ‘production centre’ where different 
individuals and bands could rehearse, record, put on gigs and print relevant material. 
The collective had unsuccessfully  attempted to attract relevant funding from the 
Scottish Arts Council. The cost of such a project was prohibitive and the only viable 
option was to register WSP as a charity in order to acquire a space from the Council and 
minimize relevant  taxes. A second option would be to shift their focus to what they 
termed as ‘dodgy’ areas of the city  where renting a property  was much cheaper. Peter 
believed that ideally  they would initiate a partnership  with a warehouse (see also 
Chapter 5) that would be used by  the collective outside business hours. In any  case, they 
were looking for spaces in non-residential areas in order to avoid noise disturbance. Up 
until the end of my fieldwork, the collective had been unable to secure such a space. Yet 
this aspiration reflects in a concrete manner music’s persistence and the collective’s 
continuous commitment to music-making. It also echoes Lefebvre’s remark: 
[T]he right to the city is like a cry and a demand...The right to the city cannot be 
conceived of as a simple visiting right or as a return to traditional cities. It  can only 
be formulated as a transformed and renewed right to urban life (1996: 158).
The right to the city  emerges, therefore, as an ethical right and an ethical demand for the 
use of urban resources. It is also a right to be ‘acknowledged’, as revealed by Colin’s 
words above. Inhabiting the city concerned the ways in which urban spaces were lived 
and transformed by the collective but also implied the group’s gradual integration or, to 
put it  differently, their localization (Chapter 6). Therefore, contested spaces should not 
necessarily be perceived as the sites of direct conflict, opposition or resistance (Low & 
Lawrence-Zúñiga 2003: 18), but as examples of people’s sustained efforts to negotiate 
on their own terms and ‘rhythmically’ alter from within the urban contexts they inhabit. 
Music practices as a cluster of related tactics were a catalyst in this process.
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3.7 The Raw and the Cooked
On a sunny  autumn Sunday  morning I took the train to Glasgow. Transmission was 
hosting a series of presentations by  self-organized communities in Glasgow and beyond, 
spanning practices that ranged from political activism to music and art. WSP were 
scheduled to give a talk, so I was anticipating it with great interest.84  To my 
disappointment, the collective did not attend the event and failed to give prior notice to 
the organizers. The reason for the cancellation was that they could not decide upon the 
content of their presentation. When I brought this up  in a discussion I had with Colin 
later on, he explained that part  of the reason why they refrained from presenting was 
their lack of a specific agenda.
WSP would often declare their general lack of ‘proper’ organization. Some gigs were 
announced just  a few days in advance, even on the day. Others were cancelled or some 
of the bands would drop out from the line-up last minute. I have mentioned the lack of 
tickets, while most  gigs would kick off with a considerable delay. WSP had ceased the 
publication of financial breakdowns,85 while, once, due to a miscalculation they ended 
up taking money from a gig’s proceeds. Moreover, for a considerable period the online 
shop  was not properly managed, which meant that customers would not receive their 
records until weeks after placing an order. Despite all of this, from an insider’s point of 
view being ‘disorganized’ was not necessarily  a negative quality, because organization 
did not matter in and of itself. Iain expressed this as follows: 
I think we try to keep it  relaxed. If you go to a gig that a big promoter is putting on, 
you’ve got all the organization – stuff that  is going on that stretch you from the fact 
that you’re there to have a good time and play your music – and if you’re thinking 
about running by a strict time-line it can be detrimental to your performance.
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84 The collective were acquainted with members of the Transmission committee, such as Ewan and Paul 
(Paul was also a core member of Nuts and Seeds) who were in a band called Triple School and had 
released music on WSP. According to Ewan, Triple School and Plaaydoh used to be ‘partner 
bands’ (Lowndes 2010: 402).
85  The reason for publishing financial breakdowns after gigs was ‘transparency’,  according to the 
collective.
In this sense, ‘disorganization’ can be seen as a tactic to ‘get  things done’ while 
countering the inflexibility of well-organized institutions (Schaumberg 2013: 379, 399). 
The lack of financial reward, the small-scale character of their practice, as well as the 
notion of being disorganized would make it tempting to argue that WSP were amateurs. 
If this is so, then how were they distinguished by professionals? Stebbins defines 
‘serious leisure’ as: 
The systematic pursuit by an amateur, hobbyist, or volunteer of an activity that is 
sufficiently substantial and interesting for the participant to find a career there in 
the acquisition and expression of its special skills and knowledge (1992: 3). 
Thus, for amateurs the boundaries are blurred by a serious approach both towards their 
day jobs and their leisure activities. The former is a source of income, while the latter is 
‘merely’ a meaningful activity. However, having a main source of livelihood still does 
not provide a clear distinction. The concept of ‘work’ is deeply problematic because it 
does not take into account, for example, the part-time nature of much musical activity or 
the fact that work can be defined not only  in terms of income but also of self-
fulfillment. Furthermore, as I have shown, ‘work’ and ‘leisure’ overlapped, becoming 
blurred and ultimately  redundant in practice. Therefore, the overall sense of confusion 
stems primarily from a perspective that narrowly defines work and simultaneously 
attempts to squeeze musical activity within a leisure framework. A great deal of WSP 
practices were neither work nor leisure, but a crucial component of their everyday social 
life and personal identity (Turino 2008: 231).86 
Crucially, a conceptual distinction fails to capture the musicians’ own conceptions of 
professionalism and amateurism. Indeed, these terms may have multiple meanings and 
they  may ‘suggest social status and local affiliation rather than just financial, or even 
purely  musical, evaluation’ (Finnegan 1989: 16). For example, professional musicians 
may derogatorily describe music of which they disapprove as ‘amateur’ (Cottrell 2004: 
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86  Cohen notes that in Liverpool, music was largely seen as a ‘legitimate career’ path that was not 
necessarily opposed to a ‘“serious” occupation’, while most individuals engaged in music-making for 
other factors (1991: 3).
10). Gillett  (2000) has shown that  these terms can be inverted and that in the past, 
London-based professional musicians carried the stigma of subjugation, while amateurs 
were associated with financial independence and thus freedom to develop their musical 
inclinations. Consequently:
[The] “obvious” amateur/professional distinction turns out  to be a complex 
continuum with many different possible variations. The same people can be placed 
at  different  points along this line in different contexts of different stages of their 
lives. Some were clearly at  one or other end of their continuum, but the grey area in 
the middle in practice made up a large proportion – perhaps the majority – of local 
musicians (Finnegan 1989: 14). 
Merriam argues that in the context of ethnomusicological studies ‘professionalism 
seems to run along a continuum from payment in occasional gifts at one end to 
complete economic support through music at  the other’ (1964: 125). According to 
Cottrell, being paid to perform is not only  important to the musicians’ economic well-
being but it is a symbol of belonging to a specific community, as well as ‘a significant 
component of their own self-conception’ (2004: 12). This distinguishes them both from 
other practitioners along Finnegan’s continuum, but  also from non-musicians. An 
important characteristic of this continuum though is the interdependence of practitioners 
along its length, evident in the fact that amateur activities within the locality provide the 
‘essential background for the more “professional” music world’ (Finnegan 1989: 18). 
The history of local music attests to that (Chapter 1), and later on I will elaborate on 
what seems an inherent paradox of DiY, which partly  derives from this interdependence, 
essential to both sides (Chapter 6).
Therefore not only are these classifications complex and the outcome of historical and 
cultural circumstances, but they  are conceptually impoverished when they are not 
informed by the reality  on the ground. The fact that the collective certainly did not 
frame or articulate their practice in terms of professionalism or amateurism confirms 
this, but also Peter’s reflection on his experience: 
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The idea that we are amateurs...Having worked into a pub where they do stuff on 
that kind of business level – where they’re employing somebody to put on a gig 
and put up the posters and so on – I honestly don’t really see the differences. They 
are very minimal and, if not, most  of the time the actual interest  from people that 
are booking the gigs – because they are booking it  as a job – is zero. They’ll hang 
about until the doors open and then they’re away you know? As long as everything 
goes smoothly and the agreements with the bands have been met, then that’s it. And 
that, I would say, is far more amateur (emphasis added).
In the Afghan context, Baily  (1988) notes that music practitioners that are considered 
‘cooked’ or professionals are the ones who have special music knowledge, as opposed 
to the ‘raw’ amateurs. The latter, however, ‘could even find a virtue in their own 
shortcomings as musicians’ as means not to dispel but reinforce their amateur status 
(ibid.: 118-119). Similarly, following the current terminology we could say that  WSP 
were not decidedly amateurs, but deliberately amateurs, embracing an aesthetic of 
simplicity and familiarity (Chapters 6). Etymologically the term ‘amateur’, from the 
Latin amator, conveys a ‘lover’, someone who does it for love, not for money. 
However, the relation between DiY practice and money could be perceived as intrinsic 
but also highly  contingent and evolving (Chapters 5 & 6). WSP had not written off the 
possibility of making a living out of music. So it was neither ‘love’ nor ‘income’ from 
paid work that could determine their status as professionals or amateurs but, rather, the 
ethical significance of the terms. 
This is evident in Peter’s words, which demonstrate that what distinguished WSP from 
professionals was their caring attitude towards the bands they hosted in their events or 
on their label. Peter had substantial experience in working as a sound engineer for other 
promoters’ events and he would recount  how they regularly complained about the bands 
that they were putting on – and whose music they were supposedly into – and talked 
about musicians in a really negative way. Peter would not choose to host  a band whose 
music he did not appreciate, because this would have the effect of him being 
uninterested in the event. But the collective believed that the ongoing exploitation of 
bands was their own fault too, in the sense that the majority of musicians who had the 
ambition to ‘make it’ could fall prey to corporate interests. This is what set WSP bands 
apart from several other local musicians.
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The historical degeneration of professions to mere ‘business’ and the emerging 
suspicion and accusations of ‘greed’ (Robertson 2001) provide some background and 
underscore the ethical implications of the terms. In the case of WSP we cannot speak 
about ‘degrees of professionalism’ (Finnegan 1989: 17), but of situated and distributed 
ethical action. It would be more accurate to argue that, rather than WSP following a 
‘professional’ career marked by material increments, they had embarked on a ‘moral 
career’ (Fortes 1987) punctuated by ethical practices. Their lack of relevant terminology 
was thus substituted by considerable reflection on the nature of effort, commitment and 
dedication as ethical skills in making music, releasing records and organizing events. 
Sustaining commitment is profoundly ethical according to Lambek (2010b). Actions are 
rarely consistent, however, and WSP practices pay testament to this. For Lambek, it  is 
the acknowledgement of one’s failure to keep promises based on mutually agreed 
ethical criteria that ultimately matters. The collective’s acknowledgement of their own 
shortcomings (e.g. being ‘disorganized’) is ethical as a self-critique (see Schaumberg 
2013: 399), but also notable in its recognition of the ‘other’. In turn, this reflects the 
collective’s desire to be recognized by other music actors. In this chapter I have 
demonstrated that this was expressed as a demand, but can also be recast as the other’s 
(as well as our own) ethical obligation. Taylor’s work on the ‘politics of recognition’, 
and specifically  on the recognition of the ‘other’ as an ethical obligation, is instructive 
here (1992; see also Conclusion).
The notion of learning as an ongoing process cut across the complex amateur-
professional continuum. Doing things collaboratively or playing in bands were each 
invaluable sources of information about the conventions and constraints of the music 
industry. This knowledge was greatly facilitated by one’s direct participation in the 
collective’s practices. The urban environment of Glasgow afforded the social and 
musical interactions and exchanges that promoted such learning and culminated into an 
ethics of sharing. Sharing in this instance represented a resolutely  temporal 
phenomenon. As Widlok has shown (2004), sharing as an intrinsically  ethical practice 
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has its own temporality geared towards the here-and-now. However, being able to 
sustain this practice by committing to it adds a long-term dimension, which is critical 
for its ethical resonance (Lambek 2010b: 47). 
I argued that time cannot be disentangled from urban space and the ways in which 
people experience the locality. These elements, I believe, are best captured by the idea 
of urban pathways. Pathways have spatial or habitual referents but also temporal ones in 
the sense that they  are repetitive, rhythmical practices. Another temporal aspect of 
sharing then, is that it becomes important in its spatio-temporal perpetuation, which in 
turn shapes urban musical pathways. Ultimately, the virtue of sharing can be seen as the 
practical foundation of DiY music-making, the ethical nexus where different  musical 
pathways meet and a persistent practice within a multi-temporal and polyrhythmic city. 
It represents a re-evaluation of the plural urban routes within a specific context, where 
mobility constantly ‘triggers new attempts at fixity’ (Connell & Gibson 2003: 46)
Making music happen was predicated upon such practices of sharing and the synergy of 
individuals. These practices along with additional tactics such as ‘disorganization’, as 
well as irony and ambiguity in the imaginative use of band and institutional names, 
allowed the collective to express themselves musically, assert this right spatially  and 
position themselves ethically in the city. Outdoor gigs, but also a series of events in 
‘unconventional’ venues momentarily imposed small gaps in the stream of everyday 
urban rhythms. If ‘the extra-everyday rhythms the everyday and vice versa’ (Lefebvre 
2004: 95), then ‘difference’ is equally  the outcome of rhythms. Repetition and 
difference are two sides of the same coin, because rhythms never repeat the same action 
absolutely and indefinitely but subordinate this sameness to ‘alterity  and even 
alteration’ (ibid.: 79). This has repercussions for DiY music-making in the city and for 
urban life more generally.
The orchestra’s performance exemplifies many of the points discussed in this chapter. It 
shows, for example, the intimacy of WSP gigs and the friendly and relaxed atmosphere 
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that people would encounter in this context. It further demonstrates the amount of effort 
and cooperation involved in the organization and execution of these events, as well as 
the ongoing contestation, appropriation and transformation of urban spaces into sonic 
territories. I would also like to stress the musical component of these practices. The 
electric guitar orchestra brings music itself into dizzying focus by exposing its sensory 
capacity to weave human bodies into a sonic stream that precedes cognition and 
articulates its own space-time continuum. One of the contexts in which the affective 
qualities of music emerge is when one is exposed to the sound for the duration of live 
performance. These characteristics are also embedded within ethical practices involving 
bodily  exercises or techniques on the part of the performers, as well as relating to 
audience behaviour. The following chapter takes the ethics of embodied musicality  as 
its main theme in relation to Divorce. 
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Chapter 4: Divorce
4.1 Affect and the Sensuous Embodiment of Ethics
A subject feels – that is, he is able to affect and be affected. 
(Cobussen & Nielsen 2012: 112)
In the previous chapter the consideration of the urban character of WSP practices 
precluded me from attending to the somatic engagements, the corporeal entanglements 
and their immediacy in music as bodily practice. In this chapter, therefore, I will discuss 
the centrality of the palpable body  in musical creativity and reception. For this I turn to 
Divorce, a band affiliated with the local DiY network. Divorce are particularly well-
suited to my ethnographic exploration due to the intensity characterizing their sound 
and performances, both of which necessitated and imposed a multi-sensory  immersion 
on band members and audiences alike. 
Arguing the salience of the body in music practice is nothing new. Blacking (1979) has 
noted that  music presents a ‘special’ mode of bodily  organization and control that sets it 
apart from other social activities. He claims that music mediates between the biological 
complexities of bodies and cultural bodily arrangements, and that despite its modeling 
and constraining capacities: 
People choose to invoke and invent  music, rather than other systems of action that 
may put fewer restrictions on their freedom of choice, because music-making 
offers an intensity of feeling and quality of experience that is more highly valued 
than some other social activities (Blacking 1979: 8).
Blacking’s assertion is useful to my arguments in multiple respects. First, it  postulates 
the body’s importance to the study of music-making. Second, it suggests that the felt 
intensity of music is precisely  what underscores, third, the paradox whereby a restricted, 
regulated body  is the means to experiential richness. Finally, says Blacking, compared 
to other activities, music-making has a higher value in people’s lives to the extent that 
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actors choose and are willing to accept the delimitation of their own freedom in order to 
achieve the quality  of a social experience. The remainder of this chapter will attempt to 
debunk these points by advancing the proposition that corporeal registers are 
fundamental to the consideration of music-making as a practice of relational ethical 
self-fashioning. In doing so, I will employ insights from anthropological approaches to 
the senses (e.g. Classen 1993, 1997; Howes 2003; Seremetakis 1994), ethics (e.g. 
Hirschkind 2006; Mahmood 2005) as well as the notion of ‘affect’ (e.g. Connolly 2002; 
Massumi 2002).
The sensory  constellations comprising Divorce’s music practices call for a sensuous 
examination of music. This should go beyond both a visual paradigm pervading textual 
approaches to sound and a distinction between visual and aural cultures (e.g. Ong 
1969). After all, ‘[a]n ocular-centric culture need not  necessarily result in a more logo-
centric one’ (Hsu 2008: 435). While I embrace the argument for the ethnocentric 
character and inadequate properties of vision in the acquisition of knowledge, I do not 
proceed to postulate an ‘acoustemology’ (Feld 1996) or affirm the need for a ‘sounded 
anthropology’ (Samuels et al 2010). Rather, attention is required to the interplay of 
sensory stimuli and responses in any given environment (Classen 1993: 136).  
Rather than treating the senses as materially embedded inward capacities and passive 
receptors of external stimuli, I perceive bodies as dynamic and sensually  rich interfaces 
that have the capacity  to articulate a ‘sensorium’, that is, a sensorialized social space 
(Chau 2008). As such, music performances become sensoriums enabling the mutual 
production of sensory worlds through active participation. It follows that relationships 
within the band and between the band and its audiences were sensuously articulated. 
Although my approach is sensitive to issues of embodiment, the focal point of my 
argument is the enactment of these relationships. I seek to examine the specificity of the 
practices and techniques, in short, the work that music-making entails and how these 
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sensed activities elicit particular embodied sensibilities and aptitudes. Consequently, my 
account diverges from phenomenological approaches to the body (e.g. Csordas 1990).87 
As Seremetakis notes, the senses do not only inhabit the autonomous body  as a form of 
internal experience but are also embedded within a relation between the body  and the 
materials that surround it (1994: 6). Such an approach, Hirschkind explains, ‘moves us 
away from a mentalist understanding that locates experience in a silent interior toward 
one that places it in a body practically engaged with the world’, in which ‘perception is 
not a moment of passivity but an act, a performance that  links the sensory 
sedimentations of the past to the horizon of present actions’ (2006: 29).
From an affective standpoint the ‘body is by no means a tabula rasa’ (Mazzarella 2009: 
292). Corporeal mnemonics are the sites as well as the nexus of the affective 
‘intensities’ that condition sensory fields. The traces of these presubjective intensities 
both depend upon and hone bodily  sensations within a complex of relationships 
between the body and its environment. For Massumi (2002), whose influential 
elaboration of affect (Spinoza’s affectus) is situated within Deleuze’s philosophy, affects 
are autonomic visceral responses, intensities that are presubjective and asocial without 
being presocial. The body does not only absorb pulses but ‘it infolds contexts’ (ibid.: 
30), traces of past actions as incipient future potentials. 
Affects are impingements that  are felt but not yet cognitively processed; they  register 
nonconscious traces, but not unconscious, because the body is concrete but unmediated, 
real but abstract, that is, ‘virtual’. It is caught up in ongoing movement and becoming. 
In contradistinction to a ‘discursive’ body, affects point to bodily  resonances that are not 
always semiotically expressed because ‘the skin is faster than the word’ (ibid.: 25). As 
such, affects are bodily tendencies, corporeal sensations and movements that precede 
cognition and do not presuppose a thinking, intentional subject. Rather, subjective 
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87  For a recent overview of anthropological approaches to phenomenology,  see Desjarlais and Throop 
(2011). For a classic phenomenological account of musical skill development, see Sudnow (2001 [1978]).
experience is epiphenomenal, it is what emerges when the unstructured affective 
potential in all its abstractness or indeterminacy – its immanence – is selected, reduced 
or ‘qualified’: 
The autonomic tendency received secondhand from the body is raised to a higher 
power to become an activity of the mind. Mind and body are seen as two levels 
recapitulating the same image/expression event  in different  but parallel ways, 
ascending by degrees from the concrete to the incorporeal, holding to the same 
absent center of a now spectral – and potentialized – encounter (Massumi 2002: 
32).
Affect evades cultural logics and discursive articulations and displaces the onset of 
social life from the bounded cognitive subject to the sensuous, affective body. Affects 
are thus differentiated from emotions: 
Emotion is qualified intensity, the conventional, consensual point  of insertion of 
intensity into semantically and semiotically formed progressions, into 
narrativizable action-reaction circuits, into function and meaning. It is intensity 
owned and recognized. (ibid.: 28). 
Emotions represent the most intense ‘capture’ of affect. This underscores the latter’s 
‘autonomy’, namely that it does not belong to an individual body but escapes 
confinement. As Shouse puts it: ‘Feelings are personal and biographical, emotions are 
social, and affects are prepersonal’ (2005: para. 2). It follows that affect offers an 
analytical tool with which to examine these ‘proto-thoughts’ or ‘visceral modes of 
appraisal’ (Connolly  1999: 27) that are lodged into the body beyond the threshold of 
conscious awareness and discursive meaning. Contrary  to the psychologistic and 
individualistic connotations of ‘emotion’,88  affects provide the means to think beyond 
the autonomous subject and his or her body as the incarcerator of inward feelings and 
the disseminator of outward emotions. 
In invoking Massumi’s terminology I do not wish to take affect at face value, but rather 
to interrogate its usefulness and applicability in a musical-anthropological context. Nor 
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88 As Richard and Rudnyckyj note, the anthropology of emotion still bears the connotations of inwardness 
and personalism (2009: 61).
do I intend to embrace a biological determinism. After all, the astute critiques of Leys 
(2011) and Papoulias & Callard (2010), among others, have exposed the peculiar links 
between affect and how psychologists have conceptualized emotions. The rootedeness 
of a sharp dualism between body  and mind that pervades affect as it has been theorized 
by Massumi, Connolly and other influential proponents, has also been highlighted. 
These scholars, according to this argument, have somewhat turned Descartes on his 
head in their effort to dispel the spectre of intentionality and an ideologically-bound 
subject. Although the intentionality/non-intentionality  debate is a false problem for 
reasons I discuss in Chapter 6, I hereby  attend to the criticism about the ‘mindless’ body 
implied by affect.
What is the benefit  of utilizing the notion of affect ethnographically? Instead of 
embracing the vitalist assumptions of affect, I focus, following Mazzarella, upon the 
movement between affective incipience and its rationalization, between the intensity of 
affective potential and its ‘qualification’ (2009: 304). It is in the resonances between the 
body with itself and other bodies, as well as in the transitions occurring between body 
and mind within a richly sensorialized environment, that the preconditions of ethical 
becoming reside. My ethnographic analysis of affect  inhabits the space where sensation, 
perception and action coalesce. Rather than tracing the emergence of perception, I seek 
to highlight the interlinkages of body and mind, affective intensity and ethical action. 
Specifically, the ‘feedback’ between emergent affective registers located in the flesh and 
conscious ethical fashioning. In doing so, I place the bodily capacities enabling music-
making alongside musical attributes that equip bodies with ethical sensibilities. 
‘Emergence emerges’, writes Massumi about the relationship between potential and its 
qualification (2002: 10). It is along the continuous cyclical movement between affect 
and ethical practice that my  ethnography  aligns itself. A notion of emotions lacks 
precisely this self-reflexive capacity  of affect, namely the ability  of bodies and persons 
to affect and be affected (Deleuze & Guattari 1987: 261; Massumi 1987: xvi, 2002: 15; 
Spinoza 2006 [c.1674]: 40). This forms the solid empirical basis of my subsequent 
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analysis. Crucially, I treat affects not as ‘objects’ that are transmitted, circulated or 
exchanged among different autonomous bodies (e.g. Brennan 2004), but as conditions 
that enable the formation of relational ethical subjects and within which these subjects-
in-becoming circulate (Richard & Rudnyckyj 2009). In essence, then, my  aim is to 
reveal how music not only reflects but also engenders particular ethical identities (Frith 
1996c).
My account  is thus ‘methodological’ rather than explanatory. Its explicit  aim is to 
illustrate and bring into focus ‘affect’ rather than resolve or explicate it. In doing so, I 
follow Hirsckind’s (2006) richly textured ethnographic analysis that does not confront 
the meaning of affect as such. Similarly, I pay attention to musical sensations as a 
bodily  modus operandi that shifts the focus from an exclusively  cognitive-ideological 
understanding of music to sensually-induced pre-reflexive visceral faculties and 
dispositions. These form the raw substance of ethical work and refinement. Therefore, 
the perceptual apparatuses of the body and its affinity with material and social contexts 
are instrumental in the consideration of music-making as an affective experience and 
ethical action. The body emerges as a tool of ethical self-fashioning insofar as music 
practices inculcate particular affective potentialities. 
In a different ethnographic context, Hirschkind argues that the practice of cassette-
sermon listening infused the body  with ‘latent tendencies of ethical response sedimented 
within the mnemonic regions of the flesh’, while this process involved ‘the vocabularies 
of ethical affect, bodily sensation, and moral actions’; these functioned ‘as instruments 
for objectifying and organizing sensory material, in accord with long-standing 
discourses on ethical cultivation’ (2006: 82-83). Along similar lines, Mahmood, who 
focuses on the women’s mosque movement in Cairo and the moral reform it engenders 
in the context of the Islamic revival, notes the ‘extraordinary degree of pedagogical 
emphasis’ on external behaviour among her informants and the existence of ‘an 
elaborate system of techniques by  which the body’s actions and capacities can be 
examined and worked upon, both individually and collectively’ (2005: 31). She 
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concludes that: ‘It is the various movements of the body that comprise the material 
substance of the ethical domain’ (2005: 31, emphasis added). Both scholars draw on 
Foucault’s notion of ‘technologies of the self’, which:
[P]ermit  individuals to effect  by their own means, or with the help of others, a 
certain number of operations on their own bodies and souls, thoughts, conduct, and 
way of being, so as to transform themselves in order to attain a certain state of 
happiness, purity, wisdom, perfection, or immortality (1997: 225)
By employing these scholars’ insights with regards to the deliberate exercises and the 
implanted bodily sensibilities and potentialities that engender particular ethical subjects, 
I hope to show that music-making could be perceived as an ethical practice. Musical 
abilities and affiliations largely depend upon deliberate actions and dispositions that 
compel actors to submit  themselves to training regimes that ostensibly suppress their 
freedom. I will show how, through their involvement in concrete music practices, 
Divorce as well as audience members sought to fashion ethical selves by  adhering to 
specific bodily  norms. These required regulated bodies in accord with ruled patterns of 
singing, instrument playing and social etiquette.
 
❊❊❊❊❊❊
An ethnographic account of how Divorce were formed on the basis of common musical 
inclinations will be followed by an exposition of the main music practices in which the 
band engaged. Among the various activities involved in the functioning of the band, 
members of Divorce privileged live performance as perhaps their most rewarding realm 
of experience. Although the experience of performing live was exhilarating, it was also 
daunting and nerve-wracking, especially for Ruth, the vocalist. Rehearsals were 
perceived as a serious commitment. Above all, rehearsals provided the time and space 
for band members to compose music by enhancing the sort of camaraderie that was felt 
during performance. Everyone would participate in the song-writing process by  playing 
simultaneously  in the studio and through the incorporation of individual contributions 
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into a coherent whole. This form of projected egalitarianism defined the shared identity 
of the band’s members.
My ethnographic vignette of a themed house gig-cum-party  at which Divorce performed 
will give rise to the discussion of the band’s music’s sensuous qualities. Their music 
was imbued with plurosensory meanings and symbolisms stretching beyond sonorous 
experiences to include tactile, visual and kinesthetic impulses. A section about the 
ethical work in the form of specific techniques that band members undertook will 
highlight the bodily conformity that music-making necessitates. Next, I consider 
audience etiquette and how bodily deportment encouraged the internalization of a 
contextualized and ethically  appropriate behaviour. In my exploration of these 
variegated actions, I contend that the whole gamut of music practices derives from 
affective intensities and sensory impingements that represent a tendency towards mutual 
ethical becoming.
4.2 Initiating Divorce
Divorce was initiated by Alistair and Sophie in late 2008. The two founders had been 
friends since they were teenagers. According to Alistair, the reason for striving to start a 
band that  they would truly  enjoy was that a great portion of music coming out of 
Glasgow was ‘too melodic and happy’. Divorce sought to do something ‘different’. 
Originally from Fife, Alistair had recently moved to Glasgow from Edinburgh to study 
Music Management at Stow College whilst working as a booking agent at the 13th 
Note. Sophie was working at the Captain’s Rest.89  Alistair was a drummer and Sophie 
played the electric bass. 
The band properly took shape once Anna joined them as a guitarist. Coming from a 
rural place called Lanchester in County Durham, Anna had started her painting and 
print-making degree at the GSA in 2005, and during the time of my fieldwork she was 
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89 Bar and music venue on Great Western Road.
working at an art shop  in the East End. She had also been allocated a dedicated studio 
space in Bridgetoun90 and had exhibited in local art spaces such as the Glue Factory and 
the Market Gallery. Before moving to Glasgow Anna used to listen to the music of Park 
Attack, a now-defunct local band. When she arrived in the city, she began attending 
Park Attack  gigs, often alone, and it was precisely in this context  that Anna gradually 
became acquainted and developed links with other local musicians. 
While studying at the GSA she had attempted to start a band with another young woman 
who also happened to know Alistair. This did not lead to the formation of a band, yet 
meeting Alistair was critical to her recruitment to Divorce. Apparently, both were 
interested in the same ‘noisy’ bands and Anna’s musical inclinations had proved 
incompatible with the other prospective members’ preferences. A few months later 
Alistair called Anna and invited her to join Divorce. At  the same time, and independent 
of her meeting Alistair, Anna also regularly attended the weekly club nights that Sophie 
organized at the Art School, which quite often featured Anna’s favourite bands. 
The three of them, with the addition of Rory from Park Attack, subsequently practiced 
for a while at the Green Door Studio. Rory’s contribution though, who played 
keyboards and effects, did not seem to fit with the band’s musical scope and eventually 
he left the band. It was around that time that Alistair also met Lucy, an American 
student who lived in Glasgow, and asked her to join Divorce as the second guitarist.91 
Lucy  had encountered Alistair at her friend’s party  where they ended up talking 
extensively  about music. Alistair recruited Lucy on the spot and the following week she 
joined the band’s rehearsals. In a similar way to Anna, Lucy had also become aware of 
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90 Anna’s peers at the GSA had set up a studio in the area that featured around twenty small spaces.
91  When I first met Lucy she was working at the Captain’s Rest, but she subsequently switched to an 
admin position elsewhere.  Lucy was originally from Houston, Texas. She had arrived in Glasgow in 2005 
to pursue a postgraduate degree in Slavonic Studies after having completed her undergraduate degree in 
Spanish and Russian at the University of Texas in San Antonio. Her ultimate goal was to travel to Russia, 
but once she arrived in Glasgow she became involved in local music and was currently planning to stay 
indefinitely. For Lucy, Glasgow had sparked her interest ever since she was in high school, when she 
visited the UK for the first time. As she characteristically put it: ‘In my heart, I want to stay here, this is 
the place I want to be’.
the local thriving music networks through frequent attendance of music events. It was 
when she was directly exposed to live performances that she truly  realized her interest 
in the activities taking place.
That was the initial line-up of Divorce and it was only later on, after the four members 
had composed three instrumental pieces, that Ruth joined the band. The singing 
component of these compositions was not initially  addressed and none of the members 
were particularly comfortable with singing. Anna had reluctantly volunteered, despite 
not feeling confident singing and playing the guitar simultaneously. Consequently, the 
band decided to recruit a vocalist. Ruth was a Glasgow native with an arts background, 
studying sculpture and environmental art at the GSA while working at Stereo. While at 
Langside College to do her Highers, Ruth had begun attending music events and 
eventually became involved in local experimental music. Alistair and Ruth had met 
through common friends and during a night out, while discussing music, Ruth expressed 
her interest in starting a band. There is no doubt that Ruth’s experience of the local 
experimental and noise music networks appealed to Divorce and she was soon invited to 
join them. The band provided her with rough recordings of the songs they  had already 
composed and Ruth wrote the lyrics. Her initial shyness and silence soon gave way  to 
aggressively loud vocal performances (see below). She recalls: 
I went  to a few practices, but I didn’t  make a peep for ages because I was so 
nervous. And then at one point just  basically went  for it and just  started shouting 
really loud, and the others were like: “Oh my god, what  was that sound that  just 
came out!”.
The band’s full membership allows me to outline certain common characteristics as well 
as differences between individual band members. To begin with, ages ranged from early 
twenties to mid-thirties. With the exception of Sophie and Ruth, members originated 
from places outside of Glasgow, and even of Scotland. They were employed and had 
pursued or were currently pursuing higher education. In common with WSP, none of the 
band’s members had received substantial formal music training. Anna, for example, was 
a self-taught guitar player who, as a teenager, would learn basic chords by downloading 
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guitar tabs off the Internet. Ruth’s only singing experience before joining Divorce came 
from her school years, a series of happenings that had left her uncertain of her vocal 
capabilities. In contrast, Lucy had taken both singing and piano lessons as a child but as 
a teenager she became interested in the electric guitar, which she learned to play by 
herself. The band was not  the only musical activity  in which Divorce members were 
involved and yet it quickly became a critical and habitual part of their lives.92
Divorce came into being through a series of encounters that members themselves 
characterized as ‘total chance’, ‘complete accident’, or ‘instantaneous’, largely the 
outcome of ‘good timing’. However, this seemed to be only part of the story. No doubt 
‘random’, serendipitous encounters contributed to the formation of the band but this 
process of coming together was not solely  the result of luck. First  of all, the fact that 
Anna, Lucy and Ruth ended up in the band after a night out socializing with Alistair 
was not a simple coincidence. Rather, this form of sociality  was conducive to the 
emergence of music projects but  also very common among musicians in Glasgow, 
where certain pubs and bars stayed open until 3am and where nighttime economy was 
intimately  linked with popular music (Forsyth & Cloonan 2008). As Michael from the 
band Errors put it when he was describing to me the nexus between drinking, 
socializing, and music: ‘This is when all the “magic” happens!’. 
I have already examined how the practice of sharing facilitated the development of 
music networks. In the case of Divorce, the formation of the band could be also broadly 
and partly  accounted for by Bourdieu’s notion of cultural capital (1984) and, more 
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92  Lucy had previously participated in various short-lived bands, but it was her arrival in Glasgow that 
really triggered her musical creativity. Before joining Divorce she had initiated a solo project 
(occasionally a duo), Blood of the Bull,  and subsequently teamed up with Iain from WSP in Phat Trophies 
(Chapter 3), where she sang and played the organ. Ruth had been a core member of the close-knit noise 
music network and she played in Barbarians, by beating scrap metal with sticks. The resulting sound was 
captured by contact microphones and processed through distortion pedals. Ruth also played the guitar in 
Palms with the additional duties of song-writing and singing. By contrast, Divorce was Anna’s first and 
only band,  although she had formerly practiced with various musicians. Anna hosted a regular show on 
Subcity Radio (see Chapter 5) and had also started composing electronic music. Sophie and Alistair had 
both been engaged in diverse music genres and bands throughout the years preceding Divorce, but none 
of those had felt truly rewarding. Divorce was Sophie and Alistair’s main project. Alistair was also a 
session musician in addition to offering his drumming skills for Cameron’s Remember Remember, an 
essentially solo project (see Chapter 5). 
specifically, by Thorton’s (1995) contextualized and music-related ‘subcultural’ capital, 
which highlights individual status within specific social fields. In light of this, the 
common artistic affiliations and educational background of several band members had 
culminated in specific dispositions germane to particular modes of music-making and 
aesthetic appreciation. This was encapsulated by their common taste in music that 
initially forged relations between members of Divorce. The factors that contributed to 
the formation of the band were also spatially articulated and a grounded perspective 
would see them circulating in the same music venues, attending similar gigs and 
socializing within a common network of individuals: their musical pathways coincided 
(Finnegan 1989). Lucy told me that she had seen Alistair but they  had never talked 
before the party. 
The specific presence of the art school as a cultural milieu constituted an additional 
important backdrop to Divorce’s story. Of course, it hosted a pool of creative youth who 
also made music. But particularly pertinent to the Divorce story, Anna and Ruth might 
not have been attracted to Glasgow if not for attending classes at the GSA. Yet being an 
art school student and playing music in bands did not assume a cause and effect 
relationship. There was no direct link between one’s status as an art student and his or 
her decision to form a band, especially with other GSA peers. 
As an illustration, Anna and Ruth were not acquainted before the latter joined Divorce,93 
nor were Anna’s musical predilections necessarily shared among other GSA students. 
As mentioned, Anna would initially attend certain music events alone because most of 
the students in her year had different tastes in music to her own. Somewhat ironically, 
the art school experience could have an indirect, adverse effect upon music-making as 
we shall see. Therefore, rather than determining or imposing a particular aesthetic or 
‘style’, it would be more appropriate to argue that art school institutions engender and 
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93 This also holds for Anna’s relationship with two members of Ultimate Thrush (see below), with whom 
Divorce later became closely affiliated. Ruth was discussing with Will and his brother Alex the possibility 
of forming a band before she joined Divorce.  Ultimate Thrush subsequently recruited Calum, who was 
studying at the GSA alongside Will.
afford a particular approach that is conducive to music-making. This attitude does not 
insist on a specific ‘image’ but is honed by and depends upon ‘commitment to a 
working practice, to a mode of learning which assumes the status of lifestyle’ (Frith & 
Home 1987: 28).
In other words, institutional and shaping factors within field dynamics (see also Chapter 
2) do not reveal much about taste as an assortment of everyday, conscious practices, 
choices and decisions of musicians, nor do they  account for music’s sonic presence and 
effect on this process. Following Hennion (2007), we could say that musical taste does 
not primarily confer cultural status or distinction but suggests an activity that involves 
participation and reflection. As I will demonstrate in the following chapter, musical taste 
should be perceived as a technology of ethical self-formation rather than a property or 
attribute of individuals. An account of the experiential levels on which musicians 
operate may indeed leave room for contingency or randomness. However, by not 
accommodating for wider factors, social institutions and culturally defined ideas that 
affect local music-making (Chapter 1), the broader and largely unconscious processes in 
which these kinds of phenomena emerge, develop, change or dissolve will remain 
obscure. 
Despite the reality  that the process of starting a band in Glasgow was not related to 
some form of determining structure, local circumstances largely facilitated the 
formation of bands in specific ways and Divorce were no exception. Having said this, I 
do not claim that Divorce could be seen as an archetypal Glasgow band nor that such a 
band ever existed. Rather, I am concerned here with the enactment of musical taste 
through embodied practices that expressed these ethical dispositions in action, but also 
how these dispositions were formed and learned through repeated bodily practice. 
Sometimes, taste was literally carved on human flesh. Alistair had acquired a 
homemade tattoo on his right bicep: a robot-like head with a speech bubble coming out 
of its mouth. This was the logo of one of his favourite bands, a ‘free-jazz/noise/metal’ 
179
band called The Flying Luttenbachers. The remainder of this chapter delves 
ethnographically  into the ways in which the band’s musical sensibilities were gradually 
absorbed by their ‘skins’ and transformed into bodily capacities as well as ethical 
potentials.94 
4.3 Music Practices and the Functioning of the Band
4.3.1 Performance
The self-managed character of the band meant that performances were the culmination 
of a time-consuming process that included carrying the equipment to the venue, setting-
up and ‘sound-checking’. The web of negotiations and arrangements surrounding 
instrument transportation, borrowing or sharing were particularly  pertinent to Alistair’s 
drum kit. For example, during one of their 2010 tours of England, Alistair was using 
Comanechi’s drum kit, the band with whom Divorce were touring. Anna, Sophie and 
Lucy  would normally bring their instruments, effects pedals and, quite often, their own 
amplifiers, to connect with the venue’s PA. 
Setting up  the equipment consisted of laying the pedals on the floor, plugging in cables 
and placing amplifiers against  the wall or to the side but still facing the audience. 
Alistair had to assemble the drum kit in front of a stool and screw the plates on their 
stands. Finally, one or two hand-written playlists would be taped on the floor within 
each member’s line of vision. Depending on the nature of the event and the time at their 
disposal, Divorce would test their equipment and adjust sound levels and other effects 
on their amplifiers, as well as checking for technical issues. This procedure was 
supported by a sound engineer, unless the event took place in a flat (see below). With 
the engineer’s assistance Divorce pitched their sound at the desired level ensuring that 
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94 Among the Gahuku-Gama of New Guinea the notion of ‘skin’  encompasses the covering of the body, 
individual behaviour and personality, as well as ethical evaluations, i.e. ‘good’ or ‘bad’ skin (Read 1955).
these adjustments enabled them to produce the various and often subtle nuances of their 
compositions.
The way the band members were organized on stage at gigs was fairly consistent: 
Alistair would sit  in the middle of the stage and towards the back, in between Anna and 
Lucy. In the first  few Divorce gigs I attended Anna stood on the left, but she 
subsequently  swapped positions with Lucy. Sophie normally occupied the space in front 
of Alistair and Lucy, while Ruth, carrying only her microphone, was free to move on 
and off the stage as she wished. This arrangement had a practical function, namely that 
Sophie was able to communicate with Alistair during the performance. This was crucial 
because bass and drums provided the rhythm section that held together the band’s 
compositions. Anna and Lucy could concentrate on playing their guitar parts with Ruth 
fronting the band and typically attracting most of the audience’s attention. 
With the exception of themed events, the band did not wear elaborate stage clothing or 
makeup, although other bands, such as Ultimate Thrush, regularly employed hand-made 
costumes to enrich their performance repertoire. Generally speaking, decisions about 
clothing and self-presentation were founded upon practical rationale. For example, 
Alistair wore glasses and would take them off in order to play drums. Ruth did wear 
fancy  outfits during the initial stages of the band’s life, but eventually  realized that she 
needed comfortable clothes that would endure the intense performances. Her intention 
was to wear clothes that would not fall apart after one or two gigs, even in light of the 
expressive intensity of performance that Divorce strived for. 
Alistair had a dynamic presence that was supported by the spectacular and powerful 
playing that the drums can facilitate, by affording a greater range of motion as well as a 
wide variety of gestures. Sophie, however, also engaged in vigorous movement and 
occasional headbanging. Anna and Lucy had more delicate but still energetic and lively 
postures. Ruth specifically, as the front-woman, manifested and integrated these 
performative elements. Her dramatic enactment ranged from crawling on the floor, 
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jumping around and singing on her knees to lying down and rolling on stage amongst 
the other members of the band.  
Live performance was a distinctively important aspect of the band’s operation. 
However, Divorce also used gigs as a ‘testing ground’ for their tunes.95  By elaborating 
on their songs during performances or by building their sets in specific ways, they were 
able to tease out ideas that informed their subsequent compositions or even altered 
existing ones. Sometimes, the band would decide to drop specific songs for good. 
4.3.2 Rehearsals and Composition
The band met for the first time at the Green Door Studio in the West End. After a short 
break, Rory’s departure and Lucy’s addition, Divorce reunited at the Q10 Studios in 
Merchant City  before eventually moving to the Arc Studios Glasgow in the Southside. 
According to Anna, it was the first  rehearsal at the Q10 that cemented the band’s line-
up. Divorce still gathered at the Arc during my fieldwork where they practiced every 
Tuesday for three hours. They moved from Q10 to the Arc because the majority  of 
bands in the former studio played music that stood in stark contrast with Divorce’s, 
whereas the Arc hosted mainly ‘noisy’ bands. The Arc charged a hire fee of £25-£27 for 
three hours, which the band would pay weekly. This was the expected charge for hiring 
studio space in Glasgow, unless bands rented by  the month, which was cheaper. For 
example, Remember Remember, for whom Alistair played the drums, rented a converted 
school hall in Kinning Park.
The process of music-making remained consistent even after Ruth joined the band: 
lyrics were added to instrumental compositions. Whereas for the first  three songs Ruth 
wrote lyrics for finished pieces, for all subsequent songs she penned the lyrics in situ, 
during the process of music composition. Therefore, whether an opportunity to revisit 
earlier songs or the main context for the enactment of musical creativity, Divorce songs 
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95 ‘Testing’ and the ethical are intimately related. See, for example, Ronell (2005).
were largely  the outcome of a collective and ‘organic’ process. Music was never written 
down and the band experimented with various ideas, while individual suggestions 
regularly punctuated the process. Alistair often came up with drum-beats. At other 
times, Lucy or Anna introduced guitar riffs or Sophie would bring a bass line. However, 
these musical scaffoldings were manipulated by the rest of the members and twisted to 
such an extent that the initial idea would be ultimately transformed into a collective 
novelty. By working around these basic structures through trial and error, the band 
could spend a whole rehearsal working on a song and polishing it to a satisfactory level.  
This improvisatory, but certainly  structured and planned, songwriting process was 
further underpinned by the band’s lack of identification with a specific music genre. In 
essence then, there was no generic formula or ideal to which the band aspired. They did 
not explicitly seek to write songs that would meet detailed musical criteria. Although 
this creative freedom sometimes introduced challenges and highlighted the uncertain 
and open-ended character of composition, the method of discovering the band’s desired 
sound through communal music-making was a concomitant of the fact that individual 
members felt comfortable and truly enjoyed playing with each other. Instead of trying to 
push their music towards a specific direction, they opened up their compositions to 
several potential sonic avenues. Each member’s distinctive style of playing 
notwithstanding, it was exactly this diversity that gave rise to and sealed the final 
outcome.
Practice time embodied the creative nexus between individual ideas and their collective 
manipulation. But  the music-making process was not limited to three hours per week. 
The band would also meet after rehearsals or during the week for drinks or to listen to 
music. These bonding sessions or ‘rituals’ (Bennett 1980: 76-78) provided the context 
for discussion and reflection. Furthermore, Alistair regularly forwarded his ideas to the 
rest of the band ahead of Tuesday  practice. Divorce never felt that they needed to 
practice twice a week, something that only happened in preparation for upcoming gigs 
necessitating the creation of a set. 
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The increasing familiarity between members, as well as the development of their 
musical skills through band participation, had certainly contributed to their productivity. 
Practicing and performing live provided a context in which the band decided which 
songs would be recorded and released and, in turn, release schedules would influence 
Divorce’s songwriting accordingly. 
4.3.3 Recording and Releasing Songs
In February 2009 the band recorded their first release, a 10’’ vinyl EP. The four songs on 
the EP were recorded and mixed by Iain of WSP and were subsequently released that 
June, with a launch party following in July  at the Captain’s Rest. The band had only 
formed a few months before and yet the record was not self-released but rather licensed 
to Optimo Music, a local label owned by DJs and club promoters Optimo (Chapter 1). 
Optimo Music expressed their interest in releasing Divorce songs after Ruth, who was 
an Optimo regular, had invited one of them to attend the band’s first gig. Divorce were 
in turn invited to perform at  Optimo, which was the band’s second gig. Ruth recalled the 
Optimo gig as ‘the first time we had been pushed outside of our comfort zone as a 
band’. 
Alistair advised me that Optimo Music were a small record label, which meant that they 
barely had the resources to release the record and that they  did not own a studio. 
Nevertheless, he was grateful and felt really lucky  that Divorce could have such a 
release so early in their career. The band chose to retain the rights to the music content: 
once the 500 copies of the record sold out – and later they did – Optimo would have to 
seek the band’s consent in order to repress it. Local record shops such as Monorail 
stocked the record, but it was also made available for sale online, both from the band 
themselves and from other online music retailers. Almost a year had passed before a 
split cassette tape with Ultimate Thrush surfaced on MÏLK in March 2010.96 The release 
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96 London-based DiY record label and music promoter that hosted the London gig of the two bands while 
on a tour of England in October 2009. That show culminated into the release of the tape.
featured one band per side, and Divorce contributed three songs that were again 
recorded by Iain. The elaborate artwork was created by  Will (Figure 4.1), Ultimate 
Thrush’s guitarist (see also Chapter 3). 
Figure 4.1: Divorce/Ultimate Thrush split cassette tape cloth cover and insert.97
Only 250 copies were made.98  Once the limited run had sold out they  uploaded the 
music onto the WSP website so that people could access it for free. Each band also 
provided one of their songs that appeared on the split tape for a compilation that was 
released that June by a small Canadian record label called Scotch Tapes. 
In September 2010, Divorce launched a third tour of the UK after their second tour in 
March the same year. That  set of shows, on which I followed the band, also featured 
Comanechi from London. The two bands had played live together before, including 
Comanechi’s album launch gig in London the previous December, as well as two shows 
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97 Retrieved from http://www.oliverpitt.co.uk/ [Accessed 10 October 2012].
98 Even Anna was not able to secure a copy of the tape because she forgot to keep one for herself once it 
was released.
in Scotland a few weeks after that, one in Edinburgh and another at  the 13th Note in 
Glasgow. The tour and a split 10’’ vinyl release were announced simultaneously. The 
500 copies of the record would be officially released in late September by London’s 
Merok  record label. There was one song from each band on side A and for side B the 
bands joined forces for a cover version of Sonic Youth’s ‘Death Valley ’69’, recorded 
again by Iain at the 13th Note.99  The link between Divorce and Merok was established 
through Comanechi, who had also released their own album on the label. The 10’’ was 
initially only available to purchase directly from the bands during their tour. 
A few months earlier, the band recorded nine songs at the Green Door Studio, which 
they  were planning to release as an LP. Some of these songs were new but Divorce also 
re-recorded some old ones for inclusion in the album. Iain recorded the album but did 
not participate in the mixing process. The band were not satisfied with the final mix: 
Anna and Lucy agreed that ‘the songs were never fully mixed’ and Divorce were 
thinking of recruiting Iain to remix them.  The recording took place at the end of June 
over three days, including mixing. The band could not afford to hire the studio for 
additional time although they would be forced to do so if they fell behind schedule, 
paying for the extra time in installments. The recording started on the afternoon of the 
first day and drum parts were recorded first. According to Alistair he would need three 
takes for each song: ‘One nervy, one proper and one “laggy”’. The guitar and bass parts 
were recorded on the second day and Ruth did the vocals last. Anna pointed out that 
they  did not need to play the songs several times to record them as each member knew 
their parts quite well. 
Divorce had managed to record their first album but its release was a matter of finding 
an appropriate label. The day  before the recording was scheduled to begin, Alistair 
informed me that there were two labels that Divorce were considering for the release. 
One was, again, Merok. However, the more the band discussed the album with them, the 
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99  This song was originally written by Thurston Moore, Sonic Youth’s guitarist, and Lydia Lunch, 
probably the most well-known no wave figure.
more they  started realizing that Merok’s policies were incompatible with the band’s 
principles. Alistair, who was the band’s main contact with the label, had forwarded them 
rough mixes of the album. But the label never provided their feedback. In the meantime, 
Merok  had emailed Alistair a list comprised of ‘a ridiculous amount of demands’ that 
would essentially  deprive Divorce of their rights to their own music (i.e. a standard 
recording contract). At the same time, a second label from Milton Keynes called 
Fortissimo expressed their interest, but this plan was abandoned too after the individual 
who ran the label decided to move to the US.100  Subsequent internal developments, 
resulted in the album still remaining unreleased at the time at which I finished my 
fieldwork. 
4.4 ‘Satanic Toga’ House Party
On the last Saturday  of August 2010, before leaving home to catch the train to Glasgow 
I received a tweet from Divorce.101 A ‘Satanic toga’ house party  was to take place that 
evening. Both Divorce and Ultimate Thrush would perform live. Colin from WSP and 
Alistair also notified me of this last-minute event. ‘Satanism’ was not merely a stylistic 
choice, but also alluded to the corporeal and sensual elements of the bands’ music (see 
below). As is evident from the following description, the themed event would be a 
parodic pastiche of Satanic stereotypes, iconography and phraseology:
!!!!!!!!!!!TONIGHT!!!!!!!!!!!!!
PRAISE SATAN IN A BEDSHEET
SATANIC TOGA HOUSE PARTY w/ ADDED RITUALS, NOISE, 
INCANTATIONS, DJs, SNAKE-CHARMERS, BLOOD-LETTING, LIVE 
BANDS and LOTS OF SWEET BERRY WINE!!!! (bring yr own wine)
ULTIMATE THRUSH and DIVORCE will attempt to invoke the wrath of OUR 
MASTER BEELZEBUB through the medium of SONG.
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100  Fortissimo had previously released an LP by Peter J. Taylor, the conductor of the electric guitar 
ensemble in Maryhill (Chapter 3).
101  Online social media such as Facebook and Twitter were widely used by members of the band for 
promotional purposes.
DJ GOAT-FACED KILLA shall keep proceedings suitably UNHOLY with music in 
praise of HE WHO WALKS BACKWARDS.
CHURCH DOORS OPEN AT 10pm
LIVE MUSIC WILL BEGIN AT MIDNIGHT, THE HOUR OF EVIL
(Divorce on first)... so if yr going to see Take A Worm For A Walk Week 
you can still pop round.
TOGAS MUST BE WORN.
(If you have no toga, door cover is £6.66 and an inverted crucifix 
branded onto yr buttock)
ViIRGINS [sic] & WITCHES WELCOME (but will not live through the night)
TO FIND OUT THE LOCATION OF THIS SATANIC CEREMONY TEXT THE 
HIGH PRIEST OF THE ANTICHRIST ON
[Mobile Phone Number]
HAIL HAIL HAIL! TOGA TOGA TOGA!102
I arrived at  the main entrance of the tenement where the party was on. John, who played 
bass in Eternal Fags, was waiting outside. He wore a plaster cast on his arm, as a result 
of which Eternal Fags had had to drop out from the Kaddish album launch event at the 
13th Note earlier that evening.103  Three flights of stairs led to the first floor flat. The 
door was open and there was nobody to collect the advertised £6.66 (Satan’s) cover 
charge. At the end of the small but busy  corridor there was a spacious room on the left. 
There, people were standing or sitting on the floor. Most of them were wearing togas 
and it seemed that they had put a lot of effort into dressing up. As I entered the room I 
saw Harry, who was DJ-ing for the night.104  On the long walls of the room, there were 
large pieces of paper cut and elaborately sketched in line with the event: a large skeleton 
on the left, and opposite a large drawing of an erect, bull-like creature with wings, 
framed by two white inverted crosses. 
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102 Retrieved from https://www.facebook.com/events/149680788392953/ [Accessed 14 May 2011].
103 John subsequently left the band and Colin and Iain continued as a duo (Chapter 3). Before heading to 
the party I attended a gig organized by the DiY music collective This Is Our Battlefield, where Kaddish, a 
Dundonian band, launched their new record.
104 Harry worked in Monorail.
This figure was overlooking a drum kit in between speakers with bottles on them 
serving as candle-holders. Additional musical equipment was placed around the drum 
kit – guitars, amplifiers, cables and effects pedals. Song playlists were attached on the 
floor in front of the drum kit. Harry was playing loud guitar music and people were 
dancing. The whole concept seemed to be very  well thought out and executed 
considering time constraints. I spotted Iain and Colin from WSP and went to join them. 
After a while, Alex came in and I asked him how I could get my toga on (I had brought 
a bed sheet and pins).105  He introduced me to two of his friends who took me to another 
room and within two minutes they were able to make a perfect toga using just two pins. 
Divorce, who had arrived in the meantime were sound-checking as it  was almost 
midnight. Sophie, the bassist, was dressed as a witch, wearing white makeup and two 
black patches around her eyes. Anna and Lucy were wearing long, hooded black capes 
and had covered their faces with fake blood and Satanic symbols, such as pentagrams 
and inverted crosses. Ruth’s face, hands and upper chest were also covered in fake 
blood (Figure 4.2). Alistair was missing, despite the fact that I had been chatting to him 
earlier on. He was dressed up as Jesus. 
Divorce members started to get impatient and were asking his whereabouts. Sophie, 
Anna, and Lucy were strumming their instruments, repeating the same chords, partly to 
check the sound quality and volume and partly to signify that their set was due to begin. 
This recurring, abrasive and loud electric sound that was slowly but steadily  building up 
into a wall of noise enhanced the palpable tension, which was further intensified by the 
unbearable heat and humidity in the room. The space was now packed and the audience 
had surrounded the band, with several people standing in between Divorce members. 
Ruth, in front of the drum kit, was holding her microphone sorting out its long cable 
while trying to conceal her apparent nervousness. Sophie was standing next to her. 
When Alistair finally entered the room he was wearing a mask with long hair and beard
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105 Alex was the drummer of Ultimate Thrush. He was playing drums in seven local bands.
Figure 4.2: Ruth at the ‘Satanic toga’ house party.
and was covered in red body  paint (Figure 4.3). He took a seat  behind his drum kit, in 
between Anna and Lucy, and the band immediately began their set.
I was standing very close to the band, receiving the full force of their amplified sound 
unfiltered by other people’s bodies. This made me realize that I had left my earplugs at 
home. Ironically, it  was the initial experience of a Divorce performance that had 
convinced me to purchase my first pair of earplugs.106  Witnessing Divorce’s set tonight 
was a rather visceral experience and their carefully  crafted noise had a profound 
physical effect. Considering the suffocating heat  and the total lack of free space in the 
room, the band’s sonic onslaught clashed with the mass of perspiring bodies in the 
audience by inducing a simultaneously unifying and claustrophobic effect.
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106  Although the music was loud and guaranteed tinnitus (and prolonged exposure possibly ear damage), 
Divorce did not use earplugs. This was understandable because filtering the sound meant that the band 
would not be able to perceive the full range of frequencies they were playing, in their effort to control the 
final sonic output. 
Figure 4.3: Alistair at the ‘Satanic toga’ house party.
Apart from Lucy, who was somewhat trapped between Sophie, Alistair’s drums and the 
speakers, the band stayed mobile for the best  part of the set, which lasted less than half 
an hour. Although Ruth had to confront the audience literally face to face and was 
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unable to move freely across space as she did during most performances, she managed 
to accompany the dramatic delivery  of the lyrics with intense corporeal movement. 
Alistair quickly took his mask off right after the first  song, apparently due to the 
excessive heat. I was careful to avoid Sophie’s swinging bass guitar, because despite the 
lack of space she had not compromised her performance and she was moving her 
instrument back and forth while dancing erratically. However, Ruth, the vocalist, was 
less lucky. 
Once the set was finished, everyone instantly left the room craving for fresh air. I saw 
Ruth in the bathroom holding her forehead, while Sophie was there too. Ruth had a cut 
on her forehead and there was blood oozing from the wound. I asked her if that was ‘for 
real’ because her face was covered in fake blood, which at this moment was difficult to 
distinguish from real blood. She replied affirmatively and looked rather worried. After a 
while both decided to leave and I did not see Ruth or Sophie for the rest of night. Back 
inside, Alistair and Anna asked to see the pictures I had taken during their performance. 
Anna told us that  she had some issues with her guitar sound due to the lack of an 
installed sound system but she had enjoyed the gig nonetheless. Alistair asked me 
whether I could send him the photographs, and I agreed to do that the following day.
4.5 Extreme to a Certain Point
Further to the ironic use of stage names (Chapter 3), my informants employed irony in 
their visual manipulation of particular stereotypes. Satanic iconography was a case in 
point, which also appeared on Divorce releases (Figure 4.4). The sense of mockery 
underscoring the direct citation of diabolical references is consonant with the 
observation that ironists deploy the literal meaning of an utterance in order to subvert it 
and convey a comic or ridiculing attitude (Fernandez & Huber 2001: 3). Sensationalism 
aside, demonic iconography did manage to emulate the ‘sensualism’ with which Satanic 
cults and Satanism in general have been associated, without inducing an ‘epidemic’ of 
moral panic (see La Fontaine 1998). 
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Figure 4.4: Divorce 10’’ vinyl label.
The playful provocation evident in the description of the party, the decoration and the 
costumes deliberately  flirted with established notions of Satan as ‘a potent symbol of 
man’s (sic) lustful nature’ (Kahn-Harris 2007: 40) and humans’ bestial or animalistic 
essence (Lewis 2009: 44; Faxneld & Petersen 2012: 6). By replacing the inverted cross 
as the symbol of human potential in contemporary Satanism, the pentagram represents 
the primacy  of matter over (Christian) spirit (Cordero 2009: para. 4; Petersen 2009: 9). 
After all, the toga alluded to another popular stereotype whereby the Roman Empire had 
degenerated into a swirl of sexual orgies, while the garment’s embodiment of the mores 
of Roman citizenship  was indeed replaced by its signification of moral decline (Vout 
1996: 217). Evacuated from its evil, sexual and unethical resonances, the carnality 
invoked by the specific themes related to a broader facet of the band’s music and 
specifically its sensuous and visceral qualities, that  is, its geno-song characteristics 
(Barthes 1977; see Conclusion). These affective intensities conditioned a kaleidoscopic 
sensory  stimulation that impinged on the body via multiple channels and did not  confine 
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music within a uni-sensorial auditory corporeality (Howes 2003: 47), but engaged 
tactile and visual registers.
 
Alistair was proud of the first 10’’ record because he considered it  a well-made and 
carefully  crafted artefact. Anna, who had the necessary skills for the job had produced 
the artwork. It was the creation of Divorce designs such as this or for Divorce t-shirts 
that had revived her interest in painting. The record was also pressed on bright red 
vinyl. Thus, the cover and the actual record were dominated by red, a colour invariably 
associated with happiness, love, passion and sexual readiness as well as danger, while 
its titillating, arousing qualities are said to produce an outward and expansive bodily 
behaviour (Elliot  & Maier 2007). Alistair recounted how good he had felt when he 
walked into Monorail and saw the record placed in a privileged position high on the 
shop’s wall, where new releases were usually  exhibited. His desire was for Divorce to 
produce physical copies of their music and he thought that ‘material counts’. Vinyl 
records in particular could be seen as the sensuous epitome of music formats due to 
their size, smell and fragility, as well as the fact that one could actually ‘see’ the music 
etched on vinyl (Fonarow 2006: 47-48). Crucially, vinyl carried analogue sound as 
opposed to digital formats.
The band had chosen Green Door to record their album because of the analogue 
equipment in place that was preferred by Divorce, something that also explained why 
they wanted to re-record the songs that were initially captured on digital equipment. The 
analogue equipment at Green Door had no practical advantages over digital. It was the 
distinctive ‘warm’ sound which only recording on magnetic tape could produce, as 
Alistair put it, which appealed to Divorce. Thus, analogue sound was preferred on the 
basis of its sensation rather than its practicality. Despite being a common claim, the 
association of analogue sound with heat is important. As Classen (1993: 126) has 
argued, thermal symbolism pervades cultural life and ideas, which are not only 
articulated in thermal terms but are felt and expressed through the body. The warmth of 
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sound ‘touches’, enters and envelops the body completely, endowing it  with affective 
potential.
Related to this was the view that live performance could provide a model for recording. 
Thus, for Anna, the ideal was to try and record ‘as live as possible’ rather than have 
each member play  their parts separately. This ran the risk of making mistakes, but this 
was something for which the resulting dynamic could compensate. Therefore, some 
mistakes in playing were acceptable and could be outweighed by an ‘unmediated’ 
delivery that could reach the ears of the listener and affectively  engage him in the 
performance (see also Hirschkind 2006: 51-52). Cohen notes a similar preference in the 
approach of her case studies to recording and she explains that they sought to capture 
the ‘raw’ intensity of live performance, something that was almost impossible due to the 
different volume and lack of visual references of the recorded sound (1991: 179). The 
loudness of sound, the effects and adjustments that the band employed to fit their sets 
and the theatricality of performance created an environment conducive to the multi-
sensuous enactment of the compositions. 
Divorce’s live sets were often put  together so that the band would not have to stop 
playing in between songs. This was achieved by elongating songs or producing guitar 
feedback – a self-referential resonance, the complex immediacy of which could best be 
described as sonic ‘intensity’ or affect (see Massumi 2002: 14). The preservation of a 
constant affective sonic stream would give Alistair and Sophie the opportunity to start 
the next song but it  also characterized the band’s performances as a whole. Divorce 
believed that  they sounded best when they performed live. This ‘live’ sound was 
determined by the specificity of its aural qualities, the kinds of equipment the band 
used, the sound engineer present, as well as the venue in question and its available 
sound installation. 
Alistair normally kept his own drum kit  at home and was trying to upgrade it by 
purchasing expensive plates and other paraphernalia. Divorce paid attention to the 
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complexity of rhythm and to the rhythmic sections of the songs in general, which often 
provided the foundations for the band’s compositions. According to Alistair this 
separated Divorce from other noise music acts, who focused less on rhythm and more to 
the production of loud and repeated soundscapes. Finnegan notes that the distinctive 
combination of emotive and kinetic elements of music are exemplified by rhythm 
(1989: 340), while drumming has been an integral element of ritual (Needham 1967; 
Turner 1968). Indeed, percussion, dance and ritual are considered interdependent, to 
such an extent that certain West African cultures, for example, use one word to describe 
all three (Fonarow 2006: 169). However, for Divorce, the prominence of rhythm in the 
song-writing process was not translated into its sonic privileging. Guitar and bass 
sound, as well as vocals, were equally important as Anna explained: 
We like everything to be completely focused and dry, we always have complete 
level and everything’s coming through pedals [guitar and bass sound]. Whenever 
we have distortion on the amps it’s all through pedals and never any reverb or 
anything on the vocals, everything’s just dry basically. I think the less effects you 
actually put on things the harsher they sound. 
A few months after the band had started rehearsing and writing songs Anna bought her 
own guitar amplifier, which she would always carry  at  gigs locally and on tour. She 
preferred the specific sound that her amplifier produced, and which other brands could 
not because they  sounded ‘bassy’ and ‘muffly’, whereas Anna wanted her guitar to 
sound ‘trebly’. In order to achieve this high-pitched, screeching sound Anna would 
adjust the amp’s settings to the high-end maximum. The treble on her pedals also had to 
be set accordingly. Anna was using three pedals, a Big Muff, a Fuzz and an Octavedrone 
(Figure 4.5). 
The Octavedrone was ‘mental sounding’, and Anna would combine it with the Fuzz. 
That would produce the desirable ‘ridiculously loud and distorted’ sound. The Fuzz 
pedal was her main one and would stay  continuously on while playing. The Big Muff, a 
pedal which Sophie also owned and used, would enrich the guitar and bass sounds with 
more ‘metal’, while the Octavedrone did what its name implied: it would reproduce 
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whatever note Anna hit but also expand it to an octave above and an octave below. In 
essence, then, it sounded as if Anna played three notes with one strum. The added 
‘fuzzy’ effect would culminate in a ‘weird’ sound. 
Figure 4.5: Anna’s pedals on stage at Sneaky Pete’s, Edinburgh.
In terms of the range of frequencies, Anna, Lucy and Sophie split the frequency bands 
between them, with the former playing hi-end parts, Lucy’s guitar sound moving within 
the mid-range and Sophie occupying the low-end with her bass. Splitting the entire 
frequency range between the three of them resulted in the production of a full riff. As 
Alistair had once remarked: ‘If you want to make loud music you need to make it sound 
big’. 
The desired characteristics of the band’s sound also ordered and classified performance 
spaces as well as articulating the ways in which band members related to sound 
engineers and sound equipment. Anna, like the rest of the band, carried her equipment 
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to the venue where Divorce would perform. However, the space’s acoustics, its sound 
engineer and the equipment at hand largely dictated the final output. Ruth believed that 
Nice‘n’Sleazy  was a ‘weird’ venue in terms of the quality  of sound, which worked for 
some bands but not for others. Similarly, the band valued specific local venues with 
regards to their capacity  of producing a specific sound, but also on the basis of the 
sound engineers that were employed in each. Anna believed that by using their own 
equipment the band could minimize the risk of altering their sound while playing live, 
even in the absence of a high-quality installed PA. By  contrast, using random amplifiers 
could have a direct, negative effect. 
Along the same lines, the lack of a skilled or cooperative sound engineer could also 
pose serious challenges. Whereas sound personnel at the 13th Note and the Captain’s 
Rest were considered experienced in working with noisy bands such as Divorce, in 
other venues problems arose when sound engineers attempted to impose their views or 
could not understand the band’s preferred sound. The problem was rather acute during 
Divorce tours when the band had to deal with technical staff that were unfamiliar with 
the band’s music. A common source of debate was Anna’s ‘trebly’ sound. Several times 
she was addressed with the question of whether she wanted her guitar to be that trebly. 
Anna summarized the characteristics of the ideal sound engineer as follows: 
I think a good sound guy should be able to adapt to whatever the band play in front 
of them, no matter what their taste in music is. I think the whole point of that is to 
be quite neutral and just  make that  band sound the best  that  they can, rather than 
telling them how to change their sound. 
Sometimes sound engineers also criticized the loudness of her guitar and would 
subsequently  turn the volume down. Anna would lose all the effects and intricate details 
present in her playing. For sure, sound levels were sometimes less negotiable due to 
each venue’s specific regulations. But when this was the outcome of the sound 
engineer’s insistence rather than a legal obligation, Anna would ask him or her to 
disconnect the amplifier from the PA (the volume controls of which were at the 
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engineer’s disposal) so that her sound remained unaffected. The wattage of her amp 
would suffice to compensate for the lack of amplification via the central sound system. 
The way in which aurality determined the band’s relation to space, materials, and other 
individuals, such as sound engineers, resonates with Classen’s remark that the senses 
provide the means by which we order the world around us. Moreover, Classen points 
out that ‘sensory relations are social relations’ but at the same time ethical relations 
(1993: 136-137). For example, the critical judgements made by sound engineers on 
Anna’s guitar sound were ethical in character. As Frith points out, ‘good’ or ‘bad’ music 
are aesthetic preferences that are linked to ethical judgements (1996b: 72). 
Crucially, the multi-sensory  qualities of music-making, which involved the warmth and 
odour of analogue sound and vinyl, the spectacular movement of bodies onstage and the 
coloured intensity  of the visual imagery employed for releases, point to the fact that we 
should consider the sensory interplay rather than the dominant sensory  medium or the 
hierarchy of the senses in each context  (Classen 1993: 135-136). Divorce members 
described their sound as big, warm, dry, harsh, fuzzy, distorted and focused. This 
implied a sensuality that went beyond the sonorous characteristics of music and towards 
an understanding of the plural modes of affect that undergird musical creativity  and 
sonic presences, as well as to the expansion of perceptual and expressive regimes that 
music affords. As Anna summed it up, Divorce’s music was ‘a sensory overload, maybe 
extreme to a certain point’.
4.6 The Vocalist’s Three Bodies
The practico-material circumstances of music-making cannot be neatly separated from 
ethical conduct. Ethics do not refer to meaning or signification but are embedded in the 
specific technologies or techniques, that is, the work that individuals do, including the 
bodily  capacities that they bring upon themselves through training (Mahmood 2005: 27, 
29). In this section, I explore ethical practices in relation to music-making by focusing 
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upon the body as a musical instrument (Seeger 1987: 78-81). Ruth’s instrument was her 
voice, a musical capacity inextricably  linked with her body, which emerged as a 
‘technical object’ as well as a ‘means’ (Mauss 1973 [1935]: 75). The affective 
propensities with which her body was endowed spurred ethical potentialities that were 
subsequently ‘qualified’ through specific techniques.
During rehearsals, while Alistair, Sophie, Lucy  and Anna played their instruments, Ruth 
would hold a pen and a pad and write lyrics. By  the time Divorce had finished the song 
Ruth had also finalized the lyrics: 
I was pretty much left  to my own devices while everyone was doing the song, and I 
would sit next to everyone while they were doing it  and just think about lyrics, 
write lyrics down, think about where lyrics might  go, and sometimes I would write 
lyrics and then figure out  how to place them in the song...Nobody wrote lyrics but 
me. 
It is interesting that, while for the first three songs that were composed in Ruth’s 
absence it took her some time to add lyrics, for the subsequent ones Ruth was able to 
write all the lyrics on the spot. Ruth wrote ‘rhythmically’ and so it was easier for her 
writing to follow the actual tempo of the music and capture the dynamics of bodily 
movement in the studio. Her body, therefore, was a rhythmic tool (Lefebvre 2004). 
Having an interest in literature and poetry  also helped Ruth with her writing, as did a 
pocket thesaurus that she always carried with her in Divorce rehearsals. 
Although individual members could come up with a certain musical part that formed the 
basis for a song, Divorce compositions never sprung out of Ruth’s lyrics or song titles, 
and the band collectively decided upon the latter. Ruth’s writing reflects Foucault’s 
remark about the relationship  between writing and the ‘care of the self’ (1997: 207-222, 
232-234). Ruth was not writing about herself, but, as she had mentioned, lyrics were a 
means to learn and perfect  her writing style. The rhythmic, almost metronomic mode of 
her writing regulated this process requiring bodily  instrumentality  and the channeling of 
affect into translatable cognitive territories. According to Lefebvre the palpable qualities 
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of musical rhythm and its relation to the body, time and work, to ‘real life’, integrates 
and facilitates the ethical function of rhythms (Lefebvre 2004: 66).
Ruth’s preparation for Divorce performances involved the brief warming-up of her 
voice and also testing the microphone by checking that vocals blended well with the 
band’s instrumental sound. I had observed that just before their sets, Ruth would sit 
alone for a few minutes avoiding communication. An otherwise sociable and outgoing 
person, she nevertheless opted for a short period of isolation before the gig, during 
which she would ‘psych herself up’ for the performance by  reading through the playlist 
and the lyrics. She told me that: ‘I would probably  have a beer or two to take of the 
edge of the nerves a little bit, and then I would just be quiet...because I get so nervous’. 
This is consonant with Cohen’s remark (1991: 97-98) about  different degrees of 
drunkenness which Liverpool bands sought to achieve before going on stage. Getting 
into a state of emotional readiness to confront the audience was important, but isolation 
and alcohol consumption also represented processes of bodily, that is, ethical adaptation 
to the requirements of the performance. With regards to her actual performance, Ruth 
explained that: 
The crawling happened because I was so nervous at  our first show that I couldn’t 
deal with everyone looking at  me, so I crawled up on the floor in their feet  so that 
not as many people would be able to look at me. The evolution of me going from 
crawling to standing on stage and dancing a bit  is an evolution of my performance 
confidence-building. This is funny because most people think that it would be 
easier for me to stand on stage and sing and harder to get  out in the audience and 
roll about. But  it  was so much easier to do that  because not  everybody is watching 
me the whole time. 
But there was more than this. Despite Ruth’s perception of her performances as honest 
and authentic, over time she started feeling that her seemingly unregulated movements – 
in essence a conscious effort to discipline uncontrolled intensities – were not regarded 
by the audience as affective but as an ‘affectation of some sort’, a set of mannerisms she 
was expected to deliver. Consequently, Ruth attempted to diversify  and enrich her 
repertoire, which had the opposite effect of her becoming more restrained during 
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performances. Another reason for this shift, according to Ruth, was that occasionally 
people in the audience perceived her performance as sexually charged or even an 
invitation to interact with her outside the context of performances. During 
performances, verbal communication with the audience could also potentially  impose a 
break in Ruth’s physical and mental coordination because each song:
[W]as an emotional follow-up, so between songs I was just ready for the next 
one...It  was so intense that I wasn’t  really ready to talk to anyone because I was just 
in the zone of whatever...I just  had to keep doing that, I had to keep going until the 
end of the set.
Ruth’s only piece of equipment was a microphone. However, shouting and screaming 
were not  only physically demanding, but Ruth also felt that her vocal delivery was 
hurting her throat and her ability to sing properly. Especially  during the tours, Ruth 
avoided staying up until late drinking, and she would only allow herself one cigarette 
per day. Although she acknowledged the fact that the rest of the band would prefer to 
socialize with her after the gig, she had also realized early on that the level of physical 
punishment that consecutive performances inflicted upon her body meant that she had 
to compensate by resting after the gigs. Furthermore, singing with a sore throat could 
dramatically affect and compromise her subsequent performances. There was a time 
when the band played three gigs in three days, all in Glasgow. Halfway through the 
second show Ruth suddenly realized that: 
There were certain notes I couldn’t hit  anymore; when I tried to hit them my voice 
wouldn’t make a sound at  all, and I could do everything else except for these set 
notes that my voice had just decided that I’m not allowed...And then I had to go a 
bit  lower and the sound would come back in. After that I realized that  I’d have to 
maybe look after my throat a bit more. 
The raspy and guttural nature of Ruth’s singing was the main reason for the increasing 
deterioration of her voice, and she soon started looking for ways of diminishing the 
damage without affecting her performances. One of her friends, who also engaged in 
equally intense singing styles, had informed her about a classically-trained female 
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performer in New York called Melissa Cross that had developed a particular set of 
warm-up exercises for people who practiced shouting and screaming.107 
These exercises were called ‘the zen of screaming’ and were based upon the idea that 
through the mobilization of specific parts of the body, the sound could be produced with 
support by the diaphragm, thus releasing the tension that  tended to concentrate on the 
throat. ‘Pushing’ the sound with her diaphragm resulted in Ruth’s abdomen being in 
pain after the performance but not  her throat. Ruth would engage in the exercises at any 
point before the performance and, as long as she did not sleep in between, her voice 
stayed at the same ‘position’ ready  for singing. Ruth practiced the zen of screaming 
regularly, but after a while she would only do it occasionally, especially when her throat 
was feeling sore. 
Over time Ruth developed a strong diaphragm but also a more elaborate vocal 
repertoire. Apart from the benefits of the warm-up exercises, Ruth’s corporeal 
adaptation to the demands of her role in the band became a process of assessing, 
discovering and cultivating her singing abilities. Whereas at first she was not 
particularly aware of her voice’s limitations, later on Ruth became conversant with 
different kinds of melodies and ways of producing them, by  adding twists and adjusting 
her shouting to the circumstances relevant to each occasion. Initially, she would just 
shout as loud as possible in a fairly  natural way, but increased confidence and the 
incorporation of nuanced and diverse vocal techniques meant that what sounded to 
untrained ears like ‘growling’ was in fact singing: the outcome of hard work and 
practice that adhered to specific criteria. 
For Ruth, her vocals were ‘a weirdly internal experience’ and she had always been 
‘unsure about how to deal with this kind of tension’. I take ‘internal’ to signify an 
embodied affective capacity rather than a disembedded cognitive process. This is 
because it was internal organs that were targeted and had to be conditioned by the vocal 
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107 See http://www.melissacross.com/home.php? [Accessed 15 August 2012].
exercises. It follows that the subliminal, autonomic processes with which Ruth’s body, 
movement and voice were imbued had to be mastered, reorganized and ‘rationalized’ 
through visceral technologies that impinged upon her affective potential by ‘qualifying’ 
it. These techniques were partially predicated upon ‘sacrifices’ that Ruth had to make 
rather than a form of austerity  akin to Christian asceticism (Weber 1930), or extreme 
forms of bodily  and material renunciation (e.g. Laidlaw 1995, 2005). In this sense it was 
closer to classical forms of asceticism, in the form of ‘an exercise of the self on the self 
by which one attempts to develop and transform oneself, and to attain to a certain mode 
of being’ (Foucault 1997: 282). 
It also resembled the occupational ethic of sacrifice described by Wacquant (1998) 
whereby an instrumentalist conception of the body amongst pugilists was 
complemented by intense corporeal care to sustain its efficacy. These interrelated ideas 
and practices were not  aimed to suppress but to hone and consolidate the instrumental, 
the ‘aesthetic’ and the sacrificial/ethical bodies into a harmonious and virtuous conduct 
according to the principles of the craft. Similarly, the process of training and austerity 
that Ruth had to undergo to preserve and develop her vocal abilities was linked not to 
acts of self-renunciation, but to a bodily apprenticeship which involved the care of the 
body in accord with an ethic attuned to the needs of her singing praxis. This forged a 
specific êthos, that is ‘a way  of being and of behaviour’ (Foucault 1997: 286; see also 
Chapter 2). 
Ruth of course cared about her appearance and audience reception, therefore ‘aesthetic’ 
concerns were indeed important. But rather than ‘beautifying’ the ethical, ‘aestheticism’ 
is better understood as a transformational potential (Foucault 1997: 130) and also as a 
particular aesthesis (or aisthesis), that is, the affective/sensuous registers engaged in her 
practice as a felt experience (Mazzarella 2009: 293; Wacquant 1998: 329). As Atkinson 
notes in his ‘operatic’ ethnography, performers strive towards a bodily perfection, but 
one which – contrary to Wacquant’s pugilists – is irrelevant to both general fitness and 
‘good looks’ (2006: 56). This is not to deny  that vocal performances are intensely 
204
physical experiences. ‘The lives of the performer and the athlete’, Atkinson continues, 
‘are equally devoted to protracted periods of training and rehearsal that are preparations 
for less frequent and periodic bursts of intense activity’ (2006: 56).
It follows that a singing body is a docile body, but not in the sense of authoritarian 
control (e.g. Foucault 1977). The submission to certain bodily  conventions, rules and 
positions should neither be perceived as subordination nor as passivity, but as an 
exercise of self-determination through inhabiting norms (Mahmood 2005). Ruth’s 
practice was not predicated upon resisting or rejecting the doctrines pertinent to her 
singing style, but  upon her conscious desire to excel, cultivate and achieve a particular 
mode of bodily (ethical) capacity. 
Thus, the forms of asceticism related to this mode of self-fashioning exemplified the 
paradox of Foucault’s ‘subjectivation’: it is through the same conditions of restriction 
and subordination that individuals become aware of their agentival capacities and work 
on themselves in order to realize their subjective potentialities. ‘Docility’, therefore 
should not be conflated with the abandonment of agency but with one’s ability  to 
actively submit oneself to a training regime in order to gain the desired skills or 
knowledge. Mahmood suggests that we should go beyond the structure/agency  dualism, 
exactly  because agentival action does not necessarily involve ‘resistance’, but it further 
consists of active and diverse appropriations, expressions and performances of 
normativity (ibid.: 22; see also Chapter 6). 
Ruth was preoccupied with developing her vocal abilities and renewing her 
performance repertoire. This ethical project involved a certain number of techniques at 
the level of the visceral and the interoceptive, but the interconnectedness of voice and 
bodily  movement also conditioned the proprioceptive. Therefore, Ruth’s aesthesis of 
performance engaged an array  of sensory-motor sites and also engendered a particular 
muscle-sense and bodily motion that permeated her movement. For Potter,  kinaesthesia 
offers a sense of biological control and manipulation but also register and manage 
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bodily  change and emotional expression (2008: 451-452). As I have argued above, 
Ruth’s evolving sense of movement reflected the regulation of affect, a shift in bodily 
discipline as well as an emotional strategy. 
But this involved the rest of the band too. The gradual sharpening of her stage skills 
meant that Ruth’s seemingly uncontrolled intensity  of movement was counteracted by a 
particular stage orientation and navigation through experience that resulted in mutual 
bodily  attunement and harmonious onstage motion. Ruth’s training required a massive 
effort, a ‘docile’ body but also care about her physical well-being. Technologies of the 
self are considered as training techniques within a broader principle: ‘Take care of your 
self’ [soucie-toi de toi-même] (Foucault 1997: 285). 
Caring for oneself, though, should not be conflated with an egoistic form of self-love as 
opposed to altruistic sacrifice, but as a process that essentially  expresses care for others 
(ibid.: 227, 287-289; see also Chapter 5). The fact that I have focused on Ruth due to 
the innate corporeality  of singing by no means undermines the role of the body  in its 
relation to musical instruments. After all, corporeal instrumentality and the dynamics of 
movement are acute characteristics of instrument playing (e.g. Baily 1977; Dawe 2005). 
For Baily, ‘[a] musical instrument transduces patterns of body  movement into patterns 
of sound’ (1977: 275). Dawe argues that instruments externalize, extend and transform 
human bodies and minds in that they affect:
[S]tates of mind as much as joints, tendons and synapses, ergonomics and social 
interaction – the joy of playing musical instruments is a joy that comes from 
exhilaration felt  at the physical, emotional and social levels. The “feel” of the fret 
board of a guitar, for example, not only reflects attuning or attuned motor-spatial 
co-ordination skills when one is playing, it reflects a dexterity that  is both manual 
and sensual, cathartic and athletic (2005: 60).
The fact that Divorce members were self-taught musicians does not  preclude the 
controlled, regulated body that is required for learning an instrument or enacting music. 
Such a view would conceal the corporeal investment that goes into the process of 
music-making outside of institutions. After all, technical competence does not suggest 
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an exclusive or ideal way of corporeal engagement with musical instruments: learning 
involves participation that  requires the presence of the body  beyond technical 
proficiency  (Qureshi 2000: 808). Lack of formal tuition influenced the band’s sound. 
Alistair, for example, regarded it to enable him to avoid the conventions of formal 
playing. Consequently, he claimed that his mind accessed rhythmic combinations and 
ideas that were unconventional. These valorized musical idiosyncrasies do not 
contradict Green’s assertions about music education: 
Overall, the musicians shunned the notion of discipline in so far as it was 
associated with something unpleasant, but recognized it  in so far as it  related to the 
systematic ways in which they approached learning. The level of systematization 
seems to have become increasingly apparent  to the musicians as time went  by 
(2001: 103).
Although at the start Alistair did not consider himself a good drummer, through bodily 
practice he had become more efficient. The other members of Divorce also believed that 
playing in the band had improved their instrumental skills. Playing and learning to play 
an instrument imposed upon their respective bodies specific positions, postures, 
movements and bodily  training through which musical capacities lodged themselves 
into the flesh. As such, these corporeal practices were also ethical, insofar as they 
contributed to the constitution of embodied subjects. In music practice, therefore, the 
body emerged as an instrument of ethical becoming (see also Hirschkind 2006: 79). 
But considering that the musician’s body  is organized around or surrounded by his or 
her instrument, would it be an omission not to perceive musical instruments themselves, 
as well as Ruth’s microphone, pen and notepad, as ‘ethical materials’ of a kind (see 
Mahmood 2005: 82)? This point is reinforced by the predominance of tactile sensations 
that instrument playing invokes, among their equally compelling visual and olfactory 
elements, and the logic of ‘whatever you touch, touches you too’ (Hsu 2000: 252). In a 
way then, could we say that instruments also ‘perform’ musicians (Bates 2012), 
condition their bodies and endow them with ethical proclivities and aptitudes ? I pursue 
this matter further in Chapter 6.
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4.7 The Ethics of Etiquette
For Ruth singing was an ‘internal’ experience. However, writing lyrics and then 
passionately shouting them during performances was a form of an ‘extra-personal 
experience’ (Seremetakis 1994: 6). As I mentioned above, for the band as a whole an 
important aspect of the song-writing process was the evaluation of their compositions in 
performance during which their music could be scrutinized. In rehearsals, individual 
members focused upon playing their own parts to produce the building blocks of the 
songs. The gig, on the other hand, presented a dynamic in which each composition 
could be considered as a whole, how it sounded in space and was disseminated to the 
audience, and the ways in which the band experienced its enactment. As Anna put it: 
‘There’re so many songs that we’ve written, played live and hated or torn apart’. 
Music was one of the means by which Divorce and the audience were related. In several 
instances the band would introduce themselves or address the audience verbally. Ruth 
consistently felt  shy and unable to do this. For example, at the Newcastle gig during 
their 2010 tour Ruth passed the microphone to Alistair who briefly  introduced the band, 
while at the Leeds gig Lucy apologized to the audience for the band’s delay in getting 
on stage. Ruth recounted an incident, when she had been prompted by  a member of the 
band to ask the sound engineer for certain adjustments. After shouting and screaming in 
the last song, she switched to her normal, delicate voice in order to talk to the engineer. 
She thought that it  was exactly the discrepancy  between the two different  tones that 
rendered it funny, but this also made her appear as a totally different person. 
This relationship was reciprocal. Apart from applauding and cheering, the audience 
frequently and loudly commented upon the performance and, more often than not, they 
would ask for an encore. In Newcastle and Manchester the band did not perform 
additional songs despite the audience’s sustained applause, which can be explained by 
the fact that Divorce were supporting Comanechi, and generally it was considered 
inappropriate for a support band to do an encore. Another way in which the audience 
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expressed their appreciation was through erratic dancing, pushing and other seemingly 
spasmodic and risky bodily maneuvers often known as ‘moshing’, ‘slamdancing’, 
‘stagediving’ and ‘crowdsurfing’ (Fonarow 2006: 82-91; Tsitsos 1999). Moshing was 
quite common at Divorce gigs. Tsitsos defines it  as a form of dance ‘in which 
participants (mostly men) violently  hurl their bodies at one another in a dance area 
called a “pit”’ (1999: 397).108  The band’s music was conducive to such practice and it 
was something they expected: ‘A rowdy show is a rowdy show and I totally understand 
that’ was Lucy’s view, but she added that: 
There’s difference between dancing and maybe even shoving each other around a 
bit...[But] even if you’re drunk, if you know that there are people standing at the 
front of the stage with pints or something, you don’t  push them on top of people’s 
gear, their equipment, their guitars.
Before going on tour with Comanechi Lucy made a pedal board upon which she 
mounted all her effects pedals so that she could replug everything quickly  in case 
somebody accidentally kicked them. In Newcastle, after seeing that moshing had 
evolved in a rather disorderly situation and that there was a risk of injury  or damage, she 
took the microphone and pleaded the audience to calm down and respect the band and 
their equipment. After Lucy had urged the audience for a calmer response the situation 
still looked out of control. 
For example, I was unwillingly pushed around, had beer accidentally  poured on me, got 
squeezed, stepped on and other delights. Somebody had also trampled over and 
unplugged the microphone’s cable that Ruth was able to regain after pushing away  some 
people. Then, all of a sudden, Lucy jumped into the audience with her back facing them, 
she bent her legs and back and started walking backwards whilst playing the guitar. In 
doing so, she managed to drive the audience towards the back and nobody complained 
or reacted against this unexpected move. The performance went on as if nothing 
extraordinary had happened.
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108  Moshing emerged as a variation of slamdancing, which was a modification of the early punk ‘pogo’ 
dance (Tsitsos 1999: 405).
Bodily  discipline was thus required for the purposes of music-making and performance, 
but it  also underpinned the band’s relationship  with the audience. The body’s affective 
attachments and responses to its musical surroundings were exemplified by the way in 
which Ruth asserted herself during performance, as well as by the overall physicality  of 
the band’s correspondence with the audience. Atkinson states that a performance is 
equally ‘physical’ for audience members in the sense that  ‘to see and hear a performer 
“in the flesh” is to share in the physicality  of the enactment’ (2006: 56). The visceral 
‘exchange’ signified by Lucy’s gesture not only  aimed to protect the band but also 
highlighted and delineated physical boundaries for the event as a whole. Consider 
Anna’s words, for example: 
I like moshing, there’s nothing wrong with jumping about and friendly pushing, as 
long as you understand you don’t  want to hurt somebody else. Somebody might 
genuinely be enjoying the music, but  you still have to respect other people’s 
boundaries, especially when, say, somebody that’s small has to stand really far 
back and they don’t want to go at the front because there’s people pushing about. 
To the eyes and bodies of the uninitiated – such as myself – moshing felt ‘out of 
control’. However, as Tsitsos notes, moshing expresses a form of rebellion through 
dancing that reflects the desire ‘for ordered control’ (1999: 400). Therefore, etiquette 
was important (see also Fonarow 2006: 91). Respecting boundaries and not hurting 
others were inherent values of the practice, though sometimes the violent clash of 
bodies made it difficult to avoid minor injuries. This form of etiquette was apparent 
when fallen dancers would be immediately aided by  other moshers to stand up (Tsitsos 
1999: 406). Could we define moshing as a form of etiquette, that is, a set of manners or 
constraints imposed to individuals with regards to what is considered to be a proper 
conduct? In her examination of nineteenth-century  American etiquette manuals, Yeung 
argues that:
By contrast  to the notion of etiquette as an “artificial” external form or merely a set 
of gate-keeping rituals...manners were inextricably linked to morality and standards 
of authenticity and sincerity...I suggest that at  the heart of a seemingly external 
etiquette lies, quite simply, ethics – that is, the imperative to align principle with 
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habitual practice in bringing about, paradoxically, one’s own virtue and sincerity 
through disciplined effort (2010: 236, 243).
Although Yeung does not mention Geertz, her conviction echoes the latter’s description 
of etiquette in Java (1960: 227-260; cf. Lindquist 2004; Wikan 1990). Geertz describes 
how among the prijajis or urban elites a combination of beliefs reflected in a 
behavioural continuum ranging from refined and exquisite to rough and impolite, as 
well as a distinction between ‘inner life’ and comportment, brings about the 
circumstances of a regulated behaviour as the means to refine an individual’s emotional 
life. This is mediated by rasa or ‘etiquette-feeling’, which is considered a form of 
‘capital’ that each individual possesses. The role of rasa is to make others feel peaceful 
through the deployment of politeness, which incites a similar response that subsequently 
feeds back to the individual’s inner cosmos, thus increasing his rasa capital. 
Etiquette builds a ‘wall’ and protects one’s true emotions, but paradoxically this wall is 
built  mainly  by the effort of trying to make others feel at ease. On the one hand prijajis 
strive to cultivate and discipline ‘inner’ emotional virtues. On the other hand, etiquette 
is a form of training that helps them to outwardly  protect and defend these virtues. 
However, as an emotionally tranquilizing property, behaviour and comportment are 
inextricably linked with the inner life of individuals, while the dual sense attached to 
rasa or ‘etiquette-feeling’ suggests an alignment, a resonance and a sequence in the 
ordering of outer life and inner state. 
As such, etiquette ‘is the transfer to the level of interpersonal behavior of the calm and 
muted feeling tone of the inner life’ but also ‘an effort after order as it moves from the 
surface of human experience toward its depths, from the outer aspect of life toward the 
inner’ (Geertz 1960: 238, 242; see also Mahmood 2005). The ordering of etiquette 
allows one to turn inward and engage in emotional refinement, but these two processes 
are not kept separate and so subjective emotional cultivation depends upon the formal 
control of outward behaviour and vice versa.
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But the historical transition from sincerity to authenticity  (Trilling 1971), in other words 
from a preoccupation with appearance to one with essence, suggests that etiquette as a 
carefully  calculated demeanour obscures the transparent relationship between what one 
‘does’ and what one ‘means’, and is thus a barrier to authenticity (Yeung 2010: 241). 
With this in mind, how might we account for the fact that the external rules of conduct 
that constrain and regulate behaviour might actually  be both ethical and authentic (see 
also Conclusion)? After all, adhering to strict rules can be perceived as unethical, 
insofar as ethics involves the conscious practice of one’s freedom. 
According to Yeung, and following Geertz’s account, we could perceive etiquette as the 
means by which individuals acquire the desired virtues and characteristics incorporated 
in manners that will become ‘natural’ and ‘authentic’ through embodied practice, rather 
than define it as a merely deceptive performance of a normative order. 
As evidenced by Hirschkind (2006) and Mahmood (2005), mastering prescriptions 
through bodily training holds ‘the promise of virtuous authenticity  and authentic 
virtue’ (Yeung 2010: 244). Consequently, moshing etiquette represents a physical course 
to authenticity and an embodied, ethical conduct geared towards inducing particular 
sensibilities and dispositions. However, if we accept Tsitsos’s remark about the 
rebellious underpinnings of the dance we then are presented with another paradox, 
namely that following etiquette is also a confirmation of social order (ibid.: 246). 
This order, nonetheless, is not singular. Moshing as a form of ‘non-manners’ can best be 
described as, and captured by, the notion of ‘resistant comportment’ (Hamann 2007). 
The rejection of ‘proper’ etiquette and the dominant social order (that considers clashing 
bodies and ‘violent’ behaviour aesthetically appalling and at best  as downright 
rudeness), involves the simultaneous propagation and enactment of another order: an 
‘anti-structure’ (Turner 1969). This can be found in the comportment of moshers and 
articulates, regulates and determines behaviour in the context of similar events. 
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Notably, the rejection of the dominant social order that defines what etiquette is raises 
the question of how to determine appropriate behaviour tout court. The answer lies in 
the recognition that the appropriateness of etiquette as socially accepted behaviour is 
immanent to ongoing practice and emerges through the acting-out of the embodied 
propensities it helps to instigate. As Yeung argues, practicing rules of etiquette involves 
a good deal of unpredictability, improvisation and judgement. In principle, etiquette as a 
strict and teleological adherence to a set of guidelines is anethical and inauthentic. But 
to the extent that it stems from continuous bodily-regulated behaviour and practice and 
engenders ethical sensibilities, etiquette presents an end in itself. This is because then 
one indeed means what one does rather than doing what he or she means (Yeung 2010: 
245). Considering the above, moshing was a ‘sincere’ form of dance, a form of 
authentication through deportment and an ethical embodied practice. 
Crucially, etiquette implies a form of interaction, mutual constitution and embodiment. 
In her account of the psychosomatics of the area closer to the stage (the ‘pit’), Fonarow 
examines ‘the body  as the means to perception’ and bodily movement as ‘the conduit to 
musical appreciation’ (2006: 104). The hyper-density and intensity  of physical intimacy 
and interaction facilitate a sense of unity, community or communitas (Turner 1969) 
among audience members, but between performers and audience too. As Keil has 
shown, the expression of common problems through elaborate oral, aural, kinetic and 
visual symbolisms promotes a catharsis, a sensuous resolution that fosters solidarity 
(1966: 137). 
Turner’s communitas is an expression of our common human bond and nurtures a 
feeling of inclusiveness. The ‘anti-structure’ that it accomplishes is better conceived as 
shared ‘flow’ but one which has limitations, while these boundaries spring from within 
the flow itself rather than imposed from without (Turner 1988: 133). In this light, 
etiquette seems to play an important role in even the most shifting, ‘liminal’, betwixt-
and-between circumstances. Communitas, however, just  like etiquette, is conditional 
and does not guarantee that everyone present will enter its realm. Musical performance 
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thus represents a tendency, a shared and mutually  sensed affect and a capacity  to enter a 
reciprocal ethical becoming. DeChaine calls it a ‘project’: ‘[A]n opportunity  for 
reflection; a potential for change; a becoming; an instructive, collaborative energy that 
we breathe (or scream) into each other’s ear. In the space of musical experience, we 
foment transformation’ (2002: 95).
4.8 Noise Interference
During the 2010 tour, and after the Manchester gig had come to an end, Ruth and Lucy 
each announced that they were leaving the band. Their exact reasons were unknown to 
me at the time and had not been made public. Later on, however, I had the opportunity 
to talk with both Ruth and Lucy about their departures.109  Ruth’s energy depletion and 
time constraints stemming from her studies had resulted in a tension that was amplified 
during the physically  demanding tours, which involved successive intense performances 
and relative lack of sleep. One repercussion of this was her gradual lack of active bodily 
engagement with the music. ‘After a while’, Ruth told me, ‘I felt like I was going 
through the motions’. But she also added: ‘It’s physical, emotional, and mental 
investment to be in a band that’s doing that much’. 
Lucy  on the other hand believed that the ‘camaraderie’ had gradually  dissolved, and 
thus the reason for her participation in the band ceased to exist. According to Lucy this 
had deprived Divorce from the pleasure of making music together. She had seen that 
last tour as an opportunity  to try  and remedy these problems. However, the situation had 
not improved and this was a signifier to Lucy that  the band was falling apart and that 
her time in it had run out. For Lucy, ‘people that are playing music in bands are just 
people, they’re human beings, and sometimes it’s really easy to forget that about each 
other’. She explained that the shifting dynamic of the band had affected her ability to 
function and make music.
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109 Divorce have not disbanded. A few months later they recruited a new vocalist, Jan,  an American GSA 
student. Anna remained the only guitarist in the band.
Band dynamics have been scrutinized in various ethnographic accounts (e.g. Cohen 
1991; Bennett  1980). However, the systematic and almost mechanical connotations of 
the bands’ ‘functioning’ tend to valorize band dynamics as a process of social exchange 
and interaction based upon personal aspirations, social conventions or economic 
constraints. However, music’s importance is neither grounded in cognitive processes nor 
in its social function. Music is equally, if not mainly, compelling due to its physicality. 
The bodily responses and affective qualities associated with the band’s music had a 
profound effect on members of Divorce as well as audiences: the multi-sensory stimuli 
elicited by onstage physical movement, the visual imagery that accompanied their 
releases, tour posters and, sometimes, performances, the tactile and kinetic elements of 
instrument playing and dancing, ‘heat’, as well as the visceral gravity of the sound, were 
all major affective impingements on the band’s continuous engagement in music-
making. In short, the band loved playing music, making and manipulating sounds, 
which were sources of profound pleasure or ‘fun’ (Cohen 1991: 190). This ‘fun’ aspect 
celebrated bodily  expressiveness and sensuality rather than a form of detached 
reflection on musical ‘meaning’ (see also Verkaaik 2004). 
The meaning felt by Divorce’s music did not reside in music per se, that is in pure 
sound. Music does not exist  in a vacuum but dwells in the affective attachments it 
creates between individuals, spaces and materials. ‘Sound’ was insufficient to keep the 
band together. ‘Composition’, writes Jaques Attali in Noise, is ‘participation in 
collective play’ and ‘an ongoing quest for new, immediate communication, without 
ritual and always unstable’, during which the individual discovers ‘his own body and 
potentials’ (1985: 135, 141). When this quest  ceased to be plentiful, when the ordinary 
affects of ‘something coming together’ stopped setting in motion this potential (Stewart 
2007: 2), music became meaningless. The harmony of collective music-making could 
not be replaced by  musical harmony  as such. It is evident though that, as a sensuous 
stimulus, sound unleashes impulses that  cannot be disentangled from a plurosensory 
215
environment in which visceral responsiveness depends upon audition as a visual, tactile 
and kinaesthetic construal (see also Hirschkind 2006: 101). 
Joining my voice with anthropological approaches to the senses, I hope to have shown 
empirically  that the dominance of visualism in the ‘West’ is in practice a fiction, alas its 
hegemony still persists and normally dismisses the suggestions regarding the cardinal 
importance of other senses as forms of ‘exoticization’ (Howes 2003: 51). Conversely, 
while I endorse Hirschkind’s succinct  argument about active listening that  has 
historically escaped scholarly vistas, my  ethnographic findings do not call for an 
‘acoustemology’ or a ‘sounded anthropology’ nor for the privileging of one sense (out 
of how many?) over the others but, as I noted above and as Hirschkind demonstrates, 
for attention to the sensuous interplay that sonic landscapes in everyday  life demand and 
amplify.
The ethnographic example of Divorce and their relationships with their audiences, 
equipment and themselves show that affective intensities as undiluted potentials are not 
‘things’ transmitted between bodies, but exactly the opposite: it  is embodied subjects 
that circulate through the medium of affect, which engenders and enables their self-
fashioning and the constitution of particular forms of social relations (Richard & 
Rudnyckyj 2009). While affect is not  an epiphenomenon of action, but rather one of its 
integral and structuring components, it still retains its indeterminacy and its potential as 
capacity or tendency. 
The formation of and the ‘dynamic’ within a band or the sense of communitas in 
performance are molded by affective conditions, but both, as we have seen, retain their 
contingency. Thus, it is the propelling intensities of affect that shape bands without 
foreclosing their potential and not bands giving rise to (affective) music. Adapting 
William James’s famous formulation (1884: 190), we could argue that we are compelled 
to make music because we make music in a way that brings plenitude and satisfaction. 
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However, the deployment, refinement and extension of these affective traces belong to 
the dimension of the ethical.
As I have attempted to illustrate in this chapter these affective properties are not 
intrinsic to individuals, themselves sovereign subjects, but to relational processes of 
self-cultivation and formation: the care of the self. Music practice supports the 
conviction that we must understand ethics not as an abstract and universal set of moral 
dicta, but instead observe them in actions of self-formation in which different ethical 
subjects require the cultivation of different bodily capacities. As such, bodies are not 
mere reflections of social, cultural or ethical norms but are palpable examples of how 
different corporeal practices forge and enact different ethical subjects (Mahmood 2005: 
139).
It is evident that what we call ‘affect’ dramatically impacts upon the formation of 
particular bodily dispositions and therefore ethical sensibilities. But ethical becoming 
adheres to conscious practices and work that actors put into transforming themselves 
into ethical subjects. Affects as autonomic visceral responses cannot deliver the 
complexities and nuances of action, any more than the autonomous cogito can account 
for the intersubjective nature of ethics. In embracing the ‘visceral habits of 
perception’ (Connolly 2002: 46), we should underscore, with Leys (2011), that an 
inherently  organic view of affect not only undermines the role of intentionality and 
reason, but such physiological-autonomic registers depend upon a sharp  mind-body 
dichotomy. By privileging the corporeality of action, Massumi and other affect theorists 
conceive of the mind as disembodied consciousness, thus risking a biological 
essentialism that reinforces rather than counters the spectre of Cartesian dualism (see 
Papoulias & Callard 2010).
Rather than pondering on the ‘meaning’ of affect, I have chosen to focus on the body  as 
an affective locus with which to highlight  the conjunctions between body and mind, 
affect and cognition, in the emergence of ethical subjects. Instead of engaging in a futile 
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attempt to explicate music’s irrationality  or falling into a neo-vitalist  ‘illusion’ of 
unmediated experience (Mazzarella 2009: 303), I opted to ground my analysis in the 
movement from affective immanence to conscious ethical action, in the ‘resonance’ or 
the ‘feedback’, that is the distance between affective sensation, perception and relational 
ethical action. I hold that this is something that can be accomplished and described 
ethnographically, and this is what I have attempted to do, however partially, above. 
Because the body is never a tabula rasa, and taking into account the empirical 
impossibility  of ‘catching’ these past traces, we could explain, following Bergson, ‘not 
how perception arises, but how it is limited’ (1988 [1896]: 40), how it is ‘qualified’, 
channeled and routinized through technologies of ethical formation. The fecundity of 
affect lies in its potential to open up ways of studying how and, crucially, why particular 
ethical orientations and bodily dispositions emerge through the linkages of affective 
regimes, sensory-motor capacities, cultural mediations and ethical work. Hirschkind’s 
ethnography is exemplary in that respect. ‘An agile body was to a flexible mind as 
comportment was to character’, writes Geurts for the Anlo (2005: 171). Affects are not 
opposed to reason, and the somatic works in relation to the psychological to give rise to 
the ethical. The primacy of one over the other obscures our endless and simultaneous 
movement between immanence and qualification, as well as the reciprocality and 
relationality of our bodies and psyches in our quest for an ethical life.
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Chapter 5: Cry Parrot
5.1 I Just Want to Be Ethical
If corporeal instrumentality is central to ethical self-formation through music practice, 
then how can we grasp  from an ethical standpoint the music practices that do not 
directly  engage the body? More specifically, how do we approach ethically the 
‘musicking’ (Small 1998) of non-musicians? This chapter discusses the practices of Cry 
Parrot (hereafter CP), a local DiY music promoter.110  While in the previous two 
chapters I focused upon the participatory and bodily aspects of music-making and their 
respective significances in urban life and ethical becoming, here I turn from forms of 
music sharing to promotional practices and from affect to judgement.
As will become apparent, although CP had benefitted from the intermittent presence of 
various individuals, it was mainly under the creative control of one person, Stuart. As 
such, my discussion revolves around Stuart’s promotional techniques and the 
consideration of the practical judgements that informed and shaped his conduct. But 
how were Stuart’s promotional practices different from the tactics of WSP? According 
to Colin:
It’s a whole different thing really. It used to be more blurry, but over the last year 
it’s become more clear. I guess he’s an independent promoter who puts on bands, 
whereas we’ve still got a little bit of this DiY hangup...I don’t see why he’s the 
only guy that isn’t a getting a cut, if that’s the case, when you have these big gigs 
and Monorail are selling tickets and they’re making money off that, and the bands 
are making a career out  of touring, and then, you know, the venue is getting their 
bar cut and everyone is getting paid...I mean, I think for him it’s like a network and 
he obviously likes music as well, but it doesn’t totally seem a fair set-up to me.
Thus, CP and WSP were different, but the extent to which this difference was translated 
in Stuart’s wholesale conversion remains to be seen. In my effort to account for the 
ethical modalities of his judgements and actions pertinent  to this shift, I follow 
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110  On the role of promoters in live music, see Brennan and Webster (2011), Frith et al (2013) and 
Webster (2011).
Faubion’s Anthropology of Ethics (2011). Faubion’s framework takes as its starting 
point Foucault’s writings on ethics. Foucault’s model has not been taken as a blueprint 
for the study of ethical conduct – and rightly so (Mahmood 2005: 30). What Faubion’s 
book does is undertake a painstaking reformulation of Foucault’s parameters of the 
ethical field, thus providing important revisions.111
In the second volume of the History of Sexuality, Foucault identifies four elements in 
the ways in which subjects conduct themselves in relation to ‘rules’ or moral codes: the 
‘determination of the ethical substance’ [substance éthique], that is, ‘the way in which 
the individual has to constitute this or that part of himself as the prime material of his 
moral conduct’ vis-à-vis the moral code (1985: 26). The different ways in which 
individuals relate to moral precepts further point to the ‘mode of subjection’ [mode 
d’assujettissement]: ‘the way in which the individual establishes his relation to the rule 
and recognizes himself as obliged to put it into practice’ (ibid.: 27).112 
The third parameter involves the forms of ‘elaboration or ethical work’ [travail éthique] 
that ‘one performs on oneself’ in order ‘to attempt to transform oneself into the ethical 
subject of one’s behavior’ and ‘not only in order to bring one’s conduct into compliance 
with a given rule’ (ibid.). The final characteristic is the telos of ethical conduct: the 
accomplishment and establishment ‘of a moral conduct  that commits an individual’ 
primarily  ‘to a certain mode of being, a mode of being characteristic of the ethical 
subject’, rather than ‘only to other actions always in conformity with values and 
rules’ (ibid.: 28). All four parameters involve one’s relationship with oneself. This is:
[N]ot  simply “self-awareness” but self-formation as an “ethical subject”, a process 
in which the individual delimits that  part of himself that will form the object of his 
moral practice, defines his position relative to the precept he will follow, and 
decides on a certain mode of being that  will serve as his moral goal. And this 
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111 Faubion also draws heavily on the work of other figures, such as Max Weber and Niklas Luhmann.
112  ‘Subjectivation’  is a better translation. Insofar as ‘subjection’ and ‘subjugation’ signify authoritarian 
imposition and total lack of freedom or self-determination, they fall outside the ethical domain (Faubion 
2011: 45, 49). For Foucault, ‘a slave has no ethics’ (1997: 286).
requires him to act upon himself, to monitor, test, improve, and transform himself 
(Foucault 1985: 28).
Foucault’s ethical apparatus was not  completed and thus exhibits limitations that  invite 
adjustments. Foucault’s subsequent lectures (2005) attest that he was preoccupied with 
parrhêsia, the reflexive practice of truth-telling. This specificity of Foucault’s approach, 
Faubion explains, fails to formally register ‘ethical complexity’, that is, the possibility 
of actors striving towards multiple ethical goals, and the ways in which different 
subjects (not necessarily  ‘individuals’) relate to one another. With this in mind, 
Foucault’s mode of subjectivation refers to the ways in which subjects relate to moral 
codes or rules, but does not acknowledge that these variegated deontological 
possibilities may also include ethical exemplars (see e.g. Humphrey 1997), ideals or 
‘role models’ that compel subjects to undertake ethical work beyond duty. Foucault’s 
construal of ethics retains an ancient Greek personalism and disregards the ethical 
centrality of exemplars. 
An important consequence of this is that his analytical evaluation of ethics does not 
adequately elucidate the intrinsic role of the ethical ‘other’, especially in the form of the 
ethical pedagogue: someone who provides an ethical example, and not in the narrow 
sense of an ‘instructor’. In the previous chapter, I mentioned that, for Foucault, the care 
of the self always involves others. Faubion has shown elsewhere (2001a) that  Foucault’s 
quasi-Aristotelian rendering of ethics has an essential pedagogical element to it. Ethics 
must be taught. Contrary to Aristotle’s conception of ethics as praxis, Foucault 
perceives ethical becoming as a process of poiêsis – as ‘self-making’ and not merely as 
homeostatic replication or ‘doing’. This ultimately engenders a certain analytical 
asymmetry by  overemphasizing one’s capacity  for self-determination over pedagogy 
and the subject’s adherence to the ‘rule’. A final lacuna detected by  Faubion concerns 
the decisive role of ethical judgements in shaping the subject’s ethical telos, a capacity 
that is not formally addressed in Foucault’s work. 
For Faubion, the ethical domain can be described in two different ways:
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One: it  is a domain of the development of one or another competent and conscious 
exercise of the practice of freedom. Another: it  is a domain of the development of 
the potential occupant  into the actual occupant of a subject  position in and from 
which the conscious practice of freedom is exercised...The subject position – or 
subject, more briefly put  – is always socially, culturally and historically specific 
(2011: 36).
Faubion embraces Foucault’s parameters of ethical substance and telos, while he 
acknowledges the importance of ethical work or askêsis, epitomized by the technologies 
of the self. The latter’s particular importance lies in the subject’s capacity of self-
intervention or ‘autopoiesis’: ‘[T]he self’s production of itself’ (ibid.: 5). Technologies 
of the self are reflexive and, frequently, self-reflexive instruments but, due to the 
intrinsically pedagogical nature of the ethical domain, they  could also be effected with 
‘the help of others’ (Foucault 1997: 225, but see ibid.: 177). The decisive role of the 
pedagogue is primarily manifested in Foucault’s final parameter, specifically in how the 
trainee’s mode of subjectivation is determined. Foucault’s second and slightly  altered 
definition of the mode of subjectivation as ‘the way in which people are invited or 
incited to recognize their moral obligations’ (ibid.: 264), attests to the fact that ‘ethical 
practice proceeds after all in the middle voice, actively and passively often at one and 
the same time’ (Faubion 2011: 50) 
The mode of subjectivation has, according to Faubion, two additional facets: the process 
of recruitment to, and selection of, a subject position and, second, that position’s scope, 
structure and priority. The former highlights the ascriptive and self-appointed blend of a 
subject’s ethical positioning and that the (self-)assignation of such a position is usually  a 
long-term process involving personal choice and training vis-á-vis pedagogical 
supervision and instruction. The latter alludes to the ethical complexity  of any given 
subject position. 
Faubion formally restores the cardinal importance of judgement by adding to these four 
parameters the mode of ethical judgement. This provides insight into how subjects 
problematize rather than blindly follow the ‘rule’, affords the recognition of the 
existence of heterogeneous normativities, and gives credence to Foucault’s intuition that 
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ethical subject and ethical discourse are not independent but interdependent (Faubion 
2011: 69-70). This last parameter can be broken down to the mode of ethical valuation, 
which concerns the establishment of ethical criteria and accordingly the decision of who 
or what is the subject of ethical regard; and to the mode of ethical justification that 
includes the discursive formations whereby ethical orientation towards practice is 
determined. That the subject’s ethical subjectivation is mediated by the mode of 
judgement suggests that subjects may often exhibit behaviour that  is simultaneously 
ethical and ‘immoral’ (Stafford 2010: 188).
One of the indispensable features of the framework proposed by Faubion is the 
grounding of ethics within the intersubjective, without falling into the Durkhemian 
‘social’. As I mentioned in Chapter 2, in Faubion’s schema the ethical encompasses the 
moral or the ‘themitical’.113  Faubion acknowledges that his ‘diagnostics’ for An 
Anthropology of Ethics is one among many  (2011: 13). However, I hope that the ways in 
which his adjustments to Foucault’s model are relevant to my own work are becoming 
apparent. 
In what follows, I attempt to demonstrate ethnographically  the ethical nature of Stuart’s 
involvement in live music promotion, the concrete practices associated with the process 
of hosting bands, as well as the ideas and values that informed his modus operandi. In 
doing so, I trace a gradual conversion from a DiY mode of conduct to what could be 
labelled ‘independent promotion’. By delving into promotional practices, negotiations 
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113  After the Greek themitos: ‘[A]llowed by the laws of the gods and of men, righteous’ (Faubion 2011: 
24). With this distinction Faubion registers ‘a series of cognitive, affective, semiotic, pragmatic and 
structural differences between the more ecological and dynamic [ethical] and the more homeostatic and 
reproductive [themitical] aspects of ethical autopoiesis – the becoming and maintenance of the ethical 
subject...The themitical dimension of the ethical field is hardly without its own dynamics, but they belong 
largely to the order of the reproduction of what at any particular place and point in time constitutes the 
regnant normative order,  though in its normativity an order that may include values, ideals and exemplars 
as well as imperatives...The broader ethical field to which the themitical is internal must always also have 
one foot at least in the dynamics of production, of becoming, indeed of self-becoming...The themitical [is] 
less mutable. It partakes of whatever longevity the autopoietic system of whose normativity it is the 
valorization can boast. [We should not] mistake the normativity...for the themitical itself....[E]thical value 
and themitical normativity stand in a weakly dialectical relationship to one another...[H]owever 
inextricable their relation may be, the ethical retains a certain priority over the themitical (ibid.: 20,  24, 
114).
and judgements, I demonstrate both the centrality  of such processes to the successful 
organization of music events and their resonance to Stuart’s ethical conditioning. 
❊❊❊❊❊❊
To put it another way, this chapter provides an account of Stuart’s ethical subjectivation. 
The events and processes pertinent to his ethical recruitment and selection and their 
attendant pedagogical and subjective dimensions will be made explicit. Following the 
discussion of the constitution of Stuart’s mode of subjectivation is a consideration of the 
various exercises or askêseis, both pedagogical and reflexive, that Stuart had undertaken 
in his effort  to become the occupant of a subject position. Thinking and conversing were 
two exercises that problematized his promotional routines and gradually  led to a shift in 
his practice. This shift  was initiated by a specific event. Not only did this event trigger a 
form of ethical questioning regarding his conduct, but eventually resulted in the 
expansion of Stuart’s subject  position. Exercising judgement was crucial to this process. 
Finally, I will discuss Stuart’s ethical complexity, that is, the scope, structure and 
priority of his subject position, before proceeding to the examination of his ethical telos 
and substance. The point here is to address ethics in a manner that is intrinsically 
ethnographic. Hence, what precedes the consideration of the parameters of Stuart’s 
ethics is an ethnographic account of two music events that  empirically exemplify his 
conversion.
5.2 From Rags to Riches
During our interview in the West End Stuart invited me to a CP event that would take 
place the following evening. I arrived at the Glasgow Central train station after my 
interview with Eileen from Synergy Concerts in Rosebank (near Motherwell). It was 
already late and I still had no idea where ‘Mitchell’s’, the venue for the night’s gig, was 
situated. No address was provided by Stuart on the CP website.114 I called Stuart on his 
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114 http://cryparrot.co.uk/ [Accessed 21 March 2013].
mobile phone but he did not pick up. As I was walking along Sauchiehall Street  I asked 
various people about the location of the venue, including members of staff at nearby 
restaurants and bars. Idlewild were playing at the ABC that night, so there were a lot of 
people queueing outside. 
I was wandering around the GSA area off Sauchiehall Street  when I met two young men 
who advised me to walk towards the Mitchell Library which was right next to the 
venue, on North Street. I walked all the way down Sauchiehall Street past 
Nice‘n’Sleazy  and reached the motorway. I was now standing outside the library but 
there was no sign of the venue. I called Stuart once more but  to no avail. It  was my first 
CP event and it seemed that I would miss it. I was ready to head back to Queen Street 
train station, when my phone rang: it was Stuart. I hung up and called him back straight 
away and while I was doing so I spotted him across the street. The venue was a few 
yards away from the library.
Mitchell’s was a small pub that had previously been called the Ivy  Bar (see also Chapter 
3). Stuart explained that Mitchell’s was free to hire for live music performances but, 
since a sound system was not installed, appropriate equipment had to be carried to the 
venue in order to set  it up for a gig. When we arrived, there was loud music pouring out 
of the main entrance. A karaoke session was scheduled for but the pub was yet to 
become busy. The clientele were mainly  middle-aged. The venue was spread over two 
floors, meaning that the gig would take place downstairs at a small basement area, 
which I estimated that it had a capacity of forty people at best.  As I entered, on the right 
there were musical instruments and other pieces of equipment placed on the ground, 
including two drum kits, guitar amplifiers, a vintage wooden case containing effects 
pedals, as well as a table on which Stuart had placed his laptop and a plastic cup full of 
change. Occupying half of the basement’s space, the music equipment also served as the 
only visual boundary between the ‘stage’ and the area designated for the audience. On 
the left there was a small corner bar surrounded by a handful of high stools.
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Stuart introduced me to the three people in the main area: Eliot, Quack Quack’s 
drummer; Stephen, who played the guitar in Sexy Entourage;115  and Barry  (see also 
Chapter 3). Barry told me that he had ‘nothing to do with tonight’s gig’ but added that 
he had lent his guitar amplifier to the bands, pointing towards a medium-sized dark blue 
Fender. He would later go to Stereo to attend a monthly club night called Harsh 70’s 
Reality in which Moon Unit would perform.116  Moon Unit was Sexy Entourage 
drummer Craig’s second band. He had arrived in the meantime. Stuart had brought a 
large plastic food container filled with pasta. He had cooked for the bands, while 
members of Quack Quack  would sleep in one of Stuart  friends’ flat tonight. While I was 
chatting with Barry, Stuart was trying to connect the sound mixer and the main speakers 
to his laptop. He was sorting out the cables in his effort  to play some background music 
before the event kicked off, but eventually he decided to use his laptop  speakers because 
changing the set-up was seemingly complex and time-consuming.
It was just after 9pm, the event’s scheduled start time, but there were no more than 
fifteen people in the venue – including band members. Barry placed the cover charge 
for the night (£3) in the plastic cup and I did the same. Stuart  had welcomed everyone in 
a friendly manner and the atmosphere felt quite intimate and relaxed. Most of the people 
arriving at the venue seemed to already be familiar with each other. They introduced 
themselves to those with whom they were unacquainted, such as myself. A young man 
named Chris joined Barry and myself and he turned out to be one of the members of the 
Nuts and Seeds music collective (Chapter 1) and the band Dananananaykroyd [sic]. 
Stuart looked a little disappointed at the low turnout, which, according to him was due 
to the Idlewild gig, as well as another one taking place on the same night. However, by 
the time Sexy Entourage were ready to begin their set more than thirty people were in 
the audience and the basement was packed. ‘Every time it’s like this, you don’t know 
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115 The event’s line-up consisted of these two bands. Quack Quack were a band from Leeds that retained 
close ties with the DiY network in Glasgow.
116 The night, which proved to be short-lived, was named after the fourth LP of the Dead C, a band from 
New Zealand.
what will happen in the end’, Stuart told me. After the bands’ brief sets, I left  Mitchell’s 
with a feeling that I had been to a friendly musical gathering rather than what could be 
termed as a ‘gig’.
Stuart kept on hosting such small and intimate gigs but overtime both the musical scope 
and the presentation of his events evolved and diversified considerably. Almost a year 
after that evening at  Mitchell’s, John Maus, a North American musician, was touring the 
UK, and Stuart had booked him for a Glasgow event at Mono, which he was expecting 
to sell out. I had reserved my ticket online weeks in advance because if a show sold out 
there were no exceptions to be made. When I arrived at Mono, people were standing 
outside, including Nigel and his dog, and I noticed a board stand with a poster 
advertising tonight’s event.117  Inside the venue there was a table on the left with John 
Maus’s merchandise, among which a white t-shirt with a black John Maus figure 
singing and a logo underneath saying ‘I saw John Maus Live!’, as well as his second 
album release on vinyl and the first one on CD. There was also a vinyl record for sale 
by Plug, who would also perform that  night.118  The show was to be opened by 
Cameron, who was performing solo as Remember Remember (see also Chapter 4). On 
the right, there was a wooden platform that was normally used as a stage.
Tom from Crasier Frane was sitting behind the table along with Alan, who occasionally 
helped Stuart with the gigs.119  I showed them the booking reference number by the 
online ticket retailer and received a red ‘CP’ marker on my right wrist. Stuart, who was 
standing nearby, expressed his excitement about the gig and stated that he had made a 
substantial effort to promote it  by printing and distributing a hundred A8 posters across 
the city  and constantly updating CP online social media. This was understandable 
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117  Nigel, a Mono regular, was a highly sociable man in his seventies who would regularly attend music 
events taking place in the venue.
118  Both John Maus and Plug released music on Upset the Rhythm, a London-based music collective, 
promoter and label. Stuart regarded them as ‘the point of reference for DiY in the UK’.  For their 
‘statement of intent’, see http://www.upsettherhythm.co.uk/about.shtml [Accessed 23 January 2013].
119  Crasier Frane was a local online (and occasionally printed) music fanzine. See http://
www.crasierfrane.com/ [Accessed 23 January 2013].
considering that John Maus was one of Stuart’s favourite acts. He also commented upon 
the t-shirt and the fact  that it  looked ‘a bit cheesy, but then’, he added, ‘it is good cheese 
and it  only costs £5’. I asked him what time Cameron would go on stage and after 
consulting his watch Stuart replied that he would start ‘in 7 minutes’. 
I walked around the venue to find a place to sit, but  the sitting area behind the 
merchandise table was already  full. Mono had almost  reached capacity and only the 
open area in front of the small stage was unoccupied. The bar, opposite the stage, was 
also busy with people queuing for drinks. Therefore, I decided to go and stand next to 
the fermentation tanks along the wall, which meant that I would be close to the stage.120 
I could see Stacy and Cameron standing at the bar and Cameron’s equipment was 
already set up on the stage. Cameron’s set lasted half an hour and the audience seemed 
to have enjoyed Remember Remember’s performance despite that they  were standing 
away from the stage.121  I was chatting with Stacy and Cameron outside when Alistair 
arrived. We started talking about the Divorce gig the following evening at the GSA and 
Alistair informed us that there would be a guest list. In fact, Eileen from Synergy, who 
promoted the gig, had allowed the band to add to the list as many  ‘guesties’ as they 
pleased. 
Back inside, I bumped into Colin from WSP at the bar. He was anticipating the gig with 
excitement and we started speculating about John Maus’s performance. He then 
suddenly changed the topic and showed me a box on the bar containing purple poppy 
pins that were produced and sold in order to honour the animals killed during wartime, 
a move that was consonant with the vegan ethic of the venue. As I was talking to Colin I 
also saw Graham passing by. Although a few months earlier he had been employed by a 
well-known local music promoter – something which had led to the termination of his 
collaboration with Stuart – he would still attend most CP events. 
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120 Mono also produced its own drinks including organic lemonade, ginger beer and ale.
121  Audiences would regularly stand around the front side of the stage, thus forming what is locally 
known as the ‘Glasgow horseshoe’.
Tonight there were no technical issues or delays and Stuart  seemed happy and relaxed. 
The area next to me was full of people coming closer and closer to the stage, including 
two photographers. After Plug’s set and John Maus’s dramatized performance the lights 
and music went back on to signal that the gig was over. From what I could see the t-
shirt proved quite popular and many people were holding them up checking their size. 
As I was leaving Mono, Stuart was standing right outside the entrance saying goodbye 
to each one of us. He was holding a pile of flyers that advertised music events organized 
by Bryony from Tracer Trails who was standing on the opposite side of the door, also 
giving away flyers.122  I asked Stuart whether I could take the poster from the board 
stand and he agreed. 
5.3 Junior Nuts and Seeds
I initially met Stuart through Alistair who had also put me in touch with WSP (Chapter 
3). What has been given: a Motherwell native, Stuart was still residing there at the time 
of my fieldwork along with the rest of his family  and he would commute to Glasgow by 
train. In his early  twenties, he was a good-natured and instantly  likeable person. The 
‘given’ encompasses several other more specific modalities according to Faubion and of 
which an individual might be conscious or unconscious. For that reason, and depending 
on the individual’s capacity  to embrace or reject such ‘given’ conditions, the distinction 
between what is given and what is contingent is not absolute (2011: 124-126).
Education provides a good example of this. As a process of acquisition of or 
endowment with a specific habitus, it can be seen as a modality of the given. However, 
as Bourdieu himself shows (1984: 135), education – at least  in its latter phases – cannot 
be said to belong strictly to the ‘unconscious’. After all, as a gradual process of 
acquisition, education is not a case of instantaneous ascription but instead corresponds 
with a domain of future possibilities. For example, when I started my research Stuart 
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122 Bryony was a music promoter who organized events in both Edinburgh and Glasgow. She occasionally 
collaborated with Stuart (see below).
was still doing a degree in TV and Film Studies at the University of Glasgow. Shortly 
after his graduation in June 2010 the Department for Culture, Media and Sport (DCMS) 
announced its plans to abolish the UK Film Council, a decision that had left Stuart 
wondering about the usefulness of his degree, as well as his employability: ‘I have a 
better CV in event management’ he told me, characteristically hinting at his 
accumulated practical experience. 
During his university years Stuart had a job at the supermarket chain Morrison’s. More 
recently, he had started DJing in bars and music venues, mainly in Captain’s Rest and 
Nice‘n’Sleazy. He would also ‘guest DJ’ in venues such as the Flying Duck. Despite 
what one might expect, Stuart was not a musician. Stuart continued his DJing activities 
after graduation and at the end of that summer he took up a six-month internship at the 
Centre of Contemporary  Arts (CCA). In October he became the music programmer for 
Nice‘n’Sleazy  and a few months later, after his internship had finished, he took over the 
schedule for the venue’s club nights as well. While the CCA internship required him to 
work in the Centre from 10am-6pm on weekdays, the job at Nice‘n’Sleazy  was quite 
flexible and allowed Stuart to work remotely from the comfort of his home.
Stuart’s education and work experience exemplify how ‘the given’ folds into the 
contingent, as well as illustrating the complex process of recruitment to (and selection 
of) a subject position. An ethical role rarely  involves only direct ascription or personal 
achievement. Instead, the mode of determination of ethical subjectivation is always a 
mixture of both. Subject positions necessitate the ethical conditioning of the subject 
around deontological axes, but also through his or her living up to specific exemplars, 
values and ideals encapsulated by ethical pedagogues. Because of their distinctive 
ethical standing, such figures usually operate as recruiters. 
Stuart had two such recruiters: one was Nuts and Seeds (NaS). Stuart praised their 
practice, which involved a substantial amount of care towards the bands they catered 
for. Stuart followed their steps closely and as NaS decided to cease their activities he 
230
inherited the ‘chrism’, becoming ‘junior NaS’. This is how several individuals initially 
referred to CP. The demise of NaS had inflicted a blow on the local DiY stream of 
activity, a situation which CP and to a lesser extent  WSP were striving to remedy. In 
other words, Stuart was working towards the occupation of that subject position, yet not 
precisely as we shall see. 
Stuart was also inspired by  local club promoters and music collective LuckyMe, who 
exhibited various characteristics that Stuart sought to implement in CP, such as 
memorabilia, a party  atmosphere, as well as a forward-looking and expansive outlook. 
It was clear, as the second ethnographic example attests, that there was an underlying 
preoccupation with quality  in Stuart’s promotional practices (see also below). One 
tangible example was CP posters, which in the local scheme of things were among the 
best designed. Even established promoters with substantial revenue did not invest as 
much time and effort in making their posters more than a carrier of the necessary 
information. 
Stuart believed that the main reason for the recent resurgence and persistence of DiY 
music in Glasgow was a common dissatisfaction with local promotion companies and 
their practices. This dissatisfaction largely stemmed from the notorious ‘pay-to-play’ 
policy (Introduction & Chapter 6). Therefore, Stuart’s recruitment was fueled by 
positive examples on the one hand and by an example to be avoided on the other. This 
calls for a consideration of the process of ascription not only as an externally imposed 
condition, but additionally  as a process of self-appointment and a matter of considered 
choice that  is opposed to the qualities of those considered to be ethically  abject 
(Faubion 2011: 61-62).
A fourth mode of recruitment was the name under which Stuart  organized music events. 
In the same manner that ‘junior NaS’ ascribed him to a particular subject position, the 
name chosen for his promotional activities bore ethical weight. As I have shown in 
Chapter 3, names and their primary signifiers have more than a contingent relationship. 
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It will become apparent that, contrary to the attitude of WSP towards their institutional 
name, Stuart valued the Cry Parrot brand. However, names (or labels, see below) do 
not overdetermine the content, which oscillates between the ‘tyranny of the name’ and 
self-determination. As such, they count ‘simply as one type of recruitment, and a type of 
uncertain outcome’ (Faubion 2011: 159). Stuart said that: 
I can’t  remember what  it was named after, and it  was just  kind of a crazy name. I 
look back and I guess people remember it. I’ve kept it on and I guess it’s got almost 
a humourous, colourful aspect  about it, it’s not  cold...I think it’s just an unusual 
thing to name altogether. And in a way I’m kind of glad about  it. I think it  is a 
ridiculous name and genuinely makes no sense.
It was actually Blake, Stuart’s high-school friend who named Cry Parrot. The idea of 
forming CP, then, goes back to when Stuart was in high school. Stuart  and Blake were 
discussing the possibility of organizing gigs, but it was only in university  that they 
managed to put their ideas into practice. Although Stuart initially considered it a joint 
project, he later felt that Blake was not as committed and determined as he was, thus 
Stuart ended up running CP on his own two years after launching it. 
Shortly after Blake’s departure, Stuart recruited Graham and this is how CP was set up 
when I began my fieldwork. The first  time I met Stuart he presented CP to me as a joint 
effort between Graham and himself. Catherine, Stuart’s girlfriend at the time, would 
contribute to the production of posters and flyers, as well as offering support during 
gigs. In October 2010, Graham left CP in order to take up a job with a well-known local 
promoter, from which time he was not allowed to take part in CP activities due to a 
perceived conflict  of interest. Just a few months earlier Aidan had stepped in, and went 
on to become Stuart’s ‘right hand man’. He remained in this position for almost a year, 
but he eventually had to leave due to his other commitments, such as running the 
University  of Glasgow’s Subcity Radio, where Anna from Divorce also hosted a show. 
In the meantime, Stuart and Catherine had broken up. By the time my field research was 
coming to an end, CP had become an individual affair: ‘It’s me on my own really’, 
Stuart declared to me that June.
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Even when other individuals were involved in the organization of events they seemed to 
play  a peripheral role. This was evidenced by the ways in which Stuart assessed, albeit 
hesitantly, their influence on him and CP, saying that his ideas about music promotion 
had been unaffected by Graham, Aidan and his other former affiliates. However, Stuart 
acknowledged their dedication, passion and acute awareness of all things musical. That 
Stuart had been all along the main creative force behind CP could also be illustrated by 
his supervisory role. For example, when Graham selected the bands for some of their 
events Stuart still had the final word. Moreover, when Stuart booked Hype Williams in 
November 2010 as the main act  for one of their gigs, he instructed Aidan to book the 
support bands. Consequently, according to Stuart, his associates did have a degree of 
creative control but the operation as a whole was overseen and commanded by him.
Retaining control of CP’s creative output was the outcome of Stuart’s sense of 
ownership stemming from his accumulated knowledge of live music promotion, not to 
mention the deeply personal attachment to CP he had fostered over the last  five years. In 
essence, then, CP had been Stuart’s project all along and he would assign specific tasks 
to certain people depending upon the circumstances at hand. Crucially, in doing so, 
Stuart assigned himself to a specific subject position. To put it  differently, one’s ability 
to act, as an intrinsically ethical property (Lambek 2010b), underscores processes of 
self-ascription to and selection of a subject position. Stuart described the functioning of 
CP as follows: 
It’s ultimately me and I delegate jobs to certain people. For the website I can get a 
guy – he’s one of my friends. Some people help out  with posters and I’ve got a 
collection of people who would help out on the door. Basically people involved to 
do more basic jobs, whereas I do all the organization and all the programming and 
all the delegation. That simplifies it  in a way. I think if you’re going to have 
someone as a co-curator – if you may use that  as a word – or a co-delegator, a co-
organizer or whatever, you have to be on a similar level...Because what I do takes 
up a lot of my time thinking, and it  takes up a lot of my time organizing other 
things, obviously it’s quite hard to get into the mindset of what works too.
The functioning of CP demonstrates that it had a hierarchical nature. However, it  gives 
credence to the argument that an anthropological treatment of the ethical field cannot be 
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squarely  centered upon the individual but on subjects who strive to occupy or who pass 
through positions (Faubion 2011: 119). Not only  these subjects may be relational, as in 
the case of Divorce, or collectives, as WSP were, but the ethical positions themselves 
are also highly complex. Apart from the aforementioned frequent collaborators, Stuart 
would also engage other people into the project, such as Alan who was on the door at 
the John Maus event, or when, for example, he had to make arrangements to 
accommodate the touring bands for the night. As he did not reside in Glasgow, for this 
Stuart relied on his friends, usually from local bands. Visitors would sleep on ‘couches, 
floors or mattresses’ and to return the favour he enlisted his friends’ bands for future 
events. Similarly, he expected local bands to engage in promoting the event themselves, 
in order to attract at least a small number of people, such as their friends, family and 
other acquaintances. 
Despite his multiple concurrent activities in the city  Stuart was living in Motherwell and 
he had only moved to Glasgow for a short period of time, during which he had a flat in 
the Hyndland area in the West End. The main reason why he lived elsewhere was his 
financial situation, which changed for the better once his unpaid internship was 
terminated and his work hours for Nice‘n’Sleazy were increased to 30-40 per week. As 
a result, when I finished my fieldwork Stuart was already  in the process of moving to 
Glasgow. Looking outside the music world, Stuart was also feeling comfortable in 
Glasgow: ‘I think my network is here and all my friends are here and quite happy  as 
well’. As such, the city and its specificity, its built environment and its social and 
cultural heritage (Chapter 1), can be perceived as an auxiliary recruiter in the local 
musical landscape, a recruiter that did not assign but rather compelled Stuart towards 
becoming the occupant of his subject position. As Faubion puts it: ‘Emplacement is not 
selection’ (2011: 158; cf. Basso 1996). 
As the distinction between ascription and achievement with regards to one’s role is not 
clear-cut, the boundary  between recruitment and selection is relative and porous. The 
latter, as opposed to recruitment, involves a process in which recruiters and ethical 
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pedagogues ‘are less and less likely to have the character of molders and shapers and 
more and more the character of advisors’ (Faubion 2011: 158). The gradual process of 
distancing himself from those who had hitherto been his recruiters found its expression 
in Stuart’s ambiguous relation with the CP name, his increasingly instructive role 
towards his collaborators, his trajectory  involving a refinement of his subject position, 
as well as in the creative deployment of urban resources, such as performance spaces. 
Selection is also the juncture at which the subject, in assigning himself to a specific 
position, has to reflect on it and consider the possibilities or alternatives available to 
him. This reflection or ‘thought’, is what Foucault calls ‘problematization’:
It  is what allows one to step back from this way of acting or reacting, to present it 
to oneself as an object of thought and to question it  as to its meaning, its 
conditions, and its goals. Thought is freedom in relation to what  one does, the 
motion by which one detaches oneself from it, establishes it as an object, and 
reflects on it as a problem (1997: 117). 
Hence Foucault’s characterization of ethics as the conscious practice of freedom; it is 
the process whereby actors consciously choose the kinds of subjects they wish to 
become by subsequently exercising and putting into practice their self-constituting 
freedom (Laidlaw 2002: 324; see also Foucault 1997: 200-201).
Places and objects are also important in the process of subjectivation and continue to 
impinge upon one’s ethical becoming, but through the process of selection they are 
gradually transformed into ‘ethical materials’ that facilitate rather than constrain the 
becoming of the subject (see also Chapter 4). Such materials at once determined and 
facilitated Stuart’s subjectivation. The money kept from successful gigs or fundraising 
events (see also Chapter 3) was not seen as profit per se but would be invested in 
memorabilia or future projects.123 Stuart had recently produced stickers and badges with 
their logo to be given for free at music events, exactly as LuckyMe had done previously. 
These were seen as having a continuous effect after the gig and they could also help to 
spread the word about CP. 
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123 The relationship between DiY and non-profit is not clear-cut (see Chapter 6).
The importance of these tangible expressions was also evident in the fact  that Stuart 
regularly complained about the lack of visual documentation of the gigs he promoted, 
something that he was planning to implement. Some money from the proceeds was also 
put into paying off the debt that Stuart had accumulated due to his involvement in music 
promotion. Stuart gradually raised the prices of CP gigs, which not only had become 
more expensive but were now ticketed as well (cf. Chapter 3). Issuing tickets, producing 
memorabilia such as badges, decorating the venues for performances, employing hand-
made posters and expensive equipment for the shows, for example good sound 
installations or video projectors, demonstrated that ‘stuff’ mattered for Stuart, who was 
inclined to express his ideas through material forms in conjunction with CP’s constant 
online presence. 
These aspects of Stuart’s ethical conditioning were crucial, not least because they 
concretely attested to a process of ethical routinization in accord with his subject 
position’s themitical dimension, the scope and reproductive dimensions of which Stuart 
would subsequently seek to modify. Routinization itself is a fundamental mechanism of 
selection and, therefore, a reflexive way of being in the world, contrary to what Zigon 
contends (2007: 138; see also Chapters 2 & 6). The process of organizing and executing 
events appeared straightforward, especially  considering their small-scale nature, so the 
experience of organizing several gigs had solidified Stuart’s practice. 
The volume of gigs that he promoted remained relatively  stable during my fieldwork. 
Whereas initially  Stuart  had to confront various issues due to his lack of experience, he 
was now more confident about his efficiency as a music promoter. For Stuart, the 
organization of music events was formulaic and certain aspects should always be taken 
into account, including bookings, fees and combining appropriate bands in the line-up. 
Other considerations included communications, the production and distribution of 
promotional material, providing food and accommodation for the bands, setting-up 
performance spaces, and last but not least, arranging payment. In the following section I 
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examine the concrete practices that were involved in the promotion of music events, and 
which contributed towards Stuart’s ethical becoming.
5.4 From DiY to Independent
What sorts of askêseis, what kinds of technologies did Stuart employ in ‘achieving’ or 
becoming the occupant  of this subject position? The most important aspect, which 
preceded the formation of CP but kept on boasting Stuart’s involvement in music 
promotion, was music itself. His interest in music could be said to constitute a final, but 
also critical recruiter in Stuart’s ethical cosmos. But musical taste, as I have shown in 
the previous chapter, is not a metamodal condition of subjectivation in the sense that it 
solely reflects social status and education, as Bourdieu would argue (1984). 
Taste and distaste are both pedagogical and reflexive technologies of ethical self-
formation (Faubion 2011: 137-138). The vast majority of CP gigs featured bands and 
musicians whose music Stuart appreciated greatly, and the John Maus gig is a telling 
example. Musical predilections largely  influenced choices about the content of Stuart’s 
promotional practice as well as provided the thrust for his continuous preoccupation 
with promotion. The ongoing cultivation of musical taste was a necessary askêsis for 
the delineation of his subject position.
I mentioned that Stuart had been exposed to ethical examples that he could emulate, 
follow or avoid. However, he did not  have a pedagogue in the form of an advisor or a 
‘master’, whose presence and support would facilitate the self-examination of his 
thoughts and practices (see Foucault 1997: 233-234). Instead, Stuart  had to take up that 
role himself in his collaborations with other individuals. The main criterion with which 
individuals were taken on board as Stuart’s collaborators was a genuine interest  in the 
musical diversity  underpinning CP’s practice. Both Graham and Aidan were recruited 
on the basis of attending CP gigs and showing an interest. Even when Graham moved to 
commercial music promotion, he continued to attend most CP shows. Stuart was 
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respectful towards Graham’s decision, but he pointed out that Graham’s new job to 
some extent dictated the breadth of his music-listening: 
I think ultimately he’s interested in the same music as me, he’s very much 
interested in all kinds of sounds and he gets really excited about independent 
music, but you know, obviously his job is strongly geared towards commercialism, 
so he has to listen to a lot of other stuff now as well. 
As Martin Cloonan has argued, ‘the more professional the promoter, the more they are 
subject to other people’s tastes’ (cited in Webster 2011: 38).  CP did not occupy an 
office or any other establishment, and organizational matters were arranged mainly 
through email. Stuart’s critical objective was to stay  up-to-date with his inbox and 
initially he would approach bands or booking agents, but as CP shows were becoming 
increasingly  popular and Stuart had managed to build a wide range of contacts in the 
music industry in and outside Glasgow, booking agents would also contact him with gig 
offers. His personal preferences aside, Stuart would also browse the line-ups of music 
festivals to identify  bands that would fit within the musical scope of CP. He had hosted 
a wide range of musicians from the UK as well as abroad, with the latter mainly 
consisting of touring bands. This had the advantage of not incurring additional costs for 
travel and allowed Stuart to keep door and ticket prices to a minimum. 
Local bands normally  included young acts from Glasgow that would open the show for 
the headlining touring bands. Carefully choosing the line-up for these events constituted 
an important reflexive and self-reflexive exercise because it combined and balanced an 
array of factors such as Stuart’s musical proclivities, logistics, and audience 
expectations. This process required a certain amount of organizational skills, but its 
ethical aspects were predicated upon a self-examination. This, according to Stuart, 
stemmed from the idea that promoters allegedly had ‘big egos’, expressed in their 
decisions about which shows to promote and which not. However, Stuart would try  to 
remain open-minded regarding the musical aspects of CP and his job at Nice‘n’Sleazy 
was a contributing factor: 
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Through Nice‘n’Sleazy’s, I’ve been putting on bands I’m not  as passionate about 
but I’d be open-minded to it, if I was to be offered something or something popped 
up that would fit.
Perhaps the most important askêsis was Stuart’s attitude and conduct towards finances. 
When Stuart launched CP, his jobs at Morrison’s and as a DJ sustained his practice. 
Later on, he would organize fundraising gigs – what he called ‘unofficial funding’ – and 
towards the end of my fieldwork he could still keep CP afloat thanks to his full-time 
wage from Nice‘n’Sleazy. For the most part, financial matters with touring bands were 
settled in advance. According to Stuart, 99% of the touring bands would ask for a 
guarantee, with Stuart being able to offer them between £50 and £80. If the turnout was 
satisfactory, all bands, including support  acts, would receive additional funds. However, 
he made clear to local bands that  he could not afford any guarantee for them in advance. 
When I enquired about how the bands responded to this, Stuart replied that  most of 
them recognized that it was impossible to receive guarantees considering the small-scale 
character of these events, but that there were also acts that were more ‘career driven’.
As was the case for WSP and any other local DiY promoter, booking a venue for a 
music event was largely dictated by financial considerations and venue availability. 
Cheap  or free venues were in high demand, and CP would regularly host their gigs in 
venues such as the 13th Note, CCA, and Mitchell’s during the first half of my 
fieldwork. In venues that did not employ sound engineers Stuart would pay his friends 
to do the sound, including Peter from WSP. Of integral importance and relevance to 
Stuart’s concern with finances was turnout. This was because he sought to cover 
expenses and not end up losing money. Although in most cases bands would receive 
more than what was initially  agreed, sometimes up to £250 for successful shows, there 
were instances when gigs had produced a deficit. Door charges were kept low, with 
most gigs around £4-£5 but occasionally rising to £7-£8 for ‘bigger’ bands. Stuart 
believed that, by keeping the fees as low as possible, more individuals would have the 
opportunity to attend the gigs. This would be beneficial for the bands because he would 
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initially give all the proceeds to them minus the costs that would allow him to fund 
future ventures.
A particular approach towards money  and financial decisions was thus informed and 
shaped by  necessity but also from his will to support the bands and make CP gigs 
accessible to audiences. Moreover, this attitude was linked to a particular ethics of care 
(see also Chapter 3): despite his lack of financial resources, Stuart would try  and 
accommodate bands for the night wherever possible. Another of Stuart’s main principles 
was to provide food for musicians in the line-up, which, as I have mentioned, was a 
common practice of local DiY promoters from NaS onwards. The absence of luxury and 
comfort for the touring bands did not prevent them from responding positively  about 
their host, and Stuart sought to ensure that bands were satisfied with their time in 
Glasgow by creating a pleasant atmosphere. For example, he would take the bands on 
short excursions around the city and spend time with them.124
Stuart would cater for bands’ other requirements, which normally comprised of sourcing 
appropriate music equipment. It  was not unusual for CP to carry  a drum kit to the venue 
or for Stuart  to negotiate instrument-borrowing between bands in the line-up. Part of 
creating a nice atmosphere for bands and audiences alike meant decorating event 
spaces. Although this was not always the case, and when it  did happen the decor was 
usually  not very elaborate, small touches seemed to be sufficient to transform a generic 
pub basement into a welcoming and cosy  venue. I remember entering the 13th Note 
basement for a CP gig to find lit candles on the tables. I was also surprised that  the usual 
scattered cables, instruments, rucksacks and other paraphernalia that were lying around 
in previous gigs had been tucked away. Then, for their Halloween party  at the Vic Bar125 
large amounts of fake spider webs, a smoke machine and carved pumpkins were used in 
order to create an appropriate atmosphere. 
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124 The ethics of the ‘host’  is quite ambiguous (see Candea & da Col 2012). Stuart’s hospitality could also 
be seen as part of his effort to preserve complete control over CP’s organizational matters.
125 Located in the Glasgow School of Art.
Promotion for these events would take the form of designing, printing and distributing 
posters and flyers, as well as through CP’s dedicated website and relevant  social media. 
Stuart stated that: ‘From my experience overall, posters and flyers are useless’ and that 
‘the Internet is the future of promotion’. However, posters would almost always be 
well-designed and colour-printed or on coloured paper (Figure 5.1). 
Figure 5.1: Cry Parrot posters.126
This paradox can be explained by  Sarah Thorton’s observations about ‘micro-media’ in 
Club Cultures, where she notes that ‘the most venerated are not necessarily  the most 
actively engaged in convening crowds’ (1995: 151). As I have already pointed out, the 
proliferation of last-minute events not only led me to join Twitter, but highlighted the 
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126 Retrieved from http://www.oliverpitt.co.uk/ & http://cargocollective.com/moonshakedesign/POSTERS 
respectively [Accessed 23 March 2012].
instrumentality  of ‘word-of-mouth’ in the congregation of crowds at those gigs (e.g. the 
‘Satanic toga’ party). For Stuart, who always planned and announced his events in 
advance (cf. Chapter 3), word-of-mouth did not seem to play an important role, but as 
Thorton herself remarks, various promotional media feed into each other in sparking 
and preserving interest among audiences, while ‘micro-media’ as a whole are not set 
apart from less ‘grassroots’ forms of advertising. Indeed, CP events would occasionally 
be listed or reviewed in widely circulated free press magazines, such as The Skinny. 
Therefore, posters and flyers could be seen as processes of authentication contributing 
to the ‘visibility’ of CP and thus to the consolidation of its identity.
Although Stuart perceived CP posters and flyers as ineffective methods of promoting 
events, the actual process of distribution had an additional ethical meaning and 
pedagogical value. He once recounted how mainstream promoters expressed a 
dismissive attitude towards DiY gigs by placing their own posters right on top of the 
ones by  DiY promoters (see also Chapter 1). Stuart half-jokingly mentioned to me that 
he was tempted to do the same as an ‘act of revenge’. However, Stuart was clearly 
against such a practice and he expected others to respect CP’s right to occupy poster 
space around the city. Fly-posting could be seen as a mundane process that, 
nevertheless, carried ethical connotations as well as symbolic value in its contestation of 
urban territories (Chapter 3). 
Ethically speaking, the paradoxical nature of the process of crafting posters that were 
considered ineffective is interesting for another reason. Apart from the anticipated 
evolvement of promotional strategies due to technological innovations, this ‘paradox’ is 
also reflective of the complexity of ethical conditioning. In its pedagogical emphasis, 
ethical subjectivation goes beyond the mere reproduction or rejection of the themitical 
dimensions of the subject  position to be occupied (Faubion 2011: 48-49). Conformity to 
the rule and action, imply a complex relationship that emerges in different degrees and 
variations. Otherwise, submission to the norms would become subjection, thus falling 
outside ethical threshold. As I have argued in the previous chapter, action allows 
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subjects to inhabit norms rather than oppose them or being completely subjected to 
them. Therefore, Stuart’s continuation of the established practice of producing posters 
and flyers and his simultaneous opting for a more efficacious means to advertise gigs 
are not antithetical within his mode of subjectivation, because ‘subject positions are 
malleable, if some more than others’ (Faubion 2011: 4). 
At different points along the evolution of CP, Stuart’s reflexive thought was translated 
into practice. Halfway through my fieldwork Stuart announced that from then onwards 
he would issue tickets for all CP gigs. People would still have the option of paying on 
the door, but according to Stuart it was the realization that many audience members felt 
more comfortable and secure when buying tickets in advance. The plastic cup with 
change at  Mitchell’s that  subsequently  enjoyed recurring mentions in my fieldnotes, 
ultimately  gave way to tickets that  were sold by Monorail, the record shop hosted 
within Mono, and an online ticket retailer. The former charged a booking fee of 50p or 
£1 per ticket depending on the ticket price and the latter 10% of the ticket’s face value. 
Listening and talking to the audience, therefore, as well as paying attention to their 
feedback were two additional pedagogical technologies through which Stuart learned 
and which urged him to implement changes by adjusting his promotional tactics.
The general transformation of CP practice was also evident in the bands that Stuart 
booked for the gigs. The process remained more or less similar, but the names that 
appeared on the bill were of much wider appeal. Promoting gigs and specifically  the 
production of posters had also changed during the course of a year. Stuart would still 
seek to print posters in the least expensive way, but now he would print them in bulk, 
while allocating the production of flyers to specific online companies. Whereas in the 
past Catherine or Stuart’s friends designed the posters, he was now using four different 
‘reliable’, that is, professional ‘poster people’, who received £30 as a set fee for each 
design. Stuart was adamant that even if gigs produced a deficit, he still had to pay  poster 
designers, something that he perceived both as a nice gesture and as an incentive for 
them to do good work.
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The sites which hosted CP events were now mostly conventional venues, such as Mono, 
Stereo and Nice‘n’Sleazy. Ironically, the first time I met Stuart he had mentioned that 
Stereo and Nice‘n’Sleazy were somewhat expensive to hire for the level of the gigs he 
used to promote. A year later, Stuart was able to book Nice‘n’Sleazy for free, whereas 
some of his gigs would take place at Stereo. By employing well-known, mid-size 
venues Stuart could also minimize the risk of technical issues and avoid the need to 
carry  and install a sound system for the night. Bigger bands meant additional expenses, 
however, because bands of such a calibre required hotel accommodation. 
The money-factor had influenced other parts of the organizational process. Whereas in 
the past local bands were informed that payment depended on the turnout, Stuart would 
now provide guarantees to most bands. One direct result of such a policy  was that he put 
himself at risk of losing (more) money, because the earlier losses were largely  the 
outcome of guarantees for gigs that had failed to attract a substantial crowd. For 
example, when we were discussing about This Is Our Battlefield and their practices, 
Stuart mentioned that all members would still pay the cover charge for the gigs they 
hosted – something that Stuart initially  did too – while they would never guarantee any 
money  or take a cut off the proceeds to forward it to the next gig. For sure, the number 
of guarantees provided by Stuart was correlated with both an increased turnout at  CP 
gigs and the anticipation of success of events featuring specific bands. 
The shift in Stuart’s mode of conduct was influenced by his accumulated practical 
knowledge, his interaction with bands, audiences and other actors involved in music-
making and, finally, by reflecting upon his own practice. Therefore, apart from ‘doing’, 
the process of thinking – perhaps the most self-conscious of Stuart’s technologies of 
self-fashioning, as well as discursive contexts, framed two decisive askêseis that 
encompassed and sharpened Stuart’s decision-making. Thinking is a reflexive process 
but conversation too offers the opportunity  for continuous reflection, albeit one that is 
usually  shot with new discoveries and realizations. As such, conversation is an 
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inherently  pedagogical exercise (Faubion 2011: 264-265). Crucially, these two 
techniques and their application were mediated by judgements.
5.5 A Scene of Crisis
Stuart’s ethical subjectivation to the themiticality of DiY live music promotion did not 
constitute a straightforward adoption of a script or a set of ideas and values to be put 
into practice. Reflexive action was a catalyst for his dissociation from the ‘normative’ 
that would become apparent over time. As such, the aforementioned changes in CP 
practice were not only the outcome of trial and error. They also punctuated a parallel 
conversion from a DiY register to an independent modus operandi. This ethical re-
evaluation sheds light upon various aspects of Stuart’s principles and conduct. This 
passage was marked by a specific event, an incident that compelled Stuart  to diverge 
from the DiY example and adapt his routines accordingly. Although I did not observe an 
abrupt change in Stuart’s practice, gradually  CP veered away from a DiY blueprint as 
this had been inherited from NaS. If a ‘turning-point’ can be traced, then perhaps 
unsurprisingly it was related to Stuart’s perspective on, and use of, financial resources:
I think a big turning point for me was in January [2011], when I put on Moon Unit, 
a headline show, and it was in Nice‘n’Sleazy’s. There were two supports, both of 
which were local. 170 people paid in at £5, and, you know, I paid Moon Unit  like 
£250 and gave their supports £130 each. And I just think to myself...I took £150 
from that  gig because, well, they’re getting paid loads of money – I’m taking £150 
and that’s maybe forwarded to something, you know? Normally I would just  give 
it, like, before, I would just give it all away. I think I was just quite intensely strict 
on the ethics.
This event (and no doubt many others to a lesser extent) gave rise to Stuart’s 
questioning of what was themitical, what valorized, engendered and reproduced such 
‘strict’ norms by encouraging DiY promoters to hand over all the proceeds to the 
performers.127 This incident could be called a ‘scene of crisis’:
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127  The ethic of ‘giving it away’ was quite common but neither homogeneous nor evenly distributed 
across the DiY spectrum (Chapter 6).
A scene of the unfamiliar or of disturbance, in which the experience of the 
disruption or of the failure of the reproduction of the routine is also the impetus of 
thought and action (Faubion 2011: 81-82).
Drawing upon Weber’s analysis in his essay  on charismatic authority (1946), Faubion 
discerns the following characteristics of such a scene (2011: 81-90): it  is a moment 
when rationalization has dramatically decreased and in which themitical normativity has 
yet to be established. As such, the scene of crisis could be seen as anethical because 
ethical value remains non-routinized in this context. Because everyday routine has been 
suspended and because such a scene belongs to the unfamiliar and the extra-ordinary  it 
is a moment that calls for reflection and urgent response. The floating and indeterminate 
quality of the ethical parallels charismatic authority  in the latter’s inevitably  non-
normative nature and lack of fixity. 
The charismatic is incongruous with themitical regimens or institutional orders 
‘precisely because the charismatic leader reveals...the inadequacy of the established 
social and cultural order’ (Faubion 2011: 83). Now, because he or she stands outside the 
normative order, it is only through the performance of ‘extraordinary’ acts that charisma 
can be retained and justified. Moreover, insofar as the ethical field is a social field, it is 
only through his recognition of the ethical chrism of the other that ethics emerges. 
Assuming, however, the existence of a unilateral form of relation between charismatics 
and mere followers automatically places the latter outside the ethical domain by 
transforming subjectivation into subjection. This initially  leads to the conclusion that 
the scene of crisis is devoid of ethics. Hence the need of the recognition of the chrism of 
the other. Although this gesture does not necessarily involve routinization, it 
nevertheless transcends the ‘personal’ and incites the delineation of the ethical ground 
upon which the charismatic ‘collective’ exists and operates. This distinguishes them 
from non-charismatic others. To the extent that the Weberian primal scene affords such 
gestures of recognition and as long as these acts do not constitute the establishment of 
themitical normativity, the scene of crisis is neither ethical nor anethical. 
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The inference that the scene of crisis and the ensuing extension of the chrism remain 
non-routinized recalls Zigon’s moral breakdown and the resulting ‘moment’ when ethics 
must be performed (2007). However, Zigon’s sharp  distinction between moments of 
crisis and the ‘unreflective mode of being in-the-world’ fails to register what I have 
already mentioned, namely  that routinization as a process of selection involves 
reflexivity. And as Faubion shows, such a rigid dichotomy is analytically disruptive of 
the pragmatic flow and continuity between the ethical and the themitical. Charismatics 
already entail traces of routinization and of the soon-to-become normative, not least in:
[T]he beginnings of their transformation from exemplars of the anethical-
becoming-ethical response to extraordinary circumstances into exemplars of the 
practices best  suited to the themiticality of systems already in place and in need 
less of adjustment than of ongoing maintenance (2011: 112).
As such, the modulation of charisma holds the potential for ethical innovation and 
adjustment of what is already in place through its relation to themitical systems, rather 
than operating outside such regimes, thus giving rise to something anew. 
Employing the allegoric essence of the Weberian scene allows me to adapt it to Stuart’s 
subjectivation in order to describe the latter in comparable but ethnographic terms: the 
moment of ‘crisis’ urged Stuart realize that his habitual ways of promoting music events 
were problematic. Sensing that elements of his routinized practice, consonant with DiY 
ethics, failed to live up  to the necessities of a long-term engagement with music 
promotion, he started questioning the themitical normativity of a DiY framework. The 
ethical possibilities opened up from such a problematization were by  definition non-
normative and non-routinized. Very  quickly though, the anethical moment of crisis gave 
way to routinization, elements of which were already  present in both the transformation 
of his thoughts into customary practice and, notably, in the sense that these practices 
were consonant with the normative logics and themitical principles of another register: 
that of the independent promoter. 
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The following questions immediately  emerge: who was to be included in this ethical 
field? How would its ethical criteria be established and what kinds of judgements were 
pertinent to its realization? In other words, what was its mode of ethical valuation and 
justification?
5.6 The Stigma and the Dilemma
I mentioned that, for Stuart, two of the readiest technologies of the self were reflexive 
thinking and conversing with others. For Arendt, the activity (as opposed to action) of 
thinking as an ethical exercise is a form of self-fashioning (2003: 105). But as Lambek 
notes, citing Benhabib (2003), Arendt distinguished between thinking as objective and 
ethically neutral, and judgement as situated and communicative (2010a: 26). In 
transcending the distinction ‘between freedom and obligation’ or ‘between conventional 
morality  and charismatic innovation’ judgement appears to Lambek to be more 
appropriate ‘as the fulcrum of everyday  ethics’ (2010a: 26, 28; see also Chapter 2). 
Faubion also highlights how: ‘Ethics demands judgement, which demands justification, 
which demands criteria of both diction and declamation, which demand functional 
language games’ (2011: 96). 
Thus, for Stuart, conversation as a discursive, intersubjective process seemed to be 
instrumental to the formation and establishment of ethical criteria through ‘language 
games’ (Wittgenstein 1958). The attachment of criteria to the terms of a discourse, 
though, does not clarify whether criteria precede or follow from agreement in 
judgement, while recourse to criteria usually implies disagreement (Lambek 2010b: 43). 
In Stuart’s case, without taking the form of a debate or dispute, such a discursive 
interaction was occurring upon shifting grounds and ill-defined criteria (Chapter 6). 
Unavoidably, the terms DiY and independent were the two axes along which such 
discourse took place. The ultimate lack of consensus with regards to the content, 
definition or meaning of these terms, however, need not inhibit us from perceiving this 
ongoing process as an ethical discourse: 
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Ethical discourse of even the most  obstreperous lack of consensus and just short of 
complete collapse must still defer to a matrix of the justification of the use of its 
terms; otherwise, it  would not  constitute a discourse of any sort at  all (Faubion 
2011: 69).
DiY and its meaning had been a consistently  favourite discussion topic between Stuart 
and myself. He seemed extremely  interested in clarifying what was involved in the term 
as well as confused and frustrated by its volatile meaning. The plural ways in which it 
was interpreted and put into practice had been a common predicament within the DiY 
network (see Chapter 6). For Stuart, who was previously a ‘DIY promoter’ and lately 
had become ‘an independent promoter with DiY ethics’, thus distinguishing between 
DiY as a label and DiY as practice, providing a clear definition of DiY – or independent 
for that matter – was not an easy task. An attempt to provide some content for these 
terms is needed here. Stuart would frame independent as follows: 
It’s as ambiguous as DiY...I guess [it  describes] people or individuals, or acts less 
focused on a commercial aspect of the music and strongly focused on being 
creative? Creativity and a sense of going out and trying to do it  yourself, rather 
relying on other people? Reading it back about how to define Cry Parrot now, this 
is an independent promoter with DiY ethics. It’s something very fluid, I guess... 
About DiY ethics he believed that: 
Again it’s just  like independency [sic], it’s a strong focus on the arts, a strong focus 
on inclusivity, a strong focus on a scene and people being together; these are the 
ethics I think in my mind. 
Notice how the two definitions not only share a similar level of ambiguity, but, in fact, 
they  could be used interchangeably. Why then Stuart decided to discard the DiY label 
but retain its ethics? Moreover, why add ‘independent’ to it? To begin with, Stuart 
considered the former term problematic:
DiY, I think, is something that was forged out  of punk, but  DiY also suffers from 
the stigma of “laziness”. If someone says he’s a DiY promoter, then certain people 
can go: “Well, that’s a lazy promoter”, you know, “that’s someone not doing it 
right”. 
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Thus, the negative connotations of such a label were both undesirable and confining, the 
implication being that a number of bands would potentially refrain from booking their 
Glasgow gigs through Stuart. More broadly, DiY thus defined would restrict CP within 
a specific network of people. This tension created by the perceived lack of effectiveness 
of DiY promoters accelerated Stuart’s conversion to an independent label and mode of 
practice. However, DiY and its ethic were getting across positive messages as well, 
according to Stuart: 
I think a lot  of the selling point for the gigs is, you know, you’re supporting the 
artists, and you’re supporting the promoter in a way as well because you’re making 
sure they don’t lose money, you try to support  what  they do. I think that’s an 
important  thing with Cry Parrot, you’re supporting a scene, you’re caring about 
something. 
Consequently:
DiY is something that’s formed upon ethics which are troublesome...but  ultimately 
a positive thing. I think independent  is perhaps the word...I guess for me it keeps a 
sense that I’m open-minded anyway and I’m trying to be doing my own thing in 
my own way perhaps. I just want to be ethical. I think I just struggle with defining 
(emphasis added).
In essence then, it was both the label and the ethics DiY embodied that were 
‘troublesome’, as seen from the outside. But while the label would trigger negative 
responses, the ethics were perceived as positive by Stuart. His recognition of DiY’s 
negative connotations exemplifies Mary  Douglas’s observation that labeling, as a form 
of classification, involves an increasing bias that leaves our assumptions unchallenged 
(2002 [1966]: 46). In this case, as I have also discussed in Chapter 3, the assumption 
was that DiY pertained to what we call ‘leisure’, a view that leaves the definition of 
professionalism, as well as the distinction between professionals and amateurs, intact. 
Therefore, DiY provided a ‘discordant cue’ that tended to be rejected based on 
established assumptions. If this ambiguity or discordance is accepted, Douglas says, 
then ‘the structure of assumptions has to be modified’ (ibid.: 45). 
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In the following chapter, I argue that DiY dwells in and feeds upon precisely such a 
profound semiotic indeterminacy that disturbs and begs the reconsideration of certain 
assumptions. The process of labeling is never ethically neutral, more so because it is not 
a matter of particular negative attributes conferring those labels. Rather, it  is a social 
relationship  between the attributes of a person, group, or entity and their incongruity 
with our assumptions or stereotypes that lead to stigmatization (Goffman 1963: 13). 
As Stuart put it, the problem for outsiders was not ‘laziness’ per se (in itself a 
misapprehension as I have shown for ‘disorganization’ in Chapter 3), but the stigma, 
that is, the notion of laziness not fitting within the stereotype of a music promoter. Of 
course, stigmatization does not guarantee the ethical subjection of the stigmatized 
(Faubion 2011: 62), because it  does not address the ‘reverse’ discourse, namely how the 
notion of the promoter fits within DiY (see Foucault  1978: 100-102). It seems to me that 
Stuart’s engagement in the discourse about DiY and independent revolved around 
exactly this counter-possibility.
The adoption of independent seemed to represent a more suitable marketing technique, 
but also a more honest and accurate representation of CP practice because for Stuart, it 
reflected the fact that he was open to ideas outside of the DiY network:
DiY promoters essentially adopt  corporate or marketing techniques. That’s so true, 
you know? Ultimately, branding is important, and promotion and scheduling and 
budgets and all these things, they all come into play and I think that’s something 
I’m still trying to get a grasp on...But  you know, you have to adopt some sort of 
model to get anywhere. 
Adopting models from the ‘professional’ music world was not an objective in itself 
though, and Stuart was highly skeptical and critical of a number of corporate practices. 
For example, there was a fine line between exploiting corporate strategies to effectively 
promote events on the one hand, and endorsing corporate funding or sponsorship  on the 
other. This was a line that Stuart did not want to cross and he was critical of other local, 
small-scale, young promoters who were prone to utilizing sponsorship from a well-
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known energy drink brand for their club events. However, Stuart was realistic when 
reflecting upon his collaborations with, for example, the Glasgow Film Festival (GFF), 
and had no delusions about the government and corporate funding involved in these 
large-scale events. 
The appropriation of corporate techniques such as branding seemed to play an important 
function, which stickers and badges served particularly  well. But the CP logos that 
embellished these artefacts did not mean that Stuart fully  embraced branding as a 
metasemiotic phenomenon or logos (Manning 2010: 46), that is, the organizational 
principles of commodity  circulation. As Manning notes, the dissociation of brand from 
its product has resulted in the conflation of brand semiotics with semiosis (ibid.: 36), 
thus disrupting the link between the ‘immaterial’ brand and the materiality of the 
product. 
Such a break effected by capitalist marketing further obscures the fact that acts of 
commodity  branding historically have been quite common. Moreover, the historically 
shifting registers of authenticity associated with branding do not erase the underlying 
paradox that the act of marking products sought to resolve: that in all economies of 
scale individuals have had to live with impersonal objects, the homogeneity of which 
could not negotiate the complexity and heterogeneity of social relations (Wengrow 
2008). Therefore, in a city saturated with promoters, Stuart’s mobilization of branding 
should not be placed within a matrix of authenticity  and corporatism. It should instead 
be seen as a means for Stuart to delineate his own space within a complex web of 
musical affiliations, and specifically to invest CP with his own identity  or social role 
and express his ownership.128
Being caught between two registers had elicited a form of ‘moral torment’ (Robbins 
2004). Stuart would constantly question many of his choices pertaining to the 
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128  This vaguely recalls Caroline Humphrey’s observations on the relation between Mongol nomads and 
horse-brands (1974: 485).
organization of shows, and he was reluctant to implement or introduce new elements 
from fear that his practice would fall outside the limits of DiY. For example, he had 
repeatedly wondered about whether employing a film projector would be consonant 
with DiY practice, which generally promoted an aesthetic of simplicity  (Chapter 6). 
And, of course, taking money  from the proceeds was taboo. As Robbins’s ethnography 
demonstrates, ethical reasoning reflects neither Kant’s autonomous rational subject 
freely choosing between categorical universals and knowing at any given moment what 
is the right or wrong course of action, nor is it, as Robbins further shows, exclusively 
attached to utilitarian motives or to unreflective cultural reproduction. 
But contrary  to the Urapmin, who found themselves in the midst  of two conflicting and 
mutually  exclusive ethical realms, for Stuart, in principle at least, there was no dilemma 
in the sense of being called to embrace one and renounce the other. It  was rather a 
matter of scrutinizing the possibility  of expanding an existing register (DiY) in order to 
encompass a wider set  of ideas and practices, which he perceived necessary for the 
viability of the register itself. The fluid themiticality of the register would render any 
such dilemma ambiguous at best. Therefore, the criteria of its justification were to some 
degree performative thus retaining its ethical indeterminacy and escaping complete 
routinization. This did not preclude Stuart from engaging in ongoing critical thinking 
and participating in this ethical discourse. After all, practices and their discursive 
codings are rarely in accordance (Faubion 2011: 94). Criteria, though they  might be 
used retrospectively to assess a decision, usually  fail to provide answers to actors that 
find (or put) themselves into problematic situations (Caton 2010: 175).
Even in cases in which mutually agreed criteria fall short of elucidating the appropriate 
course of action, ethical judgements and their validity rarely depend upon subjective 
intuition or universal ‘common sense’ but are the products of intersubjective and 
representative thought (Arendt 2003: 141). And judgements, in the lack of a clear 
distinction between right and wrong and in the absence or inadequacy of general ‘rules’, 
hark back to positive or negative examples, as we have seen. ‘The question arises’, 
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writes Arendt, ‘whether there is really nothing to hold onto when we are called upon to 
decide that this is right and this is wrong’, and the answer is that  we ‘cannot hold on to 
anything general, but to some particular that has become an example’ (Arendt 2003: 
143). Insofar as actors have recourse to examples ethical judgements go beyond 
subjective opinion. 
Stuart’s reflections, as well as the tension between DiY and independent echo 
Hesmondhalgh’s account of ‘indie’, a music genre which emerged out of the uneasy 
relationship  between the challenges that  punk posed to the music industry, and the more 
mainstream aspects of contemporary music business: 
In an era of pragmatic acceptance of collaboration with major capital, there is a 
need to (re)develop a case against the majors which does not rely on a simplistic 
romanticism. At  the core of the post-punk independent [i.e. DiY] ethos was an 
important argument about autonomy (1999: 53).
A pragmatic response to changing economic logics, indie combined the desire of 
cultural producers to achieve success while at the same time working outside the 
dominant norms of the industry  (Hesmondhalgh 1999: 52). The failure of a DiY êthos to 
create a system outside the dominant system is reflected by indie’s very  existence, 
which represents the merging of the contradictory drives of popularity and alterity (see 
Born 1993). The lack of control that corporate funding enforces does not necessarily 
result in aesthetic compromise though (Hesmondhalgh 1999: 55-57). 
If the hallmark of the ethical discourse about DiY and independent is autonomy, radical 
self-determination and control, then from an ethical-pedagogical standpoint it is 
problematic (Laidlaw 2010a: 377). It is at strain with the ethical domain as such, which 
is always a domain of the intersubjective, and it questions the ethical character of 
projects that do not privilege autonomy (e.g. Mahmood 2005). Less of an ideal and 
more a normative part of the themitical dimension of a Western ethical apparatus, the 
imperative of autonomy cannot be disregarded but it  must be qualified (Faubion 2011: 
72, 75, 120-121, 159; see also Chapter 6). As Ferrara has argued (1998), although 
254
‘authenticity’ presupposes autonomy, the latter is an insufficient condition to give rise to 
authentic conduct, while the ‘subjective’ capacity of ‘grounding validity’ is always a 
property of intersubjectively consituted subjects. 
5.7 A Flurry of Activity
Not unlike other modern subjects, Stuart exhibited ‘ethical complexity’. In striving 
through CP to occupy an ethical subject position pertinent to his musical interests and 
promotional practices, he had simultaneously become the occupant of another subject 
position, namely the one conditioned by his work for Nice‘n’Sleazy. The simultaneous 
existence of these different positions had clearly  affected Stuart. For example, a side-
effect of his employment in Nice‘n’Sleazy was his relative lack of time and energy  to 
treat the bands as he used to: 
Whereas I still like doing that – don’t get  me wrong – I just can’t do that all the 
time. I make sure I’m pleasant, it’s just  that  I struggle to consistently treat them like 
a house guest, that’s quite draining in a way when you’re putting on so many gigs 
and so many bands...And it’s across the board, but  I think I make more effort  in the 
Cry Parrot shows because it’s more personal and I’m personally more into these 
bands, but I maybe don’t  have as much energy as I used to...It’s not  that  I’m not 
excited by the gig and it’s not  that I don’t think that they’re nice people, it’s just 
that I don’t have as much energy to sit  down and have a meal with them and take 
them around. 
Organizing an average of eight gigs per month for Nice‘n’Sleazy plus the regular club 
nights, was both hard work and emotionally draining for Stuart due to the interpersonal 
communication involved in the job. However, as I demonstrated above, this tension was 
gradually neutralized and the two subject positions began to overlap considerably. 
Converting from DiY to independent was a semiotic shift that designated the ethical 
transitions and refinements brought upon CP. I think it would be more correct to 
perceive these changes as Stuart’s effort to enlarge the subject position he sought to 
occupy  rather than move on to a different subject position altogether. Stuart’s gradual 
shift attested to his desire to embed characteristics from independent promotion within 
an existing DiY register. From this perspective, his mode of subjectivation did not 
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contribute to the reproduction of the homeostatic characteristics of the DiY subject 
position to-be-occupied but mainly to its alteration and diversification. In questioning 
the taken-for-granted through ongoing problematization, Stuart adapted his conduct, and 
along with this, he effected changes on his subject position.
 
While CP progressively mutated to an independent promoter, Stuart’s experience in 
DiY promotion had allowed him to work at Nice‘n’Sleazy. Therefore, his initial position 
was a necessary condition for the occupation of the latter one, as well as for the 
subsequent expansion of his initial position’s ethical scope, which, conversely, would be 
influenced by Stuart’s work experience in both Nice‘n’Sleazy and the CCA. In short, 
the scope, structure and priority of his ethical subject position(s) permits ut to 
understand how:
Certain subject positions include or can include or permit  the nesting within them 
of certain others...Certain subject positions might be the necessary or the sufficient 
condition of certain others to which they are nevertheless not  equivalent. Certain 
subject positions are trans-institutional and others not. The demands of certain 
subject positions may override the demands of certain others. One might occupy a 
certain position night and day and another only on occasion. Subject positions are 
variably expansive. They have variable logical profiles. They bear variable ethical 
weight (Faubion 2011: 66). 
Stuart’s ethics takes on further complexity  if we take into account his numerous 
collaborations both within CP and with other promoters, venues and organizations. 
Although the relations with his associates were assymetrical in the sense that Stuart was 
ultimately  in command of the operations, at times, CP consisted of a subject position 
with multiple occupants in-becoming. This intrasubjective complexity was intensified 
by the accommodation of other subjects external to CP. 
Stuart had formed a ‘partnership’ with the SWG3 Studio Warehouse, where he hosted 
monthly afterparties for the SWG3 gallery’s exhibitions (Chapter 1). The partnership 
with SWG3 was not the only joint  initiative that Stuart had begun. I briefly mentioned 
his collaboration with the GFF, for which CP organized events that emphasized a film/
music crossover. Moreover, cross-promotion and collaboration with other promoters 
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and venues was important  and Stuart saw his involvement in such mutual efforts as 
strengthening the events by enabling him to bring different musical strands and diverse 
audiences together, as well as nurture established connections or initiate new ones. 
Finally, cross-promotion had the practical benefit of permitting Stuart to undertake 
projects of larger scale, such as the Music is the Music Language three-day  festival he 
was initially planning for September 2011 along with Bryony from Tracer Trails.
Some of the touring bands Stuart booked, especially later on, signaled that CP had 
become a competitor within the local live music industry, which Graham’s company  had 
recognized by banning him from continuing his promotional alliance with Stuart. The 
ethical environment of CP also included younger actors under Stuart’s pedagogical 
supervision. One example was Crasier Frane and another was Red Room, a young 
promoter who had sought advice from Stuart for setting up a one-day festival. 
Consequently, in his belief that the organizational aspects of live music promotion were 
essentially  straightforward, his aim was to enhance their understanding and confidence 
in putting on their own events and convince them not to rely upon promoters who could 
potentially exploit them. 
Therefore, Stuart’s practice was beneficial for various music actors, and he had the 
foresight to understand that CP’s long-term viability was correlated with the general 
well-being of the local music network. Providing advice to young bands and promoters 
was geared towards ensuring continuous creative stimulation in music practice. By 
attracting new crowds to his events and supporting young bands and promoters he could 
facilitate local music’s growing potential through the establishment of links between 
different actors, thus supporting this prolific activity so as to not fade out over time.
5.8 A Sense of Togetherness
The first time I asked Stuart  what had motivated him to engage in music promotion, he 
replied that it was to have ‘fun’ and put on gigs from bands they liked. Having ‘fun’ and 
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expressing ‘their’ personal musical taste as the main motivation behind CPs actions 
were complemented over time by ‘wanting to put together something interesting and not 
purely wanting to make money...something that is all-encompassing but still 
affordable’. ‘Interesting’ and ‘all-encompassing’, as well as ‘exciting’ and ‘stimulating’ 
were terms which were often employed by Stuart to convey his ideas about CP events. 
This view was not new, but it had explicitly been put into practice towards the end of 
my fieldwork. Physical objects, visuals, a crossover with film and the arts, as well as the 
diversity of music promoted by CP represented the embodiment of this ideal. Stuart’s 
collaboration with SWG3 and GFF attested to this and reflected what an all-
encompassing event should entail. 
This had also given rise to an idea of novelty and movement. In practical terms, it 
involved Stuart  hosting CP events in different venues so as to avoid becoming 
formulaic. The idea of mobility also explains several developments or changes in CP’s 
practice over the course of my fieldwork. In order to keep things ‘interesting’, CP had to 
evolve, to ‘move forward’. Stuart entertained that:
It  would piss me off if Cry Parrot  just felt stagnant, same level, and people. If 
you’re continually putting on smaller bands you are generally getting the same 
people in every time, and there’s no push forward. I think what  I’m basically trying 
to do is extend, you know. I’m not really aiming towards a certain thing as such, 
it’s not like I’m trying to get  towards the next  step and that’s me putting on U2. It’s 
purely to try and solidify, perfect what it’s all about. 
Therefore Stuart had identified a tension between DiY and progress, with the latter 
being one of the main values guiding Stuart’s promotional practice. So whereas the 
temporality of DiY was resolutely immanent (Chapters 3), Stuart’s conduct was 
informed by  a more ‘progressive’ notion of time. It can be argued then, following Wilk 
(2007), that  this tension represents not the competition but the coexistence of different 
lived temporalities and futures. Not only did Stuart’s open-ended progress peculiarly 
resemble the temporal immanence and unpredictable futurity  of DiY, but as I will 
demonstrate in the next chapter the latter’s indeterminacy  also invites contemporaneity 
of present and future through its ongoing process of becoming.
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Stuart’s notion of progress that engendered major as well as minor transformations of 
his promotional ethics were underpinned by a concern with quality: ʻI think it was just 
that feeling of trying to polish things off and I just  care more about the quality of the 
event now’. Better quality equaled well-made objects, diverse music, ‘bigger’ names on 
the bill and ‘proper’ venues, in addition to a ‘fun’ and welcoming atmosphere. Stuart’s 
words exemplified the rationale behind the evolution and change evident in CP practice 
over time and his objective was to create a feeling of a ‘gathering’ or a ‘party’. He 
believed that music events should be based upon mutual trust between promoters, 
musicians and audiences (see also Chapter 3), whereas the event as a whole should aim 
to foster a sense of togetherness. 
I still remember his expression of disapproval and surprise when somebody stole my 
bottle of wine at the WSP thirteen-band all-nighter at the Audio Lounge studio in 
Maryhill, where Stuart was DJing. He said: ‘Who would do such a thing?’. Note that 
this specific event had attracted around 300 people. Stuart was not being naive but 
articulating his strong belief, stemming from his experience, that people attending 
similar events shared a more-or-less similar êthos or that, at least, they  were conscious 
of the ‘sense of togetherness’ advocated by  the DiY network and thus respectful towards 
it. Perhaps, a similar feeling of intimacy was the reason for my  inattentive behaviour in 
the first place.
The fact that Stuart was striving to induce a sense of togetherness in his events as the 
telos of his subjectivation confirms Foucault’s idea that ‘the self’ is not pre-given but 
has to be created (1997: 262). Actors are not born ethical subjects (Faubion 2011: 4). 
Insofar as different  actors strive to occupy the same position, individual idiosyncrasies 
and the modes of subjectivation are integral to an anthropology of ethics that wishes to 
trace the variable trajectories and limits of subject positions and not merely  their 
themitical reproduction. 
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Faubion argues that once actors securely  occupy their positions, ethical practices 
become dispositional, a part of the habitus (2011: 37;  see also Mahmood 2005: 136). 
The accumulation of such dispositional capacities does not  necessarily  imply that the 
end of subjectivation – the occupancy of a subject position as the actor’s ethical telos – 
equals to the consummation of a project  (Faubion 2011: 42-43). Stuart was not confined 
by the subject position for which he was recruited and he implemented various changes 
as a result of his askêseis. But even if he reached his telos, even if CP became the 
exemplification of inclusivity and intimacy it would not be the end of the line:
I guess people can rely on it  [Cry Parrot], they continue turning up, people are 
stimulated by the events and the network has expanded...That’s what  I want  and I 
want to keep it  exciting all the same though. I think that’s the big thing, I just want 
to keep it  fresh. If you keep it  fresh and keep it  dynamic, you know, if it’s 
something that’s moving like a dynamic entity, to me that  brings more people on 
board because they’re excited by that thing. 
Such a view resists complete routinization, the process of transforming ethical value to 
themitical normativity. Routinization reduces ethical complexity. Yet  routinization is not 
the telos of ethics but its retraction and the partial capture of ethical value by normative 
schemata and recurring practices. This explains both the tendency for the emergence of 
countercurrents of increasing ethical complexity  and the historical and cultural variation 
of ethics (Faubion 2011: 114-115).129  Still, according to Stuart’s words above, small 
increases in complexity do not preclude the possibility of extending the ethical chrism 
(and the subject position as such), despite the fact that  the process of ethical valuation, 
of designating who is the subject of ethical regard, is inherent to routinization.
5.9 Generosity
When Foucault speaks of ethical substance, the part of oneself targeted for ethical 
askêsis and review, he does not necessarily mean one’s body. Carnal pleasures 
[aphrodisia] in classical Greek thought did not designate (Christian) flesh or sexual acts 
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129 Faubion seeks to avoid the trap of relativism through his engagement with Niklas Luhmann’s systems 
theory (Faubion 2011: 9-10; see also Robbins 2012).
as such, but instead referred to one’s relation to, and the texture of, one’s ethical 
experience of sexual pleasure and desire (1985: 43, 1997: 263-264). Although sexual 
acts were surrounded by a certain amount of suspicion and anxiety (ibid. 1985: 117), 
aphrodisia as an object of ethical concern should be perceived as ethically neutral, 
‘neither as irredeemably evil nor as always already and incorruptibly good’ (Faubion 
2011: 39). ‘[W]hen a philosopher was in love with a boy’, says Foucault, ‘[t]he problem 
was: Does he touch the boy or not? That’s the ethical substance’ (1997: 264). 
In reformulating Foucault’s question, I would like to suggest that the problem for Stuart, 
his ethical substance, can be phrased as follows: does he keep the proceeds or not? Does 
he give it all away or not? Of course, one obvious difference is that this problem, as 
opposed to the philosopher’s predicament, admits of various degrees. But Stuart’s 
ethical substance, what can be best  referred to as ‘generosity’, has all the characteristics 
of malleability and neutrality that  make it an appropriate candidate for the target of 
askêsis in bringing about Stuart’s ethical telos (cf. Faubion 2011: 55; Lambek 2010a: 
20). Generosity demanded ethical work. Hence the hallmark of Stuart’s mode of 
subjectivation: how to limit his generosity that was seen as detrimental to his long-term 
engagement with music. It was one or another chrêsis or ‘use’ (Foucault 1985: 53-62) 
that encompassed Stuart’s subjectivation: the use of money or, simply put, financial 
management as an ethically-valorized practice and not merely as a calculated functional 
strategy.130 
While generosity  (or its absence) is usually manifested as personal disposition, it 
belongs to the themitical dimensions of systems, in this case specifically  to the DiY 
mode of conduct. The regulation of chrêsis is not handed down as a set of rules but such 
moderation is predicated upon a savoir-faire on the part of the subject, a practice 
mediated through particular attitudes, themselves acquired through specific askêseis 
(Foucault 1985: 62). Stuart never conceded that he perceived or kept the proceeds from 
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130  According to Lambek, it is ‘the balance between prodigality and meanness’  that characterizes 
generosity, while knowing how to choose ‘the judicious middle path between two opposing extremes’  is 
indicative of phronêsis (2010a: 20). 
his promotional transactions as personal income or profit. It was evident though that the 
sharp differences between his early and later practice were inextricably  linked to a 
changing use of money. I would argue that the reason for such a shift was twofold: it 
related to Stuart’s experience of working in the local art and music industry, and second 
to the financial deficit that certain CP gigs had incurred. These reasons were interrelated 
as they both provided a lens into the economy  of live music promotion and questioned 
CP’s long-term viability. 
Stuart’s unpaid internship at the CCA was a case in point. The six-month post involved 
basic administrative tasks. However, this basic organization also extended to corporate 
networking events, which according to Stuart attracted substantial funds for the CCA. 
Although his internship did not have a specific focus, towards the end of his tenure he 
was asked to produce the Centre’s music programme. Stuart eventually  refused, on the 
basis of this task being ‘a proper, full-time, paid job’, which he would be keen to 
undertake if he was properly employed by the organization. As he explained to me: 
They realized that I was there and I could maybe help them with the music 
programme but, ultimately, I can’t  really do a music programme for free anymore, 
just  because it’s time more than anything. If it  was still a hobby I would maybe 
consider doing bits and pieces, but  the fact  that you get paid for doing one venue 
and then you don’t get paid for doing the other, to me, seems a wee bit unfair. 
Therefore, receiving a wage from Nice‘n’Sleazy enhanced his conviction that  the effort 
and time invested in music programming and promotion had to be financially rewarded. 
A common feature of both CCA and Nice‘n’Sleazy  was that they  provided Stuart with 
an opportunity to deal with more commercial aspects of the art  and music world. This 
experience was not an overtly  positive one: the CCA internship  afforded him some 
insight into arts funding, which, amidst a global financial crisis, Stuart believed that was 
‘crumbling apart’, feeling that  pursuing a career in the creative industries by following a 
publicly funded route was a risky affair. On the other hand, he became convinced that 
organizations in need of external funding tended to lose their focus on creative matters 
due to their overt orientation towards attracting necessary funds for their projects.
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Stuart’s converted approach regarding CP finances was also partly owed to the losses he 
had made over the years. In general, he claimed that music promotion was not a 
profitable venture and he would cite as examples the names of local commercial 
promoters who had decided to quit. Regarding the idea of keeping money from gigs to 
cover his earlier losses, Stuart mentioned that: ‘Some people would say: “Oh why are 
you [keeping money]?”. I don’t think it’s a bad thing, making money  back that you’ve 
lost in a gig’. 
As mentioned above, Stuart did this with the most successful CP gigs and with 
fundraising events, while he would forward these amounts to future projects, 
memorabilia and equipment – in different kinds of ‘investments’, as he used to call 
them. But the rhetorical question he one posed to me, and to which I had no answer, 
revealed Stuart’s intentions about the future of CP: ‘Why not take a wage if it 
consistently becomes something that is so busy all the time and acts are being paid 
really well?’. 
5.10 The Ethics of Identity
Stuart’s mode of ethical subjectivation was largely constituted, informed and 
consolidated by specific principles, attitudes and gestures towards financial resources. 
The ways in which a promoter operated at a business level were essentially acts of 
ascription to and selection of a subject position. Working through the ethical 
conundrums and risks of particular chrêseis necessitated considerable and diverse 
askêseis, because seemingly  trivial changes in routinized practices immediately signaled 
and were perceived as a shift of identity and ethical positioning. This acutely 
demonstrates not only  the strength and the extent of one of the themitical dimensions of 
the DiY ethical position, but also how close a link could be drawn between DiY and 
money  at a basic functional level, in the sense of how lack of resources engendered and 
sustained particular approaches to music-making, such as the practice of sharing 
(Chapter 3).
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The ethical framework put forward in this chapter affords some further remarks that 
transcend the realm of music practice. First, I hope to have shown that ethics is an 
intersubjective and pedagogical process of autopoiesis and that exercising freedom is 
fundamentally a matter of personal inclination and conscious choice as much as it is 
historically, socially  and culturally conditioned. I have demonstrated that the ethical and 
the themitical are not mutually exclusive but rather intimately related and co-
contributors to the subject’s ethical formation. Stuart’s (everyone’s?) ethical practice 
gives empirical credence to the idea that the ethical and themitical dimensions of 
autopoietic systems interpenetrate and affect one another. Otherwise, ethics would only 
be the outcome of a moment of crisis or ‘moral breakdown’ (Faubion 2011: 86). 
Zigon’s (2007) postulation of ethics as a fleeting event followed by the ‘return to the 
status quo ante’ (Laidlaw 2009: 436), disregards Foucault’s conceptualization of ethics 
as a process not isolated from moral precepts and as one’s continuous relationship with 
oneself (Foucault 1997: 263). This requires ongoing problematization (‘thought’), 
which does not invite momentary decisions, but historically  alludes to an open-ended 
process and thus to the subject’s capacity  to change itself and take different forms (ibid.: 
117-119, 256, 290-291, 318; see also Laidlaw 2002: 324). Problematization is not  only 
one’s reflection upon a problem, but ‘what establishes the relation with oneself and with 
others and constitutes the human being as ethical subject’ (Foucault 1997: 200). 
Stuart’s ethical telos cannot be perceived as the consummation of a project. It would be 
more precise to say that the ‘project’ comprised the consistent and continuous 
problematization and molding of his subject position interspersed with periods when the 
tendency towards routinization was stronger. Ethically speaking, this points towards the 
fluctuating degrees of self-determination that subjects have at  their disposal and the 
alternating and mutually  reinforcing nature of the ethical and the themitical. If at times 
Stuart’s askêseis took the form of ethical reasoning in relation to what was or was not 
appropriate from a DiY standpoint, then carving ethical routes incongruous with such a 
perspective confirms Faubion’s view, following Laidlaw (2002) and Nietzsche (1998 
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[1887]) before him, whereby  ethics does not and should not necessarily  refer to 
something positive, ‘good’ or ‘right’ (Faubion 2011: 61-62). Confining ethics to a 
particular value system and a specific contrast between ‘good’ and ‘evil’ assumes the 
ascription of a specific meaning to ethics (or ‘morality’) as such (Laidlaw 2002: 318) 
and the fixing of a ‘positive’ or ‘ethical’ content to ethical subjectivation.
Precisely because Faubion’s anthropology of ethics does not focus on the individual but 
on subjects passing through, occupying and changing (changeable) positions, these 
subjects could be of various kinds. Would it be possible to claim that Stuart was 
something other than a Western everyman, an individual, a person (Dumont 1986; 
Geertz 1983a; La Fontaine 1985; Mauss 1985)? As Faubion remarks: 
Like the typical human being, the ethical subject, even when only an individual 
human being, is thus already always of intersubjective, social and cultural 
tissue...Its I is always also other (2011: 120).
In this respect, the process of ethical subjectivation cannot be determined a priori as a 
process of individuation. Despite his focus on inclusivity and ‘togetherness’, the 
pedagogical and intersubjective mode of his subjectivation, the occasional collective 
nature of CP and the fact that as a promoter Stuart had inherited and disseminated a 
pluralistic ethics, the claim that he constituted a relational subject  seems far-fetched. I 
would refrain from arguing this, contrary  to what I have claimed about Divorce 
(Chapter 4), mainly due to the sense of individual ownership  and control that Stuart 
sought to retain on CP throughout. 
I would be equally  reluctant though to contend that Stuart was an individualistic 
individual, regardless of how themitically  strong such a calling is in our society. This 
brings me to a final point that concerns ‘identity’. Stuart once told me that that  CP was 
ultimately  his identity with music. Ethically-marked identity cannot be reduced to what 
is usually  referred to as ‘status’ or ‘role’ (nor to some combination of these) due to its 
ethical indeterminacy (Faubion 2011: 101-104). As such, an anthropology of ethics 
265
should start from and be grounded in ethical practices, but the unroutinized nature of 
ethical value precludes the identification of an ethical subject with the contingency of 
his or her practice. Ethics envelops praxis and poiêsis but is also present in sheer being, 
because ‘the ethical subject does and must  engage in poiesis even in merely being an 
ethical subject’ (Faubion 2011: 102). Identity conveys ‘a dimension of practice and the 
organization of practice’ that is irreducible to normative demands (ibid.: 13). Therefore, 
as Stuart’s statement above shows, identity  is better conceived of as being intimately 
related to one’s subject position (ibid.: 104; see also Robbins 2012). However, this 
should remain an ethnographic question.
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Part III





 6.1 The Ethical Bricoleur
In Part II I described the set of distinct but related ways in which my informants sought 
to become ethical subjects, that  is, to fashion ethical selves through music practice. The 
considerable variety  of technologies of the self that  subjects historically  and cross-
culturally have had at their disposal has enabled me to examine an array of musical and 
extra-musical practices and their interrelationships as essentially practices which people 
had chosen in order to make themselves the subjects they wished to become. This 
variety must be qualified, however. Not all practices revolving around music are 
techniques of self-formation, character-building and transformation. Not all practices 
foster a specific êthos. Not all practices seek to do so or accomplish this in different 
contexts, nor do all subjects undergo the process of autopoiesis, nor are they able to 
pursue an ethical life: for the ancient Greeks, a slave – to others or to one’s appetites or 
desires – has no ethics (Chapter 5). He or she lacks the capacity, that is, the freedom to 
determine themself and become an ethical subject. 
What, then, was particularly ‘ethical’ about the techniques that my informants 
employed? Was there something that bound these disparate practices into an ethically 
coherent whole? I believe that what emerges from the preceding chapters as the salient 
feature of my  informants’ ethical subjectivation is their differentiated relationship  with 
DiY, and specifically with a DiY êthos. Whether it was perceived as something to be 
cherished, embraced, expanded or avoided, the ethical resonance of music practices I 
observed during my fieldwork exhibited more than a contingent relationship  to DiY. 
What compelled me to ethically  frame ordinary music practices in the first place was 
the intrinsic ethical dimension of DiY in both practical and discursive terms. DiY 
purported to be ethical and was ethical by virtue of its partially  negative identity 
conferred by its professed opposition to practices that were considered ‘unethical’. 
Therefore, my informants had preceded me in framing music as an inherently ethical 
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practice and discourse. And a DiY êthos, variably  articulated, recognized and practiced, 
was central to this.
Consequently, this chapter should begin with the most basic question: what  is DiY? The 
answer stumbles upon a seemingly unsurpassable obstacle: DiY has been historically 
deployed to describe a broad range of practices, and as a result to convey  diverse 
meanings. Its use in popular discourse emerged in association with home-improvement 
projects in the 1930s and, especially  in Britain, during the postwar period a ‘Do-it-
Yourself’ approach to home improvements was flourishing (see also Luvaas 2012: 
8-10).131  The need to rebuild the country after the war meant that  DiY initially sprung 
out of necessity, in the absence of the financial means of many  working- and lower-
middle-class households to hire the services of professionals (Oram 2003: 179). 
Concurrent developments in popular culture culminated in the proliferation of skiffle, a 
popular music genre that had its roots in black and white folk music and in Britain 
evolved from the British jazz revival (see Dewe 1998). By employing a DiY approach, 
skiffle musicians utilized homemade instruments and the genre became hugely  popular 
in the country  by paving the way for the subsequent emergence of other music genres 
(see Frith et al 2013). Nevertheless, it was not until the advent of punk and post-punk in 
the late 1970s and early 1980s that DiY’s meaning as an êthos was firmly established 
(see e.g. O’Hara 1995; Reynolds 2005; Savage 1991).
An anti-consumerist  and collaborative êthos that propagated active participation and the 
democratization of culture through equal access to the means of its production was of 
course not particular to punk. For example the international arts and crafts movement 
born in Victorian England during the 1850s (e.g. Blakesley 2006), and the production of 
‘zines’, initially foreshadowed by science fiction fanzines in 1930s U.S. (see Duncombe 
1997), were predicated upon similar values and ideas. A set of DiY-oriented aspirations 
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131  Relevant publications of the period were read widely. The magazine Do it Yourself first circulated in 
1957.
were also attached, at least discursively, to the so-called ‘rave’ scene in the UK in the 
late 1980s and 1990s. The media-generated moral panic surrounding raves at  the end of 
1980s focused upon what was seen a dangerous, decadent, drug-fueled cultural form, 
which ended up being banned by the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act in 1994. 
Apart from the extraordinary fact  that a law made a mention of a specific type of 
popular music, the 1994 Act was targeting far more than this and it imposed constraints 
on various forms of grassroots oppositional activity, such as squatters and New Age 
travelers. Not only did the Act backfire and result in the intensification of these and 
other activities but  the political climate of the preceding period had also given rise to 
additional forms of cultural and political expression. Therefore, under the umbrella of 
‘DiY culture’ (McKay 1996, 1998) an array  of practices and events came together, such 
as free festivals, ecological activism, anti-road movements and self-publishing.132  The 
following decades, DiY culture saw an ever increasing diversification of this activity 
and an even broader use of the term DiY. Nowadays ‘Do-it-Yourself’ is a ubiquitous 
motto employed to designate practices ranging from music and the arts to knitting and 
making cupcakes. One even encounters DiY employers, accountants and PR agents 
(Duncombe 1997: 188-189; Luvaas 2012: 5-6).
From this unavoidably partial overview three things immediately  emerge: first, DiY has 
been a historical phenomenon. Second, a DiY approach is not exclusive to music but 
belongs to a much broader terrain. The second point anticipates the third, namely that 
even within music there is profound disagreement and confusion as to what constitutes 
DiY practice. The existence of relevant historical antecedents obscures rather than 
clarifies, because there has been no consistent pattern for subsequent practitioners to 
follow. Consequently, the loose threads that constitute the fabric of the historical 
relationship  between music and DiY may still be taken as a blueprint, but one that is 
always accompanied by  a certain eclecticism. Indeed this seems to be the only way of 
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132 See, for example, Atkinson (2006), Holtzman et al (2007),  Spencer (2005) and The Trapese Collective 
(2007).
attempting to make sense of the meaning of the term while living up to the ‘standards’ 
delineated by previous, similar operations. This attempt is further undermined by  the 
sheer variety  of practices and multiplicity of domains that have appropriated the term, 
each in turn endowing it with additional meanings. Thus, DiY presents the same 
problem that we encountered in relation to the concept of ‘scenes’ (Chapter 2), namely 
that it is a vernacular term loaded with diverse meanings that has been introduced in 
academic discourse. How can we unproblematically  accept, for example, that a DiY 
accountant and an anti-road protester present the same values?
We do not  have to search outside of anthropology  to find an answer to this question. 
The notion of the bricoleur conjures up an image of the DiY practitioner that  seems 
applicable in virtually all the instances described above (and many more). Making do 
with ‘whatever is at hand’ has always been the fulcrum of DiY practice. In a practical 
sense, then, ‘Do-it-Yourself’ can be perceived as a form of bricolage, that is a 
patchwork constructed from a limited amount of material resources and not defined in 
terms of a project but  by its potential use (Lévi-Strauss 1966: 17-18; see also Luvaas 
2012: 110-111, 122-123). 
The figure of the bricoleur is certainly  insufficient to account for the political character 
of DiY movements or the ethical potential of DiY practice, both of which have invested 
the term with plural meanings. But what if the bricoleur is indeed a singular figure 
across the realm of DiY practice, contrary  to what we might initially think? What kinds 
of answers can we come up with if we rephrase the initial question and instead of asking 
what DiY is, we ask what DiY practitioners do? After all, the history of DiY is a history 
of practices rather than things. Even when the term is followed by a noun and not a 
gerund, it  implies a crystallization of activity. That is, that  objects are embodiments of 
skillful activities.
DiY involves making things yourself instead of consuming ready-made ones 
(Duncombe 1997: 7; Holtzman et al 2007: 44). This means that the necessary skills for 
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any DiY activity  must be acquired. I would like to argue that  the acquisition of skill 
does not precede but is intrinsic to DiY practice and emerges in the process of 
engagement with specific activities. By following Ingold’s insights (2000), I perceive 
DiY not as a set of practical rules or a design to be subsequently  handed out to passive 
followers, but rather as a skilled practice in and of itself. People make things, such as 
building houses, cooking food, or weaving baskets. All these are forms of making. What 
if, as Ingold suggests, we reverse this and perceive making as a form of weaving? 
Whereas making highlights the production of an object – the consummation of a project 
– weaving aptly demonstrates the processual nature of skilled activity  and the gradual 
emergence of material form, which is always embedded in and the outcome of the 
whole field of relations between practitioners, their tools and materials, as well as the 
environment in which they are situated. 
If, as I want to argue, DiY can be best described as an emergent skilled practice, then 
how can we account for its ethical resonance? The leap from practical skills to ethics 
seems huge. However, this is not the case (Widlok 2004). As Francesca Bray notes: 
‘Everyday ethical behaviour can be viewed as a form of skilled practice, one that always 
mobilizes social and symbolic resources and that frequently also deploys material, 
technical skills and instruments’ (2013: 180). Everything that applies to skilled practice 
could also be invoked or ‘borrowed’ in order to examine DiY as ethical practice. In the 
same way that skills are learned and acquired in-the-weaving, individuals become 
ethical subjects through cultivating and conditioning themselves within complex 
intersubjective environments. Thus, instead of the external imposition and individual 
enactment of ethical rules, DiY encapsulates and exemplifies a form of ethics that is 
contingent upon the total field of relations in which the subject is enmeshed.
It is for this reason that  the notion of ‘DiY culture’ is problematic, because the 
connotations of ‘culture’ convey an a priori consensus which is constraining and which 
obscures rather than illuminates the fact that the array of ethical activities under the 
DiY rubric are grounded in the very process of doing it. Now, if playing music can be 
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seen as an ethical practice, this is also because the plenitude that  it brings is internal to 
the practice (MacIntyre 1981); people do it for pleasure and in order to excel in their 
playing. However, there are also goods that are external to music-making for which 
different actors compete, such as being paid for performing or gaining fame and 
prestige (Bourdieu 1993). In retaining the inherent pleasures of music-making, my 
conviction is that DiY represents a nexus where both internal and external goods meet.
If the emergence of material forms and ethical subjects is the result of repetitive, 
rhythmic movements and habitual practices, the consolidation of DiY practice through 
music-making in the city also requires its rhythm (Lefebvre 2004). In building upon my 
discussion in Chapter 3, and by employing Finnegan’s concept of pathways (1989) I 
will demonstrate that DiY music-making as a form of weaving is a distinctive urban 
practice and that its regularity across a series of cross-cutting urban pathways enables 
subjects to exercise their right to the city  (Lefebvre 1996, 2003). For Lefebvre, the right 
to urban life is enacted in the use of the city by  its inhabitants and in the appropriation 
of spaces. 
Similarly, Ingold remarks that use is the process by  which forms are produced, and it 
should be seen as a creative ‘process of environmentally situated and perceptually 
engaged activity’ (2000: 354). This is equally true for the bricoleur, whose means are 
defined not in terms of a project but in terms of their use in ever changing 
circumstances. More specifically, due to the scarcity  of his or her resources at hand the 
bricoleur’s decision about where to place an element in a construction will dramatically 
affect the structure of the emerging form (Lévi-Strauss 1966: 19). By changing the form 
the bricoleur changes both the system and himself or herself, because the form and the 
bricoleur are integral parts of the system of relations that gives rise to the former. Thus, 
changing the city means changing ourselves: the right to the city, I repeat, is an ethical 
right. Therefore, by highlighting the inadequacy of the term ‘local’ to capture the 
generative and relational aspects of locality, I rely on urban musical pathways in order 
to address the specificity of the city as an emanating form of ethical life (Lambek 2011). 
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It follows that the creative practice of the bricoleur involves improvisation (Hallam & 
Ingold 2007), which develops into a form of cultural production (DiY) that reflects and 
affects a form of dwelling (urban living), as well as ethical forms (ethical subjects). In 
the bricoleur’s universe, these three forms are interrelated within a system that ‘grows’ 
from within. In working through fragments, the bricoleur creates something novel out 
of the old (Ingold 2000: 371). The synergy of humans and materials in any  skilled 
practice calls attention to the constellations of diverse relations that are also involved in 
the carving out of ethical trajectories. I address this matter by arguing, following 
Laidlaw (2010b), that although ethical subjectivation requires a distributed notion of 
agency and personhood, the fact that intentionality is seen as the defining characteristic 
of agency is problematic, while a causal web of relationships between different actors 
fails to account for the assignment of responsibility. Because of this, the idea of freedom 
is more conducive to our understanding of ethics (Foucault 1997; Laidlaw 2002). 
This is a pressing issue and more so due to the connotations of resistance and opposition 
implied in the term agency which confines all practice within a structure/agency 
dualism and disregards that, far from oscillating between the two, certain ethical 
practices signal its dissolution (e.g. Mahmood 2005). As I have shown in Part II, my 
informants did not resist local norms and established music practices but actively 
attempted to inhabit them, albeit on their own terms. In doing so, they did not engage in 
a form of political activism or resistance as it has been argued for ‘DiY culture’ (McKay 
1996, 1998; see also Gartside 1997; Halfacree 1999). Their ‘politics’ was not predicated 
upon an elaborate articulation of social and political aspirations; it was a ‘politics by 
example’ (Duncombe 1997). In other words, it was defined not by its specific content, 
but by an evolving form. And as Walter Benjamin has argued, progressive cultural 
politics depends not on what you do, but how you do it (1970 [1934]). 
❊❊❊❊❊❊
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DiY is a paradox. It is used in a striking variety of contexts, yet no single definition is 
able to capture this pluralism; and I have attempted to outline here the reasons why it 
should not. In the remainder of this chapter, I break down ‘Do-it-Yourself’ into its 
constituent parts and examine them in turn.133  I start from the middle in an attempt to 
define what ‘it’ is or what is meant by ‘it’. I draw on the views of several of my 
informants in order to highlight that even within a fairly  small and well-connected 
network of individuals engaging in similar music practices, consensus on the meaning 
of the term is impossible to attain. This leads me to the conclusion that the semiotic 
meaninglessness of the term as well as its omnipresence reflect what has been called a 
floating signifier (Lévi-Strauss 1987 [1950]), but that its value lies in what the term 
does rather than what it explains. Next, I offer a detailed analysis of ‘doing’ in DiY and 
explore its potential as a skilled urban practice. I contend that the evacuation of the 
term’s propositional force is balanced by the ways in which DiY practices endow it with 
ethical meaning. The conviction that DiY is still meaningful is reinforced in the final 
section where I examine its relational nature. I find ‘yourself’ to be out of step with 
practices on the ground which point towards a reconsideration of Western forms of 
individualism and of conventional notions of ‘politics’. 
6.2 To ‘DiY’ for: Doing for What?
It was not only  Stuart who seemed perplexed by the content of the term. In fact, one 
could argue the opposite, namely that his conscious ethical conditioning was predicated 
upon the continuous problematization, realization and, ultimately, renunciation of 
certain aspects of a DiY êthos. By contrast, it is the puzzlement and contradictions 
arising from the claims and practices of WSP and Divorce that forcefully demonstrate 
the difficulties in delineating a set of prescriptions that typified a DiY approach to 
music-making. 
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133  ‘Do-it-Yourself’ appears in different forms in the literature (e.g. DiY, DIY, D.I.Y.). This seems to 
convey little more than personal preference, something which underscores DiY’s fluidity and shows that 
an examination of its meaning should begin with the term itself.
In Chapter 3 I indicated that, strictly speaking, WSP lacked a well-defined agenda that 
directed their conduct. The collective’s self-professed ‘disorganization’, and the 
apparently  piecemeal attempts in articulating a clear and concise framework testified to 
what seemed to my uninitiated eyes an open-ended and precarious enterprise. Of course, 
their ideas and practices were constantly challenged, negotiated and sharpened through 
experience. Moreover, these were linked to a set of notions relating to a virtuous modus 
operandi, as well as to judgements about music’s inclusiveness and accessibility.
WSP perceived the DiY êthos mainly as the means to claim and retain control of their 
music. Keeping control and operating as a non-profit unit were seen as interdependent 
but the latter’s association with DiY was far from clear-cut. Whereas non-profit was 
ostensibly  easier to grasp,134  the term DiY had been the object of constant negotiation, 
appropriation or rejection. Colin believed that it was a source of confusion for everyone 
involved and that its êthos, which conveyed a communal venture, literally contradicted 
‘Do-it-Yourself’. Rather, the term functioned as a signifier that affiliated WSP with like-
minded music practitioners and simultaneously  distanced them from others. Hence the 
correlation between DiY and non-profit as an index of the collective’s approach, 
according to Iain: 
With DiY you know that  we’ll not  make money off it. That’s what I would get  if I 
saw it somewhere. We’re just non-profit. I think it  would probably be better to say 
non-profit  all the time, because I don’t  know whether people that  say they are DiY 
are actually non-profit. 
DiY then did not represent an accurate or truthful description of non-profit  activities but 
an ill-defined term and a potent signifier, a guarantee of ethical conduct and a practical 
guide that enabled WSP to navigate the complex map of the local music industry. Yet 
the appealing simplicity  of DiY facilitated and established connections between like-
minded individuals. Embracing a DiY êthos was furthermore explicitly geared towards 
accumulating necessary knowledge through hands-on training and experience. 
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134 However,  charging a fee for events or even covering costs by taking money off the proceeds could be 
considered ‘unethical’ for part of the DiY cohort (see Chapter 5).
Consequently, empowerment and self-sufficiency were cherished and, therefore, WSP 
believed that it was especially  important for younger bands, who could thus circumvent 
intermediaries (WSP included). What is more, music per se was privileged over a 
shared DiY êthos, which was desirable but still inadequate as Peter explained: 
You don’t want to be putting on bands just because they’ve got the same ethics as 
you...If you’re not into the music what’s the actual aim of doing that?
Nevertheless, a kindred mentality beyond music was indeed crucial, evident in the 
collective’s numerous contacts with GSA students and graduates. WSP held the opinion 
that artists had a nuanced understanding and superior hands-on experience of DiY 
practice due to the nature of their craft. 
It was not  exclusively ‘noisy’ bands that subscribed to a DiY êthos. For example, 
various bands on the WSP roster were musically quite distinct from, say, Divorce, who 
advocated a harsh and abrasive sound (Chapter 4). Thus, there was no direct 
correspondence between a specific sound and a DiY êthos locally. Nevertheless, 
according to Lucy, noisy  bands were in fact related by way  of a close link between DiY 
and a particular practice: 
For people that want  to make noisy music, a DiY approach to things is more 
conducive because it doesn’t require a lot of pomp and circumstance and external 
bullshit. You need your amps, you need some cables and some pedals, and an 
instrument. That’s pretty much it.
But that was exactly not it, as we have seen: the effort, care, planning, hope, 
disappointment, dedication, collaboration, frustration, competence, problematization, 
negotiation, and ongoing practice that engendered and sustained this apparent simplicity 
were integral elements of a DiY approach. Lucy’s comment is telling of the fact that this 
complexity could be underplayed and taken for granted by my informants. Having 
become dispositional, part of the habitus, these ethical practices, oddly enough, 
projected a musical aesthetic of simplicity. Indeed, understating the complexity  of DiY 
practice is itself a linguistic mark related to the floating nature of the term (see below).
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Although DiY as a modus operandi was appealing to the band, consensus was lacking 
with regards to its specificity and whether the band could or – echoing Stuart – should 
actually be identified with it. The modality  of DiY, which along with WSP the band 
collectively seemed to acknowledge, was that it enabled musicians to maintain creative 
control and the rights over their music. In the absence of a blueprint and in the face of 
financial uncertainty and shifting band dynamics, how this sense of control was 
interpreted, sought for and achieved varied greatly  among individual members. The 
band detested the ‘pay-to-play’ policy  and Alistair had made that crystal clear when he 
publicized such an offer (Figure 6.1), followed by derogatory statements about ‘pay-to-
play’ promoters and a declaration that the band would never play such a show. 
Figure 6.1: The ‘pay-to-play’ offer as it was made public by Divorce.135
Alistair entertained, however, that the band’s êthos could not be challenged or tainted by 
playing larger shows. This was important  as it  demonstrated an aspiration, akin to 
Stuart’s yearning, to transcend the stereotype according to which DiY bands should 
remain fairly  local and unknown. Contrary  to this conventional view, Alistair perceived 
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135  Retrieved from http://i763.photobucket.com/albums/xx275/andybrowntown/Tuttut.jpg [Accessed 15 
February 2011].
their êthos as having the capacity  to inform the band’s future decisions and actions, thus 
assigning to it  a much broader scope. He maintained that ‘Do-it-Yourself’ was more 
critical than music per se, because engagement with the former embodied an ethical 
apprenticeship not  merely  enclosed within the acquisition of musical skills. Having 
participated in other bands for years, Alistair was well aware that a DiY approach could 
be translated in Divorce receiving full credit  for whatever successes but also the 
responsibility for any potential failures. Creative ‘autonomy’ came at  a cost. This ethical 
stance notwithstanding, there were also utilitarian and realistic overtones, according to 
Lucy: 
It  depends on what you’re trying to adhere to, and that’s why I don’t  think that 
[DiY] is particularly trying to spread a message to people. It would be cool if it  was 
but I don’t  think it  is, because it  doesn’t work all the time, and I would have to say 
for everybody...It  depends, for example, on how big an audience you want to play 
and where you want to play.
Although DiY safeguarded the band’s ethical integrity, Lucy was not convinced that 
such an êthos could present a pragmatic alternative to the current status of the music 
industry, and, most importantly, that there was no intention of broadcasting itself as 
such. After all, receiving support from people outside the DiY network was 
unavoidable, if anything due to the scarcity  of venues and other material resources. 
Consequently, Lucy was particularly reluctant in classifying the band’s practice as 
‘DiY’. 
Ruth, on the other hand, found the term simply meaningless. Having said that, she 
perceived that the êthos reflected by the term was important. For Ruth, DiY had been 
made redundant and steadily followed the path of the term independent, which from its 
initial conception as independence from corporate interests had ended up a label 
(‘indie’) for musicians essentially operating under the thumb of major record companies 
(see Hesmondhalgh 1999). Subsequently, the rhetoric of independence became the 
hallmark of the DiY label. DiY was uncritically  used as an umbrella term and, just as 
‘indie’, it went from signifying something specific to conveying pretty  much anything, 
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which, as Ruth believed, was a sign that soon it would mean nothing or something 
totally  different from what it  was initially  intended. In its decreasing intelligibility, DiY 
had replaced independent with the former being merely a new word for the expression 
of old meanings. 
Common knowledge dictated that  the chances of signing a record deal with a major 
label that would not jeopardize or compromise the band’s êthos were slight, but on the 
other hand DiY record labels exhibited a shortage of financial resources due to their 
small-scale, self-funded nature. ‘Money is only ever there to pay for something, rather 
than pay people’, as Anna put it. In light of this, DiY epitomized a non-economic model 
that could still sustain music practice and its pleasurable qualities, while, for Anna, 
money-making could be seen as the denial of this process, harking back to a tension 
between creativity and commerce (Cohen 1991). However, the rest of Divorce did not 
share such a perspective – quite the opposite. 
The nexus between DiY and money was seen as a legitimate aspiration, an unavoidable 
matter-of-fact or a necessary evil. For example, Ruth noted that  money  unavoidably 
emerges as an issue the more successful a band becomes and also highlighted that 
earning a living through music could not be written off as ‘unethical’. Problems could 
surface though if music-making was exclusively determined by financial aspiration. 
Lucy  on the other hand, although happy in principle to make money  from her music, 
nevertheless doubted whether she could actually  do it had she been confronted with this 
hypothetical scenario. But as she remarked, even in the current state of affairs, music-
making was not immune to financial pressures: ‘You don’t want to think about the 
money  aspect but, let’s face it, it’s there...You just want to know that you’re going to 
break even’. If the possibility of earning a substantial income, desirable or otherwise, 
was highly  unlikely  for the band, Divorce members still recognized the fact that ‘Do-it-
Yourself’ was free-for-all. 
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So what did ‘the rest’ think then? Although space limitations do not allow me to 
examine their views in detail and attend to their equally  important thoughts on the 
matter, what follows should reinforce the idea that  DiY exhibited a kind of semantic 
omnipotentiality. 
For example, Robert who had released some of his music through WSP as Japanese 
War Effort acknowledged that DiY was essentially  a learning process but he found the 
term increasingly ‘fashionable’ and was reluctant to identify with its êthos. Jamie from 
Gay Against You (GAY) highlighted the connection between DiY and local arts, as did 
Alex from Ultimate Thrush (Chapters 3 & 4), who clearly distinguished between the 
collegial dimensions of DiY and what he perceived as business-like practices. Helen, 
who taught at the GSA, pointed out that, for a number of individuals, DiY represented a 
stepping stone and the initial part of a process towards career progression, while 
Michael from Errors, who shared a rehearsal space with Colin’s band (Gummy Stumps), 
believed that DiY was a positive and stimulating introduction to the music industry 
when compared with potential exploitation by major labels. However, he did find DiY 
somewhat ‘exclusive and cliquish’. Gerard (Chapters 1 & 3) endorsed this view by 
adding that DiY did and should have a much broader resonance outside music. 
By contrast, Ray from Open School who had presented at the Transmission event 
(Chapter 3), reckoned that the term was devoid of political meaning. Jamie’s friend, 
Barry (Chapters 3 & 5), identified a necessary tension or contradiction in the practices 
of individuals involved in DiY music-making whose self-reliance included a 
‘corporate’ aspect. I had observed two such examples during my fieldwork: Chris from 
Nuts and Seeds, whose band Dananananaykroyd [sic] had released material on non-
DiY labels; and Graham from Cry Parrot who was subsequently employed by a local 
commercial promoter (Chapter 5). 
The self-doubt and certain internal criticism were complemented and reinforced by 
external accusations and criticisms leveled at the DiY network tout court. I was told that 
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‘professional’ promoters had expressed the view that  the DiY cohort were ‘cliquey’, 
‘lazy’ and ‘disorganized’ (Chapters 3 & 5). This was why Graham from Cry Parrot had 
once argued with members of a well-known promotions company (ironically, the ones 
who subsequently employed him). I should stress here that, despite these negative 
connotations, not everyone outside the DiY network looked down on the ways in which 
my informants approached music-making; nor, conversely, did the latter single-
handedly dismiss the practice of non-DiY promoters. 
A good example was Synergy Concerts, which had been described to me as a 
‘crossover’, while Eileen, who managed Synergy, held the view that DiY was the 
bedrock of any  healthy music scene and she regularly booked bands from the DiY 
cohort to perform at  her gigs, including Divorce and GAY among others. Donald, who 
used to organize music events for the local music magazine Is This Music? was 
sympathetic towards the DiY cohort  regardless of his conviction that such a grassroots 
enterprise was emphatically amateur (cf. Chapter 3) and that the exclusive focus upon 
paying musicians was essentially  achieving nothing more than ‘turning capitalism on its 
head’.136
But not all grassroots music was considered DiY any  more than DiY signaled 
exclusively  grassroots operations. A DiY êthos lodged an ethical texture and a conscious 
poietic affinity in one’s relationship with music, oneself and others. The question that 
emerges though about ‘Do-it-Yourself’ is ‘to do what?’. ‘It’ could be endowed with any 
meaning and because of this, as Ruth pointed out, the term had become meaningless. 
The contradictions and dilemmas associated with it attested to the fact that an 
unproblematic application of DiY was impossible. To different degrees this was evident 
in the views and practices of WSP, CP and Divorce, but it  was also amplified by the 
diversity of opinion among additional music actors. Would it be incorrect to suggest  that 
DiY did not exist?
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136 On DiY as the flip side of capitalism, see Duncombe (1997) and Luvaas (2012, 2013).
6.3 The Floating Nature of DiY 
To return to my initial question: what is DiY? And a second: if DiY potentially means 
anything and nothing, why  do people resort to it in order to describe their music 
practices? Here, I will deal with the first question. I would like to argue that the 
meaninglessness of DiY derives from the very attempt to define it  as an abstraction by 
separating it  from the context of action. Although the term appears to accumulate 
semantic value in opposition to its ‘others’ (e.g. professionalism), it would be wrong to 
conclude that DiY is pure negation, defined in contrast to social conventions. Rather, as 
I have argued in this thesis, DiY essentially rested upon a plural relationship with its 
‘others’, while due to its strong focus on practice its definition was fundamentally 
positive. Because DiY relies upon practical action, its analytical bankruptcy becomes 
evident only when it is approached as a signifier of abstracted modalities of action. 
Considering the multiple and diverse ethnographic manifestations of the term, the 
variable and conflicting views of my  informants, as well as the fact that DiY as a 
meaning-bearing unit exhibits historically the potential of carrying any meaning, we 
seem to be dealing with an instance of a floating signifier (Lévi-Strauss 1987 [1950]). 
Lévi-Strauss employs mana as an example of the floating signifier, which is an acoustic 
image without a fixed concept. He argues that the difference between mana and similar 
types of notions in Western societies is not one of a kind but of the degree to which 
these belong respectively to an official interpretive apparatus (the Western parallel 
would be ‘science’) and a more fluid and informal system of communication. If the term 
DiY seems derivative, this does not mean that the notion encapsulated by the term can 
be reduced to its diverse manifestations or that it  is far removed from mana. Rather, in 
all cases, types of notions such as DiY, mana, or ethical charisma (Chapter 5):
[O]ccur to represent  an indeterminate value of signification, in itself devoid of 
meaning and thus susceptible of receiving any meaning at all; their sole function is 
to fill a gap between the signifier and the signified, or more exactly, to signal the 
fact that...a relationship of non-equivalence becomes established between signifier 
and signified, to the detriment of the prior complementary relationship...There is 
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always a non-equivalence or “inadequation” between the two, a non-fit and 
overspill...this generates a signifier-surfeit relative to the signifieds to which it  can 
be fitted. So, in man’s effort  to understand the world, he always disposes of a 
surplus of signification (Lévi-Strauss 1987 [1950]: 55-56, 62).
This ‘surplus of signification’ also explains why Lucy’s explanation above appeared to 
be simplistic. Because of this ‘inadequation’ and because ‘the signifier precedes and 
determines the signified’ (ibid.: 37), more specifically because DiY and similar notions 
mediate between the unperceived totality of meaning (signifier) and referential reality or 
knowledge (signified), the floating signifier ‘is the disability of all finite thought’ and 
incorporates primarily ‘the conscious expression of a semantic function, whose role is to 
enable symbolic thinking to operate despite the contradiction inherent in it’ (ibid.: 
63).137 As such, Lévi-Strauss continues, the floating signifier is:
[A] zero symbolic value, that is, a sign marking the necessity of a supplementary 
symbolic content over and above that which the signified already contains, which 
can be any value at all, provided it is still part of the available reserve (ibid.: 64).138
DiY as a floating signifier, in its pure, semiotic state, is an indeterminate value of 
signification. In its semiotic resemblance – not ethical equivalence – to ethical value or 
charisma, it largely remains unroutinized and beyond substantive articulation (see 
Faubion 2011: 95-97). But as Faubion warns us, the identification of the floating 
signifier with the value of signification itself should be approached with caution. 
Specifically, the semiotic importance of ethical value as a floating signifier cannot be 
equated with significance in an ethical sense, anymore than the semiotics of DiY can be 
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137  According to Mehlman (1972: 23-24), Lévi-Strauss subverts Saussure’s distinction between signifier 
and signified into a second Saussurean dichotomy, namely between langue and parole. This is due to the 
Saussurean ‘arbitrariness’ of the sign constituted by the ‘unmotivated’  relationship between signifier and 
signified having eclipsed in Lévi-Strauss’s formulation. However, Mehlman argues, the non-equivalence 
or ‘inadequation’  between signifier and signified embodied by mana indicates precisely this arbitrary 
nature of the sign entering the level of langue/parole,  where the possibility of communication coexists 
with its potential paralysis at the moment which language is transformed into speech. After all, with mana 
as a floating signifier Lévi-Strauss returns to the Saussurean signifier, albeit one without a definitive 
signified.
138  Lévi-Strauss’s conception of the floating signifier follows linguists Jakobson and Lotz, who perceive 
the ‘zero-phoneme’ as that which ‘is opposed to all other French phonemes by the absence of any 
distinctive features and of any constant sound characteristic. On the other hand, the zero-phoneme...is 
opposed to the absence of any phoneme’ (1949: 155).
seen to convey  its predominance in practice. Thus, if we are to account for the analogy 
of the semantic function of DiY and how it  precedes, determines and encompasses a 
constellation of variegated practices, then this would not lay in the term’s lexical value 
or propositional content, but in its illocutionary force (Austin 1962), that is, in what it 
‘does’ rather than what it ‘explains’. As Bloch (1989) has argued, once the propositional 
force of language decreases, its illocutionary  force may increase precisely due to 
linguistic ambiguity, in which case meaning cannot be separated from its context of 
production. 
Therefore, the ‘meaning’ or essence of DiY cannot be perceived outside practice but 
rather it is intrinsic to action. How to do ‘it’ is not given but is generated in the process 
of doing. Lévi-Strauss seems to agree when he suggests that we should not ‘seek the 
origin of the notion of mana in an order of realities different from the relationships that 
it helps to construct’ (1987 [1950]: 56). But whereas his statement refers to semiotic 
relationships, the notion of DiY alludes to ethical relationships grounded in real action. 
As such, DiY constitutes a specific register, that is ‘a mode that brings certain 
experiential fields “into resonance”’ (van de Port 2004: 11). These experiential fields are 
‘incontestable’, in the sense that they conjure up an image beyond discursive reason: 
they  are ‘as undeniable as they  are unspeakable’ (ibid.: 14). Although the semiotic 
indeterminacy  of DiY hinders its ‘discursivity’, it should be clear by now that as a 
register DiY was far from ‘undeniable’, at least among my informants. 
This points to the second way in which DiY clearly diverges from the extraordinariness 
and ineffability  of the floating signifier in its association with the ‘sacred’ (Durkheim 
2001 [1912]: 35-41; see Faubion 2011: 95-96). The lack of sacredness, however, does 
not deprive DiY from its ‘authenticity’ (see Conclusion), but it does call for its 
embeddedness within a notion of everyday life as opposed to a transcendental essence. 
If the absence of its capacity to enchant means that DiY, in all its profanity and 
secularity, cannot be termed a floating signifier after all, so be it. But it seems, to me, 
that we do not have to fall back on a sanctified notion in order to semiotically  account 
286
for its fundamentally  liminal nature; nor does this warrants us to discount it simply as 
an ill-defined motto that happens to be in vogue. 
Besides, DiY refers to a mode of ethical becoming and being in the world and, 
therefore, it is worth reminding that the ambiguous experiential nature of the processes 
of ethical conditioning it incites inhibits us from reducing it to a semiotic phenomenon. 
It is rather a phenomenon of which its opacity and atmospheric qualities are not merely 
semiotic but surround ethnographically observable practices (see Faubion 2011: 96-97). 
It is this meaning in-the-making to which I now turn in an attempt to illuminate the 
importance of DiY as an ethical, urban practice. If DiY verges on meaninglessness, then 
why do people employ it  to describe their conduct? How can we conceptualize DiY as a 
form of urban practice and what are the ethical attributes of such a practice, its 
implications for urban life and the ways in which people experience the city? Finally, 
can DiY enrich our understanding of how music actors become ethical subjects?
6.4 Locating Ethics
As noted in Chapter 2, Finnegan shows an acute awareness of the shifting boundaries of 
the locality, but ‘the local’ is nevertheless employed throughout her study 
unproblematically, although she argues that: 
It  would be misleading to envisage musical worlds and musical activities as fully 
contained within Milton Keynes itself. But  of course no town in Britain is only 
local...Musical activities outside the area were also important for those who 
travelled outside Milton Keynes or came to the area for the first  time, given the 
existence of accepted musical models more or less shared throughout  the country 
(1989: 183-184). 
Finnegan acknowledges the fact that the city was neither of direct concern to individuals 
and groups involved in music-making nor were their musical pursuits framed by its 
boundaries (wherever these might lie). Finnegan’s insights seem to hold for WSP who 
had moved in Glasgow from Stirlingshire, for those members of Divorce who came to 
the city from different places and for different purposes, as well as for Stuart who 
287
commuted from Motherwell. All three, as well as the DiY cohort at large had 
established connections with ‘like-minded’ actors in other places around the country  and 
beyond.139 
Thus, DiY music-making in Glasgow engaged people and places that were far from 
‘local’. ‘Locality’ itself as a self-contained geographical space or an analytical tool for 
the description of urban life is ambiguous at best, because it  assumes an embeddedness 
in space and time which conceals the fact that cities are in a constant  state of flux. Most 
importantly, it obscures the generative aspects of ‘the local’ not  as a spatialized 
metaphor or event, but as a relational (Appadurai 1995), performed (Coleman & Collins 
2006) and ethical practice (Lambek 2011). As Appadurai notes, anthropologists ‘have 
taken locality  as a ground not figure, recognizing neither its fragility nor its ethos as a 
property of social life’ (1995: 207).
One of my main objectives in this thesis has been to account for the shared but tacit 
practical and ethical knowledge that localizes music-making and its practitioners. This 
involved contextualizing the relationship between urban space and the temporality of 
music practice, as well as the processes of articulation of local meanings through an 
ethnographic examination of explicit practices vis-à-vis the broader historical, social, 
economic and political contexts in which these take place. 
Instead of an overarching framework for the social-scientific study of music or a 
conceptual pastiche consisting of an ‘eclectic array’ of ideas (Hesmondhalgh 2005: 32), 
I suggest that we should rather embrace the residual, porous and in between nature of 
social life as the definitive characteristic of music-making: ‘What would it mean’, Biehl 
and Locke ask, ‘to consistently  embrace this unfinishedness, seeking ways to analyze 
the general, the structural, and the processual while maintaining an acute awareness of 
the inevitable incompleteness of our theories?’ (2010: 320). Such an indeterminate and 
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139  For example, in December 2010 Eternal Fags (Chapter 3) played a successful gig in Murcia, Spain, 
while Stuart already had proposals to curate events abroad, and he did so shortly after I finished my 
fieldwork, at the Made festival in Umeå, Sweden. 
elusive state of affairs will not necessarily fail to address fluctuating, shifting and 
transforming realities. By contrast, it will embed ethnographic analysis alongside such 
transitions, temporalities and anticipations. Finnegan exhibits a certain uneasiness at the 
elusiveness of ‘the local’, which is part of the reason for her elaboration of the concept 
of ‘pathways’ that I have employed throughout. It  seems to me that pathways best 
capture these ideas in relation to DiY practice. It is worth quoting her at length:
These “pathways”...avoid the misleading overtones of concreteness, stability, 
boundedness and comprehensiveness...“Pathways” also reminds us the part-time 
nature of much local music-making...of the overlapping and intersecting nature of 
different  musical traditions and of the purposive and dynamic nature of established 
musical practices...These pathways did more than provide the established routines 
of musical practice which people could choose to follow: they also had symbolic 
depth. One common impression given by very many participants was their musical 
pathways were of high value among the various paths within their 
lives...These...were established, already trodden and, for the most part, abiding 
routes which many people had taken and were taking in company with others. To 
be sure, none were permanent in the sense of being changeless, nor could they 
survive without people treading and constantly re-forming them; new paths were 
hewn out, some to become established, others to fade or be only faintly followed, 
others again to be extended and developed...These pathways included both 
personal networks and established groups, and were another way in which local 
musical “worlds” were realized in practice. From the point  of view of both 
individual participants and the localities through which they ran, they constituted 
one set  of purposive actions – an invisible structure – actions through which people 
chose to conduct their lives (1989: 305-307).
What the idea of pathways captures so well is that music, as I have already argued, had 
first and foremost an important value in people’s lives. However this value was defined 
and realized it  yielded an ongoing, propulsive negotiation of the conventions of music 
practice not through innovative actions or a series of breaks with entrenched norms and 
‘traditions’ but through an improvisational creativity that dwells in becoming (Hallam & 
Ingold 2007). For Deleuze, ‘[h]istory  amounts only to the set of preconditions, however 
recent, that one leaves behind in order to “become”, that is, to create something 
new’ (1995: 171). These preconditions cannot account for all the ‘constellations through 
which life chances are foreclosed’ or anticipate ‘the ways desires can break open 
alternative pathways’ (Biehl & Locke 2010: 318). Echoing this in their analysis on 
creativity and improvisation Hallam and Ingold write that conventions:
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[C]an provide general guidelines or rules of thumb whose very power lies in their 
vagueness or non-specificity. The gap between these non-specific guidelines and 
the specific conditions of a world that  is never the same from one moment to the 
next  not  only opens up a space for improvisation, but also demands it  (Hallam & 
Ingold 2007: 2).
Therefore, musical pathways as life trajectories are neither predetermined nor 
teleological in the sense of having clear and predefined goals and aims, but generative. 
As outcomes of improvisation, pathways are also relational and temporal. I argued in 
Chapter 3 and 4 that following conventions involves not so much replication but  their 
continuous and often unconscious alignment to fit the circumstances of subjects who 
take part in mutual self-becoming. It is this rhythmical adjustment that invokes the 
temporality of pathways, predicated upon repetition and alteration as actors go along. 
Therefore, the rhythmically orchestrated relation between repetition and difference calls 
for a cyclical conception of time or, more accurately, an alliance between the linear and 
the cyclical, space and time, returning and becoming (Lefebvre 2004). 
Pathways have their history, not as pastness, but one that is always in-the-making. They 
are trodden but cannot be mapped: ‘There is no script for social and cultural life. People 
have to work it out as they go along. In a word, they have to improvise’ (Hallam & 
Ingold 2007: 1). If anything, pathways exemplify the idea of music-making as social 
practice and process. As people adapt pathways and, in turn, become attuned to them, 
anthropology should continually adjust itself to fleeting circumstances and to the 
imagining of alternative futures: ‘By  dwelling in the meantime of individual lives and 
social worlds’, and by  ‘[g]rasping subjectivity as becoming – rather than structural 
dependence’, anthropology has the ability to anticipate and shed light upon emergent 
forms of living, to ‘invoke neglected human potentials and to expand the limits of 
understanding and imagination – a people yet to come’ (Biehl & Locke 2010: 336-337). 
This immanence of life correlates with perceptions of time and action in DiY (Chapter 
3), which McKay defines as ‘a culture of immediacy’ (1998: 13). Its focus on action and 
‘the excitement of the moment’ risks losing sight of relevant historical trajectories, as 
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well as future potentials (Chapter 5). However, DiY means a shortage of time and ‘that 
is why there is an obsession with the collective present. There can be no long term 
strategy when there is no long term’ (Jordan cited in McKay 1998: 13). In other words, 
DiY practice essentially serves to bring the future into the present and, contrary to a 
teleological conception of progress (Chapter 5), its ongoing evolvement is embedded 
within DiY’s very nature (see below).
My informants’ urban pathways, in all their messiness, idiosyncrasies and spatio-
temporal dimensions, were concrete, grounded realizations of a DiY êthos. Indeed, the 
characteristics of complexity, malleability and persistence of pathways, the possibility 
for innovation as well as the fact that people passing through them contributed to their 
renewal, enlargement and continuity, point to their correspondence with ethical subject 
positions. In the same way  that musical pathways tangibly  enact processes of 
subjectivation and facilitate the becoming of ethical subjects, they also constitute a 
series of active routes towards localization and the production of ‘reliably  local 
subjects’ (Appadurai 1995: 206). 
In his article about locality  as a form of ethical life, Lambek remarks that the only way 
to grasp  the ‘soul’ of a place, to account for the there there, is to shift our focus ‘from a 
consideration of abstract space or stationary  objects to one of realized moral action...to 
the liveliness of human activity...to the acts of inhabiting place’ (2011: 206). In essence, 
then, the effort to account for ‘local knowledge’ (Geertz 1983b) is a process of 
accounting for the matrices of acts of habitation. Urban musical pathways represent a 
series of routes upon which such acts unfold. As spatio-temporal sedimentations of 
ethical practices pathways produce and constitute ‘the local’ as an assortment of 
activities with their own intrinsic temporalities embedded across space.
Thinking about the local in terms of activities pertinent to habitation also allows us to 
reclaim the particularity  of the local. In Chapter 3, I considered the ways in which 
participation in DiY music practice and the appropriation of spaces largely articulated 
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the collective’s urban existence. I further argued that the rhythmical nature of music 
practices necessitated an appropriation of time that was integral to music-making; and 
that such temporal appropriation is inherently  good when the activity in question brings 
plenitude and is in harmony  with itself. For Lambek, such activities represent a way of 
thinking about the local ‘with respect to the goods internal to a set of practices, such that 
activity and context are conjoined’ (2011: 209). 
But as these acts do not occur in a vacuum, they  demand and strive to accomplish the 
mutual recognition that is necessary to inhabiting the locality. Therefore, I argued that 
the recognition of one’s right to inhabit upholds an ethical right: the right to carve out 
an ethical life. For Lefebvre: 
The right to the city manifests itself as a superior form of rights: right  to freedom, 
to individualization in socialization, to habitat  and to inhabit. The right to the 
oeuvre, to participation and appropriation (clearly distinct from the right to 
property), are implied in the right to the city (1996: 173-174). 
More than this, exercising the right to inhabit simultaneously  engenders localization, 
not as a passive process whereby  subjects learn to produce and reproduce local 
knowledge ‘by virtue of its local teleology and ethos’, that  is, for itself (Appadurai 
1995: 206). Rather, localization occurs through the perpetual interaction and reciprocal 
relationship  between active self-making and practices that effect  urban change. As 
David Harvey notes:
The right  to the city is far more than the individual liberty to access urban 
resources: it is a right to change ourselves by changing the city. It is, moreover, a 
common rather than an individual right...The freedom to make and remake our 
cities and ourselves is, I want to argue, one of the most  precious yet most neglected 
of our human rights (2008: 23).
By ‘sculpting space’ and ‘by giving themselves rhythms’ (Lefebvre 1996: 105) along 
urban pathways, my informants foregrounded and enacted their right to the city. In 
doing so, they sought to carve an ethical self or, more precisely, to weave one. 
292
6.5 DiY as Weaving?
DiY lacked a definition a priori. Considering the close-knit relations between local 
music practitioners the absence of consensus might initially  seem odd. However, even 
in societies and groups that are considered ‘traditional’ it is not consensus but dissensus 
that forms the basis of cultural communication and the former is achieved through 
specific practices, performances and ‘rituals’ (Appadurai 2004; Fernandez 1965, 1986). 
Helen, who, as a local academic, active participant and researcher in grassroots art  and 
music, had a fairly well-informed view on DiY practice noted that, for all the diverse 
conceptualizations of the term, there was consensus that DiY was a ‘good path to 
follow’.140 
Therefore, the pathways associated with DiY were ‘good’, but their evolving nature 
positively precluded the delineation of specific definitions and criteria. Gerard, a long-
standing participant in local music, reiterated this conviction when he told me that: 
‘There comes a point where DiY stops being your own alternative and becomes the 
right way to do it’. This is where, I believe, we can search for an answer to the semiotic 
meaninglessness of the term as well as its ethical importance. What seemed to provide a 
sense of coherence to an otherwise fluid and porous group was the significance of the 
affinity between practical ways of making music and the ethical ways of actively 
following (or rejecting) specific musical pathways. Music practice per se had emerged 
as the object of ethical discourse and action. Nevertheless, DiY was not so much a 
modus operandi but represented the ethical modalities that infused a kaleidoscopic array 
of practices, and not only music. For Gerard this is certainly true: ‘It’s basically  how I 
see the world’. DiY was a dimension of ethical practice as such. 
A DiY êthos presents a mode of ethical conduct that is not  teleological. In other words, 
DiY is not the means to an end; the means is the telos. I alluded to this in Chapter 3 
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140  At the time of my fieldwork Helen also taught a relevant course at the GSA with the title ‘Do It 
Yourself: Art/Music/Publishing’.
(‘sharing’), as well as above in my  discussion about how to approach the local. More 
specifically, music practices pertinent to a DiY êthos can be seen as inherently good. 
MacIntyre distances himself from an Aristotelian conception of ethical practice in the 
abstract and distinguishes between internal and external goods in practices (1981: 
187-191, 196-197). For example, receiving money, status or prestige through playing 
music are goods external to the practice and largely  the result of particular 
circumstances. After all, one could acquire these goods by engaging in various other 
activities. Therefore, it is only when the goods cannot be achieved through other 
activities that they can be called goods internal to the practice in question. It follows 
that virtues should be understood with respect to activities that enable subjects to 
achieve these internal goods, that is, in relation to practices in which means and ends are 
conjoined.141 
As Lambek explains, ‘a practice is ethical insofar as the goal is not instrumental but 
reaching for excellence within the particular practice’ (2010a: 21). Lambek thinks that 
music is an evident example of this and that many people play for the pleasure of it and 
not for financial rewards, but he also argues that the distinction between internal and 
external goods is not absolute or always easy  to discern. Any given practice may be in 
turn linked to other practices and their respective goods, internal or external (ibid.: 
21-22). In fact, DiY music-making could be perceived as the nexus at which internal 
and external goods meet: where ethics, musical enjoyment and pleasure converge with 
the provision for necessary resources (in order for the practice to continue), publicity 
and even prestige; where ‘creativity and commerce’ are not necessarily  antithetical 
(Cohen 1991), but mutually constitutive (Weinstein 1999).
Therefore, in abolishing this distinction, the very constitution of what  comes to be 
perceived as ‘good’ (and, according to Gerard, right) emerges and is gradually 
accomplished in DiY practice. Criteria of ethical conduct are not always pre-existent but 
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141 MacIntyre reserves the term ‘practice’ only for those activities the exercise of which realizes the goods 
internal to them, but he notes that virtues are not exclusively exercised through practices.
are generated and formed in practice. According to Widlok: ‘The constitution and 
definition of human goods is an open process and evolves as any other skill and as 
human life itself evolves’ (2004: 60). Certainly, my informants followed already trodden 
pathways and emulated ethical exemplars, but their routines did not reduce ethical 
practice to rule-abiding behaviour or the application of norms. Rather, and to echo 
Colin’s words (Chapter 3), the value of a DiY êthos was shaped and honed by  the very 
process of doing it. 
To clarify what is at stake, a useful analogy can be made with Tim Ingold’s 
anthropology of skill, in which skilled making does not merely involve ‘technical 
execution’; design and construction are intertwined (2000: 289). After all, skill is not 
only involved in making tangible objects, but personal and social identities (ibid.: 290). 
It follows that the distinction between ethical practice as a form of doing or praxis and 
the production of objects as making or poiêsis cannot be sustained (Faubion 2001a: 
93-94, 2011: 102). 
As I showed in the previous chapter askêseis are technologies of self-making. 
Therefore, making objects and selves can be perceived as skilled practices. Normally, 
technical knowledge (e.g. making knots) cannot be handed down as a prior set of rules 
and representations, but is generated during its practical application (Ingold 2000: 358). 
Similarly, the knowledge about how to do things ethically is acquired in the process of 
responding to everyday  circumstances and of making ethical decisions pertinent to the 
pursuit of the good (Widlok 2004: 59). 
In both cases, making can be seen as a form of weaving: the process by which both 
technical and ethical practitioners perfect their skills through patterns and adjustments 
of rhythmic ‘movement’ in the production of objects and ethical selves respectively (see 
Ingold 2000: 290).142  In both cases, the form that is produced emerges in the rhythmic 
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142  This is reminiscent of Stuart’s attempt to try to ‘solidify’ and ‘perfect’ his practice, not as his ethical 
telos, but as a continuous movement and an ongoing dynamic process (Chapter 5).
repetition of the weaving movement and the gradual unfolding of the relationship 
between the practitioner and his subject matter (Ingold 2000: 342).143 
In a manner analogous to how the form of the object  is brought into being through 
skilled, rhythmic movements, the repetitive nature of DiY music practice across 
overlapping urban pathways produces ethical subjects. This is not to deny that both 
practitioners have an idea of what they want to make or become. And as Widlok 
remarks, while ethics entails striving for a good that may never be fully  realized, skilled 
practice aims to complete and achieve certain goals (2004: 60).144 
This also imposes a distinction between internal and external goods in practices. If DiY 
represents a link between the two, then how do we overcome this problem? This is 
precisely the issue with the notion of making, particularly  in that it ‘defines an activity 
purely  in terms of its capacity  to yield a certain object’, which is precisely the opposite 
of what weaving brings to the foreground: ‘To emphasize making is to regard the object 
as the expression of an idea; to emphasize weaving is to regard it as the embodiment of 
a rhythmic movement’ (Ingold 2000: 346). 
The above considered, WSP’s inability  to come up with a DiY blueprint or a package of 
rules to be presented at the Transmission event (Chapter 3) should be recast and seen 
against any design’s insufficiency to capture the processual dimension of skilled 
practice or to determine the form of material objects, ethical subjects and even living 
organisms (Ingold 2000: 344-345). Once DiY is perceived as weaving, ‘design’ 
becomes irrelevant. Rather, as baskets take shape within a field of forces at the interface 
between weaver and material in an environment, subjects emanate from intersubjective 
practices taking place in ethical environments (Faubion 2011). As such, (ethical) skills 
are properties, not of individuals, but of the total field of relations in which they are 
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143 It is important to note that, for Foucault, the self is not a ‘substance’ but a ‘form’ (1997: 290-291).
144 Furthermore, techniques of the self do not necessarily require a material apparatus and are often linked 
to instruction (Foucault 1997: 277).
situated (Ingold 2000: 353, emphasis added). Not only does this dissolve the distinction 
between designers and practitioners/followers but it points towards a more distributed 
notion of ethics, agency and personhood. In what follows, then, I look at the ways in 
which ‘Do-it-Yourself’ encapsulates a particular but problematic notion of agency and 
discuss whether this has implications for the anthropological study of ethics.
6.6 The Ethics of Freedom
Anthropologists have taken up Foucault’s ideas about power, domination and 
knowledge with particular enthusiasm. But as Laidlaw has argued (2002; see also 
Faubion 2001a), Foucault’s writings on ethics and freedom, which had been neglected 
until recently, open up a way to describe ethical freedom ethnographically and to 
account for its diverse, historically constituted forms.145  While Foucault is best known 
for his preoccupation with power relations, he nevertheless contends that these: 
[A]re possible only insofar as the subjects are free...if there are relations of power 
in every social field, this is because there is freedom everywhere...The idea that 
power is a system of domination that  controls everything and leaves no room for 
freedom cannot be attributed to me (1997: 292-293). 
As Laidlaw puts it, ‘among anti-Foucauldians, Foucault  was the original, and in many 
ways the best’ (2002: 322). In his call for an anthropology of ethics, Laidlaw asserts that 
such an engagement ‘will only be possible...if we take seriously, as something requiring 
ethnographic description, the possibilities of human freedom’ (ibid.: 315). According to 
Foucault, ‘freedom is the ontological condition of ethics’, while ‘ethics, is the conscious 
[réfléchie] practice of freedom’ and ‘the considered form that freedom takes when it is 
informed by reflection’ (1997: 284).146  Foucault’s idea of freedom is not predicated 
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145  See also Chapter 2. Lambek (2010a: 25-28), Robbins (2007: 294-295) and Zigon (2007: 137; 2008: 
42-45) acknowledge the importance of ethical freedom but their approaches differ, among other things, in 
the degree to which freedom is central to ethics and morality.
146  According to Faubion (2011: 36-37), the translation of réfléchi(e) as ‘conscious’ rather than 
‘considered’  or ‘reflexive’ is better suited to express the idea that, over time, ethical practices become 
dispositional and, as such, ‘unconscious’ to a certain extent (without this meaning that there is no space 
for creative intervention).  Therefore,  contrary to other translations of the term, ‘conscious’ registers this 
transition and addresses ethical practice in its entirety.
upon achieving but exercising it, and is neither rooted in reasoned self-interest  or 
agency, nor situated outside power relations: 
[Foucault] persistently distance[s] himself from two utopian ideas about  freedom 
(ideas which, being utopian, often lead in practice to the opposite of freedom): the 
idea that  to act freely is to act in conformity with reason (or one’s “true” interests - 
this is the idea that lurks behind much anthropological use of “agency”), and the 
idea that freedom is only possible in the total absence of constraint  or relations of 
power (Laidlaw 2002: 323).
According to Lambek (2010a: 25), Foucault’s idea of freedom aims to transcend the 
Kantian dichotomy between reason and grounded experience, while eschewing a 
conception of ethics as radical self-determination. Following Faubion (2011), I argued 
in the previous chapter that, while Foucault’s conception of ethics is not ‘subjectivist’, 
he emphasizes the subject’s capacity to bring about an ethical self as opposed to follow 
norms. However, I further noted that, for Foucault, the freedom of becoming the person 
one wishes to be is historically and culturally  limited (1997: 291), while the care of the 
self and one’s relationship with oneself are not processes detached from prescriptions 
(Chapters 4 & 5). For Foucault, this is freedom indeed and, moreover, the only kind of 
freedom (Laidlaw 2002: 323). Foucault’s freedom is one predicated upon interaction; 
not subjectivity but intersubjectivity. It is ‘the freedom of the subject and its relationship 
to others’ that ‘constitutes the very stuff [matière] of ethics’, as part of a broader 
concept of ‘governmentality’ that refers to ‘the whole range of practices that constitute, 
define, organize, and instrumentalize the strategies that individuals in their freedom can 
use in dealing with each other’ (1997: 300).
If the conscious practice of freedom is partially  dependent upon or related to the total 
field of relations in which the ethical subject is situated, then, to some extent, ethical 
self-fashioning will yield benefits for the whole group that partake (one way  or another) 
in any given practice. This reflects a crucial difference between external and internal 
goods (MacIntyre 1981: 190-191), namely that the former benefit individuals to the 
detriment of others, while the latter have positive effects for the whole field of practice. 
But from the perspective of ‘technical’ skill, this field involves practitioners, materials 
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and the environment in which they find themselves; it includes both humans and non-
humans. 
Continuing the analogy from the previous section, is it not the case that musical 
pathways as ethical trajectories bring together an array of subjects and objects, spaces, 
ideas and forces? Would it be wrong to argue that the cross-cutting DiY musical 
pathways are distinct forms of urban assemblages and that their ‘eventful’ nature 
depends upon the synergy  of humans and machines, urban and virtual spaces (Tironi 
2010; see also Chapter 3)? Or that ‘ethical materials’ such as musical (or writing) 
instruments (Chapter 4), may have indelible physiological and ethical effects on 
musicians, to the extent that we can speak of instruments having a ‘social life’ (Bates 
2012)?147  Or, finally, that other ‘objects’ such as promotional materials determine and 
facilitate ethical subjectivation (Chapter 5)? After all, Foucault himself would contend 
that subjects are produced by  and remain embedded within complex entanglements of 
forces and forms (1970). 
Furthermore, it  has been argued that, for all their profound differences, both Foucault 
and Latour’s respective works challenge the idea of autonomous intentionality and they 
do so in different  but complementary ways (Pyyhtinen & Tamminen 2011). Similarly, 
Ingold notes that intentionality does not belong to, or pre-exist in, ‘the user and the 
used’ but it is instead ‘immanent in the activity itself, in the gestural synergy of human 
being, tool and raw material’ (2000: 352). In all three cases, human and/or material 
forms are composed by  and produced as relational compounds.148  If intentionality  is, to 
different degrees, a property  of actor-networks, apparatuses or skilled activities, does it 
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147 This should not be conflated with the approach delineated by Arjun Appadurai on commodities (1986). 
‘There is a difference between musical instruments being incidental to, or constitutive of, social 
interaction’ (Bates 2012: 372).
148  This relationality is not a closed universe. For Ingold, skilled practices are embedded in and affected 
by an environment, while for Foucault (1978) and Latour (2005) action is enveloped by life and plasma 
respectively (Pyyhtinen & Tamminen 2011: 145). What we see is part of this ‘outside’  taking specific 
form in relational entities (e.g. power relations and networks). Semiotically, it is the relationship between 
the floating signifier and its signifieds, which always fail to express its wholeness but nevertheless 
emanate from it. It also corresponds with the relationship between unroutinized ethical value and 
themitical normativity (Faubion 2011).
follow that we should embrace posthumanism – or ahumanism (Pyyhtinen & Tamminen 
2011) – as an inherent characteristic of ethics?
I believe the answer should begin with the recognition that reducing agency and action 
to intentionality misses the point. I alluded to this in Chapter 4 with regards to the 
affective body, although in Chapter 2 I relied heavily upon the notion of agency to 
navigate through an array of concepts that seemed to be placed along a continuum with 
structure at one end and agency  at the other. One of the problems with ‘agency’ is its 
ubiquity within the social sciences, resulting in the concept assuming a variety of 
meanings. Laidlaw (2010b) identifies two major conceptualizations of agency  that 
currently pervade anthropological analysis: one that is associated with ‘practice theory’ 
and a less influential second version developed in relation to Actor-Network Theory 
(ANT). According to Laidlaw, both present issues and limitations. 
One issue with the former view of agency is that it is firmly and consistently  in 
opposition to larger structures and, as such, it  is only  rendered visible or valuable in 
actions that aim to resist, subvert or transform existing structures. Its structural 
significance indicates that ‘as an index of freedom, the concept of agency  is pre-
emptively selective’ (ibid.: 2002: 315). There is thus a discrepancy between lived reality 
– how subjects strive to realize an ethical self – and how, in principle, that is in theory, 
this ethical self ought to be realized. As I described in Part II, my informants critiqued 
but neither resisted nor wholly  rejected relevant prescriptions; rather, they demonstrated 
an active desire to inhabit certain norms, structures and configurations which agentival 
action is supposedly geared towards resisting. A further issue with this conception of 
agency is its exclusive focus upon individual subjectivity  and intentionality. Yet such a 
view of agency:
[S]muggles rather specific values into a concept of the individual’s efficaciousness, 
imagines this to consist  of a creative force deriving from the interior of the human 
individual, postulates a zero-sum relationship between this and socio-cultural 
structures, and finds moral as well as analytical virtue in discovering where the 
former prevails over the latter (Laidlaw 2010b: 145).
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On the other hand, Laidlaw continues, ANT’s premise that everybody and every-thing 
potentially play an independent role in a causal chain of events disregards the 
assignment of responsibility, which is always present in real life and inseparable from 
the causality of events, but cannot be explained solely  in causal terms. In other words, 
what is intentional is the interpretation of events and actions and thus the ascription of 
agency to specific actors. 
Similarly, in everyday  life there is nothing objective or natural in judgements about, and 
attributions of, intentionality and ‘moral responsibility’ to agents, animate or inanimate, 
something that we do constantly  (Laidlaw 2010b: 146-147). It emerges that causality, 
intentionality and responsibility  are intrinsically  but variably related, and their 
attribution is so deeply rooted in our everyday routines that we should try  really hard 
not to recognize in inanimate objects the kinds of intentions that ascribe responsibility 
(as ANT theorists do in order to underscore causality). For example, it was Ruth’s voice 
that had decided she could not properly sing at the three consecutive Glasgow gigs 
(Chapter 4). 
In turning away from subjective intentionality  or causality as the hallmark of agency to 
responsibility, Laidlaw draws upon Bernard Williams (1993, 1995) to demonstrate that 
agency does not strictly  coincide with either individual efficacy or with causal effects. 
This is because ‘agents’ might not ultimately be held responsible for their actions, but 
someone/something else or others in the plural. For example, Ruth initially did not take 
care of her voice. She slept less and partied and smoked more than was subsequently the 
case, while it  might be true that other band members had prompted her to socialize more 
after gigs than had Ruth intended. While all this can be explained in causal terms as a 
chain of events or by saying that what Ruth did was, in the end, her own choice, one 
may conversely argue, as Ruth did, that it was her voice, cigarettes, lack of sleep, the 
band or even singing itself that should be ‘blamed’ and which, intentionally  or 
unintentionally, harmed her ability to sing. 
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Therefore, Laidlaw argues that neither a focus on subjectivity  nor on causality, nor, 
indeed, some combination of the two is sufficient for imputing agency in any given 
situation (2010b: 150). Because it  is the determination of responsibility  that is 
intentional, how and why we assign it may vary. However, the complexity and diversity 
of responsibility and its motivated attributions are not subjective qualities and this is 
where, according to Laidlaw, ANT provides, at the very least, a useful corrective to 
practice theory’s conflation of intentionality with subjectivity, and thus helps to recast 
agency on the basis of distributed responsibility. Agency, then, should be seen as 
distributed and relational, because through ‘intermediating agencies’149  (which largely 
refer to the ways in which we are related to other people and social groups and not only 
objects) we may be held responsible (or not) for situations outside (or not) our 
individual control or intentions (Laidlaw 2010b: 152-153).150 
Because blame and responsibility  are indispensable from any consideration of action, 
the social-scientific dualism of structure and agency is not a dualism at all; agency  rests 
upon this third, ethical dimension of responsibility rather than causality or individual 
efficacy (ibid.: 154-155). This third dimension delineates a space ‘where people interact 
with one another, where decisions are – or seem to be – made, actors identified, 
responsibilities allocated, actions justified, moral claims asserted, and possible futures 
imagined’ (Keane 2003: 242). The actuality that agency is inextricably linked to 
relational processes of the assignation of responsibility has a final and crucial 
implication, namely that the proliferation of responsibility and its attribution, that is, 
‘more agency’, does not result, as practice theory would have it, in ‘more 
freedom’ (Laidlaw 2010b: 162). 
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149  Lauren Berlant also challenges the agency/structure dualism and the identification of agency with 
subjectivity and intentionality, by developing the concept of ‘lateral agency’ (2007).
150 Caton (2010), following Arendt (2003), also calls attention to responsibility to consider the problem of 
evil by drawing on a concept of personal responsibility. Laidlaw does not deny that individuals act, but 
that the source and assignation of responsibility for these acts normally dwells in a set of relations. This 
relationality serves to either undermine or augment one’s responsibility. For example, that statistics 
anticipate specific crime rates does not erase the fact that a criminal has committed the act.  It does affect, 
however, our judgement of where responsibility for the act lies and, indeed, our interpretation of the very 
identity of the act (Caton 2010: 179; Laidlaw 2010b: 153, 160).
The ethical dimensions of practice appear particularly  conducive to ethnographic 
description and analysis. They account for the ‘middle ground’ missed by definitions of 
agency caught up in a system of cause and effect or subjective intentionality. The idea 
of a culturally defined and historically  specific freedom as conscious, ethical practice 
addresses the concept of agency’s problematic connotations. Ethical freedom avoids 
both the overtones of resistance to structures and the easy  identification of intentionality 
with subjectivity. The ethical modalities of action are not intrinsic to individuals, 
themselves seen as given entities, but rather are intersubjective processes of self-
cultivation and formation. While ANT can help us to expose the contingencies and 
interrelationships that  underpin ethical self-fashioning, it falls short of accounting for 
the responsibility that ethical action always entails and our judgements in the process of 
assigning such responsibility. It  would be impossible to do these things if we embraced 
an anti-humanist ethics (see also Vandenberghe 2002; cf. Faubion 2011: 119).
6.7 DiY Politics
The argument I have just discussed demonstrates that we need to embrace the 
intersubjective and relational nature of ethical practice and, in doing so, we must 
transcend the structure/agency dichotomy whilst also reconsider established notions of 
Western personhood and individualism. We should not disregard the idea that music or 
any other skilled activity ‘brings into use’ human bodies and materials in an 
environment. There is a risk, however, that the ethical dimension of skilled practice will 
be obscured by a singular focus either on causality  or bodily techniques (see Ingold 
2000: 352). Skills – musical, ethical or otherwise – are learned and exercised through 
interaction and in conjunction with others. Whether it is making music, gradually 
transforming ourselves into ethical subjects, or both at the same time, these actions 
always take more than one person. Skilled practice requires care, judgement and 
dexterity  (ibid.: 353). Are not these also intrinsic characteristics of ethics? Moreover, as 
ethical properties, are not these of intersubjective nature as I have shown? 
303
‘Do-it-Yourself’, writes Stephen Duncombe, ‘is a far-from-radical proposition. The idea 
of not allowing your creativity  to be stymied by any “authoritarian system” is the 
essence of American individualism’ (1997: 188). And George McKay joins in: ‘[T]he 
turn to a politics of Do it Yourself, of self-empowerment, can be seen as a corollary of 
the Thatcherite notion of the privileging of the individual’ (1998: 19). However, my 
ethnographic findings demonstrate that DiY does not promote an individualistic 
approach to music-making, but rather that its ethical potential is firmly rooted in social 
interaction and co-operation. This is also where DiY’s ‘political’ essence is grounded, 
namely in the coming together of people. 
DiY is not politics by  definition, but ‘politics by  example’ (Duncombe 1997: 205). 
More specifically, following Duncombe’s insight, DiY is ‘pre-political’ (Hobsbawm 
1959), in the sense that it lacks a clear articulation of its own aspirations to transform 
the world. However, as opposed to political formations that have the means to effect 
change in the public realm, DiY gains its authority  through its focus on lived experience 
rather than political theory. It embodies the conjunction of means with ends by resting 
upon what Arendt, following Aristotle, called ‘actuality‘ [energeia], which conveys 
open-ended [ateleis] activities the meaning of which lies in performative action itself 
(1998 [1958]: 206). DiY is therefore ‘predicated on such authenticity, such 
commitment, such rooted realness of action’ (McKay 1998: 32). 
Nevertheless, saying that DiY is pre-political assumes a form of politics that DiY does 
not necessarily express. Hence ‘DiY politics’ in the section title, and not ‘the politics of 
DiY’. It would seem – at least as I have experienced it among my informants – that the 
kind of ‘political’ realm that DiY engenders and supports is much closer to Arendt’s 
notion, which derives from the ancient polis and according to which politics:
[R]ises directly out of acting together, the “sharing of words and deeds”. Thus 
action not  only has the most  intimate relationship to the public part of the world 
common to us all, but is the one activity which constitutes it (1998 [1958]: 198).
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Does it follow that DiY would represent a form of politikê, in the Aristotelian sense of 
‘the care and maintenance of the polis’ (Faubion 2011: 22)? Arendt describes a politics 
that, as Hirschkind perceives it, enables ordinary citizens to ‘shape the conditions of 
their collective existence’ (2006: 8). The ‘actuality’ of DiY reflects the privileging of an 
êthos rather than a homeostatic teleology. By contrast, politikê is energeia and praxis, 
but not poiêsis (Faubion 2001a: 93). As I have argued after Faubion (2011), the ethical 
maintains a primacy over the themitical, while for Arendt the polis ‘is the organization 
of the people as it arises out of acting and speaking together’ and not an entity in need 
of mere reproduction (1998 [1958]: 198). Faubion himself notes that Foucault’s ethics 
could never be confined within politikê (2001a: 91). 
Ethical freedom should not be conflated with politikê, but the êthos of freedom is 
profoundly political insofar as it involves one’s relationship with others (Foucault 1997: 
286-287). Foucault distinguishes freedom from liberation, because the latter is an 
essential but insufficient condition for the conscious practices that make people free and 
capable of co-existence with others (ibid.: 282-283). Arendt  would agree with this 
definition of freedom when she states that ‘the appearance of freedom...coincides with 
the performing act. Men are free...as long as they act, neither before nor after; for to be 
free and to act are the same’ (1961: 153). Therefore, acts that assert the subject’s ethical 
freedom are inherently ‘political’ and, as stressed many times already, always involve 
others: ‘Freedom needed, in addition to mere liberation, the company of other 
men’ (ibid.: 148). 
Still, if ethical acts of self-making have ‘political’ resonance, then what do they  do 
exactly? Does DiY resonate at all with politics as we have come to know it? Though 
direct political contestation did not appear to be part of my informants’ music practices, 
critique of established norms is implied by DiY practice, but  its ‘politics by example’ 
confronts the system from within: it appropriates the structures it purports to oppose 
rather than resisting them. From a conventional political standpoint, therefore, it is 
precisely the in between position of DiY that gives it its strength. As Walter Benjamin 
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has remarked, it is the place of cultural producers and their work in the relations of 
production rather the content of their work and its attitude to these relations, which 
characterize a politically progressive culture (1970 [1934]: 2). Such a form of cultural 
production becomes an example for others and helps to bring down the boundaries 
between producers and consumers:
An author who teaches a writer nothing, teaches nobody anything. The determinant 
factor is the exemplary character of a production that enables it, first, to lead other 
producers to this production, and secondly to present them with an improved 
apparatus for their use. And this apparatus is better to the degree that  it  leads 
consumers to production, in short that  it  is capable of making co-workers out of 
readers or spectators (ibid.: 6)
It seems to me that  this could not be truer for DiY, in the sense that it allows subjects to 
become producers. For Finnegan, the claim of being either ‘amateur’ or ‘professional’ 
can have political resonance (1989: 16). However, DiY is a political example by virtue 
of what it does rather than what it is or claims to be. On the other hand, freedom from 
something does not automatically culminate in freedom to something else (Duncombe 
1997: 193). Yet this bypasses the point  that freedom itself, as the very stuff of ethics, 
lies in our capacity  to become ethical subjects. As such, DiY constitutes first and 
foremost an ethical example.
However, DiY can never become a blueprint because it always emerges in the process 
of use. This is also how material forms emerge (Ingold 2000) and how cities become 
oeuvres (Lefebvre 1996). By dissolving content or ‘substance’ into form DiY ‘grows’ 
from within, rather than its form being applied from outside (see Ingold 2000: 339). 
DiY thus represents a form of autopoiesis and in the process of ‘growing’ it 
simultaneously  transforms the relations of its own becoming. This relational quality of 
DiY is what makes it important but elusive; it  is also what calls for a reconsideration of 
‘yourself’ in DiY. As both Duncombe (1997: 189) and McKay (1998: 27) have noted, 
‘yourself’ perhaps insists on ascribing a sense of atomistic or possessive individualism 
where it does not exist. If DiY is a form of weaving, then surely ‘Do-it-Ourselves’ 
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accurately captures the interweaving of musical pathways and ethical trajectories, in 




What has this thesis come to? An ethnographic answer would be that  DiY is better 
conceived as a verb, as something that people do, and as an Aristotelian ‘actuality’ that 
inheres in the process of new beginnings and one’s capacity  to act, what Arendt has 
called ‘natality’ (1998 [1958]: 8-9). 
But, as Stuart knew, the freedom to begin involved judging what was left behind and the 
compromises entailed in reconciling the old with the new (Lambek 2010b: 55). 
Conversely, and as the collective was aware, long-term commitment was equally 
ethical, but in a sense, all DiY activity was a beginning embedded within a constant 
stream of action and ongoing judgement. It was a process of ethical enskilment (Ingold 
2000: 416) that was inseparable from everyday  practice. It was, moreover, a practice 
predicated upon freedom and collective action, and a distributed sense of responsibility. 
It was small, but with tremendous power for ethical transformation. Its poietic and 
transformative capacities engendered an ethical register comprising bodies, selves, 
urban spaces and rhythms within a mutual becoming. Ethical bricoleurs constitute 
themselves, their bodies and the spaces they inhabit as a continuous self-bricolage 
(Rabinow 1997: xxxix).
This thesis started from the premise that music is a social practice and process. This 
allowed me to attend to the multifarious uses of music as the means for men and women 
to produce meaning, change themselves, their bodies and the cities in which they live. 
Music does not only dwell in musical notation but belongs to the realm of everyday life. 
In examining ethnographically  the everyday  practices of a small group  of three 
Glasgow-based music actors, I have sought to demonstrate that music, ethics and the 
city are inextricably related in quotidian but powerful ways. Listening, playing or 
dancing to music are ubiquitous practices that most people would not hesitate to term as 
‘good’, but the ‘virtue’ of music and its ethical potential tends to escape our everyday 
and academic horizons. 
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Certainly  not all practices are free from ultimate goals or competition, and yet ‘above 
all’, according to Lambek, ‘they provide orientation, motivation, and make life 
absorbing, worthwhile and even exciting’ (2010a: 22-23). Even though we could reduce 
the heterogeneity of DiY and trace its position within Bourdieu’s schema as a field of 
‘restricted production’ (1993), an exclusive focus on macro-processes would confine 
and, in fact, impoverish our understanding of the experiential and ethical pluralism that 
music practice affords. It would miss, for example, the singularity of the Divorce break 
by treating it as part of the interests and investments integral to the field, that is, as an 
illusio and a reassertion of the ‘game’.
This is not to deny that DiY is part  of a ‘game’ and a form of production that, in its 
many facets, variably invites or supports a consumerist lifestyle. However, for a practice 
that constantly undergoes reassessment and has been transformed from complete 
negation into a pragmatic response, neatly placing DiY within an overdetermined 
schema would seem to oversimplify. It would be a reduction of ethical complexity 
(Faubion 2011). Because such practices can only be fully grasped in terms of their 
ethical import, it  is through the examination of ethical practices that we might be able to 
understand their political significance (Mahmood 2005: 35). DiY is neither about 
rebellion or resistance, nor about subordination, complacency and passivity. As 
Hirschkind explains, to define practices of ethical cultivation as forms of indoctrination 
or enculturation would preclude us from attending to the fierce debates, disagreements 
and arguments involved, as well as from highlighting the fact that  subjects do not begin 
with a pre-formulated notion of the ‘good’ but this emerges in the process. Subjects 
acquire their understanding of virtue as they go along (2006: 140). 
DiY cannot be perceived as ‘leisure’ and though it may emerge as the outcome of 
practical necessity and defined by what it is not, it ultimately  has a positive definition. 
Practical necessity  for Bernard Williams is not to be conflated with ‘moral obligation’, 
which in many instances cannot explain ethically why one has chosen a path and not 
another (1985: 209). This choice may or may not have an ethical source, but it certainly 
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does not exist ‘outside’ the individual as a Kantian imperative. Therefore, ‘necessity’ 
emerges as not-so-necessary but partially as a form of self-deliberation. 
DiY seen through Benjamin’s perspective (1970 [1934]) permits us to trace not what it 
can do in politics but what it stands for as politics. Stuart once told me that  DiY was the 
means to ‘take something back’, that is, to reclaim and restore the right to musical 
expression and dissemination. DiY avoids becoming stagnant but it feeds off the 
structures that it is usually seen to ‘resist’. It inhabits them and appropriates strategies 
that it  turns into tactics (de Certeau 1984). It is a process that is projected onto urban 
space and the effort of city dwellers to inhabit the locality  (Lefebvre 1996, 2003). The 
transformation effected upon the city by DiY music practice rests upon the 
metamorphosis of urban life and of the urban experience of individuals and groups who 
engage in this practice. It is not a material transformation of the urban landscape – 
scarcely any materials were removed, destroyed or added by my informants’ activity. 
Rather, it is a transformation reflected in the musical trace of inhabitants, a trace that is 
neither reductive nor additive in a material sense (Ingold 2007: 43). Exactly as selves 
and bodies are not passive, pre-given entities waiting to be discovered, space is 
produced through practice (Lefebvre 1991). It  becomes one of the constituent 
dimensions of practice. The musical pathways of my informants were as much part  of 
the urban fabric as they were the means for its transformation. As Ingold succinctly 
observes: 
The inhabitant is rather one who participates from within in the very process of the 
world’s continual coming into being and who, in laying a trail of life, contributes to 
its weave and texture (2007: 81).
DiY practice, and musical performance as such, do not leave a material trace. In its 
immanence and in the sense of communitas (Turner 1969) it engenders, DiY practice 
leaves a tacit but indelible mark on the minds and bodies of performers and audiences 
and their ways of being and acting in the world. Its legacy  is an ethical one and the 
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culmination of this ethical self depends upon mundane, rather than extraordinary 
processes. The use and contribution of urban space to this ethical becoming is both a 
means and an end and affects as much as it is affected by this ongoing movement. 
Rather than conflating the right  to the city  with what is usually glossed as ‘human 
rights’, and what is ‘legal’ with what is ‘good’, Lefebvre’s formulation demands the 
disassociation of one’s right to urban life from rationalistic and legalistic discourses and 
places it squarely  within people’s capacity and potential to realize an urban ethical life 
on their own terms, through spatio-temporal appropriations and thus by forging their 
own rhythms (2004). It points to the ways in which urban processes, such as making 
music in the city, forge particular identities. 
These identities are conferred not by experiencing music, but by experiencing becoming 
ourselves through music: ‘[O]ur experience of music’, writes Frith, ‘is best understood 
as an experience of this self-in-process’ (1996c: 109). In building particular identities 
through music my informants exercised their right to recognition, to dignity and to 
equal rights (Taylor 1992). However, such recognition is already caught up in the 
politics of identity of an authoritative state discourse of legal rights.151 It would be more 
accurate to suggest  that DiY practice as an example and potential was predicated upon 
the cultivation of capacities and sensibilities so as to realize a different ethical, rather 
than political ideal (Mahmood 2005: 193).  
Simon Frith notes elsewhere that music can set in motion a distinctive identity that can 
be consonant or dissonant with the ways in which we are identified through other social 
processes (1987: 149). Does this set music apart from other human social activities? 
Throughout this thesis I have attempted to show how music presents people with one 
312
151  An alternative could be traced in the philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas and the ethical recognition of 
the ‘other’ (1998, 2003). However,  although Levinas provides a complement to the Foucauldian ethical 
apparatus of self-making (Lambek 2010a: 25), his transcendental other somewhat misses the fact that, 
more often than not, ethical regard remains resolutely local (Faubion 2011: 90).
way of realizing an ethical self. But perhaps, as Finnegan argues, ‘music is also in some 
sense “special”?’ (1989: 331).
As Blacking remarked some time ago: ‘The effectiveness of music as music, however, 
can only be described accurately  in terms of musical parameters, and associated 
physiological responses of the body’ (1979: 10). But if music in itself is not easily 
conducive to anthropological analysis, is there a way to examine its ethical properties? 
Is it only urban rhythms and repetitive motions in the practice of music that engender 
ethical selves, or musical rhythms too? 
The first thing that emerges from such a question is that, if some music is ethical, then 
definitely there is music that can be unethical. The link between music and violence and 
the unethical uses of sound have been studied (e.g. Goodman 2010; Johnson & Cloonan 
2009), but there is no causal link between sound as such and unethical behaviour. 
Instead, music’s ethical (or unethical) essence should be grounded in its capacity to 
affect:
Like modern poetry, music primarily works on the level of what  Kristeva calls “the 
semiotic”, a non-verbal, pre-signifying and heterogeneous energy. Constructions of 
self and other through music thus rely on signification through the drives of affects, 
sensations and gestures. It  is here that we will try to situate the (un)ethical aspects 
of music, of music as sound. (Musical) sounds act on and penetrate the autonomy 
of the body, the individual ethos; they induce affects in the subject’s body – a body 
which appears to be vulnerable as it  can hardly, if at all, protect itself against 
external sonic influences. This impact is ethical in nature, exactly because it is a 
penetration, positively or negatively, of the subject’s body (Cobussen & Nielsen 
2012: 100, emphasis added).
Therefore, the ethical ‘substance’ of music is to be found not in the biologistic language 
of pulse rates or changes in blood pressure, but at the interface between sound 
vibrations and their somatic impact. Music and sound can create the affective conditions 
within which ethical selves come to be formed. Sounds do not engender ethical selves 
as such, but rather a constellation of affective potentialities from which subjects are 
formed. 
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For Kristeva, whose focus is on poetic language, music as a non-verbal signifying 
system is the outcome of semiosis, although it is the relationship between the semiotic 
and the symbolic that  constitutes subjects and which is intrinsic in any signifying 
process (1984: 24). However, it is the semiotic that always violates and ruptures the 
symbolic: ‘[W]hat  remodels the symbolic order is always the influx of the semiotic’, 
which ‘gives “music” to literature’ (ibid.: 62-63). Thus, it is the ‘musicality’ of poetic 
language that holds the promise of subverting and reformulating literary practice, by 
escaping meaning and signification. 
It is not difficult to envisage how Kristeva’s process of semiosis applies to music when, 
for example, certain dissonant melodies, arrhythmic parts or even pure noise disfigure 
and subvert conventional musical ‘meaning’. These may not signify or articulate an 
intelligible or communicative musical or discursive meaning, but might induce 
profound bodily responses. As DeChaine explains: ‘These sounds don’t mean anything 
to me, which is not to say they don’t affect me’ (2002: 84, emphasis added). 
According to Lucy from Divorce, DiY was not trying to spread a ‘message’. Rather, its 
essence was predicated upon ethics, which in turn harked back to an experience not of 
‘pleasure’, but of jouissance or ‘bliss’. For Barthes who was influenced by Kristeva’s 
ideas, a ‘text of bliss’ is:
[T]he text that imposes a state of loss, the text  that  discomforts (perhaps to the 
point of a certain boredom), unsettle’s the reader’s historical, cultural, 
psychological assumptions, the consistency of his tastes, values, memories, brings 
to a crisis his relation to language (1975: 14).
In borrowing Kristeva’s terms of genotext and phenotext (1984: 86-89), Barthes makes 
elsewhere a further distinction between pheno-song and geno-song. The former:
[C]overs all the phenomena, all the features which belong to the structure of the 
language being sung, the rules of the genre, the coded form of the melisma, the 
composer’s idiolect, the style of the interpretation: in short, everything in the 
performance which is in the service of communication, representation, expression, 
everything which it  is customary to talk about, which forms the tissue of cultural 
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values (the matter of acknowledged tastes, of fashions, of critical commentaries), 
which takes its bearing directly on the ideological alibis of a period (“subjectivity”, 
“expressivity”, “dramaticism”, “personality” of the artist) (Barthes 1977: 182). 
By contrast, geno-song is:
[T]he volume of the singing and speaking voice, the space where significations 
germinate “from within language and in its very materiality”; it  forms a signifying 
play having nothing to do with communication, representation (of feelings), 
expression; it is that  apex (or that  depth) of production where the melody really 
works at the language – not  at what it says, but the voluptuousness of its sounds-
signifiers, of its letters – where melody explores how the language works and 
identifies with that work. It is, in a very simple word but  which must be taken 
seriously, the diction of the language (ibid.: 182-183).
From a perspective of jouissance, it ‘is the body in the voice as it  sings’  (ibid.: 188), 
‘the language lined with flesh...a whole carnal stereophony’ (ibid. 1975: 66). It is this 
‘carnality’ of music and the mind-in-the-body of all music practice (see Frith 1996b: 
128) that exemplify music’s ethical function, as well as how and why certain subjects 
might be musically compelled to undergo a process of ethical cultivation. 
For sure, over time sound elements and musical gestures cease to be semiotic and cross 
the boundary  to the symbolic, where they remain as parts of conventional musical 
meaning. This is what, according to Laing, happened with punk (1985: 130). 
Nevertheless, as semiosis and jouissance, music and the affects it elicits serve as an 
amplifier of ethical subjectivation and as the means to grasp ‘how thoughts feel and 
how feelings think’ (DeChaine 2002: 86). As an affect-inducing entity, musical sound 
‘seems to be an involuntary trigger par excellence’, because it ‘feels more deeply, or at 
least more immediately, than language’ (ibid.: 90-91). Of course, this assumes a prior 
distinction between speech as ‘language’ – a set of rational rules modeled on writing – 
and ‘musical’ speech, which is not always the case (see Ingold 2000: 407-413, 2007: 
6-38). 
To recall Blacking’s words (1979: 8), music offers a ‘special’ mode of bodily 
organization and control. Whether it is associated with ‘docility’ or with the 
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organization of bodies in space, music provides the means for control and is thus linked 
to power. However, as I have shown, for Foucault power relationships emerge because 
of the existence of freedom (1997: 292). After all, ‘docility’ need not necessarily imply 
‘subjection’ (Mahmood 2005). 
Therefore, music can be ‘unethical’ only and insofar as it is used as means of 
subordination – for example, as a sonic weapon (Goodman 2010). In a Foucauldian 
sense, we could say that music is unethical when it is used to enslave. It follows that 
music’s (un)ethical resonance as music does not rest upon its capacity to induce violent 
or anti-social behaviour (usually the argument that lurks behind the moral panic that 
occasionally emerges in association with specific music genres), but  in the way in 
which sound qualities are optimally  suited to affect, that is, to harm the body – to 
deprive it  from its ethical potential. In its ability to facilitate, amplify, mute or inhibit 
subjects from realizing an ethical self, music, like sound, is explicitly linked to ethics. 
Music’s affective and thus (un)ethical potential is intrinsically linked to the way sonic 
events assume and, more specifically, enforce a relationship between sound, the subject, 
and his or her body:
To these unsignified and unsignifiable sonic events – events that cannot  always be 
turned into objects of cognition – the subject cannot not respond; she cannot not 
participate...Beyond or before the activation of semantic or cognitive listening, the 
sonic is a force of contact  that has the seductive power to affect  the body, the skin, 
the brain...Sonic events are felt  and processed as modes of feeling beyond or before 
they are cognized and categorized in schemas of knowledge. Rhythms, frequencies 
and intensities affect  bodies before they are transduced by regimes of signification 
and before they are picked up by human emotions and cognition...The sense of 
music always exceeds whatever is or can be expressed by its means, and it is here 
that we can trace a specific musical or sonic ethics. How music or sound (directly) 
affects the body has (also) ethical implications (Cobussen & Nielsen 2012: 105).
For Cobussen and Nielsen, the bodily effects of music are not ‘subjective’ as they are 
not discursive. As Massumi notes, the body does not only absorb pulses but ‘it infolds 
contexts’ (2002: 30). Sonic effects are grounded in a more distributed notion that 
embeds the subject within a complex of relations:
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Sonic effects are operative in the space between the physical sound environment, 
the sound milieu of a socio-cultural community and the “internal soundscape” of 
every individual. It is these potential effects that  give music its moral or ethical 
dimension and, with that, a certain responsibility. This implies a shift from  a 
concern with what music means to a concern with what it does and how it works 
(Cobussen & Nielsen 2012: 110, emphasis added).
If music gives rise to the body as an affective nexus and permits us to define it through 
its capacity to affect and be affected, then it further highlights the need for a different 
ontology  between sound and subject. Music ‘turns out to be intrinsically and 
unmistakably  relational’, while this relationality  does not follow but precedes corporeal 
autonomy and subjective individuality (ibid.: 113-114). Music, then, through the notion 
of affect, calls for a reconsideration of subjective intentionality  and responsibility, 
which as I have shown in the previous chapter, should be conceived as distributed and 
relational. 
In voicing concerns in relation to the subjective nature of ethics, and in challenging the 
idea of the autonomous body, musical affects present us with a distinctively useful 
analytical tool for exploring the ethical in terms of the musical, and thus for questioning 
some of our basic assumptions with regards to the self, identity and the body. Affects, 
musical or otherwise, being a constitutive dimension of the world that surrounds us, are 
not beyond our ethnographic purview. They belong to the ordinary, to our sense of 
place, to the conjunction between human exteriority and interiority  (which is central to 
the cultivation of an êthos) and to the ‘feel’ of inanimate objects, as recent 
anthropological accounts have demonstrated (e.g. Gray 2011; Navaro-Yashin 2012; 
Stewart 2007; see also Pelkmans 2013). Musical affects are the very stuff of everyday 
life and its ordinary rhythms. As Lefebvre puts it:
Musical rhythm does not only sublimate the aesthetic and a rule of art: it has an 
ethical function. In its relation to the body, to time, to the work, it  illustrates real 
(everyday) life. It  purifies it in the acceptance of catharsis. Finally, and above all, it 
brings compensation for the miseries of everydayness, for its deficiencies and 
failures. Music integrates the functions, the values of Rhythm (Lefebvre 2004: 66).
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Charles Hirschkind describes how the cultivation of shared embodied dispositions and 
sensibilities among his informants required attention not to the propositional meaning of 
sermons but to the qualities and subtle nuances of vocal delivery. As such, listening 
‘well’ meant  ‘listening with the heart’, which involved ‘the body in its entirety, as a 
complex synthesis of patterned moral reflexes’ (2006: 79; cf. Nancy 2007). The self’s 
ethical becoming vis-à-vis sound and music does not rely upon a specific doxa 
unaffected by the aural atmosphere that envelops the subject. Whether we listen with 
our hearts or our bodies, music can never only ‘reflect’. What it does reflect is an 
ongoing process of ethical evolvement based upon emerging practices to suit the 
circumstances at hand. According to Hirschkind, ‘practitioners of a tradition, through 
innovation and adaptation, attempt to cultivate and sustain the sensory condition and 
modes of attention and inattention that make that tradition viable within modern 
contexts’ (2006: 104). In other words, ‘tradition’ is sustained through the continuous 
cultivation, adjustment and alignment of practices in accord with present needs and 
concerns.
Considering how I have analyzed DiY practice in this thesis, it would make no sense to 
refer to it as a form of ‘tradition’. After all, traditions are either readily verifiable by 
harking back to an original ideal or a modern fiction and invention (Hobsbawm & 
Ranger 1983). To take only  one example, reflecting on a successful annual Scottish 
music festival, Stuart  expressed the view that this ‘identical’ repetition was an example 
of ‘bad tradition’, the opposite of what he had envisaged for Cry Parrot as a dynamic 
entity that is constantly  renewed (Chapter 5). Whereas Cry Parrot, and DiY in general, 
could hardly  be described along similar traditionalist  lines, there is a sense in which we 
could perceive it as part of a ‘tradition’. 
Instead of suggesting that the ethical examples on the basis of which DiY practice took 
shape were archetypes to be fully  emulated by  subsequent practitioners, we could define 
tradition as a set of practices and discourses that link the past with the present and 
highlight the pedagogies of practical, discursive and embodied forms of knowledge that 
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inform and sustain this traditional modality into the present (Asad 1986; Mahmood 
2005: 113-117). Thus defined, tradition emerges as a form of engagement with its 
practical and discursive constituents rather than an unchanging structure or a set of 
precepts to be followed. Instead of being ‘a regressive attachment to the past’, in this 
sense tradition is ‘an attitude that valorizes the past as relevant to the task of living in 
the present’ (Hirschkind 2006: 212). 
The orientation of DiY towards the here-and-now but also to the future-in-the-present 
does not  excise the relevance of the past. The meaning of tradition as a repertoire of 
plural and malleable practices and discourses becomes particularly  relevant to an 
anthropology of ethics that is based upon ethical freedom. Foucault is clear when he 
argues that practices of the self are not invented by the subject but represent  ‘models 
that he finds in his culture and are proposed, suggested, imposed upon him by his 
culture, his society  and his social group’ (1997: 291). Talal Asad, Saba Mahmood and 
others have relied on MacIntyre’s (1981, 1988, 1990) conceptualization of tradition in 
order to devise an argument for the salience of the concept in anthropological analysis. 
According to MacIntyre, ‘a living tradition...is a historically  extended, socially 
embodied argument...Traditions, when vital, embody continuities of conflict’ (1981: 
222). 
As Pandian and others have pointed out (2008b; Pandian & Ali 2010), MacIntyre’s 
useful concept and his focus on traditional ‘coherence’ can be adapted in order to 
accommodate ‘fragmentation’, but also to account for the multiple interpenetrations of 
different traditions. Therefore, rather than ‘reconstructing’ tradition from a series of 
disparate practices, Pandian perceives fragments ‘as marking the impossibility of a 
whole and seamless horizon of experience rather than sustaining the possibility  of its 
reconstruction’ (2008b: 470). Moreover, Laidlaw demonstrates how MacIntyre’s 
concept of tradition allows us to observe how ‘in one tradition, beliefs, values, and 
practices from another might be seriously entertained as potentially preferable to its 
own’ (2010c: 66), without necessarily losing its distinctiveness. 
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This exemplifies in DiY the meaning of inhabiting and appropriating norms and 
established practices without evacuating its distinctive ethical potential. It further 
explains why Stuart’s practice could still be called DiY. It also shows that DiY as a set 
of ever evolving practices and as an ongoing debate conjures up not a hegemonic 
tradition but ‘a more mobile, time-sensitive, more open-ended concept than most 
formulations of culture’ (Asad 2006: 289). Thus, what has been glossed as ‘DiY 
culture’ would be better off attending to the inherited and dispersed ethical possibilities 
of ‘tradition’. 
The temporality of tradition and the linkages between past, present and future it fosters, 
illuminate the trans-temporal nature of DiY practice and infuse value to a past not ‘as a 
repository  of finished business’, but as ‘continually active in the present, pressing 
against the future’ (Hallam & Ingold 2007: 11). From an affective standpoint, where the 
distance between bodily sensation and cognitive perception encapsulates the 
coexistence of past traces with incipient potentials or tendencies, the future ‘is 
contemporary  with the past’s contemporaneousness with the present’ (Massumi 2002: 
15). Less complexly and more to the point: ‘Thinking with tradition moves 
anthropology toward a sense of the contemporary moment as rooted in the inherited 
forms of the past but also bearing the seeds of many possible futures’ (Pandian 2008b: 
477).
This idea of tradition provides the means to problematize the notion of ‘authenticity’, 
which is both highly prevalent in popular music discourse and a notoriously obscure 
analytical concept. As I have mentioned in various instances throughout this thesis, my 
informants considered their music and their overall practice in some sense ‘authentic’. 
But what did this mean? For example, Divorce’s lack of identification with a specific 
music genre meant that  the perceived authenticity of their music relied upon its 
‘uniqueness’ or ‘originality’, that is, upon a lack of authenticity in relation to an 
identifiable tradition. 
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The band resisted pigeonholing when journalistic accounts compared them either to 
prominent no wave bands or contemporary noise bands with a similar emphasis on 
rhythm. On a more general level, the band were equally reluctant to associate their 
music with a local ‘sound’ or ‘scene’, although they claimed that there existed local 
bands who believed that they had to sound a certain way because they lived in Glasgow. 
Contrary  to what Cohen (1991) argues about Liverpool bands and their preference of an 
undistorted, clean and ‘authentic’ sound, Divorce’s sound was heavily processed and 
their pedals were all kinds of distortion pedals. But as Attali puts it: ‘What is noise to 
the old order is harmony to the new’ (1985: 35). These forms of authenticity reflect 
different historical periods and approaches to music-making and thus necessitated 
different degrees of engagement with technology. However, the use of technology  and 
authenticity are not mutually exclusive (Frith 1986: 269). 
The embodied ethical dispositions germane to and cultivated through music-making 
raise the question of who, rather than what, is being authenticated (see Moore 2002: 
210). Although Moore examines musical authenticity, here I am interested with 
processes of ethical authentication. After all, authenticity  or ‘truth’ may  be represented 
by cultural forms such as music, but they are not manifested in them (Derrida 1987: 5). 
As Middleton notes, it is the notion of musical appropriation that has survived ‘from the 
debris of ‘‘authenticity’’’ (1990: 139), which is consonant with Frith’s contention that 
authenticity  is utterly misleading and that ‘what we should be examining is not how true 
a piece of music is to something else, but how it sets up the idea of “truth” in the first 
place’ (1987: 137).
Marilyn Strathern notes that ‘there are two common perceptions of this world at large: 
an increasing homogenization of social and cultural forms seems to be accompanied by 
a proliferation of claims to specific authenticities’ (1995: 3). The proliferation of 
authenticity  (Fillitz & Saris 2012) and a preoccupation with defining its meaning 
highlights the very fact of its loss (Lindholm 2006). Trilling (1971) traces the historical 
emergence of this preoccupation through an examination of the virtue of sincerity  which 
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was a necessary component of social life before its dethronement by authenticity. This 
shift represented a parallel shift  from paying attention to how one appears to be to who 
one really is (Lindholm 2006: 4). The modern view of authenticity  highlighted the 
ideals of family, democracy and egalitarianism and also rejected socially  imposed roles 
in favour or self-deliberation and individualism (Berman 2009 [1970]). 
Because authenticity ‘is ascribed, not inscribed’ (Moore 2002: 210), processes of 
authentication are far more conducive to ethnographic observation and interpretation 
than abstract notions of authenticity that hark back to a historical and exemplary 
tradition (Vannini & Williams 2009: 11-12). A backwards authentication usually results 
in the proliferation of simulacra (Baudrillard 1994), rather than authentic objects or 
selves: the more one attempts to authenticate something in reference to an ideal 
archetype, the more likely  it is that this will be a fake or pale imitation (Lindholm 2006: 
20). 
This does not  mean that acts of authentication should be deemed inauthentic. Rather, it 
forcefully demonstrates that the anthropological search for authenticity  should not 
consist of the ‘make-believe’ but ‘the act of believing itself’, that  is, ‘the techniques and 
the resources that people have at their disposal to believe, in the sense of taking things 
to be true’ (van de Port 2004: 8, 10) and in their ‘ability to establish, sense, and live 
through concrete links to the world’ (Baxstrom 2008: 11). As such, authenticity  is a 
process that belongs to the realm of practice. 
As Lindholm puts it, ‘the quest for a felt authentic grounding becomes increasingly 
pressing as certainty is eroded and the boundaries of the real lose their taken-for-granted 
validity’ (2002: 337, emphasis added). van de Port warns us to take processes of 
authentication seriously and to ‘include an account of the continuous human effort that 
goes into manufacturing and maintaining a sense of “authentic grounding”’ (2004: 10). 
In The Ethics of Authenticity (1991), Charles Taylor addresses three modern malaises: 
the losses of meaning, ends and freedom. Central to his consideration is the tenet that 
322
the ‘ideal of authenticity’ is a recent phenomenon, linked to a sense of atomistic 
individualism and instrumental reason. As he goes on to demonstrate, the realization of 
authenticity  always transcends the self, and freedom always challenges ‘the culture of 
narcissism’ or radical-self determination. He explains that ‘[t]he struggle ought not to be 
over authenticity, but about it, defining its proper meaning’, which ‘at its best’ – when it 
expands ethical horizons beyond the self – ‘allows a richer mode of existence’ (Taylor 
1991: 73-74).
I believe that DiY practice goes beyond its reference to an authentic grounding and it 
provides people with a regime of living (Lakoff & Collier 2004). A regime of living 
places emphasis on the quotidian aspects of everyday  life and its multiple 
configurations across different domains and sites. In doing so, it does not set ethical 
discourse and action apart from the mundane dimensions of ordinary  life; it does not 
distinguish between the polis and the oikos. Its particular usefulness lies in its capacity 
to consider different empirical configurations and connect analytical trajectories:
A given regime provides one possible means, and always only one among various 
possible means, for organizing, reasoning about, and living ethically – that is, with 
respect to a specific understanding of the good. Regimes of living have a certain 
systematicity or regularity – like a diet, a medical regimen, or a set of exercises – 
that give them a provisional consistency or coherence. But they do not necessarily 
have the stability or concrete institutionalization of a political regime. Rather, they 
may be conceived as abstract congeries of ethical reasoning and practice that 
emerge in a range of situations, taking diverse actual forms (Lakoff & Collier 
2004: 427).
I see ‘Do-it-Yourself’ as one such regime of living that is not confined to music, and as 
just one ethical answer to the Socratic question: ‘How ought one to live?’ (Williams 
1985). DiY points to an ought that derives from an is, and not  only  vice versa. With 
DiY providing an ethical answer as good as any, it seems to me that instead of 
attempting to discern the possibilities of deriving an ought from an is, we should 
recognize that this is what people around the world do everyday  (Widlok 2004: 66). I 
have no better words to answer this question, therefore I resort to the compelling words 
that, to me, best capture an anthropological answer: 
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Wherever and in so far as people’s conduct  is shaped by attempts to make of 
themselves a certain kind of person, because it is as such a person that, on 
reflection, they think they ought to live, to that extent  their conduct is ethical and 
free. And to the extent  that  they do so with reference to ideals, values, models, 
practices, relationships, and institutions that are amenable to ethnographic study, to 
that extent  their conduct  becomes the subject  matter for an anthropology of ethics 
(Laidlaw 2002: 327). 
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